Judgment :- J.S. Khehar, C.J. A number of writ petitions seeking to assail two orders passed by the State government dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 have been clubbed together for disposal. By the aforesaid two orders, the State government has prohibited the export of iron-ore from 10 ports located in Karnataka. The State government, in order to give effect to its aforesaid determination, has not been issuing mining dispatch permits for transport of iron-ore meant for export. Accordingly, Writ petitions No.24103 of 2010 (M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25291 of 2010 (Kariganuru Minerals v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25290 of 2010 (M/s. S.B. Minerals v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25288 of 2010 (Kumarswamy Mineral v. State of Karnataka & Others), 25268 of 2010 (Veerabhadrappa Sangappa and Co., v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24532 of 2010 (M/s. Deccan Mining Syndicate Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24529 of 2010 (M/s. Lakshminarayana Mining Company v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24493 of 2010 (M/s. Hothur Traders v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24490-24491 of 2010 (M/s. Mineral Enterprises Ltd., State of Karnataka & Others); 24485 of 2010 (H.G. Rangangoud v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24482 of 2010 (M/s. Shree Gavisiddeshwara Minerals v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24481 of 2010 (M/s. Bharath Mines and Minerals v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24105 of 2010 (M/s. Zeenath Transport v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24104 of 2010 (R. Praveen Chandra v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24062 of 2010 (M/s. Sesa Goa Limited v. State of Karnataka & Others); 22945 of 2010 (M/s. V.S.L. Mining Co., Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others); 24530-24531 of 2010 (Lakshmi Narayana Mining Company Pvt. Ltd., and another v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25070-25071 of 2010 (Balaji Mines and Minerals Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25640 of 2010 (M/s. P. Balasubba Shetty and sons v. State of Karnataka & Others); 25827 of 2010 (M/s. MSPL Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others) 26221 of 2010 (M/s. Suggalamma Gudda Mining and Co., v. State of Karnataka & Others); 26222 of 2010 (M/s. Vibhutigudda Mines Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others); and 26223 of 2010 (M/s. Vibhutigudda Mines Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka & Others) have been filed. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the rival parties, in all the aforesaid writ petitions agreed, that Writ Petition No.24103 of 2010 should be treated as the main case. Accordingly, the factual matrix of the controversy has mainly been recorded on the basis of the pleadings contained in W.P.No.24103 of 2010, additional facts were also recorded from some other petitions as well, when learned counsel invited our attention to some factual aspects therefrom. Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 2. M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons, the petitioner in W.P.No.24103 of 2010, claims to be engaged in the activity of mining since 1956. M/s. V.S. Lad and Sons, which is a partnership firm, asserts that it holds Mining Lease No.2290 in the State of Karnataka. In order to substantiate, that its activities are carried out in the most professional manner, it is asserted, that the petitioner firm was conferred with several mines awards for safety. In this behalf, it is sought to be pointed out, that the Indian Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Mines, Government of India has commended it for “Overall performance”, “Afforestation”, “Dust Suppression Arrangement”, “Top Soil Management”, “Waster Dump Management”, “Drilling and Blasting”, “Environment Control and Dust Separation” by conferring awards on the petitioner. A prestigious award i.e. CAPEXIL, was bestowed on the petitioner firm by the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, in recognition of its outstanding performance in the activity of iron-ore export during the year 2005-2006. It is also the case of the petitioner firm, that one of its Managing Partner has received the ‘Rashtriya Ratan’ award in 2007, from the Global Economic Council, New Delhi, and has also received the ‘Udyog Ratan’ award from the Institute of Economic Studies, New Delhi. It is therefore the case of the petitioner firm, that it is carrying out all its activities in the most scientific and transparent manner, for which it has repeatedly won acclaims. It is accordingly sought to be canvassed, that the petitioner firm cannot be clubbed together with others involved in the nefarious activity of exporting illegally mined iron-ore. 3. Having invited this court’s attention to the reputation and status of the petitioner firm, it is also pointed out that the export activities with which the petitioner firm is engaged, is earning an enormous amount of foreign exchange for the country. 3. Having invited this court’s attention to the reputation and status of the petitioner firm, it is also pointed out that the export activities with which the petitioner firm is engaged, is earning an enormous amount of foreign exchange for the country. For the period from April 2003 to December 2008, the petitioner firm claims to have earned foreign exchange from its business of iron-ore export to the tune of U.S.$ 359, 584, 450.88. Besides earning enormous foreign exchange for the country, it is also asserted, that the petitioner’s activities earn the Government substantial revenue. The petitioner firm, for the same period, claims to have paid Rs.272,330,410/- towards geological permits and forest way permits; Rs.988,174,275/- towards VAT, CST, KTEG and service tax; Rs.2,188,581,229/- towards income tax and FBT; Rs.4,922,783,266/- towards railway freight; and Rs.212,747/- towards professional tax. The petitioner firm also claims to have incurred voluntary expenses to the tune of Rs.92,763,673/- towards environment protection. It is therefore submitted, that from April 2003 up to December 2008, the petitioner’s activities have been responsible for earning foreign exchange to the tune of U.S.$ 359,584,450.88 and has earned revenue for different Governmental agencies in the country to the tune of Rs.8,464,845,400/-. It is therefore, sought to be pointed out, that by impairing the activities of the petitioner firm besides having an adverse impact on the petitioner’s business, would also seriously affect the nation by way of losses in foreign exchange earnings, as also to revenue earnings. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner, that the petitioner firm has been providing both direct and indirect employment in the State of Karnataka. In this behalf, it is the case of the petitioner firm, that it has engaged more than 1,000 employees for its mining activity including mine safety. Besides the aforesaid employees, it is claimed, that the petitioner firm indirectly provides employment to approximately 2,000 workmen comprising of truck drivers, cleaners, loaders and other staff. It is accordingly the case of the petitioner firm, that any action stalling the activity with which the petitioner firm is engaged, has a direct bearing to the employment or un-employment of approximately 3,000 persons. It is accordingly the case of the petitioner firm, that any action stalling the activity with which the petitioner firm is engaged, has a direct bearing to the employment or un-employment of approximately 3,000 persons. It is, therefore, sought to be asserted, that stalling the activities of the petitioner firm has a direct impact on approximately 15,000 people on the assumption that each employed individual by way of average takes care of four other family members besides himself (including his wife, children and parents). Based on the aforesaid statistics, it is sought to be asserted, that any action stopping the activities of the petitioner firm would result in the deprivation of earnings utilized for the welfare of at least 15,000 people. Given the fact that the petitioner firm is just one amongst many affected by the impugned ban on export of iron-ore, it is submitted, that the impugned orders have a direct bearing, on the bread and butter of 10-15 lakh people. It is therefore sought to be asserted, that extreme care and caution deserves to be exercised before orders of the nature, which are the subject matter of challenge at the hands of the petitioners, are passed. Such orders, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, should not be passed merely because unsubstantiated rumours have been spread in the public, or because a few questions have been raised on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, that illegally mined iron-ore is being exported from Karnataka. 5. Insofar as the personal loss of the petitioner firm is concerned, it is submitted, that with the ban on export of iron-ore, the petitioner has been coerced and forced to sell its iron-ore in the domestic market. Since surplus iron-ore has become available within the State, it is pointed out, that the resultant effect is, that the sale price of iron-ore is being controlled by, steel and other allied industries located in Karnataka. These industries have been in a position to, substantially bring down the price of iron-ore, which has in turn resulted in substantial financial loss to the petitioner firm. It is also the case of the petitioner firm, that all qualities of iron-ore being exported from the State of Karnataka cannot presently be utilized within the State of Karnataka on account of non-availability of required technology and infrastructure. It is also the case of the petitioner firm, that all qualities of iron-ore being exported from the State of Karnataka cannot presently be utilized within the State of Karnataka on account of non-availability of required technology and infrastructure. This, according to the petitioner, will result in colossal waste of stocks of iron-ore which have already been mined. 6. Besides the factual position noticed hereinabove, learned counsel for the petitioners in M/s. Sesa Goa Limited vs. State of Karnataka and others (W.P.No.20462 of 2010) desired us to take into consideration facts personal to M/s. Sesa Goa Limited, as well. It is sought to be pointed out on behalf of M/s/. Sesa Goa Limited, that it is the largest iron-ore exporter in the private sector in India. It is also asserted, that the company is engaged in mining activities in the Union Territory of Goa and in the State of Orissa (besides its mining related activities in the State of Karnataka). M/s. Sesa Goa has been granted a lease over 116.15 hectares of land in (Madakeripura and other villages in Holalkere and Chitradurga Taluks in Chitradurga District) through Mining Lease No.2236, in the State of Karnataka. The aforesaid lease, according to learned counsel, is to expire on 28.10.2012. The petitioner company has been recognized as a 100% export-oriented unit in respect of the aforesaid mining lease. It is submitted, that as recently as on 15.05.2009, the petitioner company informed the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, about the enhancement of its production capacity from 2.5 metric tones to 6.0 metric tones per year. It is also the case of the petitioners, that the mines comprised under Mining Lease No.2236 have been certified in three international standards, i.e. ISO 9002, ISO 14001 and OHSAS-18001. It is submitted, that the M/s. Sesa Goa limited is the first company in the country, to maintain such high standards. On the pointed issue of illegal mining, it is asserted that the company has invested in computerization of its operations, by using the Enterprises Resources Planning (ERP) package. Its mine planning activities, are carried out by using another software package – SURPAC. SURPAC, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner is considered as a world leader in mine planning software. The movement of saleable ore is monitored and tracked using RFIDs fixed to transport trucks. Its mine planning activities, are carried out by using another software package – SURPAC. SURPAC, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner is considered as a world leader in mine planning software. The movement of saleable ore is monitored and tracked using RFIDs fixed to transport trucks. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner is also very seriously engaged in environmental care, as well as, in social development and infrastructure improvement activities. In this behalf it is pointed out, that the company has been planting over one lakh trees every year, as a part of its afforestation activities. In addition, a branch of the petitioner company titled as “Integrated Bio-technological Approach for Mine Land Reclamation” is engaged in an in-house programme in collaboration with NEERI, Nagpur, Department of Bio-Technology, Government of India and the University of LUND, Sweden. In the immediate vicinity of its mining activities, the petitioner company’s, Karnataka Unit in Chitradurga District, is engaged in assisting all the 1,700 families (from the five surrounding villages) in improving their crop outputs and farm yields, by facilitating suitable commercial plantation in collaboration with the State Agricultural University, Dharwad. It is asserted, that the petitioner company has also invested more than Rs.100 crore in Karnataka, and is committed to still further investments (towards machinery, equipment and infrastructure required) to support its mining activities. The petitioner company’s activities in the State of Karnataka, it is submitted, involve the direct and indirect engagement of 5,000 people, and as such, impairment in the activities of the petitioner company would directly affect the life and livelihood of more than 5,000 families, i.e., approximately 25,000 individuals. Insofar as the mining activity of the petitioner company is concerned, it is submitted, that its exports to the extent of 87% are of iron-ore “Fines”, whereas, the remaining 13% is “Lumpy” ore. Insofar as iron-ore “Fines” are concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner asserts, that there is only one unit in the State of Karnataka which can process iron-ore “Fines”, and as such, contends that, in the process of mining iron-ore, if the option is between either wasting iron-ore “Fines” or exporting them to foreign countries for earning valuable foreign exchange, the only option which any reasonable person would exercise is, to earn profits for the country. It is submitted, that in processing of the iron-ore “Fines”, coke is an essential requirement, but India being deficit in coke, the only option for India (if it desires to process iron-ore “Fines”) is to first earn foreign exchange (by sale of iron-ore “Fines”) and to purchase coke with the foreign exchange earned, so as to be able to process iron-ore “Fines” within the country. 7. Through the factual position expressed above, it is sought to be highlighted by the petitioners, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 have far reaching implications adversely affecting not only the petitioners, but also, the foreign exchange earnings, as also, the revenue earnings to the government and its agencies. The said adverse effects extend to those whose employment is directly and indirectly dependent on mining related activities in the State, also, to their respective families. It is also highlighted, that most of the iron ore being exported is of a kind which cannot be (processed in the country, and yet is being sold so as to earn profits for the country. All the petitioners also claim to be engaged in social as well as environmental upliftment of the State and the country. All the aforesaid, besides allied and consequential progressive activities have been adversely affected by the impugned orders. Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents: 8. Just in the same manner as the learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to certain introductory facts depicting the cause and effect of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, similarly the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 5 also prefaced his submissions by taking us through the foundational basis, which prompted the State Government, to issue the impugned orders. In this behalf, it is the assertion of the learned counsel for the respondents, that there was a spurt of demand for iron-ore in the global market from the year 2001 onwards. This came about as a consequence of increase in the price of iron-ore, wherein China emerged as the major global consumer of iron-ore. In the foot-steps of the demand of iron-ore, emerged the illegal activity of exploitation of iron-ore in the State of Karnataka. This came about as a consequence of increase in the price of iron-ore, wherein China emerged as the major global consumer of iron-ore. In the foot-steps of the demand of iron-ore, emerged the illegal activity of exploitation of iron-ore in the State of Karnataka. A chart depicting the production of iron-ore in Karnataka (which was reproduced in paragraph 3, of the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondent nos.1 to 5) is being extracted hereunder: “Following is the statement showing the production of Iron Ore in Karnataka & Exports outside the limits of India. Sl.No Yearwise Domestic Consumption Exports Total Quantity 1 2005-06 10 MNT 33 MNT 43 MNT 2 2006-07 11 MNT 23 MNT 34 MNT 3 2007-08 18 MNT 26 MNT 44 MNT 4 2008-09 22 MNT 23 MNT 45 MNT 5 2009-10 31 MNT 18 MNT 49 MNT In order to curb the activity of illegal mining of iron-ore, which was making in-roads in Karnataka, the State government as far back as in the year 2003, through a notification dated 15.03.2003, de-reserved for private mining, an area of 11,620 sq.kms. The State government also notified the surrender of an area of 6,832.48 hectares of prime iron-ore bearing lands. The action of the Government for distribution of mining licenses to a select few private individuals, without regard to their professional, technical or business background was seen by the general public as a covert act so as to benefit only a select few individuals/organizations, whereas the main objective behind de-reservation was to encourage mining based industries and to create more employment opportunities in the private sector. Illegal mining, followed the lucrative profitability connected therewith. The general public perception also was, that transportation facilities were being exploited to carry out the activity of illegal mining. Temporary transportation permits were issued to lift and transport iron-ore from patta lands. Transportation of illegal mined iron-ore was allowed out of forest areas on the basis of forest passes/transportation permits. Even the Transporters Associations/Unions were aggrieved with the activity of over-loading of transport vehicles. It was alleged by the Associations/Unions, that illegal gratification was sought by the transport authorities from truck-owners for allowing over-loading iron-ore. But, it was pointed out, that overloading had caused extensive damage to roads used for transporting iron-ore. 9. Even the Transporters Associations/Unions were aggrieved with the activity of over-loading of transport vehicles. It was alleged by the Associations/Unions, that illegal gratification was sought by the transport authorities from truck-owners for allowing over-loading iron-ore. But, it was pointed out, that overloading had caused extensive damage to roads used for transporting iron-ore. 9. The cumulative effect of illegal mining of iron-ore, as also, illegal transportation of such iron-ore, led to an extensive debate on the floor of both houses of the State Legislatures, in Karnataka. During the course of aforesaid debates, it was alleged, that large scale illegalities and irregularities had resulted in enormous revenue loss to the State exchequer, besides plundering of State’s mineral wealth. On 30.03.2010, the Department of Forest, Uttar Kannada, Karwar, seized 8,05,991 metric tones of iron-ore unauthorizedly transported and illegally stored, without any legal or valid documents. The seized iron-ore was intended to be exported outside India at Belekeri Port area. Another similar of 1,15,399 metric tones of iron-ore was made in the Karwar Port area, on the same day ie., on 30.03.2010. It also came to light from media reports, that 6,00,000 metric tones of iron-ore had been clandestinely removed from the Belekeri Port, and another, 65,409 metric tones of iron-ore had been clandestinely removed from Karwar Port. The Chief Minister of Karnataka, accordingly made a statement, that he would ensure the highest level of fairness and probity, as also, ordered an impartial enquiry into the illegal mining related activities in Karnataka. 10. It would be relevant to mention, that the first of such investigations was sought to be carried-out in the State of Karnataka, by appointing a former Chief Justice (Hon’ble Mr. Justice U.L. Bhat) of Madhya Pradesh, as a one-man Commission, to probe into the allegations of wide spread and unabated illegal mining and unauthorized transportation of iron-ore from government revenue and forest lands. Thereafter two Government orders dated 12.03.2007 and 09.09.2007 were issued in exercise of powers conferred u/s. 7(2A) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Lokayukta Act) for investigation into the afore-stated, matters and for submission of a report with specific recommendations. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate General, that the Karnataka Lokayukta, (Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde), a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, submitted his first interim report to the Government on 18.12.2008. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate General, that the Karnataka Lokayukta, (Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde), a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, submitted his first interim report to the Government on 18.12.2008. The aforesaid interim report (appended to the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5, as Annexure-R-1) highlighted various aspects of the activities of iron-ore mining. 11. In the interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta, in so far as the economics of mining iron-ore in Karnataka is concerned, it was sought to be concluded, that one metric tonne of iron-ore brings in a revenue of Rs.16/- to Rs.27/- to the State of Karnataka (by way of royalty). The interim report, reveals that the total cost of extraction of one tonne of iron-ore works to around Rs.300/-. As against the aforesaid, it was pointed out, that during the peak years 2004 and 2006, the export price of one metric tonne of iron-ore was in the range of Rs.6,000/- to Rs.7,000/-. Even in lean periods, (as per the Karnataka Lokayukta’s interim report) the export price of iron-ore per metric tonne was between Rs.1,500/- to Rs.2,000/-. Keeping in mind the sale price of iron-ore per metric tonne at Rs.5,000/-, it was sought to be calculated, that the iron-ore mining community in Karnataka earned approximately Rs.60,000/- crores, on account of having mined about 120 million tones of iron-ore, during the year 2007-2008. In so far as the domestic market is concerned, the statement of objections filed by respondents 1 to 5 shows, a profit of Rs.15,000/- crores. It is pointed out, that there is no trade or business or commerce in the world which can give such a huge profitability. 12. The interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta dated 18.12.2008 also reveals, that the mining lease holders, besides others, had been carrying out illegal mining of iron-ore by making encroachments into lands beyond the mining area expressed in the respective lease deeds. This was sought to be done, as per the Karnataka Lokayukta’s interim report, by shifting the notified leased area to different convenient locations by the lessees. The instant illegality was sought to be committed by taking a wrong reference point, or by altering the original reference point, or sometimes even with the connivance of the local staff. This was sought to be done, as per the Karnataka Lokayukta’s interim report, by shifting the notified leased area to different convenient locations by the lessees. The instant illegality was sought to be committed by taking a wrong reference point, or by altering the original reference point, or sometimes even with the connivance of the local staff. Such encroachments in a large number of cases, also traversed into the adjoining forest areas and/or government revenue lands. Encroachments beyond lease boundaries, was also sought to be carried out by depositing iron-ore beyond the pheriphery of the notified lease boundaries. Another mode of encroachment, which was sought to be highlighted in the interim report of Karnataka Lokayukta was, by formation of roads to mining lease areas located deep inside forest/government revenue lands. It was pointed out, that the aforesaid road formations had caused extensive damage to forest areas. Such and similar kind of encroachments, made by those engaged in the activity of illegal mining of iron-ore required immediate attention of the State government. 