JUDGMENT 1. The State is in appeal against acquittal of the Respondent in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 7 read with 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The corresponding judgment passed on 18.10.1996 by Special Judge (under the Act) at Seoni in Special Criminal Case No. 3/96 is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. 2. At the relevant point of time, the Respondent was posted as Assistant Commissioner (Tribal Development), Seoni whereas the complainant Alam Singh Dhurve, appointed as Lower Division Clerk in the High School, Dhutera, was attached to his office. 3. The prosecution case, in short, may be stated thus On 09.08.1995, the Respondent transferred the complainant to the office of District Panchayat at Vinjhawada. Not inclined to work at Vinjhawada due to personal difficulties, on 12.08.1995, the complainant made a representation against the transfer but the Respondent not only insisted upon him to join the new assignment but also stopped payment of salary. However, when the complainant again requested him to cancel the transfer as well as to release the salary for the months of July and August, 1995, the Respondent demanded a sum of Rs. 1000/-as illegal gratification for the purpose. As the complainant was not willing to pay the bribe, he, on 7/9/1995, made a complaint (Ex.P/1) to K.N. Dubey, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police (Lokayukta), Jabalpur, who was camping at Seoni only. After observing necessary pre-raid formalities, a trap was organized on the same day. At about 6.30 p.m., the complainant entered the office; passed the currency notes smeared with phenolphthalein to the Respondent and immediately thereafter, gave a pre-planned signal to the raiding party headed by Inspector M.T. Beg. The Inspector along with other members of the party then entered the office; apprehended the Respondent and recovered the tainted money from the right pocket of Respondent's trouser. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted before the Special Court at Seoni against the Respondent with the sanction of the State Government under Section 19 of the Act. 4. The Respondent pleaded false implication and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge, vide order dated 19/8/1996, directed issuance of process to all the prosecution witnesses. However, on 10/10/1996, considering the non-supportive evidence of the complainant, the public prosecutor of the case closed the evidence. 5. 4. The Respondent pleaded false implication and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge, vide order dated 19/8/1996, directed issuance of process to all the prosecution witnesses. However, on 10/10/1996, considering the non-supportive evidence of the complainant, the public prosecutor of the case closed the evidence. 5. Observing that it was not a case of no evidence, learned trial Judge proceeded to examine the Respondent, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code'). But, after hearing the arguments, he recorded the impugned finding of not guilty for the following reasons (i) Even though the complainant Alam Singh (PW1) reiterated the allegation as to demand for a sum of Rs. 1000/-as illegal gratification for cancellation of his transfer and release of the salary yet, he completely denied the remaining version as contained in the complaint (Ex.P/1). (ii) Alam Singh also did not support the prosecution story relating to his participation in the trap proceedings. (iii) Details of the trap as recorded in the documents (Ex.P/3 to Ex.P/7) were not proved by examining Inspector M.T. Beg and other members of the trap party. (iv) Alam Singh clearly admitted that Collector and not the Respondent had the power to cancel his attachment & further that he had already received the pay for the month of Aug., 1995. (v) As neither demand for bribe nor payment thereof was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the statutory presumption engrafted in Section 20 of the Act was not attracted to the facts of the case. 6. Learned Special Public Prosecutor has strenuously contended that the order of acquittal is not sustainable in law as, apparently, it is the obvious consequence of dereliction of duty on the part of the Public Prosecutor as well as an indifferent approach of learned trial Judge. Our attention has been invited to the decision of the Apex Court in Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) (1980) 2 SCC 390 wherein the well settled principle was reaffirmed that even in case of non-supportive evidence of the complainant, conviction may be recorded if the evidence of the police officers who led the trap is found to be above reproach or suspicion or interestedness. Making extensive reference to the relevant guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158 , he further contended that it was also the duty of the Court to ensure that there might not be miscarriage of justice due to non-production of the material evidence by the prosecution. 7. In response, learned Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the prosecution agency can not be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. According to him, it was at the instance of the public prosecutor in-charge of the case that the prosecution evidence was closed and even on the next date fixed for examination of the accused, learned prosecutor did not make any application for calling the remaining prosecution witnesses. Adverting us to decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Gangrade v. State of M.P. ( 1997 (1) JLJ 298 ), he has contended that the prosecution was bound by statement of the complainant, who was not declared hostile. He is also of the view that it would not be in the interest of justice to put the Respondent on trial once again after a lapse of more than 15 years. 8. However, fact of the matter is that the acquittal of the Respondent is primarily based on non-production of material witnesses as to trap organized in pursuance of the complaint (Ex.P/1) admittedly written and signed by Alam Singh (PW1). In this regard, the following illuminating observation made by Jenkins C.J. nearly a century ago in Ram Ranjan R. v. Emperor, ILR 42 Cal 422 : AIR 1915 Cal 545 may usefully be quoted - the purpose of a criminal trial is not to support at all costs a theory but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and the duty of a public prosecutor is to represent the administration of justice so that the testimony of all the available eye-witnesses should be before the Court. (Quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 51 ). Accordingly, all the witnesses essential to the unfolding of narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution, whether effect of their testimony is for or against the case of the prosecution. 9. (Quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 SC 51 ). Accordingly, all the witnesses essential to the unfolding of narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution, whether effect of their testimony is for or against the case of the prosecution. 9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, it may be seen that the prosecutor-in-charge of the case had not only failed to seek permission from the Court to cross-examine Alam Singh who had resiled from the recitals of the complaint but also proceeded to close the evidence in complete ignorance of the law on the subject as explained in Hazarilal's case (supra). 10. The conventional concept that the Court should not permit lacuna in the prosecution evidence to be filled up is to be examined in the light of what has been said in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, Delhi AIR 1999 SC 2292 , though in a different context. Accordingly, lacuna in prosecution is not to be equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by the Public Prosecutor during trial, either in producing relevant material or in eliciting relevant answers from the witnesses. After all, function of criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or find out and declare who among the parties performed better. Furthermore, as observed by the Apex Court in Zahira Habibulla's case (above) The courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. .... ........................................................................... Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that the ultimate objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness. .......................................................................................................................................................................... The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness. .......................................................................................................................................................................... It is as much the duty of the prosecutor as of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on record so that there might not be miscarriage of justice. 11. We are conscious of the fact that the acquittal in question was recorded on 18.10.1996. Still, in the light of factual scenario as highlighted above and the well-settled legal position covering the issues involved, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order of acquittal, based on an unfair trial, deserves to be set aside as being illegal and improper. Hence, there is no option left but to remit the case for completion of trial in accordance with law. Let it be clarified that we are not ordering a de novo trial. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the acquittal under challenge and remit the case to the trial court for disposal according to law. However, it is made clear that learned trial Judge would only be required to (i) call all the remaining prosecution witnesses; (ii) examine the Respondent under Section 313 of the Code with reference to the incriminating evidence brought on record; (iii) to call upon the accused-Respondent to enter on his defence and (iv) to give a fresh judgment after affording opportunity of advancing arguments to both the parties. All this exercise shall be undertaken as far as practicable within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment along with record of the case. 13. The Respondent is on bail. He is directed to remain present before the trial Court on 12th of January 2011 at 11:00 am positively.