JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, J. Heard Mohd. Arif Khan, Senior Advocate and Sri Anurag Narain, Counsel for the respondents. 2. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26.8.2006 passed by the District Judge, Hardoi in S.C.C.Suit No. 4 of 2005, Hardoi Zila Sahkari Bank Limited [ in short referred to as the 'Revisionist-Bank] has preferred this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 3. Draped in brevity, the facts giving rise to the instant revision are that one Smt. Manno Rani Gupta wife of Dr Suresh Chandra Gupta, the initial owner and landlady of House No. 47, Mohalla Boarding House, Hardoi, transferred the disputed house in favour of respondents-plaintiffs through a registered sale deed dated 27.3.2002. Therefore, the respondents-plaintiffs became the landlords of the disputed house. Revisionist-Bank used to transfer the rent payable in the Saving Bank Account No. 7341 of the defendants-respondents every month. A notice to quit was sent by the respondents-plaintiffs to the revisionist-defendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 4.11.2004, which was served upon the revisionist on 5.11.2004. When after expiry of the period indicated in the notice, the premises were not vacated by the revisionist-Bank, the respondents preferred a suit for ejectment of the defendant from the disputed accommodation and also claimed pendent-lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 2588/- per month, if the same has not already been credited in their Saving Bank Account lying in the Revisionist-Bank. 4. The Court below framed the following questions for determination:- 1.Whether the notice to quit is not valid? 2.Whether the notice dated 4.11.2004 stood waived? 3.Whether the tenancy in favour of the defendant is continuing for another term of five years from 5.7.2003? 4.Whether the defendant has acquired the status of statutory tenant on the basis of the principle of holding over of the tenancy? 5.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any other relief? 5. The Court below while deciding the question no.1 came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Central Act of 2002 will prevail over the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954. Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India clearly provides that in such a situation of repugnancy, the law made by the Parliament shall prevail notwithstanding the fact that the earlier law made by the State Legislature had received the assent of the President. Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India clearly provides that in such a situation of repugnancy, the law made by the Parliament shall prevail notwithstanding the fact that the earlier law made by the State Legislature had received the assent of the President. Consequently, the court below held that the provision of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by the Act of 2002 will govern the notice to quit served by the plaintiffs on the defendant. Therefore, 15 days time given in the notice to vacate the disputed accommodation is valid. The court below after giving detailed reasons decreed the suit in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs by the impugned judgment and order dated 26.8.2006 and the Revisionist-Bank was directed to vacant the premises within a month. Hence the Bank has filed the instant Revision. 6. Counsel for the revisionist has argued with vehemence that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. Act No. XXIV of 1954 has its application to the State of U.P. and provides thirty days notice for terminating the tenancy which having not been repealed by Act No. 3 of 2003 and as such the court below erred in holding that 15 days time given in the notice to be valid. 7. It has next been argued that both the Parliament and State legislature are competent to enact laws in respect to the matter enumerated in List III -concurrent list and the laws made by the State unless repealed, has got its application. The Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act 2002 came into force with effect from 31.12.2002. This Act had not repealed Section 106 of U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act whereby the words "fifteen days" were substituted by the words "thirty days" for the purposes of notice. Thus the tenancy which has been held by the Trial Court to be a statutory tenancy from month to month on the principles of holding over cannot be determined by giving fifteen days notice, thereby the notice was invalid and as such the trial court erred in law in decreeing the suit on that basis. 8. Thus the tenancy which has been held by the Trial Court to be a statutory tenancy from month to month on the principles of holding over cannot be determined by giving fifteen days notice, thereby the notice was invalid and as such the trial court erred in law in decreeing the suit on that basis. 8. On behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs, it has been argued that 15 days notice period for termination of tenancy is sufficient after 31.12.2002 i.e. the date form which provisions of Transfer of Property (Amendment ) Act 2002 ( Act No. 3 of 2003) were made applicable. By this amendment, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 was withdrawn and as such the State Amendment made in earlier Section of 106 has also lost its value. By Act No. 3 of 2003, an entirely new 106 Section was substituted in place of earlier section. After this substitution, the State Government has not made any amendment or took any other steps, therefore, 15 days notice period provided under the Central Act would be valid. 9. In the instant case, the notice for determination of tenancy was given on 4.11.2004 i.e. much after the Amending Act No. 3 of 2002, the provisions of which were made applicable with effect from 31.12.2002, and therefore, it cannot be said that 15 days notice of determination of tenancy is invalid. 