13. According to the learned Advocate General, illegal transportation of mineral was another aspect, highlighted in the interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta. On the instant aspect of the matter, it was pointed out, that there was evidence to show that in Bellary district alone 4,000 to 5,000 lorries, at any given point of time, were engaged in carrying mineral products, to and from, the mining head to various transportation points like railway stations, sea-ports, etc. The interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta also emphasized, that almost all lorries engaged in carrying minerals were over-loaded, far in excess of the permissible limits. These over-loaded trucks carrying mineral ore had, caused extensive damage to all roads used for the transportation of iron-ore. Resultantly, roads including national highways had practically been rendered unmotorable. The interim report suggests, that in the transportation activity itself, there was a need to provide check-posts with sufficient number of weigh-bridges. It was also recommended, that fixing of GPS equipment in lorries carrying iron-ore, should be made compulsory, so as to keep a check over the movement of these vehicles. The interim report also suggested, the introduction of a new transport permit policy system, by replacing the existing system where bulk permits were issued. It was also recommended, that fixing of GPS equipment in lorries carrying iron-ore, should be made compulsory, so as to keep a check over the movement of these vehicles. The interim report also suggested, the introduction of a new transport permit policy system, by replacing the existing system where bulk permits were issued. It was pointed out, that such bulk permits which were valid for a period of 30 days, were being mis-used, as the same did not even incorporate the name of mining lease holder or the quantity of material being transported or even the vehicle number. It was suggested, that bulk permits were being misused for transporting more than the permitted quantity of mineral. Whereby, legally mined iron ore was mixed with the illegally mined iron-ore, and conveniently transported to the desired destinations. The Karnataka Lokayukta suggested the idea of having one permit for one vehicle for one trip, with a maximum transport duration of seven days. The aforesaid permit according to the suggestion made by the Karnataka Lokayukta, should have a hologram as also a computer barcode, wherein, the name of the transporter, the number of vehicle, the quantity of ore to be transported, as also, the point from where the iron-ore was to be collected and the point to which it was to be delivered, should be mentioned. It was also suggested, that at the end of the trip, the original transport permit would have to be surrendered, so that it could not be re-used. 14. Based on the pleading contained in the joint statement of objections (filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5), as also, the action taken report and the recommendations made by the Karnataka Lokayukta, it was further submitted at the hands of the learned Advocate General, that out of ‘153 mining lease holders engaged in mining major minerals, cases of nearly 99 mining lease holders had been taken up for scrutiny. Out of the aforesaid, it was found that nearly 81 mining lease holders were carrying on their operations in forest land, and the remaining 18 mining lease holders were carrying on their operations in revenue land belonging to the State government. It was also contended, that it was found that 60 mining lease holders, had encroached into forest land adjoining their permissible lease area, and were carrying on mining activities on encroached forest land. It was also contended, that it was found that 60 mining lease holders, had encroached into forest land adjoining their permissible lease area, and were carrying on mining activities on encroached forest land. It was submitted, that 56 forest offence cases had been registered in the courts of jurisdictional magistrate at Bellary, Hospet and Sandur. It was pointed out that nearly 15 charge sheets had been filed before jurisdictional courts for prosecuting different mining lease holders, for loss caused to the green cover, flora and fauna, running into several hundred crores of rupees. It was also submitted, that a large number of show cause notices had been issued by the Director of Mines and Geology, Karnataka, to erring mining lease holders, for terminating their lease agreements. 15. It was emphasized, that in the first instance the State of Karnataka had ventured to prevent the activities of illegal mining and transportation of iron ore by amending the provisions of the Karnataka Mining (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008. However, several mining lease holders, aggrieved by the aforesaid amended rules, had challenged the validity of the same before this court. It is pointed out, that some of the petitioners herein had also approached this Court, for the said purpose. And that, this court had stayed the operation of the aforesaid rules, making it impossible for the State government, to implement even the recommendations made by the Karnataka Lokayukta. 16. It was also the vehement contention of the learned Advocate General, that the entire activity under reference being in public interest, had been initiated by the State government to prevent loss on account of various unscrupulous activities at the hands of individuals engaged in the activity of mining and transport of iron-ore. It was pointed out, that the State government had no other alternative, but to take stern remedial measures. It was submitted, that the activity of illegal mining as also its transportation, whereby the mined ore was being exported out of the country, could not have been permitted, by any legitimate government. Accordingly, it was the assertion of the learned Advocate General, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 had to be issued, to enable the State government, illegal transport and export of illegally mined iron-ore. Accordingly, it was the assertion of the learned Advocate General, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 had to be issued, to enable the State government, illegal transport and export of illegally mined iron-ore. It was submitted, that the instant measures are only temporary, in as much as, they would be continued for a period of approximately six months, by which time, the final report of the Karnataka Lokayukta would be obtained, and the, State government would have been in a position to adopt adequate measures to prevent the illegal activities. 17. Though the factual position expressed by the learned Advocate General it emerges, that the impugned orders were issued as a matter of compulsion, to prevent the illegal iron-ore related activities in the State of Karnataka. It was pointed out, that there was hue and cry in the public, about large scale illegal activities concerning iron-ore mining in Karnataka. The matter also came to be discussed on the floors of the Legislative Houses in Karnataka. The public perception having been confirmed in the interim report submitted by the Karnataka Lokayukta, the government commenced to implement the recommendations made in the report, by first introducing necessary amendments in the Karnataka Mining (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008. And then, by putting in place certain physical measures also. The course adopted by the State government could not progress much on account of interim orders passed by this Court. Accordingly, as a last resort the impugned orders had to be passed. The Impugned Orders: 18. Before adverting to the main controversy, pertaining to the challenges raised at the hands of the petitioners, to the orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.07.2010, it is imperative for us to understand the exact purport of the same. The aforesaid two orders, ought to be extracted herein. The English translation of the first impugned order dated 26.07.2010 is accordingly being reproduced hereunder:- “PROCEEDINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA Sub: Prohibition of exporting iron ores from the Ports in the State – reg. Read: 1. Government order No.CI 164 MMM 2006 dated 22.07.2006, 12.03.2006, 09.09.2008 and 24.12.2008. 2. Government Order No.CI 164 MMM 2006 (Part) dated 19.07.2010. 3. Demi Official letter No.DMG/2010-11 dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Khanija Bhavan, Bangalore. 4. Demi Official letter No.CI 162 MMM 2010 dated 26.07.2010 of the Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries (Mines, SSI and Textile) 5. 2. Government Order No.CI 164 MMM 2006 (Part) dated 19.07.2010. 3. Demi Official letter No.DMG/2010-11 dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Khanija Bhavan, Bangalore. 4. Demi Official letter No.CI 162 MMM 2010 dated 26.07.2010 of the Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries (Mines, SSI and Textile) 5. Letter No.BanOJaSA-30/Bhoomi-2/2010 dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department. Preamble: In the Government Order read at Sl.No.1 above, the case was handed over to the Hon’ble Lokayukta as per section 7(2)A of Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 to conduct investigation with regard to purported illegal mining activities in the State and the charges against the Government for the period from 01.01.2002 to 22.07.2006. The said investigation period is extended upto 24.12.2008. In the Assembly sessions held recently, there was serious discussion about illegal mining in the State and the members in the session expressed regretting factor that minerals were being exported to foreign nations from the State in excess of the permitted quantity and considering seriously the same, Government, found it to be necessary in the interest of public to conduct full fledged enquiry with regard to the charges of illegal, export of minerals and in view of the same, extended the period of investigation handed over to the Hon’ble Lokayukta upto 19.07.2010. In the DO letter dated 26.07.2010 of the Secretary to Government, Department of Commerce and industries (Mines, SSI and Textile) as read at Sl.No.4 above, it is stated that, the Director, Department of Mines and Geology has sought in his letter dated 26.07.2010 that, the Deputy Conservator of Forest, Karwar had seized 8 Lakh tones of iron ore out of which 6 lakhs tones of iron ore are exported and with a view to curb reuse of the permits issued for transporting minerals, computerized permits are issued with holograms and with bar codes, but, as the check posts are under modernization with interest facility and as improvement actions are under progress and hence sought to temporarily prohibit exporting minerals from Ports in the State of Karnataka for the present. There were serious discussions with regard to illegal mining activities in the State, in the recent assembly sessions held recently, to impede unauthorized mining activities in the State and the members in the session expressed regretting factor that minerals were being exported to foreign nations from the State and in view of the same, guidelines are being formulated with regard to the action to be taken by the Department and also, the Hon’ble Chief Minister has sought the Union of India to completely prohibit exporting minerals illegally. In this view, the Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries has sought to issue strict instructions to all the concerned Port Officers in this regard to stop exporting minerals from the Ports in the State. In the letter dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department, Karwar read at Sl.No.5 above, it is stated that, there are totally 10 minor ports in the coastal region in the State of Karnataka, out of which, iron ores are exported from Belikeri and Karwar Ports for past 4-5 years and in view of the reasons of violation of terms of he contract of the Director and the Government order by the companies exporting iron ores from Belikeri Ports, the licence and Port land contract issued to these companies are cancelled. Even at Karwar Port, it is found that, Export companies are transporting iron ores without obtaining permission from Karnataka Pollution Control Board and other Authorities. In this view and in the public interest and with a view to proper implementation of the Government rules, it is opined to stop exporting iron ores from Belikeri and Karwar Ports as per Indian Ports Act, 1908 and Karnataka Ports (Landing and Shipping Fees) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 20 of 1961). In this view and in the public interest and with a view to proper implementation of the Government rules, it is opined to stop exporting iron ores from Belikeri and Karwar Ports as per Indian Ports Act, 1908 and Karnataka Ports (Landing and Shipping Fees) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 20 of 1961). The Government, after examining thoroughly the above proposal, has issued the following order: GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.LOE 186 PSP 2010, BANGALORE DT: 26.07.2010 In view of the reasons explained in the preamble, as guidelines are being formulated to initiate necessary action effectively with a view to curb unauthorized/illegal transportation/export of minerals from the State and with a view to strict implementation of the Government rules and in the interest of public, in exercise of the powers conferred Indian Ports Act, 1908 and Karnataka Ports (Landing and Shipping Fees) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 20 of 1961), the Government hereby prohibits exporting iron ores from the following 10 minor Ports in the State, with immediate effect, until further orders: 1. Karwar Port 2. Belikeri Port 3. Tadhadi Port 4. Honnavar Port 5. Batkal Port 6. Kundapura Port 7. Malpe Port 8. Hongaarakatta Port 8. Old Mangalore Port 10. Padubidri Port The Port Officers of the aforesaid Ports in the State are hereby instructed to initiate strict action to prevent iron ore exports from the Ports, as exporting iron ores is prohibited by the Government. By order and in the name of Governor of Karnataka, Sd/- (S. Thippeswamy) Under Secretary to Government, Public Works, Port and Inland Water Transport Department (Ports)” The English translation of the second impugned order dated 28.07.2010 is also been reproduced hereunder:- “PROCEEDINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA Sub: Prohibiting issuance of permits for exporting iron ores – reg. Read: 1. Government order No.LoE. 186:PSP 2010 dated 26.07.2010 of the Department of Public Works, Ports and Inland Water Transport. 2. Demi Official letter No.DMG/2010-11 dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Khanija Bhavan, Bangalore. Preamble: On 20.03.2010 the Forest Department has seized approximately 8,05,991 metric tones illegal stock of iron ores from Belikeri Port and approximately 1,15,399 metric ton iron ore illegally stocked at Karwar Port. 2. Demi Official letter No.DMG/2010-11 dated 26.07.2010 of the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Khanija Bhavan, Bangalore. Preamble: On 20.03.2010 the Forest Department has seized approximately 8,05,991 metric tones illegal stock of iron ores from Belikeri Port and approximately 1,15,399 metric ton iron ore illegally stocked at Karwar Port. Out of this, about 6.00 lakh tones of iron ore at Belikeri Port and about 65,409 metric tones of iron ore at Karwar Port are illegally exported, in this regard, Forest Department has filed cases before Hon’ble Court, which are pending consideration. Apart from this, it has come to the knowledge of the Government about storage of iron ore at various Ports with an intention to transport and export iron ore illegally. On considering the quantity of iron ore being illegally produced in the State from past many years in comparison with the quantity of its local use and its export quantity, it is learnt that, iron ore in excess of the quantity permitted is being exported to foreign countries and also sum total of the quantity of iron are exported and quantity of ore for domestic use are considerable higher than the quantity of authorized production of iron ore. In the Government Order dated 12.03.2007, the case was handed over to the Hon’ble Lokayukta as per Section 7(2)A of Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 to conduct investigation with regard to purported illegal mining activities in the State and the charges against the Government for the period from 01.01.2002 to 22.07.2006 and thereafter the said investigation period is extended upto 24.12.2008 and finally extended upto 19.07.2010 and handed over the case to the Hon’ble Karnataka Lokayukta to conduct detailed investigation with regard to export of ores from the State in excess of the quantity for which transport permits were issued. With a view to impede illegal mining activities and illegal transportation and to control reuse of the permits issued for transporting minerals, Government has already initiated various necessary actions. To impede illegal mining and transportation of iron ore, guidelines are being formulated with regard to the further action to be taken by the Department and also for issuance of permits. With a view to impede illegal mining activities and illegal transportation and to control reuse of the permits issued for transporting minerals, Government has already initiated various necessary actions. To impede illegal mining and transportation of iron ore, guidelines are being formulated with regard to the further action to be taken by the Department and also for issuance of permits. The Government has intended to gather information as to the quantity of iron ore being produced in the State, quantity out of the same being used for industrial development and the quantity of ore being exported to foreign countries and as to the Contractors supplying iron ores to the iron ore exporting companies, and to re-examine thoroughly and initiate necessary reformatory actions. With a view to control illegal mining activities and export of iron ores without permits and to seize the ores and also with a view to protect natural resources, it is inevitable to provisionally withhold issuing permits. Hence, the following order: GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.CI. 162 MMM 2010, BANGALORE DATED 28.07.2010 In view of the factors explained in the preamble, the Government hereby prohibits issuance of mineral dispatch permit for transportation iron ore for the purpose of exporting the same from the State with immediate effect and until further orders. The Deputy Directors and Senior Geologists of all the Districts are hereby instructed to strictly comply with this order and to initiate all necessary effect actions immediately to prevent illegal mining: transportation. By order and in the name of Governor of Karnataka, Sd/- (G.A. Adagatti) Under Secretary to Government, Department of Commerce & Industries.” The Legal issues canvassed: The First Contention (…. the State government has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned orders): 19. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 could not have been issued by the State government, as it was not within the jurisdictional authority vested in the State government, to issue the same. In order to substantiate the instant contention, reliance was first of all placed on Article 162 of the Constitution of India, for delineating the limits of executive power vested in a State government. Article 162 aforementioned is being reproduced hereunder: “162. In order to substantiate the instant contention, reliance was first of all placed on Article 162 of the Constitution of India, for delineating the limits of executive power vested in a State government. Article 162 aforementioned is being reproduced hereunder: “162. Extent of executive power of State – Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof”. It is apparent from a perusal of Article 162, that the executive power of a State is coextensive with the legislative power vested with the State legislatures. It was accordingly submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners, that in order to determine whether or not the State government had the executive authority to pass the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, the first exercise that will have to be carried out would be, to determine whether the State legislatures had the competence to frame laws, on the subject on which the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 had been issued. Another alternative mode for determining the instant issue, according to learned counsel, was to examine whether the legislative jurisdiction of the subject (on which the impugned orders had been issued) was exclusively within the domain of the Parliament. This latter alternative, according to learned counsel, if answered in the affirmative, would also lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the subject was beyond to scope of legislative competence of the State, because in respect of subjects on which the Parliament can legislate, the executive power vests with the Central government under Article 73 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, learned counsel adopted both the aforesaid alternatives to press the first contention. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners also invited our attention to Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India. The same are reproduced hereunder: “24. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. As a matter of fact, learned counsel adopted both the aforesaid alternatives to press the first contention. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners also invited our attention to Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India. The same are reproduced hereunder: “24. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. (2) No law made by the Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation. 246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. – (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws wit respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” Broadly speaking, according to learned counsel, it emerges from the provisions extracted hereinabove, that Parliament has exclusive power to frame laws in respect of subjects enumerated in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, and Sate legislatures have the exclusive power to enact laws in respect of subjects enumerated in the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. However, according to learned counsel, it was essential to appreciate, that legislative superiority is vested with the parliament, which over-rides the legislative authority vested in State Legislatures, on a subject vested with the Parliament. It was in the background of aforesaid legal submission, that learned counsel for the petitioner first invited our attention to entry 23 of the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, and thereafter, to entry 54 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Entry 23 of the State List reads as under:- “23. Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.” Entry 54 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, reads as under:- “54. Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest”. