Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 1186 (KAR)

State of Karnataka v. Nandish

2010-11-16

K.N.KESHAVANARAYANA, K.SREEDHAR RAO

body2010
JUDGMENT K.N. KESHAVANARAYANA, J.—The respondent/accused took his trial before II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kolar, in S.C. No. 80/2004 for the charges under Sections 498A, 304B of IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The allegations made against the accused was that he married the deceased Manjamma d/o P.W. 13-Krishnappa and P.W. 14 Muni Hanumakka on 20.3.2000. Prior to the marriage, during the negotiations, the accused and his parents demanded dowry in the form of gold ornaments and they were given at the time of marriage. Subsequent to the marriage, the accused went on pestering the deceased to bring money from her parents and when she failed to comply with the said demand, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment. The deceased Manjamma in a bid to commit suicide doused herself with kerosene at about 11.30 a.m. on 19.12.2003 and set herself on fire and subsequently at about 6 p.m. on 26.12.2003 she succumbed to the burn injuries. Thus the death of the deceased was a dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC. 2. The respondent/accused pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against him and claimed to be tried. The prosecution led evidence in support of the charges levelled against the accused. The defence of the accused was one of total denial and that of false implication. According to the accused, during the night on 19.12.2003, after dinner, the deceased and her husband slept in the house by keeping the burning kerosene lamp beside her, since there was power failure and accidentally, the lamp fell down on the floor and the kerosene oil spread on the floor caught fire, as a result of which she sustained burn injuries, to which she succumbed later. Thus, according to the accused, the death of the deceased was an accidental one. 3. After hearing both sides, and on assessment of oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge, by the judgment under appeal came to the conclusion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that prior to the marriage the accused demanded and accepted dowry in any form and subsequent to the marriage, he made further demands for dowry or for any other purpose and on account of the failure on the part of the deceased to comply with the said demand, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment. The learned Sessions Judge also noticed that though the death of the deceased occurred within 3 years from the date of the marriage and the death was due to burns, the evidence on record does not establish that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry soon before her death, therefore, her death cannot be termed as dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC. 4. The learned Sessions Judge placing reliance on the statement made by the deceased before the doctor in Victoria Hospital when she was brought there and also the statement made by the deceased before the police officer as per Ex. P11, came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was accidental and not suicide. In that view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused for any of the charges levelled against him. Consequently, the accused was acquitted of all the charges. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal the State is in appeal. 5. We have heard Sri P.M. Nawaz, learned Addl. S.P.P. and Sri Mohan Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent. We have perused the records, carefully examined the oral as well as documentary evidence and read the judgment under appeal. 6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (i) Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in acquitting the respondent/accused of the charges levelled against him? (ii) Whether the judgment under appeal suffers from perversity or illegality calling for interference by this Court? 7. Having heard both sides and having perused the record, we are of the opinion that the judgment under appeal passed by the learned Sessions does not suffer from any perversity or illegality and that there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment. 8. It is not in dispute that the deceased was married to the accused 3 years prior to her death. It is also not in dispute that the deceased suffered burn injuries during night of 19.12.2003 while she was in the matrimonial home with the accused and later she succumbed to those injuries on 23.12.2003 while taking treatment in Victoria hospital, Bangalore. It is also not in dispute that the deceased suffered burn injuries during night of 19.12.2003 while she was in the matrimonial home with the accused and later she succumbed to those injuries on 23.12.2003 while taking treatment in Victoria hospital, Bangalore. In order to establish the guilt of the accused for the charges levelled against him under Section 3, 4, and 6 of the D.P. Act, the prosecution has relied on the evidence of P.W. 2-brother, P.W. 13 and P.W. 14-parents of the deceased. Reading of the evidence of the material witnesses clearly indicates that the accused was not present at the time of alleged negotiation held prior to the marriage. According to the evidence of P.W. 2, he was not present at the time of negotiation and he was informed as to what transpired during the negotiation by his father. Therefore, he had no personal knowledge about the details of negotiation held prior to the marriage. As such, his evidence has no relevance to find out whether there was any demand or acceptance of dowry prior to or at the time of marriage. The evidence of P.W. 13 and P.W. 14-parents of the deceased clearly indicate that the accused was not present at the time of negotiation and it was only the parents and uncle of the deceased participated in the negotiation. 9. Thus from the evidence on record, it is manifestly clear that the accused did not make any demand for dowry in any form nor he accepted anything. Therefore, the charges levelled against the accused under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the D.P. Act has not been made out by any acceptable evidence. