ORDER : 1. This petition is directed against order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court whereby the letters patent appeal filed by the respondents in the matter of demolition of the stalls constructed by them was allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing their writ petition was set aside. The operative portion of the order passed by the Division Bench reads as under: “In the premises we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order under appeal as well as all the notice dated 15.11.1995 issued by PRDA to the appellants and direct the PMC to pay a sum of Rs. 2 lacs to each of the appellants as and by way of damages for destruction of their wares on 23.11.1995. We also allow the appellants to reconstruct the stalls on the land in question to the extent of the stalls on the land in question to the extent of the area mentioned above at their own costs and direct the PMC to allow the appellants to remain in such stalls until they are rehabilitated in the new Municipal Market Complex to be set up as envisaged in Development Scheme No. 2 on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in the subject Deeds of Licence. The cost of construction of such stalls shall be adjusted by the appellants from the licence fees to be paid in respect thereof at the first instance.” 2. The respondents were granted licences by the Patna Improvement Trust in 1965 for putting up stalls near Station Road, Patna. In 1995, the respondents filed writ petition against their threatened eviction and demolition of the stalls. The same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, who observed that the respondents do not have any right to continue to occupy the land for which licences were given to them. 3. The Division Bench noted that notice dated 15.11.1995 was issued to the respondents to remove the stalls on or before 30.11.1995 but, even before that date, all the stalls were demolished and held that this action of the concerned authority was totally illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. 3. The Division Bench noted that notice dated 15.11.1995 was issued to the respondents to remove the stalls on or before 30.11.1995 but, even before that date, all the stalls were demolished and held that this action of the concerned authority was totally illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. Some of the observations made by the Division Bench are extracted below: “Although the licences were on daily basis, but in the background of the case it must be understood that the licences could only be put to an end upon the licensees being allotted space in the new Municipal Market Complex which was envisaged to the set up under Development Scheme No. 2 and not before. The predecessor in interest of PRDA as well as its successor is stopped from contending to the contrary. The fact remains that these licensees were no part of the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, no compensation was paid to them. The acquisition was made for their benefit and for the purpose of housing them in a developed market complex. By reason of the acquisition, the acquiring authority Patna Improvement Trust, being the predecessor of PRDA, became the landlord of these allottees in respect of the portion of the acquired built up land. Their tenancy did not come to an end. Being alive of the situation, the Patna Improvement Trust requested these allottees to obtain the allotments upon payment of rent payable by them for the acquired built up land the allottees having paid the same and thereupon having obtained the allotments on the clear understanding that they will ultimately be accommodated in the Municipal Market Complex, facilitated construction of the new Market Complex. Neither the Patna Improvement Trust nor its successor could remove the allottees from their allotments without taking step to construct the new Market Complex. All ingredients of promissory estoppel are clearly present in the instant case. In those circumstances, the construction would be that the notices dated 15.11.1995 are invalid. It would be appropriate to record that no adjudication of alleged outstanding license fees was made, nor the same was demanded and at the same time the evidence of alleged encroachment has been obliterated by PRDA. In those circumstances, the construction would be that the notices dated 15.11.1995 are invalid. It would be appropriate to record that no adjudication of alleged outstanding license fees was made, nor the same was demanded and at the same time the evidence of alleged encroachment has been obliterated by PRDA. It is now well settled in law by reason of a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vannattankandy Ibrayi vs. Kunhabdulla Hajee, (2001) 1 SCC 564 that a tenant is not entitled to squat on the land or build thereon where a building was situate, which has been destructed by natural course, but when the landlord has himself pulled down the building, the same would be different. In the instant case having regard to the fact that the landlord itself pulled down the stalls in question before the right of the appellants to remain therein came to an end, the appellants in law are entitled to squat on the land and should be deemed to be in constructive possession thereof and at the same time entitle to build thereon. We have proceeded on the basis that the appellants were asked to remove themselves from the stalls in question by 30.11.1995 by the notice dated 15.11.1995, but the fact remains that before expiry of 30.11.1995 the stalls were bulldozed and grounded to earth and with that whatever wares of the allottees were lying in those stalls were lost to them forever. This action having no sanctity of law, we wanted to know who decided to bulldoze the stalls in question on 23.11.1995, but apart from the admission given in the counter affidavit filed to the writ petition that it was PRDA who took that decision, have not been able to locate the person acting on behalf of PRDA who actually took the decision in view of total non-cooperation by Mr. Madan Mohan Singh, the then Vice Chairman of PRDA as well as the State Administration. Madan Mohan Singh, the then Vice Chairman of PRDA as well as the State Administration. Accordingly, we are unable to pinpoint the liability of damages to be awarded by us upon the person who purported to wield power of the State or its authority by such dastardly act causing damages to the appellants and are thus constrained to impose such liability upon PRDA as its successor, the PMC, who is at liberty to identify the person/persons, who took the said decision and caused the stalls to be bulldozed, and recover such damages from him/them.” 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. On 1.9.2010, this Court, after hearing the arguments, adjourned the case to enable the learned counsel for the petitioners to seek instructions on the following three options: (1) The petitioners may allot alternative accommodation to respondents nos.1 to 16 within a specified time frame. (2) The petitioners may pay compensation to the respondents in terms of the direction given by the High Court and pass appropriate order after giving them opportunity of hearing. (3) File an affidavit giving an undertaking that all illegal construction within the jurisdiction of Patna Municipal Corporation will be demolished after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the affected persons. 6. On the next date i.e. 17.09.2010, the case was adjourned at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. Today, learned counsel for the petitioners produced a letter dated 17.10.2010 sent to him by the Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation, the relevant portion of which is extracted below: “To exercise the option no. 3 in systematic manner, appellant prays to the Hon'ble Court with respect to the detail guide line and time line, which is needed so that order of the Hon'ble Court can be complied.” 8. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents also produced zerox copy of letter dated 21.09.2010 sent to one of the respondents, Smt. Phulpari Devi by the then Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Patna requiring her to exercise option for an alternative site. Shri Agrawal also stated that similar letters were received by other respondents and all of them exercised option for alternative sites. 9. Shri Agrawal also stated that similar letters were received by other respondents and all of them exercised option for alternative sites. 9. From the letters produced by learned counsel for the parties, it is evident that on the one hand an offer was given to the respondents for alternative sites and on the other hand, the officer concerned has decided to exercise option No. 3 specified in the Court's order dated 1.9.2010 which means that the petitioner No. 1 is not prepared to provide alternative sites to the respondents. 10. In our view, the exercise of third option by petitioner No. 1 does not appear to be bona-fide. If the Municipal Corporation was really interested in demolishing all illegal constructions, nothing prevented it from identifying such constructions and taking appropriate action in accordance with law. For this purpose, neither any guideline is required to be framed by the Court nor any time limit needs to be specified. The State and its agencies/instrumentalities do not require approval of the court for taking action in accordance with law. 11. Be that as it may, we do not find any justification to entertain the request contained in letter dated 17.10.2010. We are further of the view that no useful purpose would be served by adjourning the case and thereby prolong the agony of the respondents, whose property was demolished by the functionaries of the Municipal Corporation in a most arbitrary manner. 12. With the above observation, the special leave petition is dismissed.