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, based on entry 23 of the State List, that the legislative competence of a State Legislature would extend to matters pertaining to regulation of mines and minerals development, subject to one condition ie., “….subject to provisions of List I with respect to regulations and development under the control of the Union.” It was therefore contended, that the authority of the State legislature, would be subservient to any legislative provision, on the aforesaid subject, enacted by Parliament under entry 54 of the Union List. Referring to entry 54 of the Union List, it was the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that on the entire subject matter contained in entry 23 of the State List, it is open also to the Parliament to enact legislation, subject to the condition, that the same was done in “public interest”. Accordingly, it is sought to be asserted, that if Parliament enacts legislation on the subject of regulation of mines and development of minerals in “public interest”, the State Legislature would be denuded of the power vested with it under entry 23 of the State List, corresponding to the extent to which the former had chosen to legislate. Accordingly, it is sought to be asserted, that if Parliament enacts legislation on the subject of regulation of mines and development of minerals in “public interest”, the State Legislature would be denuded of the power vested with it under entry 23 of the State List, corresponding to the extent to which the former had chosen to legislate. Since the assertion made above, has not been contested by the learned counsel representing the respondents, we shall proceed further by assuming, that the jurisdiction vested with the State Legislature flowing from entry 23 contained in the State List of the Seventh Schedule, will be co-extensively reduced, to the extent on which the Parliament has enacted legislation under entry 54 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The primary reason for making the aforesaid submission was to demonstrate, that the Parliament having enacted the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as ‘Mines and Minerals Act’) for which legislative competence is referable to entry 54 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule; the legislative competence vested in the State Legislatures under entry 23 of the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, stood coextensively reduced ie., to the extent of the area of legislation covered by the Mines and Minerals Act. 21. Inviting the courts attention to the Mines and Minerals Act, it was the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the entire field of legislative competence, vested in the State Legislature under entry 23 of the State List, must be deemed to have been taken-over by the Parliament in terms of the mandate of Article 246(1) of the Constitution of India, read with entry 23 of the State List, and entry 54 of the Union List. The instant aspect of the matter is also not disputed at the hands of the Advocate General, who represented respondents 1 to 5. Having taken us through the aforesaid contours of legal craftsmanship, learned counsel for the petitioners principally referred to the two provisions from the Mines and Minerals Act. Reliance was first of all placed on Section 15, thereof which is being reproduced hereunder:- “15. Having taken us through the aforesaid contours of legal craftsmanship, learned counsel for the petitioners principally referred to the two provisions from the Mines and Minerals Act. Reliance was first of all placed on Section 15, thereof which is being reproduced hereunder:- “15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. (1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- a. the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be made and the fees to be paid therefore; b. the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgment of the receipt of any such applications may be sent; c. the matters which may be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received within the same day; d. the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed; e. the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions; f. the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining operations; g. the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable; h. the manner in which the rights or third parties may be protected (whether by way of payment or compensation or otherwise) in case where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of any prospecting or mining operations; i. the manner in which the rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation, such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reasons of any quarrying or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in any other area selected by the State Government (whether by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the person holding the quarrying or mining lease; j. the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concessions may be transferred; k. the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmission lines, tramways, railways, aerial ropeways, pipelines and the making of passage for water for mining purposes or any land comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral concessions; l. the form of registers to be maintained under this Act; m. the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority to which such reports and statements shall be submitted; n. the period within which and the manner in which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be paid therefore, and the powers of the revisional authority; and o. any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed. (2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a State Government regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force. (3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under subsection (1) shall pay royalty or dead rent, whichever is more in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals. Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty or dead rent in respect of any minor mineral for more than once during any period of three years.” Referring to Section 15 of Mines and Minerals Act, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the same is limited to minor minerals. It is pointed out, that the term minor minerals has been defined in Section 3(e) of Mines and Minerals Act, it is however the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that iron-ore does not fall within the definition of the term “minor minerals” on account of the fact that the same has not been declared as a minor mineral in terms of the requirement of Section 3(e) of the Mines and Minerals Act. Thus it is asserted, that reference to Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals Act, in respect of the controversy raised in the instant petitions would be wholly misplaced. Since it stands acknowledged at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents, the iron ore is not a minor mineral, we shall proceed on the assumption that Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals Act, would have no applicability to the controversy in hand. 22. Reference was then made to Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. The aforesaid provision is being reproduced hereunder:- “23C. Power of State Government to make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith. The aforesaid provision is being reproduced hereunder:- “23C. Power of State Government to make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- (a) establishment of check-posts for checking of minerals under transit; (b) establishment of weigh-bridges to measure the quantity of mineral being transported; (c) regulation of mineral being transported from the area granted under a prospecting licence or a mining lease or a quarrying licence or a permit, in whatever name the permission to excavate minerals, has been given; (d) inspection, checking and search of minerals at the place of excavation or storage or during transit; (e) maintenance of registers and forms for the purposes of these rules; (f) the period within which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority be preferred under any rule made under this section and the fees to be paid therefor and powers of such authority for disposing of such applications; and (g) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed for the purpose of prevention of illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 30, the Central Government shall have no power to revise any order passed by a State Government or any of its authorized officers or any authority under the rules made under sub-sections (1) and (2).] Based on Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, it was the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, that it is open to the State government to frame rules in respect of matters specifically defined in Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. It was however submitted, that the exercise of executive authority at the hands of a State government, even in respect of maters specifically defined in Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, would be totally beyond the scope of Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, unless the same is expressly authorized under the rules framed. It was however submitted, that the exercise of executive authority at the hands of a State government, even in respect of maters specifically defined in Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, would be totally beyond the scope of Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, unless the same is expressly authorized under the rules framed. Based on the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act, and the effect thereof, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that any activity or responsibility which had not specifically and exclusively been vested with the State government, would be deemed to have been vested with the Central government. Therefore, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that in issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, the State executive had transgressed into the jurisdiction exclusively vested in the Central government. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the legislative competence including the regulatory control in respect of the subject on which the impugned orders have been issued, vests with the Central government. As such, it is also submitted, that in absence of any rules framed in this behalf empowering the State government to introduce regulatory measures, the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 could not have been issued, for the alleged purpose of introducing regulatory measures, by the State government. As such, it was sought to be concluded, that the impugned orders were liable to be declared unconstitutional and void, as the same are beyond the jurisdictional authority of the State government. 23. In order to substantiate the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, reliance has first of all been placed on the judgment rendered in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 , wherein it was interalia observed as under: “(9) The question for consideration is whether “the extent of control and regulation” provided by the Central Act takes within its fold the area or the subject covered by the Orissa Act. (10) Learned Counsel for the appellant raised 4 points: (1) that the object and purposes of the Orissa Act and its provisions were quite distinct and different from the object and purposes of the Central Act, with the result that the two enactments could validly coexist since they do not cover the same field. (10) Learned Counsel for the appellant raised 4 points: (1) that the object and purposes of the Orissa Act and its provisions were quite distinct and different from the object and purposes of the Central Act, with the result that the two enactments could validly coexist since they do not cover the same field. It was argued that the Orissa Act was concerned with the raising of a fund for providing amenities to labour and other residents in “mining areas” while the Central Act was concerned not with any social purpose, as the Orissa Act, but merely with the development of the mineral resources of the country. The object to be attained by the two enactments being so dissimilar there was no common area covered by the two enactments and the “extent of control” which the Union assumed by its law was therefore entirely outside the field occupied by the State Act and there being thus no encroachment the State Act continued to operate in full force. (2) Even if the Central Act might cover the same field in the sense that it would be competent to the Central Government to make rules under the Central Act for the same purposes as the Orissa Act, and the rules when made would overlap the provisions of the Orissa Act, still there was no repugnance between the Central Act and the Orissa Act until such rules were made for until then there is no effective and operative Central legislation covering the field occupied by the Orissa Act. (3) The power to enact legislation to levy “fees” was an independent head of Legislative power under the Constitution under item 96 in the Union list and item 66 in the State List and therefore there was no question of the supersession of the State power under item 66 of the State List by a Central enactment whose source of legislative power is, entry 96 of List I and therefore the demand for the fee competently enacted by the State was not superseded by Central legislation even though the latter was covered by Entry 54 of the Union List. (4) In any event, the Central Act was not retrospective or retroactive and could not affect rights which accrued to the State prior to June 1, 1958 on which date the Central Act was brought into force. (4) In any event, the Central Act was not retrospective or retroactive and could not affect rights which accrued to the State prior to June 1, 1958 on which date the Central Act was brought into force. The fees in regard to which the demands impugned in the case were made had accrued long prior to June 1, 1958 and the demands would therefore be enforceable notwithstanding the disappearance of the State Act subsequent to the date of the accrual of the fee. (11) On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad-learned Counsel for the respondent-urged that the Central Act covered the entire field of mineral development, that being the “extent” to which Parliament had declared by law that it was expedient that the Union should assume control. In this connection he relied most strongly on the terms of s. 18(1) which laid a duty upon the Central Government “to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India” and “for that purpose the Central Government may by notification, make such rules as it deems fit”. If the entire field of mineral development was taken over, that would include the provision of amenities to workmen employed in the mines which was necessary in order to stimulate or maintain the working of mines. The test which he suggested was whether if under the power conferred by s. 18(1) of the Central Act, the Central Government had made rules providing for the amenities for which provision was made by the Orissa Act and if the Central Government had made rules providing for the amenities for which provision was made by the Orissa Act and if the Central Government had imposed a fee to defray the expenses of the provision of these amenities, would such rules be held to be ultra vires of the Central Act, and this particularly when taken in conjunction with the matters for which rules could be made under s. 13 to which reference has already been made. We consider there is considerable force in this submission of learned Counsel for the respondent, and this would require very detailed and careful scrutiny. We are, however, relieved from this task-of detailed examination and discussion of this matter because we consider that it is concluded by a decision of this Court in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd., & Ors. We consider there is considerable force in this submission of learned Counsel for the respondent, and this would require very detailed and careful scrutiny. We are, however, relieved from this task-of detailed examination and discussion of this matter because we consider that it is concluded by a decision of this Court in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd., & Ors. V. The State of Orissa and Ors. (1). There, as here, it was the validity of the demand of the fee under the Orissa Act now under consideration that was the subject of debate. The appellants then before this Court challenged on various grounds the constitutional’ validity of the Orissa Act and the rules made thereunder which empowered the State to levy the cess. One of the grounds urged before the-Court was that the Orissa Act was void, because the entire range of mineral development had been taken under Central control by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1948 (Central Act 53 of 1948). The Central Act of 1948 was a pre-constitution law, but the contention raised was that the declaration in the Central enactment that it “was expedient in the public interest that the Central Government should take under its control etc.” in terms of entry 36 of the Federal List under the Government of India Act, 1935 was tantamount to a declaration by law by Parliament of assumption of “control by the Union” within Entry 54 of List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. (12) Before referring to the portion of the judgment dealing with this aspect of the matter, it would be convenient to refer to the Central Act of 1948 on the basis of which the constitutional validity of the Orissa Act was impugned. Central Act 53 of 1948 professes to be an Act to provide for the regulation of mines and oil fields and for the development of minerals. Central Act 53 of 1948 professes to be an Act to provide for the regulation of mines and oil fields and for the development of minerals. Section 2 of that Act contained a declaration as we have in s. 2 of the present Central Act 67 of 1957 and this read: “It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Central Government should take under its control the regulation of mines and oil fields and the development of mines to the extent hereinafter provided.” It is a very short enactment consisting only of 14 sections of which it is only necessary to mention S.6 which is headed “Power to make Rules as respects mineral development” and this empowers the Central Government by notification to make rules for “the conservation and development of minerals.” By amendments effected in Central Act, 53 of 1948, by the later Act 67 of 1957, the provisions which related to “mines and minerals” and their development and the references to “mines and minerals” in provisions common to them and to oil fields were excised, so that thereafter while the earlier Act of 1948 was limited to the development of oil-fields, the entire range of the law relating to mines and mineral development was taken over and covered by Central Act 67 of 1957. Now, it was the existence of this enactment of 1948 when it applied to mines and mineral development and before it was amended by Act 67 of 1957 by confining it to oil-fields, with the declaration which is contained that it was expedient to “control mineral development to the extent provided” that was urged as having deprived the Orissa State Legislature of competence to enact the Orissa Act. Dealing with this ground of challenge Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court observed: “Its validity (the demand of the fee under the Orissa Act) is still open to challenge because the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union; and that takes us to Entry 1. The effect of reading the two Entries together is clear. The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry. The effect of reading the two Entries together is clear. The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union, to the extent of such declaration the Jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded. In other words, if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as required by Entry 54, and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra wires, not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law. The Limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature itself. This position is not in dispute. It is urged by Mr. Amin that the field covered by the impugned Act has already been covered by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948, (LIII of 1948) and he contends that in view of the declaration made by s. 2 of this Act the impugned Act is ultra vires ….. Section 2 of the Act contains a declaration as to the expediency and control by the Central Government. It reads thus: ‘………. Section 4 of the Act provides that no mining lease shall be granted after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under this Act. Section 5 empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification for regulating the grant of mining leases or for prohibiting the grant of such leases in respect of any mineral or in any area. Section 6 of the Act, however, empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification in the official gazette for the conservation and development of minerals. Section 6(2) lays down several matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the Central Government. It is true that no rules have in fact been framed by the Central Government in regard to the levy and collection of any fees; but in our opinion, that would not make any difference. Section 6(2) lays down several matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the Central Government. It is true that no rules have in fact been framed by the Central Government in regard to the levy and collection of any fees; but in our opinion, that would not make any difference. If it is held that this Act contains the declaration referred to in Entry 23 there would be no difficulty in holding that the declaration covers the field of conservation and development of minerals, and the said field is indistinguishable from the field covered by the impugned Act. What Entry 23 provides is that the legislative competence of the State Legislature is subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union, and Entry 54 in List I requires a declaration by Parliament by law that regulation and development of mines should be under the control of the Union in public interest. Therefore, if a Central Act has been passed for the purpose of providing for the conservation and development of minerals, and if it contains the requisite declaration, then it would not be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act in respect of the subject-matter covered by the said declaration. In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the Legislative declaration covers the field or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act L III of 1948. It is only necessary to add that the validity of this impost was affirmed, however, for the reason that whereas the Orissa Act was a post-Constitution enactment, the Central Act of 1948 was a pre-Constitution law and as in terms of Entry 54 “Parliament” had not made the requisite declaration, but only the previously existing Central Legislature, it was held not to be within the terms of Entry 54 and the State enactment was held to continue to be operative. Since the Central Act 67 of 1957 contains the requisite declaration by the Union Parliament; under Entry 54 and that Act covers the same field as the Act of 1948 in regard to mines and mineral development, we consider that the decision of this Court concludes this matter unless there were any material difference between the scope and ambit of Central Act 53 of 1948 and that of the Act of 1957. Learned Counsel for the appellant was not able to point to any matter of substance in which there is any difference between the two enactments. It was suggested that whereas s. 6 of the Act of 1948 empowered rules to be made for taxes being levied, there was no specific power to impose taxes under that of 1957. It is not necessary to discuss the materiality of this point because what we are concerned with is the power to levy a fee, and there is express provision therefore in S.13 of the Central Act of 1957 apart from the implication arising from S.25 thereof, which runs: “25. Any rent, royalty, tax, fee or other sum due to the Government under this Act or the rules made thereunder or under the terms and conditions of any prospecting licence or mining lease may, on a certificate of such officer as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, be recovered in the same manner as an-arrear of land revenue.” We ought to add that besides we see considerable force in Mr. Setalvad’s submission that sub-ss (1) & (2) of s. 18 of the Central Act of 1957 are wider in, scope and amplitude and confer larger powers on the Central Government than the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1948. (13) xxxx (14) We consider that this submission in relation to the Act before us is without force besides being based on a mis-apprehension of the true legal position. (13) xxxx (14) We consider that this submission in relation to the Act before us is without force besides being based on a mis-apprehension of the true legal position. In the first place the point is concluded by the earlier decision of this Court in 1961-2 SCR 537: ( AIR 1961 SC 459 ) where this Court said: “In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it was expedient in the public interest to take the regulation of development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not.” (15) But even if the matter was res integra, the argument cannot be accepted. Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. In the present case, having regard to the terms of s. 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no super-session of the State Act.” Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered in State of Tamil Nadu v. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, AIR 1995 SC 858 , wherefrom pointed reliance was placed on the following observations:- “21. The said Act is enacted to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union. Section 2 of the said Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the said Act. Section 13 empowers the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mineral leases in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Sub-section (1) of S.15 empowers the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Subsection (1A) of S.15 states that such rules may provide for the matters set out therein, namely, the person by whom and the manner in which an application for a quarry lease, mining lease and the like may be made; the fees to be paid therefore; the time and the form in which the application is to be made; the matters which are to be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received on the same day; the terms and conditions on which leases may be granted or regulated; the procedure in this behalf; the facilities to be afforded to lease holders; the fixation and collection of rent and other charges and the time within which they are payable; the protection of the rights of third parties; the protection of flora; the manner in which leases may be transferred; the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmission lines, etc. on the land; the form of registers to be maintained; reports and statements to be submitted and to whom, and the revision of any order passed by any authority under the said Rules. Clause (o) of sub-sec.