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge in our opinion is justified in holding that the accused is not guilty of the offences punishable under Section 3, 4 and 6 of the D.P. Act. 10. With regard to the charge for the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC is concerned, according to the learned Sessions Judge, though the two ingredients, i.e., the death having occurred within 3 years from the date of the marriage and death having occurred on account of burns are established, the 3rd and important ingredient, that soon before her death, the deceased had been subjected to harassment in connection with dowry has not been established, as such, the prosecution has failed to prove the said charge. The learned Sessions Judge has placed reliance on Ex. P2 MLC register extract from Victoria Hospital and Ex. P11-statement made by the deceased before the Police Officer while she was taking treatment in the hospital which had partaken the characteristic of dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872. As per the evidence of P.W. 10, Police Constable of Victoria Hospital Police Station, while the deceased was taking treatment in Victoria Hospital, the police were informed about the same and the SHO directed him to go to the hospital and to record the statement of the injured Manjamma and accordingly he came to the emergency ward, asked the doctor attending on the injured as to whether the injured is in a position to give statement and the doctor told him that the patient is in a fit condition to give statement, thereafter he proceeded to record the statement of the injured as per Ex. P11. It is also his further say that the doctor made endorsement with regard to the condition of the injured to give statement. He has further deposed that after recording the said statement, the injured affixed her LTM and thereafter he handed over the recorded statement to the head constable. This witness has not been subjected to cross-examination. The contents of Ex. P11 completely exculpate the accused and it indicates that she sustained burn injuries accidentally. 11. According to the contents of Ex. P11 during night of 19.12.2003 after dinner, she and her husband slept in the house by keeping a burning kerosene lamp on the floor by her side, as there was no power supply and during night, the said kerosene lamp fell down, as a result, kerosene spread on the floor, and caught fire. On account of this, the sarry worn by her caught fire and she sustained burn injuries and on hearing the cries her husband who was sleeping by her side tried to put off the fire and immediately she was brought to the hospital at Kolar from where she was shifted to Victoria Hospital, Bangalore. In the statement, she has not indicted any one as responsible for the burn injuries sustained by her nor this statement indicates that she sustained burn injuries in a bid to commit suicide. Therefore, the statement as per Ex. In the statement, she has not indicted any one as responsible for the burn injuries sustained by her nor this statement indicates that she sustained burn injuries in a bid to commit suicide. Therefore, the statement as per Ex. P11 completely negates the case of the prosecution with regard to the offence under Section 304B IPC. In addition to this, Ex. D2-MLC register extract, issued by the Victoria Hospital, Bangalore would also support the contents of Ex. P11. As per Ex. D.2, the patient, viz., the deceased was brought to Victoria Hospital at about 4.25 a.m. on 20.12.2003 and at that time the patient was alert, oriented and conscious and she was in a fit condition to give statement and the injured herself gave the history. According to the history furnished by the injured, she sustained accidental burns when she was sleeping with a kerosene lamp beside her on the floor and the kerosene lamp fell down, as a result the oil from the lamp spread on the floor and caught fire, as a result of which the sarry worn by her caught fire and she sustained burn injuries. Thus the statement made by the injured at the earliest point of time before the doctor clearly indicates that she sustained burn injuries accidentally. This statement do not indicate that the deceased in an attempt to commit suicide doused herself with kerosene and set herself ablaze nor inculpate the accused to any extent. The fact that the deceased made such statement once before the doctor and subsequently before the police official is not disputed by the prosecution. In fact, the prosecution itself produced Ex. P11 and got it marked through P.W. 10. In the light of the contents of Ex. P11 and Ex. D.2, absolutely no case is made out for the offence under Section 304B IPC. 12. In so far as the charge under Section 498A IPC is concerned, the evidence of the brother and parents of the deceased does not in any way establish the said charge also. Even according to the evidence of these witnesses, after marriage, the deceased came to the parental home on couple of occasions and asked for money on the ground that the accused had pledged her ornaments, therefore, she want money to get those articles redeemed. Even according to the evidence of these witnesses, after marriage, the deceased came to the parental home on couple of occasions and asked for money on the ground that the accused had pledged her ornaments, therefore, she want money to get those articles redeemed. No where in their evidences these witnesses have stated that the accused was demanding or coercing the deceased to bring money and on account of her failure, the deceased subjected her to cruelty and harassment. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused. By any stretch of imagination the judgment under appeal can be termed as perverse or as illegal. The judgment under appeal is sound and reasonable having regard to the evidence on record as such it does not call for interference by this Court. 13. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.