10. Lastly, it has been argued that the tenant-revisionist cannot claim any benefit under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act as three conditions as enumerated under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act entails that Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply only if there is a written agreement. In the present case, admittedly, agreement was said to be for 5 years but was unregistered and in view of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, such unregistered deed of more than one year, has got no value. Therefore, in absence of valid written agreement, Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be attracted. 11. Before dealing with the question involved in the instant revision as to whether substituted Section 106 as substituted by Act No. 3 of 2003 will prevail over the State Amendment made under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by U.P. Act NO. 11. Before dealing with the question involved in the instant revision as to whether substituted Section 106 as substituted by Act No. 3 of 2003 will prevail over the State Amendment made under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by U.P. Act NO. 24 of 1954 or not, it would be apt to reproduce Section 106 prior to its substitution and after substitution alongwith other provisions. 12. Section 106 prior to its substitution reads as under:- "106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage:- In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the part who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or ( if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.". By an State amendment i.e by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 the words " fifteen days" notice occurring in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were substituted by the words " thirty days". 13. A perusal of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act discloses that there is no specific form prescribed for giving notice. What is required under law is that notice should be of 30 days. It should be in writing and it should be signed by the person giving the notice. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. State, in cases of lease from month to month, provides that the lease shall be terminable by thirty days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. 14. It should be in writing and it should be signed by the person giving the notice. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. State, in cases of lease from month to month, provides that the lease shall be terminable by thirty days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. 14. Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 was enacted with the following objects and reasons:- "Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, inter- alia, provides that the lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, which may be terminated either by the lessor or the lessee by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy; and a lease of the immovable property for any other shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, which may be terminated either by the lessor or lessee by fifteen days' notice expiring by the end of the month of the tenancy. The legal position, which has also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mangilal v. I Sugan Chand, AIR 1965 101,104, is that while computing the period of notice the day on which the notice is served is required to be excluded. The Law Commission of India in its 181st Report on Amendment to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has examined the working of this section and found that a number of suits have been filed in ignorance of this legal position and these suits have been dismissed on this lone technicality. Such a position leads to serving of a fresh notice and filing of a fresh suit which amounts not only to serious injustice but also to multiplicity of litigations despite the fact that the defendant had more time available to him than the prescribed period of notice by the date when the suit is filed to evict him or even by the date of judgment dismissing the suit. 2. Hence, it is proposed that the period of notice shall commence from the date of its receipt and the amendment shall apply to the pending suits or proceedings and notices issued before the commencement of the proposed amendment. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid object. 15. 2. Hence, it is proposed that the period of notice shall commence from the date of its receipt and the amendment shall apply to the pending suits or proceedings and notices issued before the commencement of the proposed amendment. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid object. 15. After substitution by Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act No. 3 of 2003), Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as under:- Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage:-(1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to years, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section(1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice. (3) A notice under sub-section(1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section. (4)Every notice under sub-section(1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.]" 16. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision, whereas when it is said that one law is repugnant to another law, all that is meant is that the two laws are inconsistent with each other. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision, whereas when it is said that one law is repugnant to another law, all that is meant is that the two laws are inconsistent with each other. Repugnancy between the statutes may be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles:- (1)Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (2)Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (3)Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field. 