(1A) reads, “any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.’ Section 18 of the said Act states that it shall be the duty of the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and systematic development of the environment by preventing or controlling any pollution which may be caused by prospecting or mining operations”. 24. 24. First and foremost, we shall record the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned Additional Solicitor General of India, who entered appearance in this case so as to apprise us, of the stance of respondent No.6 ie., the Union of India. Appearing for the Union of India, it was the category submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, passed at the hands of the State government, fall within the executive authority of the State government, under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. It was sought to be asserted on the strength of Section 23C aforementioned, that the State government is authorized to frame rules inter alia for preventing illegal mining, illegal transportation and illegal storage of minerals. And as such, the State government must be deemed to have the jurisdiction to take all such executive actions, as may be called for, within the area of the authority vested in it, under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. Referring to the impugned orders, it is the assertion of the learned Additional Solicitor General, representing respondent No.6, that the scope of activity contemplated in the impugned orders falls squarely within the ambit of preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals, and as such, the Central government was fully satisfied, that the State of Karnataka was competent to pass the impugned order. 25. Learned Additional Solicitor General, however expressed one reservation in the matter, namely, that the subject of “export” falls exclusively within the domain of the authority vested in Parliament and/or the Central government, and therefore, to the extent of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 ordered a ban on “export” of iron-ore, the same was unsustainable. It was pointedly the assertion of the learned Additional Solicitor General, that the State government has neither any jurisdiction nor any authority, to issue an order by which “export” of anything, including iron-ore, can be banned. 26. In response to the first contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the stance adopted on behalf of State of Karnataka was, that the Mines and Minerals Act clearly authorizes the State government to pass the impugned orders, and as such, the impugned orders were well within the jurisdictional authority of the State government. 27. In response to the first contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the stance adopted on behalf of State of Karnataka was, that the Mines and Minerals Act clearly authorizes the State government to pass the impugned orders, and as such, the impugned orders were well within the jurisdictional authority of the State government. 27. Before dwelling into the submission advanced at the hands of the learned Advocate General, it would be necessary to point out, that the Advocate General in clear terms acknowledged, that the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel representing the petitioners, that legislation made at the hands of the Parliament under entry 54 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, would co-extensively reduce the legislative competence of the State Legislature under entry 23 of the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, was fully justified. In fact, during the course of hearing, the Advocate General went to the extent of asserting, that having enacted the Mines and Minerals Act, and having, recorded a declaration therein (in Section 2 thereof), to the effect, that it was expedient and in “public interest” that the Union should take under its control, the regulation of mines and the development of minerals, it should be assumed, that for all intents and purposes, the legislative competence vested in the State Legislature under entry 23 of the State list contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, had been taken over by Parliament, in terms of express provision to the said effect (in entry 54 of the Union list contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India). It was expressed at the hands of learned Advocate General, that he would establish the validity of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, from the provisions of the Mines and Minerals Act. 28. The aforesaid assertion at the handsof the learned Advocate General, to substantiate the validity of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, was based on Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. It was his submission, that under the Mines and Minerals Act, every State government has been vested with the exclusive authority to frame rules for preventing illegal mining, illegal transportation of minerals, as also, illegal storage of mineral ore. It was his submission, that under the Mines and Minerals Act, every State government has been vested with the exclusive authority to frame rules for preventing illegal mining, illegal transportation of minerals, as also, illegal storage of mineral ore. It was asserted that the State government can adopt various regulatory measures under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, as for instance, to establish check posts for checking the minerals under transit, under Subsection 2(a) thereof; to establish weigh bridges to measure the quantity of minerals being transported, under sub-section 2(b) thereof; to regulate the transportation of mineral ore in the name in which permission to excavate the same has been granted, under sub-section 2(c) thereof; to inspect, check and search minerals at the place of excavation, during transport or at the place of storage, under sub-section 2(d) thereof; to prescribe any other regulatory measure required for prevention of illegal mining, illegal transportation of minerals and illegal storage of mineral ore, under sub-section 2 (g) thereof. It is therefore asserted, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 having been passed for the purposes referred to in Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, the orders issued by the State government were within its jurisdiction, competence and authority. 29. On the instant aspect of the matter, it is also sought to be asserted, that it has been repeatedly declared at the hands of the Apex Court, that executive action is permissible, not only in respect of areas of legislative jurisdiction, but also in areas where the concerned executive authority has the right to frame rules. It is submitted that under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, the State government has the jurisdiction and authority to frame rules. It is therefore asserted that the State government would also be deemed to have the jurisdiction and the authority to pass executive orders in respect of the field over which it has the jurisdiction to frame rules. In so far as the instant issue is concerned, reliance was placed on the judgment rendered in State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and others AIR 1991 SC 1933 , wherefrom, our pointed attention was invited to the following observations:- “The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occupied by the laws made by the legislature. It is settled law that any order, instruction, direction or notification issued in exercise of the executive power of the State which is contrary to any statutory provisions, is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. But in this case we are faced with a peculiar situation. The Rules, though enforced, remained unworkable for about five years. The Public Service Commission, which was the authority to implement the Rules, was not in existence during the said period. There is nothing on the record to show as to why the Public Service Commission was not constituted during all those five years. In the absence of any material to the contrary we assume that there Were justifiable reasons for the delay in constituting the Commission. The executive power of the State being divided amongst various functionaries under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India there is possibility of lack of co-ordination amongst various limbs of the Government working within their respective spheres of allocation. The object of regulating the recruitment and conditions of Service by statutory provisions is to rule out arbitrariness, provide consistency and crystallige the rights of employees concerned. The statutory provision’s which are unworkable and inoperative cannot achieve these objectives. Such provisions are non est till made operation-al. It is the operative statutory provisions which have the effect of ousting executive power of the State from the same field. When in a peculiar situation, as in the present case, the statutory provisions could not be operated there was no bar for the State Government to act in exercise of its executive power. The impugned notification to hold special selection ‘was issued almost four years after the enforcement of the Rules. It was done to remove stagnation and to afford an opportunity to the eligible persons to enter the service. In our view the State Government was justified in issuing the impugned notification in exercise of its executive power and the High Court fell into error in quashing the same.” 30. On the issue, as to whether or not the State government could have passed an order banning “export” of iron ore, it is sought to be asserted by the Advocate General, that there is no provision under the Mines and Minerals Act, which prevents the State government from passing any such orders. On the issue, as to whether or not the State government could have passed an order banning “export” of iron ore, it is sought to be asserted by the Advocate General, that there is no provision under the Mines and Minerals Act, which prevents the State government from passing any such orders. It is submitted, that the impugned orders had been passed under authority vested with the State government to take preventive action against illegal mining, illegal transportation of minerals, as also, illegal storage of minerals under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. It was also asserted, that it was open for the State government to pass the impugned orders, whereby “export” of illegally mined ore could be prevented, so long as the same was for the objects and reasons emerging from clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. This action, according to the Advocate General, would also fall within the purview of the regulatory measures entrusted to State governments under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. To the aforesaid extent, learned Advocate General differed from the submissions advanced by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India. 31. We have given out thoughtful consideration to the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Before recording our conclusion, it would be essential to notice that the provisions contained in the Mines and Minerals Act can be divided into three parts. The “first part” is covered by Sections 4 to 17A. The provisions in the first part deal with the subject of “regulation of mining, of minerals. The “second part" is covered by Sections 18 and 18A. The provision in the second part deal with the subject of “development” of minerals. The “third part” is covered by Sections 19 to 33. The provisions in the third part deal with “miscellaneous” matters connected with development and regulation of mines and minerals. 32. From the “first part” which pertains to regulation of mining of minerals, it is relevant to make a reference to Section 13 of the Mines and Minerals Act, which deals with framing of rules for the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases. Section 13 aforesaid, has been extracted hereunder: “13. 32. From the “first part” which pertains to regulation of mining of minerals, it is relevant to make a reference to Section 13 of the Mines and Minerals Act, which deals with framing of rules for the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases. Section 13 aforesaid, has been extracted hereunder: “13. Power of Central Government to make rules in respect of minerals: (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of [reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences and mining leases] in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Section 13 aforesaid, has been extracted hereunder: “13. Power of Central Government to make rules in respect of minerals: (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of [reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences and mining leases] in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters namely:- (a) the person by whom, and the manner in which, applications for [reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences or mining leases] in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the Government may be made and the fees to be paid therefor; (b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgment of the receipt of any such application may be sent; (c) the matters which may be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received on the same day; (d) (omitted by Central Act 37 of 1986); (e) the authority by which [reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences or mining leases] in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the Government may be granted; (f) the procedure for obtaining [a reconnaissance permit, a prospecting licence or a mining lease] in respect of any land in which the minerals vest in a person other than the Government and the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which, such [a permit, licence or lease] may be granted or renewed; (g) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which, any other [reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease] may be granted or renewed; (h) the facilities to be afforded by holders of mining leases to persons deputed by the Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining operations; (i) the fixing and collection of fees for [reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences or mining leases], surface rent, security deposit, fines, other fees or charges and the time within which and the manner in which the dead rent or royalty shall be payable; (j) the manner in which rights of third parties may be protected (whether by payment of compensation or otherwise) in cases where any such party may be prejudicially affected by reason of any [reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations]; (k) the grouping of associated minerals for the purposes of section 6; (l) the manner in which, and the conditions subject to which, [a reconnaissance permit, a prospecting licence or a mining lease] may be transferred; (m) the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmission lines, tramways, railways, aerial ropeways, pipelines and the making of passages for water for mining purposes on any land comprised in a mining lease; (n) the form of registers to be maintained under this act; (o) (omitted by Central Act 37 of 1986); (p) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of [reconnaissance permits or prospecting licences’ or owners of mines and the authority to which such reports and statements shall be submitted; (q) the period within which applications for revision of any order passed by a State Government or other authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, may be made the fees to be paid therefor and the documents which shall accompany such applications and the manner in which such applications shall be disposed of; (qq) the manner in which rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation; such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reason of any prospecting or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in any other area selected by the Central government (whether by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the person holding the prospecting licence or mining lease; and (r) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed under this Act”. A perusal of Section 13 reveals, that the authority to frame rules, relating to the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases is vested with the Central government. In sum and substance, it emerges that the Central government controls the field of the “regulatory” activity pertaining to grant of reconnaissance permits, prospecting licences and mining leases. It is also essential to make a reference to Section 17A of the Mines and Minerals Act, which also falls in the first part. Section 17A aforementioned is being extracted hereunder: “17A. Reservation of area for purposes of conservation (1) The Central Government, with a view to conserving any mineral and after consultation with the State Government may reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease and, where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (1A) The Central Government may, in consultation with the State Government reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, for undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a government company or corporation owned or controlled by it, and where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such area will be reserved. (2) The State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government reserve any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease undertaking prospecting or mining operations through a government company or corporation owned by it, and where it proposes to do so, it shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the boundaries of such area and the mineral or minerals in respect of which such areas will be reserved. (3) Where in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1A) or sub-section (2), the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, undertakes prospecting or mining operations in any area in which the minerals vest in a private person, it shall be liable to pay prospecting fee, royalty, surface rent or dead rent, as the case may be, from time to time at the same rate at which it would have been payable under this act if such prospecting or mining operations had been undertaken by a private person under prospecting licence or mining lease”. A perusal of Section 17A extracted above reveals, that the authority to reserve any area for conserving any mineral also vests with the Central government. Although the aforesaid provision clarifies, that the aforesaid regulatory measure has to be carried out in consultation of the concerned State government, the fact remains, that the ultimate and the final control in the matter rests with the Central government. 33. From the “second part”, reference deserves to be made to Section 18 of the Mines and Minerals Act, which covers the subject of mineral development. Section 18 aforesaid is being extracted hereunder: “18. Mineral Development (1) It shall be the duty of the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for the protection of environment by preventing or controlling any pollution which may be caused by prospecting or mining operations and for such purposes the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as it thinks fit. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: a. the opening of new mines and the regulation of mining operations in any area; b. the regulation of the excavation or collection of minerals from any mine; c. the measures to be taken by owners of mines for the purpose of beneficiation of ores, including the provision of suitable contrivances for such purpose; d. the development of mineral resources in any area; e. the notification of all new borings and shaft sinkings and the preservation of bore-hole records, and specimens of cores of all new bore-holes; f. the regulation of the arrangements for the storage of minerals and the stocks thereof that may be kept by any person; g. the submission of samples of minerals from any mine by the owner thereof and the manner in which and the authority to which such samples shall be submitted; and the taking of samples of any minerals from any mine by the State Government or any other authority specified by it in that behalf; h. the submission by owners of mines of such special or periodical returns and reports as may be specified, and the form in which and the authority to which such returns and reports shall be submitted; i. the regulation of prospecting operations; j. the employment of qualified geologists or mining engineers to supervise prospecting or mining operations; k. the disposal or discharge of waste slime or tailings arising from any mining or metallurgical operations carried out in a mine; l. the manner in which and the authority by which directions may be issued to the owners of any mine to do or refrain from doing certain things in the interest of conservation or systematic development of minerals or for the protection of environment by preventing or controlling pollution which may caused by prospecting or mining operations; m. the maintenance and submission of such plans, registers or records as may be specified by the Government; n. the submission of records or reports by persons carrying on prospecting or mining operations regarding any research in mining or geology carried out by them; o. the facilities to be afforded by persons carrying out prospecting or mining operations to persons authorized by the Central Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining or geology; p. the procedure for and the manner of imposition of fines for the contravention of any of the rules framed under this section and the authority who may impose such fines; and q. the authority to which, the period within which, the form and the manner in which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under this Act and the rules made thereunder may be made, the fee to paid and the documents which should accompany such applications. (3) All rules made under this section shall be binding on the Government.” A perusal of Section 18 leaves no room for any doubt, that herein again it is the Central government which has exclusive power to formulate and to take such steps as are necessary for the conservation and systematic “development” of minerals. 34. From the “third part”, reference also deserves to be made to Section 23C of Mines and Minerals Act. Section 23C aforementioned is being extracted hereunder:- “23C. Power of State Government to make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- (a) establishment of check-posts for checking of minerals under transit; (b) establishment of weigh-bridges to measure the quantity of mineral being transported; (c) regulation of mineral being transported from the area granted under a prospecting licence or a mining lease or a quarrying licence or a permit, in whatever name the permission to excavate minerals, has been given; (d) inspection, checking and search of minerals at the place of excavation or storage or during transit; e. maintenance of registers and forms for the purposes of these rules; (f) the period within which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority be preferred under any rule made under this section and the fees to be paid therefor and powers of such authority for disposing of such applications; and (g) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed for the purpose of prevention of illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 30, the Central Government shall have no power to revise any order passed by a State Government or any of its authorized officers or any authority under the rules made under sub-sections (1) and (2).” A perusal of Section 23C leaves no room for any doubt, that under the “third part” the subject of “preventing” illegal mining, illegal transportation of minerals and illegal storage of minerals, has been vested with the concerned State governments. 35. 35. On the basis of the inferences drawn in the foregoing three paragraphs it would be reasonable to conclude, that if the subject matter of the impugned order falls under the “first part”, the State government would have no authority. Likewise, if the subject matter of the impugned order would fall under the “second part”, again the State government would have no authority. But if the subject matter of the impugned order would fall under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act under the “third part”, then in our view, the State government would have the exclusive power and authority, to pass the required orders. 