ORDER This writ petition is filed for a Mandamus to set aside order dated 9.11.2010 of respondent No.2, whereby, he has rejected the appeal filed by the petitioners on the ground that the same was not presented within thirty days from the date of the order passed by respondent No.3. 2. When this writ petition came up for admission on 19.11.2010, this Court adjourned the case to enable the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue to obtain instructions about the date of receipt of the order by the petitioner. 3. At the hearing, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue fairly conceded that the petitioner has received a copy of order dated 4.10.2010 on 12.10.2010 and filed the appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. 4. A perusal of the impugned endorsement shows that respondent No.2 has construed the expression "from the date of the order" under Section 71 (sic. 72) of Registration Act, 1908 (for short 'the Act') in its literal sense instead of understanding the same from a proper perspective, i.e. "from the date of receipt of the order". 5. The Apex Court in D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and another (1) (2003) 6 SCC 186 = 2003 (4) ALT 9 .2 (ON SC), while interpreting Section 48-AA of the Advocates Act, 1961 held that the words "from the date of the order" shall be interpreted in such a way as to carry out the purpose for which the remedy is provided, and making the said remedy meaningful, practical and effective. Unless the petitioner receives the order within the period prescribed for limitation, it s not expected of him to avail the appellate remedy within the period of limitation, if the same is reckoned "from the date of the order" and not "from the date of receipt of the order". Respondent No.2 failed to keep this aspect in mind in indulging in literal construction of the provisions of Section 72 of the Act. 6. For the above mentioned reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. Respondent No.2 is directed to dispose of the appeal on merits within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the appeal from the petitioner, after giving an opportunity of being heard.