17. It is an undisputed fact that by Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 the entire 106 Section occurring in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been substituted by a new Section. The court below held that the period as prescribed by the Amendment Act, 2002 will govern the notice to quit and not the period of thirty days as prescribed in U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 by State Amendment. This view has been attacked on the ground that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 have not been omitted by the Central Act of 2002 and as such the same will continue to apply as far as the period of notice is concerned. In case of any conflict therefor the constitutional scheme contained in Article 254 will have to be applied. Therefore, the argument advanced by the Revisionist is to be analysed in light of Article 254 of the Constitution and the legal position. Article 254 reads as under:- "Inconsistency between laws made by parliament and laws made by the Legislature of States - (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2)Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State. Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. 18. Article 254(1) lays down a general rule. Clause (2) is an exception to that Article and the proviso qualifies the exception. If there is repugnancy between the law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to same field, the law made by Parliament shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the law made by the State shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. A State law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together. For example, where both prescribed punishment for the same offense but the punishment differs in degree or kind or in the procedure prescribed. In all such cases the law made by the Parliament shall prevail over the State law in view of Article 254. 19. Under Article 254 of the Constitution, only in the following circumstances question of repugnancy comes (i) when there is direct conflict between the two provisions. This may happen - (a) Where one cannot be obeyed without disobeying the other (b) two enactments may also be inconsistent although obedience to each of them may be possible without disobeying the other. 20. Presumably, the Parliament with a view to introduce a uniform law throughout the country avoiding defect found in practice passed the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002. This object would be frustrated if the argument that both the U.P. Act No. No.24 of 1954 and the Amending Act, 2002 should co-exist as the U.P. Act No. of 1954 has not been omitted. This object would be frustrated if the argument that both the U.P. Act No. No.24 of 1954 and the Amending Act, 2002 should co-exist as the U.P. Act No. of 1954 has not been omitted. By State Amendment i.e. U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 the period of notice of "fifteen days" as prescribed in Section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act was substituted by the words "thirty days" but by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 the entire 106 Section occurring in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been substituted by a new Section prescribing therein the period of notice as fifteen days. Therefore, in view of the settled law, the Central Amendment Act would prevail over the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954. 21. It may also be noted that though the notice to quit was sent by the respondents to the revisionist on 4.11.2004 providing 15 days time to vacate the premises but, admittedly, the suit was instituted by the revisionists in the year 2005, which is admittedly, much after 15 days time, provided in the notice. 22. Even otherwise as sub-Section 3 of Section 106 has been brought on the statute book by means of Amendment Act, 2002, it specifically provides that the notice under sub-Section 3 of Section 106 of the Act shall not deem to be not valid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section. Thus by fixation of law, proceedings cannot be vitiated on the ground of defective notice. 23. In a case reported in AIR 1975 SC 164 Boucher Pierre Andre versus Supdt. Central Jail, their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where a legal fiction is created, full effect must be given to it and it should be carried to its logical conclusion (para 3). 24. In (1997)1 SCC 650 Gajraj Singh and others versus State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, after considering a number of earlier cases, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "22........................Legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality and which the law recognises and the court accepts as a reality. Therefore, in case of legal fiction the court believes something to exist which in reality does not exist. Therefore, in case of legal fiction the court believes something to exist which in reality does not exist. It is nothing but a presumption of the existence of the state of affairs which in actuality is non-existent. The effect of such a legal fiction is that a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under the circumstances." 25. Aforesaid proposition of law has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases reported in (2004)6 SCC 59 State of West Bengal versus Sadan K. Bormal, (2005)3 SCC 161 State of A.P. versus Pensioner's Association, (2000)2 SCC 699 State of Maharashtra versus Laljit Rajshi Shah, (2008) 5 SCC 257 UCO Bank versus Rajinder Lal Kapoor. 26. In view of the above discussions, the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1954 cannot be allowed to operate only because it has received the Presidential assent when the entire provision of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been substituted in question is directly in conflict with the Central Act. 27. In the backdrop of the aforesaid circumstances, the view taken by the District Judges while deciding the Suit is wholly correct and is hereby approved. The Civil Revision is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.