36. From a collective perusal of Sections 13, 15, 17A, 18 and 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, the scheme of control over different fields, covered by the Mines and Minerals Act, becomes clear. From the aforesaid, there can be no doubt, that the scheme of the Mines and Minerals Act vests the authority of making rules for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals under Section 23C aforementioned, with the concerned State government. And thereby, also vests the concerned State government with the executive authority to deal with the subjects envisaged under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. The question which arises for consideration from the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 neither relates to “regulation” of mines and minerals (falling in the first part), nor to “development” of mines and minerals (falling in the second part), but pointedly relates to the subject of “preventing” illegal mining activities (falling under the third part) under Section 23C thereof. As such, there can be no doubt that the State executive had the jurisdictional authority, and competence to issue the impugned orders. 37. It needs to be kept in mind, that if the measures introduced by the Central government, under the first two parts of the Mines and Minerals Act, are legitimately carried on, thee would be no difficulty. The difficulty would arise only on account of a violation thereof. But then, if the “regulatory” and “developmental” measures are violated, would the Central government be in an effective position to deal with the same within the territories of different States? It must also be understood, that the minerals found in the geographical area of a State, are owned by the State government concerned. But then, if the “regulatory” and “developmental” measures are violated, would the Central government be in an effective position to deal with the same within the territories of different States? It must also be understood, that the minerals found in the geographical area of a State, are owned by the State government concerned. The Central government has no ownership rights in respect of mineral. In case of violation of norms, or terms and conditions, the loosing party, therefore is the State government. In this behalf reference may be made to, State of Orissa vs. Union of India, 1995 Supp (2) SC 154, wherein it has been held, that the State government is the owner of the minerals found in the State. It is therefore, that measure to prevent illegal mining activities have been vested with the respective State governments under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. In this behalf entries 1 and 2 in the State List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, also have to be kept in mind. Therefore, the authority to prevent illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals in violation of the regulatory and developmental measures introduced by the Central government, came to be vested with the State government, under the Mines and Minerals Act also. Thus viewed, it would be justified to conclude, that the jurisdictional authority to pass the impugned orders, which purport to have been issued to prevent the aforesaid illegal activities, were clearly within the domain and jurisdiction of the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding that the State government was fully competent to issue the impugned orders. 38. It is also possible to conclude, from a collective reading of Sections 23C and 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act, that the area of jurisdiction vested in the State governments, as is covered under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, is exclusively vested in the State government. Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act, is being extracted hereunder:- “30. Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act, is being extracted hereunder:- “30. Power of revision of Central Government: The Central Government may, of its own motion or on application made with the prescribed time by an aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act, (with respect to any mineral other than minor mineral).” A perusal of Section 30 reveals that the Central government has the revisional authority to examine and consider the veracity of all orders passed by the State government, under the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act. The jurisdiction vested in the Central government under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act, however, does not extend to the field of jurisdiction covered under Section 23C of Mines and Minerals Act. In so far as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, reference may be made to sub section (3) of Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, which expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Central government, from exercising revisional jurisdiction, in respect of the orders passed by the State government under the rules framed by the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it needs to be appreciated, that orders passed by the State government, on the basis of rules framed by the State government under Section 23C, are not revisable under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals Act. On the instant aspect of the matter reference deserves to be made to Section 23C(2)(f) of the Mines and Minerals Act, which leaves no room for any doubt, that the revisional jurisdiction, so as to assail the orders passed by the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, also rests, with the State government. Accordingly we hereby hold that the jurisdiction of the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act is absolute and exclusive, and even the Central government cannot traverse into the same. 39. In so far as the contention advanced by the Additional Solicitor General of India is concerned, namely, that the State government has no authority to ban “export” of minerals from the State of Karnataka, in as much as, the jurisdiction to pass such an order is with the Central government. 39. In so far as the contention advanced by the Additional Solicitor General of India is concerned, namely, that the State government has no authority to ban “export” of minerals from the State of Karnataka, in as much as, the jurisdiction to pass such an order is with the Central government. We are of the view, that the instant submission does not arise for consideration, under the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act. The veracity of the instant contention advanced by the Additional Solicitor General of India, shall be taken into consideration, at a later stage of the instant order, wherein we have exclusively dealt with the contention pertaining to the subject of “export” raised at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 40. We also find no merit in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the exercise of executive authority at the hands of the State government in matters specially defined under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, would be impermissible unless permitted under the rules framed. We are satisfied that the executive power of the State government, extends to the same area, as the State has the power to frame rules, whether or not the rules have been framed. The determination by the Apex Court, in State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia’s case (supra), relied on by the learned Advocate General, leaves no room for any doubt on the instant aspect of the matter. 41. Having read and re-read the contents of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, we have no doubt, that the impugned orders have been passed keeping in view the alleged activity of illegal mining, illegal transportation, as also, illegal storage of iron ore in the State of Karnataka. Thus viewed, we are satisfied, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, were well within the jurisdiction, competence and authority of the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, we are satisfied that there is no merit in the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Second Contention (… the action of the State government in the impugned orders being “prohibitory” in nature, is unacceptable in law): 42. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, we are satisfied that there is no merit in the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Second Contention (… the action of the State government in the impugned orders being “prohibitory” in nature, is unacceptable in law): 42. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that in action which is “prohibitory” in nature as the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, cannot be considered to be “regulatory” in nature. Referring to the provisions contained in Mines and Minerals Act, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that liberty has been granted to the State government to frame rules for “regulating” certain activities connected with mining. It is submitted that all kinds of “regulatory” actions result in promoting the activity under reference, whereas, all “prohibitory” actions, totally put an end to the concerned activity. It is submitted, that even if it is presumed for the sake of arguments, that the State government, had the authority to pass certain orders under Section 23C, it was open to the State government to pass only such orders, which were aimed at “regulating” activities relating to mining and minerals. Inviting our attention to the language of the provision, it is asserted, that under Section 23C of he Mines and Minerals Act, it is open to the State government only to “regulate” the activities pertaining to mines and minerals. It is, accordingly asserted, that it is not open to the State government to put an end thereto, by issuing “prohibitory” orders in the nature of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. It is pointed out, that since the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, were “prohibitory” in nature, they were legally unsustainable under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. 43. Reference was also made to paragraph 35 of judgment in the case of Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. Etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1962 SC 1406 . “35. …. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good conditions of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and, similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good conditions of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and, similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions: for without it, the necessary lines of communications, such as roads, waterways and air-ways cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing for necessary services to enable the free movement of traffic, whether charged or not cannot also be described as restrictions impeding the freedom”. 44. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in order to support his aforesaid contention, placed reliance also on the judgment rendered in State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah ( AIR 1967 SC 1189 ). Learned counsel placed specific reliance on the following observations:-(4) It was contended on behalf of the State that the two provisos were regulatory and not prohibitory. It was urged that every injunction in the form of a prohibition cannot be regarded as a restriction upon the right to transport, and reliance was placed upon the form of clauses (b), (j) and (1) of sub-s. (2) of S.37. What is decisive in each case, it was submitted, is not the form of the rule, but the substance thereof, and that the provisos sought merely to regulate transport of forest produce. Clause (b) of S.37(2) prohibits import, export, collection and movement of forest produce without a pass. The prohibition is, it is common ground, regulatory of the right to transport forest produce. Under clause (j) rules may be made imposing prohibition against the closing up or obstruction of the channel, or banks of any river used for the transport of forest produce, and under clause (1) rules may be made prohibiting absolutely or subject to conditions, the establishment of sawpits, or saw mills or any other sawing contrivance. But cls. (j) and (i) do not operate to prohibit or restrict the transport of any forest produce. (5) Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated by the G two provisos to R.2 is not to be found in any of the clauses of subs. But cls. (j) and (i) do not operate to prohibit or restrict the transport of any forest produce. (5) Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated by the G two provisos to R.2 is not to be found in any of the clauses of subs. (2) of S.37. By sub-sec. (1) the State Government is invested with the power to regulate transport of forest produce “in transit by land or water”. The power which the State Government may exercise is however power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie, a rule which totally prohibits the movement of forest produce during the period between sun-set and sun-rise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce. A rule regulating transport in its essence permits transport, subject to certain conditions, devised to promote transport: such a rule aims at making transport orderly so that it does not harm or endanger other persons following a similar vocation or the public, and enables transport to function for the public good. It was observed by one of us (Subba Rao, J.), in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 1963-1 SCR 491 at p.549: ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 at p.1430): “Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good conditions of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and, similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions: for without it, the necessary lines of communications, such as roads, water-ways and airways cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing for necessary services to enable the free movement of traffic, whether charged or not cannot also be described as restrictions impeding the freedom”. 45. In order to support the legal proposition being projected by him, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Union of India and others v. Asian Food Industries (2006) 13 SCC 542, wherefrom, our attention was invited to the following observations. “11. 45. In order to support the legal proposition being projected by him, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Union of India and others v. Asian Food Industries (2006) 13 SCC 542, wherefrom, our attention was invited to the following observations. “11. Before adverting to the questions raised in these appeals, we may notice the statutory provisions operating in the field. 12. Parliament enacted the Customs Act, 1962 (for short “the 1962 Act”) to consolidate and amend the law relating to Customs. Section 11 of the 1962 Act empowers the Central Government to prohibit importation and exportation of goods. Section 16 provides for date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of export goods in the following terms: “16. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of export goods. – (1) The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any export goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force, - (a) in the case of goods entered for export under Section 50, on the date on which the proper officer makes an order permitting clearance and loading of the goods for exportation under Section 51; (b) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty. (2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to baggage and goods exported by post”. 13. xxx xxx xxx 14. Chapter VII of the 1962 Act inter alia provides for the procedures for clearance of export of goods. Section 50 postulates that the exporter of any goods shall make entry thereof by presenting to the proper officer in the case of goods to be exported in a vessel or aircraft, a shipping bill and, while presenting, shall at the foot thereof make and subscribe to a declaration as to the truth of its contents. Section 51 provides for clearance of goods for exportation in the following terms: “51. Clearance of goods for exportation. – Where the proper officer is satisfied that any goods entered for export are not prohibited goods and the exporter has paid the duty, if any, assessed thereon and any charges payable under this Act in respect of the same, the proper officer may make an order permitting clearance and loading of the goods for exportation”. 15. – Where the proper officer is satisfied that any goods entered for export are not prohibited goods and the exporter has paid the duty, if any, assessed thereon and any charges payable under this Act in respect of the same, the proper officer may make an order permitting clearance and loading of the goods for exportation”. 15. Parliament also enacted the 1992 Act to provide for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports into and augmenting exports from India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 16. “Export” has been defined to mean taking out of India any goods by land, sea or air. Section 3 of the 1992 Act empowers the Central Government to make provisions by order published in the official gazette for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports and increasing exports. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 thereof empowers the Central Government to make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise regulating in all cases or in specified classes of cases and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order, the import or export of goods. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that all goods to which an order under sub-section (2) applies would be deemed to be the goods the import or export of which has been prohibited under Section 11 of the 1962 Act and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly. 17. Section 5 of the 1992 Act provides that the Central Government may from time to time formulate and announce, by notification in the official gazette, the export and import policy and in the like manner amend that policy. 26. A citizen of India has a fundamental right to carry out the business of export, subject, of course to the reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by law. Such a reasonable restriction was imposed in terms of the 1992 Act. 30. The implementation of the said policy was to be made in terms of the procedures laid down in the Handbook. The provisions of the 1992 Act, the Foreign Trade Policy and the procedures laid down thereunder, thus, provide for a composite scheme. In implementing the said provisions of the scheme, in the event an order of prohibition, restriction or regulation is passed, the provisions of the 1962 Act mutatis mutandis would apply. 43. The provisions of the 1992 Act, the Foreign Trade Policy and the procedures laid down thereunder, thus, provide for a composite scheme. In implementing the said provisions of the scheme, in the event an order of prohibition, restriction or regulation is passed, the provisions of the 1962 Act mutatis mutandis would apply. 43. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that in certain circumstances regulation may amount to prohibition. But, ordinarily the word “regulate” would mean to control or to adjust by rule or to subject to governing principles (see U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations v. West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn.) whereas the word “prohibit” would mean to forbid by authority or command. The expressions “regulate” and “prohibit” inhere in them elements of restriction but it varies in degree. The element of restriction is inherent both in regulative measures as well as in prohibitive or preventive measures. 44. We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. Stated the law thus: (SCC p. 243, para 34) “34. It appears that a distinction between ‘regulation’ and ‘restriction’ or ‘prohibition’ has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corpn. Of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. ‘Regulation’ promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas ‘prohibition’ obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. Oxford English Dictionary does not define ‘regulate’ to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contended itself with the use of the word ‘regulating’ without using the word ‘prohibiting’ or some such word, to bring out that effect”. 46. In order to repudiate the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is the submission of the learned Advocate General, that the action of the State government should not be considered as a total ban or “prohibition”, inasmuch as no mining activity has been banned, and iron ore is being mined by those who hold mining leases, as hitherto before. Referring to the pleadings in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners to assail the validity of the impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.7.2010, it is submitted that none of the petitioners has expressed, that it has been stopped from carrying out mining activity under the mining leases granted to them. It is also submitted, that none of the petitioners have actually stopped the activity of mining iron ore, as a consequence of the directions contained in the impugned orders. It is, therefore, asserted that all mining activity in the State of Karnataka is continuing uninterrupted. Secondly, it is asserted, that the transportation of iron ore for domestic use is also carrying on undeterred, and that, the impugned orders have no effect over any domestic activity. Likewise, it is contended that even if iron ore is to be used domestically, in a State other than the State of Karnataka, mining lease holders are permitted to transport iron ore even beyond the borders of the State of Karnataka. Accordingly, it is sought to be suggested that the plea of total “prohibition” pressed at the hands of the petitioners is wholly unjustified. 47. Again inviting this Court’s attention to the fact, that there was extensive illegal iron ore mining, coupled with transportation of illegally mined iron ore, as also, illegal storage thereof, the State government vide orders dated 12.3.2007 and 09.09.2008 referred the matter pertaining to the aforestated illegal mining activities for investigation to the Karnataka Lokayukta, and sought his specific recommendations. It is contended, that the final report of the Lokayukta is expected in about six months. Till then, it is in the interest of the State of Karnataka, as also in the national interest, that iron ore be not exported. It is asserted at the hands of the Advocate General, that restrictions on the transportation of iron ore for export out of India, had been imposed because it would be impossible to recover illegally mined iron ore, if the same crosses over the borders of the country. The aforesaid limited ban, according to the Advocate General, has been imposed to prevent any permanent loss of revenue to the State of Karnataka, as also, any permanent consequential loss of mineral resources of the nation. The aforesaid limited ban, according to the Advocate General, has been imposed to prevent any permanent loss of revenue to the State of Karnataka, as also, any permanent consequential loss of mineral resources of the nation. It is submitted, that once iron ore has been exported, the investigating agencies would also be handicapped from determining, whether the exported iron ore was procured out of legitimate mining activity, or as a result of illegal operations. 48. It is also the contention of the learned Advocate General, that the State government had framed the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation of Transport) Rules 2008 to prevent illegal mining operations. It is submitted that some of the petitioners had approached this Court by filing writ petitions, wherein this Court had stayed the operation of the aforesaid Rules. Since operation of the Rules framed by the State government under Section 23C of the Mines and Mineral Act has been stayed, the State government was handicapped from taking any action against those engaged in the illegal activity of mining iron ore. It is submitted, that after the operation of the provisions of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation of Transport), Rules, were stayed, the said rules could not be invoked to stop illegal mining activity in the State. It is, therefore, that it became imperative for the State government to issue the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. It is acknowledged, that this Court on 24.9.2010 passed an order in M/s. Kumaraswamy Minerals Exports and others vs. State of Karnataka and others (W.P.No.6985/2008) bringing back to life the provisions of the aforesaid Rules. It is submitted, that by the aforesaid order dated 24.9.2010 (by which all the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of) certain amendments have been required to be carried out in the aforesaid Rules. The said amendments being in consonance with the views expressed by the State government, would not obstruct the activity of the State government in implementing the objectives contained in Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, (to prevent illegal mining, illegal transportation and illegal storage of iron ore, from within the State of Karnataka). But then (it is pointed out), the Court order dated 24.9.2010 was not available when the impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 27.8.2010 were passed. But then (it is pointed out), the Court order dated 24.9.2010 was not available when the impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 27.8.2010 were passed. It is the vehement contention of the learned Advocate General, that the State government had no other alternative, but to pass the said orders, specially during the period when the operation of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation of Transport) Rules, 2008 had been stayed. 49. Continuing his submission further, it is asserted by the learned Advocate General, that the State had to streamline the measures required for preventing recurrence of illegal mining, and in this regard, several steps like constitution of “special cells”, constitution of “composite check-posts”, installation of “closed circuit television” “cameras”, computerization of check-posts, regulation of stockyard licences, etc, have already been put in place. It is submitted, that as soon as the entire process of preventing the activity of illegal mining, illegal transportation and illegal storage of iron ore takes final shape, the impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.7.2010 would be withdrawn, leaving it open to the petitioners, to carry on with their obligations on the basis of their contractual undertakings, even with parties outside the territories of India. It is, therefore, reiterated that the action of the State government in issuing the impugned orders, cannot be described as “prohibitory”. In order to substantiate the instant contention advanced on behalf of the State government, the Court’s attention was invited to the observations recorded in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1170 , wherein it was inter-alia held as under: “The executive action which was upheld in that case was, it is true, not supported by legislation, but it did not operate to the prejudice of any citizen. In the State of Punjab prior to 1950 the text books used in recognized schools were prepared by private publishers and they were submitted for approval of the Government. 1950 the State Government published text books in certain subjects, and in other subjects the State Government approved text books submitted by publishers and authors. In 1952 a notification was issued by the Government inviting only “authors and others” to submit text books for approval by the Government. Under agreements with the authors and others the copyright in the text books vested absolutely in the State and the authors and others received royalty on the sale of those text books. In 1952 a notification was issued by the Government inviting only “authors and others” to submit text books for approval by the Government. Under agreements with the authors and others the copyright in the text books vested absolutely in the State and the authors and others received royalty on the sale of those text books. The petitioners – a firm carrying on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books – then moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for writs of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications of 1950 and 1952 on the ground that they contravened the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution. It was held by this Court that the action of Government did not amount to infraction of the guarantee under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, since no fundamental rights of the petitioners were violated by the notifications and the acts of the executive Government done in furtherance of their policy of nationalization of text books for students. It is true that the dispute arose before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, amending inter alia, art. 298 was enacted, and there was no legislation authorizing the State Government to enter the field of business of printing, publishing and selling text books. It was contended in support of the petition in Ram Jawaya’s case, 1955-2 SCR 225: ( AIR 1955 SC 549 ), that without legislative authority the Government of the State could not enter the business of printing, publishing and selling text books. The court held that by the action of the Government no rights of the petitioners were infringed, since a mere change or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest or undertaking. It is clear that the State of Punjab had done no act which infringed a right of any citizen; the State had merely entered upon a trading venture. By entering into competition with the citizens, it did not infringe their rights. Viewed in the light of these facts the observations relied upon do not support the contention that the State or its officers may in exercise of executive authority infringe the rights of the citizens merely because the Legislature of the State has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is issued”. 50. Viewed in the light of these facts the observations relied upon do not support the contention that the State or its officers may in exercise of executive authority infringe the rights of the citizens merely because the Legislature of the State has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is issued”. 50. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the rival parties, in so far as the second contention is concerned. In our considered view, the equities in respect of the controversy have to be determined by taking into consideration the factual position depicted on behalf of the State government, as have been noticed hereinabove. It is not possible for us to ignore the interim report submitted by the Karnataka Lokayukta, pointing out the irregularities in mining including mining from areas not covered by the mining lease, mining by trespassing into forest areas and into government revenue land. It is also not possible to ignore, illegal transportation of iron ore and the effect thereof on the biological and socio-economic environment of the area, where mining activity is been carried out. It is also not possible to overlook, misuse of bulk transport permits which are used for transporting illegally mined iron ore. Or to ignore, even the irregularities in the grant and use of stock yard licenses mentioned in the interim report of Karnataka Lokayukta. A balanced view has to be taken by weighing the private individual interests of the petitioners (who are engaged in the export of iron ore from the State of Karnataka to countries beyond the territories of India), and the interest of the State. We are also of the view, that the State government had no other alternative when the operation of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation of Transport) Rules, 2008 was stayed by this Court, while entertaining certain writ petitions filed by some of the petitioners themselves. At that juncture, the State government resorted to the use of its executive authority, to prevent imminent and permanent losses to the State, as also, to the nature by issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. 51. At that juncture, the State government resorted to the use of its executive authority, to prevent imminent and permanent losses to the State, as also, to the nature by issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. 51. It is not possible for us in the background of the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate General to accept that the measures adopted are “prohibitory” in nature, inasmuch no mining activity in the State has been banned, and iron ore is being mined by those who hold mining licences as hitherto before. Even transportation of iron ore for domestic use is carrying on undeterred, including to States other than the State of Karnataka (but within the territory of India) as hitherto before. As we have been expressly informed, that the impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.7.2010 would be withdrawn, immediately after the regulatory measures to prevent illegal activities pertaining to mining, transportation and storage of iron ore, are put in place. According to our understanding from the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate General, the operation of the impugned orders would ordinarily not extend beyond the period of six months (from the date of their issue), as by then everything would be in place and the State government would have implemented the recommendations made by the Karnataka Lokayukta. An issue, which by its very nature is “Temporary” cannot be considered to be “prohibitory”. When the action taken is, only for introducing “regulatory” measures, whereafter all the activities would stand restored, including the export of iron-ore, it is difficult to accept that the impugned orders are “prohibitory” in nature. More over, the question whether the measures adopted are “regulatory” or “prohibitory”, has to be deciphered from the pleadings in the writ petitions. The pleadings in the writ petitions, to assail the impugned orders, are of no assistance to lead to any such inference. The categoric stance of the Advocate General, that the impugned orders were issued so as to put in place measures for preventing export of illegally mined iron ore, also leads to the same inference. For the reasons recorded hereinabove we find no merit in the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Third Contention (…. The State government, has acted beyond its authority, by interfering with the private contractual obligations legally entered into by the petitioners): 52. For the reasons recorded hereinabove we find no merit in the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Third Contention (…. The State government, has acted beyond its authority, by interfering with the private contractual obligations legally entered into by the petitioners): 52. The next ie., the third contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 had resulted in invading into the private contractual rights vested in the petitioners. It is pointed out, that private contractual rights cannot be adversely affected, by an executive order of the State government. It is submitted, that it is a well settled principle, that fundamental rights, as also, other private rights cannot be altered by an executive order. It is the pointed submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the impugned orders violate the protection envisaged under Article 301 of the Constitution of India, by imposing restrictions on the activities of the petitioners. Article 301 of the Constitution of India relied upon by the petitioners is being extracted hereunder: “301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse – Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free”. 53. The learned Advocate General, has vehemently contested the aforesaid submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is denied, that the State government has in any manner interfered with the private contractual obligations of the petitioners. It is also asserted that Article 301 of the Constitution of India has no relevance to the present controversy. In his submission, reliance was placed on the conclusions drawn in State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1170, wherein it was held as under: “They do not mean, …. That it is only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists, that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them. That it is only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists, that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them. On the other hand, the language of Article 162 clearly indicates that the powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already.” These observations must be read in the light of the facts of the case. The executive action which was upheld in that case was, it is true, not supported by legislation, but it did not operate to the prejudice of any citizen. In the State of Punjab prior to 1950 the text books used in recognized schools were prepared by private publishers and they were submitted for approval of the Government. 1950 the State Government published text books in certain subjects, and in other subjects the State Government approved text books submitted by publishers and authors. In 1952 a notification was issued by the Government inviting only “authors and others” to submit text books for approval by the Government. Under agreements with the authors and others the copyright in the text books vested absolutely in the State and the authors and others received royalty on the sale of those text books. The petitioners - a firm carrying on the business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text books – then moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for writs of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications of 1950 and 1952 on the ground that they contravened the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution. It was held by this Court that the action of Government did not amount to infraction of the guarantee under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, since no fundamental rights of the petitioners were violated by the notifications and the acts of the executive Government done in furtherance of their policy of nationalization of text books for students. It is true that the dispute arose before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, amending inter alia, art. 298 was enacted, and there was no legislation authorizing the State Government to enter the field of business of printing, publishing and selling text books. It is true that the dispute arose before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, amending inter alia, art. 298 was enacted, and there was no legislation authorizing the State Government to enter the field of business of printing, publishing and selling text books. It was contended in support of the petition in Ram Jawaya’s case, 1955-2 SCR 225: ( AIR 1955 SC 549 ), that without legislative authority the Government of the State could not enter the business of printing, publishing and selling text books. The court held that by the action of the Government no rights of the petitioners were infringed, since a mere change or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest or undertaking. It is clear that the State of Punjab had done no act which infringed a right of any citizen; the State had merely entered upon a trading venture. By entering into competition with the citizens, it did not infringe their rights. Viewed in the light of these facts the observations relied upon do not support the contention that the State or its officers may in exercise of executive authority infringe the rights of the citizens merely because the Legislature of the State has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is issued.” 54. We have considered the third contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In our instant consideration, it is necessary to take note of the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate General, while refuting the second contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Suffice it to mention that during the course of hearing, none of the learned Counsel representing the parties, in any of the cases, had invited our attention to their contractual agreement with third parties, so as to demonstrate, that they would not be in a position to effectively carry out their obligations under the contracts executed by them. Secondly, the controversy which is subject matter of consideration in the present writ petitions does not relate to an activity, which was hitherto being carried out by the petitioners, and which has now been prevented from due execution. The impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.7.2010 have no such effect. Secondly, the controversy which is subject matter of consideration in the present writ petitions does not relate to an activity, which was hitherto being carried out by the petitioners, and which has now been prevented from due execution. The impugned orders dated 26.7.2010 and 28.7.2010 have no such effect. Herein the State government has banned certain activities, so as to enable it to put in place regulatory measures, so as to prevent illegal mining, illegal transportation and illegal storage of iron ore, so that the iron ore reserves found in Karnataka are not stolen by unscrupulous persons. And so that, the mineral wealth of the State is not lost for all times to come, on account of illegal mining activities at the hands of unscrupulous persons. Thirdly according to the learned Advocate General the impugned orders are of a temporary nature, and will cease to be operative after the expiry of a period of about six months. It is difficult for us to appreciate the reliance at the hands of the petitioners, on Article 301 of the Constitution of India. Article 301, extracted above, deals with issues pertaining to trade, commerce and intercourse “within the territory of India”. The impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 have no effect on trade, commerce and intercourse, “within the territory of India”, and as such reliance thereon at the hands of the petitioners, is wholly misconceived. From the inferences drawn by us hereinabove, it is not possible for us to accept, the instant contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the third contention advanced on behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The Fourth Contention (…. Investigations carried out by the Lokayukta cannot be a legitimate basis for passing the impugned orders): 55. The fourth contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, were passed inter-alia, because certain investigations were carried out by the Karnataka State Lokayukta, whereafter certain recommendations were made by him. In this behalf, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the subject matter of controversy raised in the present writ petition could not have been vested by the State government, with the Karnataka State Lokayukta. In this behalf, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the subject matter of controversy raised in the present writ petition could not have been vested by the State government, with the Karnataka State Lokayukta. It is sought to be suggested that the State government was delegating functions which it was bound to discharge on its own. Learned counsel for the petitioner, also placed reliance on Section 7(2A) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, which is being extracted hereunder:- “7. Matters which may be investigated by the Lokayukta and an Upalokayukta. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Lokayukta may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of (i) the Chief Minister; (ii) a Minister or a Secretary; (iii) a member of the State Legislature; or (iv) any other public servant being a public servant of a class notified by the State Government in consultation with the Lokayukta in this behalf; in any case where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, an Upalokayukta may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of, any public servant not being the Chief Minister, Minister, Member of the Legislature, Secretary or other public servant referred to in sub-section (1), in any case where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action or such action can be or could have been, in the opinion of the Upalokayukta, the subject of a grievance or an allegation. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta may investigate any action taken by or with the general or specific approval of a public servant, if it is referred to him by the State government. (3) Where two or more Upalokayuktas are appointed under this Act, the Lokayukta may, by general or special order, assign to each of them matters which may be investigated by them under this Act. (3) Where two or more Upalokayuktas are appointed under this Act, the Lokayukta may, by general or special order, assign to each of them matters which may be investigated by them under this Act. Provided that no investigation made by an Upalokayukta under this Act, and no action taken or things done by him in respect of such investigation shall be open to question on the ground only that such investigation relates to a matter which is not assigned to him by such order. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) to (3), when an Upalokayukta is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, his function may be discharged by the other Upalokayukta, if any and if there is no other Upalokayukta by the Lokayukta”. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners based on Section 7(2A) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Lokayukta Act) that irrespective of the “interim” findings recorded by the Karnataka Lokayukta (though no “final” findings have presently been recorded by the Lokayukta) no final conclusion can be drawn thereon. And no action can be initiated on the basis of the report of the Lokayukta, whether interim or final. According to learned counsel, taking action on the basis of investigations carried out by the Lokayukta, was clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. It is submitted, that first the State government must verify the authenticity of the investigation carried out by the Karnataka Lokayukta. If the same are found to be correct, it should apply its independent mind, to determine what remedial measures should be adopted. It is submitted, that it appears that the State government has abrogated its authority to the Karnataka Lokayukta. It is also contended, that the factual position expressed by the petitioners (noted under the heading – Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners) would demonstrate, that the instant action against the petitioners is totally uncalled for, as the same has far reaching adverse consequences. 56. It is also contended, that the factual position expressed by the petitioners (noted under the heading – Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners) would demonstrate, that the instant action against the petitioners is totally uncalled for, as the same has far reaching adverse consequences. 56. Keeping in view the fourth contention advanced at the hands of the petitioners, we were constrained to ask the Advocate General ‘whether the Government machinery in the State of Karnataka had failed?’ We wanted to know whether, the Police Department, the Department of Mines and Geology, the Forest Department, the Transport Department, as well as, the Revenue Department were incompetent to discharge their duties? We desire to be satisfied why the Revenue Department could not, on its own, determine whether mining lease holders were carrying out their activities, within or beyond, the specific area stipulated in the lease agreements? We also wished to know why, the Forest Department could not on its own protect forest areas, which according to the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were being exploited by unscrupulous persons engaged in illegal mining and transportation of iron ore? We also wished to find out, why the Transport Department could not ensure that lorries and trucks are not permitted to carry iron-ore beyond the permissible capacity? As also, why transport permits issued to carry iron-ore from the mine head, to the factory/port/railway head, were being permitted to be misused? 57. In response to the averments made in the fourth submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as also the querries posed by us, the learned Advocate General, invited our attention to the factual narration recorded under the heading – “Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents”, so as to contend, that the action taken by the State government, was not only bona fide but was also justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case, which involved destruction of the environment and plundering of the States mineral wealth. He painstakingly, reiterated the entire background, which had prompted the State government, to pass the impugned orders. He concluded by submitting, that the action taken was bona fide and for a genuine and valid consideration. 58. We have given out thoughtful consideration to the fourth contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. He painstakingly, reiterated the entire background, which had prompted the State government, to pass the impugned orders. He concluded by submitting, that the action taken was bona fide and for a genuine and valid consideration. 58. We have given out thoughtful consideration to the fourth contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In so far as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it would be relevant to notice, that a spurt of demand of iron ore in the global market commenced from the year 2001. The aforesaid demand led to its deficiency and accordingly, resulted in escalation of the prices and consequential profitability from iron-ore. The grant of mining licenses, itself became a coveted claim. Even the release of mining licenses became a matter of public debate. Since quick money could be made out of this activity, illegal mining came to be carried out in a big way. Mining activity was extended even to, government revenue land and forest areas, which were exploited without any deterrent. Illegally mined iron ore, had to the illegally transported, before profits could be earned therefrom. Therefore, illegal transportation of iron ore also took strong roots in the State. The extensive proportion of these activities had a devastating effect on public perception. Eventually the matter even came to be debated in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly and the Karnataka Legislative Council. Allegations came to be leveled across the board, with each political party blaming its rival. Public debate on the issue took express notice, of the loss caused to the State mineral wealth, as also, revenue losses to the State exchequer. A former Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, was nominated to probe into the matter of illegal mining of iron-ore. In the meantime allegations about the involvement of Ministers in the aforestated illegal activities also came to be leveled. The government was put on a back foot. So as to demonstrate fairness and impartiality, the task of carrying out investigations into the allegations was vested with the Karnataka Lokayukta. It would be pertinent to mention, that Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India was holding the office of the Karnataka Lokayukta, at the relevant juncture. So as to demonstrate fairness and impartiality, the task of carrying out investigations into the allegations was vested with the Karnataka Lokayukta. It would be pertinent to mention, that Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India was holding the office of the Karnataka Lokayukta, at the relevant juncture. The image of the Karnataka Lokayukta in the State of Karnataka, in public perception, being that a impeccable integrity and honesty, it was felt that an investigation at his hands, and the implementation of his recommendations (which would be made by him) would ameliorate, resurrect and elevate the government’s image on the issue. Since under Section 7(2A) of the Lokayukta Act, a direction can be issued to the Karnataka Lokayukta requiring him to carry out an investigation. An order came to be passed, requiring the Karnataka Lokayukta to investigate and make necessary recommendations on the issue of illegal mining of iron-ore in the State of Karnataka. In his interim report dated 18.12.2008, the Karnataka Lokayukta affirmed, that large scale illegal mining and transportation of iron ore in the State of Karnataka were going on at the hands of the mining mafia. The interim report referred to above, found almost all those engaged in mining of iron-ore, were either facing prosecution, or had assailed (before one court, or the other) the actions initiated by the State government against them. 59. In the background of factual position noticed herein above, it is not possible for us to doubt the bonafides of the State government. Firstly, in having vested the responsibility of investigation in the Karnataka Lokayukta, and thereupon, having relied upon the interim report dated 18.12.2008 for passing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. The State government not only relied upon the investigation carried out by the Karnataka Lokayukta, but also accepted the recommendations made by him. We appreciate the factual position (pertaining to the lead case and one other case) as has been delineated under the heading – “Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners”. We also appreciate, the vehement contention, at the hands of the petitioners, during the course of hearing, that no cases were pending against two of the petitioners. Yet, it is not possible to record a finding of guilt against some, and a finding of innocence against others. We also appreciate, the vehement contention, at the hands of the petitioners, during the course of hearing, that no cases were pending against two of the petitioners. Yet, it is not possible to record a finding of guilt against some, and a finding of innocence against others. We are of the view, that the approach adopted by the State government by issuing the impugned orders is most reasonable. The State government desired to put in place regulatory measures to curb the alleged mass scale illegal mining activity in the State. When there is a public hue and cry, and when, the matter reaches the legislatures in the State, it is not easy for a Court to ignore the out-cry, that something is seriously wrong. Even the Karnataka Lokayukta has affirmed the prevalence of mass scale illegal mining activity, in his interim report dated 18.12.2008. Although the State government should have acted with a strong hand, when the seeds of the said illegal activity commenced to sprout, yet it is futile to cry over spilled milk. It is never too late, to act in the interest of the State, so as to protect whatever remains. It is improper to ignore, that the basis of passing the impugned orders were a sequence of facts including the interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta. The facts that have been taken into consideration, included discovery of huge quantities of illegally mined iron ore at various ports in the State, ready for being exported to foreign countries, reveal a substantial truth in the matter. As an emergent measure, the State government, passed the impugned orders to put the mining activities in order. No court can come in the way of such a cause. The State government acted on the basis of a long sequence of facts including the interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta. And not, solely on the said report of the Lokayukta. Thus viewed, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the petitioners, that the action taken by the State government was arbitrary, or that it was merely based on the recommendation of the Karnataka Lokayukta, in his interim report. For the aforesaid reasons, it is not possible to accept the submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, even in the fourth contention. The Fifth Contention (…. For the aforesaid reasons, it is not possible to accept the submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, even in the fourth contention. The Fifth Contention (…. The impugned orders, to the extent “export” of iron ore has been banned, are without jurisdiction): 60. The fifth contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was based on, the collective effect of reading Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India along with entry 41 of Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Entry 41 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner reads as under:- “41. Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; definition of customs frontiers.” Based on entry 41 of the Union List, which relates to the subject of trade and commerce with foreign countries, as also, import and export across custom frontiers, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were pointedly aimed at stopping “export” of iron-ore from the State of Karnataka. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the legislative authority on the subjects, contained in entry 41 of the Union List, falls within the domain of the Parliament. The jurisdiction to exercise executive authority, on the aforesaid subject, therefore, would exclusively fall within the domain of the Central government (under Article 73 of the Constitution of India). As such, it was asserted, that even without reference to the provisions of the Constitution of India, and other legislative enactments (relied upon while advancing the earlier four submissions) the action of the State executive, in issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 are liable to be set aside. Stated in other words, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that contracts entered into by the petitioners with importers in foreign countries, cannot be nullified or rendered un-executable by the State government, through the exercise of its execution authority. It was submitted, that the State of Karnataka does not enjoy the privilege to control or interfere with, any aspect of trade and commerce with foreign countries and import and/or “export” across custom frontiers. 61. Based on the subject of entry 41, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that import as well as “export” across custom frontiers, falls within the domain of Parliament. 61. Based on the subject of entry 41, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that import as well as “export” across custom frontiers, falls within the domain of Parliament. It was asserted that the Parliament had promulgated the Customs Act, 1962, and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, which cover the field of import and “export” across custom frontiers. It was pointed out, that the executive power on the aforesaid subjects vest in the Central government, under Article 73 of the Constitution of India. It was contended, that all matters within the ambit and scope of the subjects contained in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India) whether or not Parliament has legislated thereon), as also, all matters in the Concurrent List in respect whereof legislation has not been enacted by a State legislature, are within the executive domain only of the Central government. As such, it was asserted, the subjects falling under entry 41 of the Union List, must be deemed to be out of bounds for executive action at the hands of a State government. 62. It was also contended, that the Parliament having enacted the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Foreign Trade Act’) for which the jurisdiction and the authority of the Parliament flows out of Entry 41 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Accordingly it was submitted, that the Central government alone can issue orders/directions on the subject of “export”. In order to substantiate the instant contention, learned counsel for the petitioners, also placed reliance on Article 162 of the Constitution of India, defining the scope and extent of the executive power of a State. Based on Article 162 of the Constitution of India, it was asserted at the hands of the petitioners, that the power of the State can extend to matters, with respect to which the legislature of a State has power to make laws. It was submitted that the State has no power to make laws in respect of either import or “export” across customs frontiers, and as such, the State of Karnataka, in exercise of its executive power, could not have issued the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, whereby the State government, banned the “export” of iron-ore. 63. It was submitted that the State has no power to make laws in respect of either import or “export” across customs frontiers, and as such, the State of Karnataka, in exercise of its executive power, could not have issued the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, whereby the State government, banned the “export” of iron-ore. 63. Insofar as the Foreign Trade Act is concerned, it was submitted, that the same was enacted for the development and regulation of foreign trade for facilitating imports into India, and for augmenting exports from India, as also, for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. On the issue of Foreign Direct Investment, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, that in the first instance, the limit of Foreign Direct Investment came to be enhanced up to 51% and thereafter to 100%, whereupon, everybody engaged in mining was allowed to export 100% of the mineral ore produced. For the definition of the term ‘import and export’ under Foreign Trade Act, learned counsel invited our attention to Section 2(e). The same is being extracted as hereunder: “2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) to (d) xxx xxx xxxx (e) “Import” and “export” means respectively bringing into, or taking out of, India any goods by land, sea or air”. It was submitted that the activity sought to be banned by the two impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 clearly fall within the term “export” as has been defined under Foreign Trade Act. Learned counsel, then systematically read out Section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act, so as to contend, that absolute authority in respect of directions in the nature of prohibition, regulation or restrictions, relating to export as well as “export” were only vested in the Central government. For the aforesaid purpose emphatic reliance was also placed on Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act. The aforesaid provisions are being reproduced hereunder. “3. Powers to make provisions relating to imports and exports:- (1) The Central Government may, by Order published in the Official Gazette, make provision for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports and increasing exports. The aforesaid provisions are being reproduced hereunder. “3. Powers to make provisions relating to imports and exports:- (1) The Central Government may, by Order published in the Official Gazette, make provision for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports and increasing exports. (2) The Central Government may also, by Order published in the Official Gazette, make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise regulating, in all cases or in specified classes of cases and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the Order, the import or export of goods”. In conjunction with the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act, learned counsel for the petitioners required us to examine certain provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Customs Act’). In the first instance, reliance was placed on sub-clauses (c), (p) and (m) of sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Customs Act. The provisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are being reproduced hereunder: “11. Power to prohibit importation or exportation of goods. – (1) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2), it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance) as may be specified in the notification, the import or export of goods of any specified description. (2) The purposes referred to in sub-section (1) are the following: (a) and (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) the prevention of smuggling; (d) to (l) xxx xxx xxxx (m) the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (n) and (o) xxx xxx xxxx (p) the carrying on of foreign trade in any goods by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State to the exclusion, complete or partial, or citizens of India.” Based on Section 11 of the Customs Act, it was submitted, that in respect of prohibition of any activity for “export” ie., for purposes of prevention of smuggling, conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and carrying on of foreign trade by a State, can be ordered only by the Central government by way of a notification. In order to demonstrate, that the aforesaid power on earlier occasions was exclusively being exercised by the Central government, learned counsel for the petitioners presented for our consideration, a Notification bearing No.18/2006 dated 04.07.2006 whereby the Central government had prohibited export of sugar till the end of the fiscal year. It was, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State government has no authority to pass order(s) on the subject of “export”, including the total prohibition of export of iron ore, in view of Section 11 of the Customs Act referred to hereinabove. Besides the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on Section 11H of the Customs Act, wherein clause (a) defines the term ‘illegal export’. Sub-section (a) of Section 11H of the Customs Act is being extracted hereunder: “11H. Definitions. – In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) “illegal export” means the export of any goods in contravention of the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force.” In addition to the aforesaid, the learned counsel desired us to examine the provisions, which had been brought to the notice of this Court by him, along with Section 2(g) of the Foreign Trade Act, wherein the term ‘licence’ has been defined. Section 2(g) of the Foreign Trade Act is being extracted hereunder: “2(g) “licence” means a licence to import or export and includes a customs clearance permit and any other permission issued or granted under this Act.” It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that all the petitioners are engaged in the export of iron-ore, mined by them in Karnataka and exported to foreign countries. It is further submitted, that all the petitioners are export licence holders. The aforesaid licences have been issued to the petitioners by the Central government allowing them to export iron-ore. It is submitted, that if the licences granted to the petitioners by the Central government were a cause of any grievance to the State of Karnataka, the remedy with the State government was, to seek recourse to the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade Act. Sections 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade are being reproduced hereunder: “15. Appeal. Sections 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade are being reproduced hereunder: “15. Appeal. – (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order made by the Adjudicating Authority under this Act may prefer an appeal, - (b) where the decision or order has been made by the Director General, to the Central Government; (c) where the decision or order has been made by an officer subordinate to the Director General, to the Director General or to any officer superior to the Adjudicating Authority authorized by the Director General to hear the appeal, Within a period of forty-five days from the date on which the decision or order is served on such person; Provided that the Appellate Authority may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the aforesaid period, allow such appeal to be preferred within a further period of thirty days: Provided further that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant: Provided also that, where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose. (2) The Appellate Authority may, after giving to the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, if he so desires, and after making such further inquiries, if any, as it may consider necessary, make such orders as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or reversing the decision or order appealed against, or may send back the case with such directions, as it may think fit, for a fresh adjudication or decision, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary: Provided that an order enhancing or imposing a penalty or redemption charges or confiscating goods of a greater value shall not be made under this section unless the appellant has been given an opportunity of making a representation, and, if he so desires, of being heard in his defence. (3) The order made in appeal by the Appellate Authority shall be final. 16. Revision. (3) The order made in appeal by the Appellate Authority shall be final. 16. Revision. – The Central Government, in the case of any decision or order, not being a decision or order made in an appeal, made by the Director General or the Director General in the case of any decision or order made by any officer subordinate to him, may on its or his own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the records of any proceeding in which a decision or an order imposing a penalty or redemption charges or adjudicating confiscation has been made and against which no appeal has been preferred, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order and made such orders thereon as may be deemed fit: Provided that no decision or order shall be varied under this section so as to prejudicially affect any person unless such person – (a) has, within a period of two years from the date of such decision or order, received a notice to show cause why such decision or order shall not be varied, and (b) has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation and, if he so desires, of being heard in his defence. It is therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State executive has no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter of “export”, and as such, the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, prohibiting “export” of iron-ore mined in India, not only across the customs barriers in Karnataka, but also, across other customs barriers in India, were clearly in excess of jurisdiction and authority vested in the State executive. 64. It is submitted, that the issue, which has to be considered is not of bona fides, or the laudable object sought to be achieved by the State of Karnataka; but whether the State government has the jurisdiction and the power to deal with the said laudable cause. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, with reference to the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act as also to the Customs Act, that the State government did not have the authority to issue the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, whereby the State government banned the export of iron-ore mined in Karnataka. 65. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, with reference to the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act as also to the Customs Act, that the State government did not have the authority to issue the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, whereby the State government banned the export of iron-ore mined in Karnataka. 65. It was also the emphatic contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that allowing and approving the action of the State government (in issuing the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010) would have the effect of destroying the federal structure envisaged by the Constitution of India. Insofar as the federal structure envisaged in the Constitution of India is concerned, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the issue of regulation of “export” from India to foreign countries, was vested either with the Parliament or with the Central government. According to the learned counsel, the State government has breached the well-defined parameters of the federal structure, based on the scheme of distribution of powers, both legislative and executive, under the Constitution of India. 66. In so far as the fifth submission advanced at the hands of the petitioners is concerned, it would be pertinent to mention, that the plea advanced at the hands of the petitioners was fully supported by Additional Solicitor General of India, who entered appearance on behalf of the Union of India ie., respondent No.6 herein. It was the categoric stance of the Union of India, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were not sustainable, to the extent that they had ordered a ban on iron-ore “export”. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the Union of India, as it was at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the subject of “export” falls within the exclusive jurisdiction and domain of the Parliament, and as such, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central government (under Article 73 of the Constitution of India). It is therefore, the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the Union of India, respondent No.6 herein, that the State government had transgressed the barriers of jurisdiction, while issuing the impugned orders whereby “export” of iron-ore had been banned by it. 67. It is therefore, the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the Union of India, respondent No.6 herein, that the State government had transgressed the barriers of jurisdiction, while issuing the impugned orders whereby “export” of iron-ore had been banned by it. 67. We have considered the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as also, at the hands of the Additional Solicitor General of India, on the sixth submission advanced at the hands of the petitioners. Even though we have narrated the facts and the provisions herein above, the purpose thereof was, only to ensure that the submissions advanced at the hands of the petitioners are recorded in the manner they had been advanced before us. While dealing with the sixth submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, we are of the view, that none of the provisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are relevant to the present controversy. The reasons for arriving at the aforesaid conclusion are being recorded by us in the succeeding paragraphs. 68. While examining the present controversy, in order to determine the purpose for which the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were issued, it is necessary for us to pose two questions, and thereupon, respond to the same. The first question would be: “Whether the State government is aggrieved with the action of the petitioners in exporting iron-ore?” And the second, “Whether the State government is desirous of annulling the export contracts procured by the petitioners for exporting iron-ore out of India?” It is not difficult to answer either of the aforesaid questions, for the simple reason, that it is not the case of the petitioners either in their pleadings, or during the course of hearing, that the State government was aggrieved by the action of the petitioners in “exporting” iron-ore, or that, the State government was interested in annulling/canceling the export contracts procured by the petitioners for exporting iron ore. It is therefore apparent, that the impugned orders had not been issued, with reference to the activity of “export” of iron-ore, with which the petitioners are engaged. The impugned orders had apparently been issued, on account of the fact that, large scale illegal mining activities were being carried on in the State of Karnataka, and for curtailing the same, the State government had passed the impugned orders. The impugned orders had apparently been issued, on account of the fact that, large scale illegal mining activities were being carried on in the State of Karnataka, and for curtailing the same, the State government had passed the impugned orders. It would, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that the object in mind was not “export” of iron-ore; but “theft” of iron-ore. 69. On the same analogy, as has been considered by us in the preceding paragraph, we may venture to pose two further questions, as under: “Whether it has been the endeavour of the State government to annul or modify any of the petitioners licenses for “export” of iron-ore?” And, “Whether the action of the State government taken through the impugned orders has resulted in the annulment of the “export” “licenses obtained by the petitioners”? In our considered view, although the second question posed herein above, would seem to fall in some grey area, yet the petitioners would be fully justified in asserting, that if the State government was desirous of annulling the export licenses procured by the petitioners for exporting iron-ore to various countries, they would have had to invoke the provisions of Section 15 and 16 of the Foreign Trade Act. From the sequence of facts noticed in the – “Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents”, we are of the view, that at no juncture, whatsoever, it seems to have been the intention of the State government, to get the export licenses issued by the Central government in favour of the petitioners authorizing them to export iron ore, cancelled. Yet again, the same conclusion as has been drawn as in the foregoing paragraphs has to be recorded, namely, that the object of the State government has never been to have the licenses issued to the petitioners for “export” cancelled or modified, but only to tackle the “theft” related mining activity in the State. 70. In our considered view, the dominant purpose for the State government for passing the impugned orders, was not related to the “export” to iron ore. 70. In our considered view, the dominant purpose for the State government for passing the impugned orders, was not related to the “export” to iron ore. From the sequence of events noticed above, and as were highlighted by the learned Advocate General, and have been recorded under the heading – “Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents”, it emerges that the impugned orders have been passed with the primary object of stopping illegal activities connected with mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore. 71. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated, that in so far as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, there was a spurt of demand of iron ore in the global market commencing from the year 2001. The aforesaid demand, was based on the deficiency of the available iron ore in the global market. This resulted in the escalation of the price and profitability from the activity of iron ore mining. The grant of mining licenses which were earlier routinely issued, came to be considered as an outstanding business proposition. Accordingly, those who were chosen for the grant of mining leases, were considered as favoured individuals, specifically at the hands of those who were denied mining leases. Since making a quick buck, came to be associated with the activity of iron ore mining, the activity of iron ore mining came to be extended, beyond the area for which mining leases had been granted ie., miners started to transgress into government revenue land and forest areas. In order to sell illegally mined iron ore, it had to be transported to the relevant locations either for use in the domestic market, or to ports from where it could be exported. This could be done, only by illegal transport of illegally mined iron-ore. There were far reaching social and environmental implications from the aforesaid illegal activities. Existing means of livelihood like agriculture, etc., were given up in favour of illegal mining of iron-ore. Individuals owning private farm-lands were more interested in extraction of iron-ore, rather than carrying on their farming activities. There was extensive public debate on the issue of illegally mined iron-ore in Karnataka. Public debate on the issue took express notice of the loss caused to the State mineral wealth, as also, revenue loss caused to the State exchequer. Individuals owning private farm-lands were more interested in extraction of iron-ore, rather than carrying on their farming activities. There was extensive public debate on the issue of illegally mined iron-ore in Karnataka. Public debate on the issue took express notice of the loss caused to the State mineral wealth, as also, revenue loss caused to the State exchequer. Eventually, the matter was considered on the floors of the legislative bodies in the State. Allegations and cross allegations were leveled by political parties. Various enquiry commissions were nominated to examine the allegation of illegal mining of iron ore. The Karnataka Lokayukta in his interim report dated 18.12.2008 endorsed the fact, that on minimal financial inputs, there was likelihood of huge profits, in the activity of iron ore mining. According to Karnataka Lokayukta, those engaged in the export of iron ore in Karnataka itself earned profits of about Rs.60,000 crores during the year 2007-2008. The interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta also revealed, that illegal mining activity was being carried out in a big way. From the pleadings contained in the joint statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5, as also from the interim report of the Karnataka Lokayukta, it emerges that out of 153 mining lease holders engaged in mining of major materials, the cases of nearly 99 mining lease holders had been taken up for scrutiny. Out of the aforesaid, 81 mining lease holders were found to be mining iron ore from forest land, and the remaining 18 were found to be mining iron ore from revenue land belonging to the State government. It was also found, that 60 mining lease holders had encroached into forest land, as a result whereof 56 forest offence cases had been registered against them. It is also apparent that 15 charge sheets had been filed before jurisdictional courts for prosecuting mining lease holders, for causing damage to the green cover, flora and fauna, running into several hundred crores of rupees. It also emerges, that a large number of show cause notices had been issued by the Director, Mines and Geology, Karnataka, to erring mining lease holders for termination of their lease agreements. It is therefore apparent, that there was rampant illegal mining activity going on in the State. It is this, that was sought to be remedied through the impugned orders. 72. It is therefore apparent, that there was rampant illegal mining activity going on in the State. It is this, that was sought to be remedied through the impugned orders. 72. From the narration of facts recorded above, it is apparent that the dominant purpose for issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 was to prevent illegal mining, illegal transportation, and illegal storage of iron ore. In sum and substance, the contemplated action taken through the impugned orders, was for preventing “theft” of iron ore from the State of Karnataka, and for no other purpose. In our considered view, therefore the impugned orders had not been issued, with the object of preventing/stopping “export” of iron ore. “Theft” being the dominant purpose of passing the impugned orders, it is not possible for us to accept, that the issue of “export” was the subject matter of consideration while passing the impugned orders. 73. Having arrived at the conclusion recorded by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of the view that none of the provisions of the Foreign Trade Act and/or the Customs Act, relied upon by the petitioners, are relevant for the adjudication of the present controversy. The State government, in our considered view, was fully justified in issuing the impugned orders, as the same fall within the parameters of the authority vested in the State government under Section 23C (1)(g) of the Mines and Minerals Act…. “for the purpose of prevention of illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals….” The instant activity of the State Government, besides falling within the purview of the Mines and Minerals Act, in our considered view, would also fall within the jurisdiction of the State Government under entries 1 and 2 of the State list, contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly, tracing theft of minerals in the State of Karnataka, and taking action in furtherance thereof, is a question of “law and order”, rather than a question of “import and export”. 74. We may draw an analogy, to settle the controversy in hand, from a simple illustration. It may hypothetically be presumed, that a jeweler is authorized to export diamonds, from the State of Karnataka, to a foreign country. Investigation carried out in the State of Karnataka revealed, that the diamonds sought to be exported by the said jeweler, were stolen. Whereupon, the diamonds were confiscated by the State government. It may hypothetically be presumed, that a jeweler is authorized to export diamonds, from the State of Karnataka, to a foreign country. Investigation carried out in the State of Karnataka revealed, that the diamonds sought to be exported by the said jeweler, were stolen. Whereupon, the diamonds were confiscated by the State government. Would the action taken by the concerned authorities in confiscating the diamonds, be treated as an action preventing “export” of diamonds? Or alternatively, would it be treated as an inherent power of State government to prevent an activity of “theft”, so as to maintain law and order? The inevitable answer has to be, that the action of confiscation of stolen diamonds, is unrelatable to the activity of “export”. On the same analogy, the only possible inference in the present case is, that even though the State government has taken action, whereby it has banned the “export” of iron-ore, the said action is for the purpose of preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of iron ore in the territorial jurisdiction of Karnataka, and has no nexus with the “export” of iron ore. 75. At this juncture, it would be necessary to notice, that the learned Advocate General repeatedly informed us, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 had been issued as a temporary measure so as to enable the State government, to put in place certain regulatory measures, to prevent illegal mining of iron-ore in Karnataka. It was sought to be asserted, that if iron-ore illegally mined was permitted to be exported, the State government would loose the possibility of initiating any prosecution in connection therewith, or even the possibility of recovering the illegally mined iron ore. The incidental action of the government to ban “export” of iron-ore, must be seen as a measure adopted to “prevent” illegal mining, transporting and storage of iron-ore, and not the other very around. We are satisfied, that the impugned action, had nothing to do with the activity of “export”, and that, the sole purpose thereof was, to curtail illegal mining activities in the State. In our view, the State government was fully competent to do what it did, under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, as also, under entries 1 and 2 contained in the State List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In our view, the State government was fully competent to do what it did, under Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act, as also, under entries 1 and 2 contained in the State List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Thus viewed, we are satisfied that there is no merit even in the fifth contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Sixth contention (…. the impugned orders violate the rights vested in the petitioners under Article 300A of the Constitution of India): 76. The sixth submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was based on the rights vested with the petitioners under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Article 300A of the Constitution of India is being extracted hereunder:- “300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law – No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that profits were being earned by the petitioners from extracting iron-ore, based on valid mining leases, issued by the State of Karnataka. The sale of aforesaid legitimately mined iron-ore, either in the domestic market, or by way of export to foreign markets, constitutes the petitioner’s property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It was therefore submitted, that the petitioner cannot be deprived of the right to such property, through the impugned executive orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. It was submitted, that heavy losses are being suffered by the petitioners, on account of the passing of the impugned orders, which have the effect of depriving the petitioners the right to fulfill their contractual obligations, which they had executed with parties beyond the boundaries of the country. It was submitted that the instant action of the State government amounts to deprivation of the property of the petitioner, without the authority lf law. In order to support the instant submission reliance was placed on the decision rendered in Hindustan Times and others v. State of U.P. and another, (2003) 1 SCC 591 , wherein it was held as under: “The expression “law”, within the meaning under Article 300-A, would mean a Parliamentary Act or an Act of the State Legislature or a statutory order having the force of law. In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan case the Supreme Court held” ‘The State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order.” Article 162 of the Constitution is subject to the other provisions contained therein. It is not the contention of the respondents that the State had been delegated with any power to levy tax or impose any fee. By reason of the impugned directives of the State, the petitioners have been deprived of their right to property.” 77. The aforesaid contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in our considered view, is wholly misconceived. In our view, the petitioners have neither expressly nor impliedly been deprived of their property. Firstly, it is not the case of the petitioners, that they have been stopped from carrying out their mining activities. Secondly, it is not the case of the petitioners, that they have been deprived of selling the iron ore mined by them, in as much as, they are permitted to sell the same in the domestic market. Thirdly, it is not the case of the petitioners, that the activity being carried out by the petitioners has been taken over by the State government. Fourthly, it is not case of the petitioners, that the contractual obligations executed by them with overseas parties, have been frustrated. Accordingly, we really find no substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 78. At the cost of repetition, it is necessary to notice, that the action taken by the State government, by issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, is of a temporary nature, so as to install certain measures to prevent illegal mining, transportation, and storage of iron-ore. Herein, what has been sought to be done is to temporarily prevent the petitioners from exporting mined iron ore, with the object of ensuring, that illegally mined iron-ore is retained within the territorial jurisdiction of the country, so that, the same is not lost for all times to come. Herein, what has been sought to be done is to temporarily prevent the petitioners from exporting mined iron ore, with the object of ensuring, that illegally mined iron-ore is retained within the territorial jurisdiction of the country, so that, the same is not lost for all times to come. The export of illegally mined iron ore would result in legitimizing the illegal activity, in as much as, after the said iron-ore leaves the shores of the country, it would be well nigh impossible for the Governmental agencies either to recover the aforesaid iron-ore or to prosecute those involved in the illegal mining activity. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The State government through the impugned orders cannot be deemed to have deprived the petitioners, of any form of property vested in them. For the reasons recorded above (as also in the preceding paragraph), we find no merit in the sixth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The Seventh contention (…. there being no truth in the assertions made in the statement of objections, the impugned orders are bound to be set aside): 79. It is the case of the petitioners, which we are recording as their seventh contention, that all the facts depicted in the foregoing paragraphs have been brought out to demonstrate, that the averments made in paragraphs 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the joint statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5, are only intended to unnecessarily malign the iron-ore mining community, including the petitioners, whereas, there is no truth whatsoever in the matter. Learned counsel pointedly assailed the factual position depicted in paragraph 16 of the statement of objections, wherein, it was sought to be projected, that the National Mineral Policy 2008, as also the Karnataka Mineral Policy 2008, to not encourage export of minerals outside India, but instead suggest the establishment of industrial units within the country for processing the same. Learned counsel for the petitioners having invited the court’s attention to Annexures R9 and R10, contends that the National Mineral Policy, as also, the Karnataka Mineral policy encourages export of minerals to foreign countries. Learned counsel for the petitioners having invited the court’s attention to Annexures R9 and R10, contends that the National Mineral Policy, as also, the Karnataka Mineral policy encourages export of minerals to foreign countries. On the express issue of illegal mining of iron-ore, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that an exhaustive report has been submitted by the Karnataka Lokayukta, wherein, even the names of some of the petitioners do not find mention. It was therefore asserted, that it is wholly unfair for the authorities to impose a blanket ban on the movement and export of iron-ore, which has the effect of unnecessarily harassing and inconveniencing innocent, honest entrepreneurs like the petitioners. It was also pointed out, that the petitioners fully support the initiative of the State government, in its endeavour to stop the activity of illegal mining (if there is any), but in the aforesaid process, it is wholly unfair for the State government to have imposed a blanket ban which targets, innocent and honest individuals/business-organizations like the petitioners. It was asserted, that the action at the hands of the State government, not only results in loss of revenue to the State government, it has far-reaching consequences even at the national level, as it deprives the country of valuable foreign exchange. It was submitted, that the employment generated by the mining industry cannot be overlooked, as a lot of people in the State of Karnataka are dependent on the mining industry for their livelihood. It was submitted, that merely because the State of Karnataka, lacks the means, or the will, to stop illegal mining, does not give the State government, the authority to impose a blanket ban of the nature (by issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010) in question. Referring to the averments recorded in paragraphs 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the statement of objections (jointly filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5), it was submitted, that the factual position, as also, the figures depicted therein are baseless and totally manipulated to project a wrong impression. Paragraphs 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the statement of objections (filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5) are being extracted hereunder:- “7. It is submitted that the total cost of one ton of iron ore works up to around Rs.300/-ex-mine. Paragraphs 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the statement of objections (filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5) are being extracted hereunder:- “7. It is submitted that the total cost of one ton of iron ore works up to around Rs.300/-ex-mine. As against this meager cost, the mining cartel has been selling the iron ore at $150 per ton and thus earning a profit in excess of Rs.5,000/- per ton. The total profit earned by the iron ore mining industry on the 120 millions tones of iron ore in the year 2007-2008 assumes mind boggling proportion of around Rs.60,000 crores in one year alone; over and above Rs.15,000 crore profit on domestic sales. 8. There is no trade or business or commerce in the world which can give such a huge profitability during post globalization. The larger question would be – should such kind of profitability be permitted in the hands of selected few mining lease holders or exporters and permit them to amass disproportionate wealth in the light of amended preamble to the Constitution of India. 9. xxx 10. xxx 11. xxx 12. It is also submitted that the concept of 100% export oriented units enumerated in the Industrial Policy was defined to mean and include any manufacturing activity/processing activity. Trading activity was never considered as an activity which can be included within the ambit of 100% export oriented unit. No doubt, special incentives and industrial concessions have been declared by the Government of India as well as State Government to promote 100% export oriented units thereby encourage rapid growth of industrialization. That does not mean that traders and shop keepers can be allowed to take advantage of such an ‘Industrial Policy’ for the purpose of export of mineral wealth in raw form thereby obtain awards and prizes as stated in the Writ Petition. That will not give rise to claim any kind of rights claimed in this Writ Petition. 13. With the spurt of demand for iron ore in the global market and consequent increase of its prices, China has emerged as a major consumer of iron ore from 2001-2002 onwards. Taking advantage of the situation, the Brazil and Australia increased the prices of their iron ore considerably which was unacceptable to China. 13. With the spurt of demand for iron ore in the global market and consequent increase of its prices, China has emerged as a major consumer of iron ore from 2001-2002 onwards. Taking advantage of the situation, the Brazil and Australia increased the prices of their iron ore considerably which was unacceptable to China. Instead, China threw the hat into the ring of Indian Export Cartel offering them unimaginably lucrative price assigning reasons of cheaper transportation charges through Sea Ports of East and West Coasts as a part of its larger conspiracy. China was contemplating to explore the possibility of dumping steel products by it in Indian Steel market through neighbouring under developed and developing countries. The other possibility which the China might be contemplating was that once the iron ore reserves in India Steel Market or strategically dictate terms and conditions desired by it, which cannot be allowed at all. The question of export arises only when we are more than self sufficient. Though, India produced nearly 52 MN Tons of Steel during the year 2007-2008, the China produced 507 MN Tonnes during that year which was 10 times the Indian Steel producing capacity. In the back drop of the same, Indian Exporters were lured to export iron ore indiscriminately in utter disregard and disrespect to the Nation’s interest contravening various provisions of several Enactments beginning from MMDR Act, Mineral Concession Rules, the Karnataka Forest Act and Rules, Forest (Conservation) Act, Environment Protection Act and the Rules, etc. thereby endangering the green cover, wildlife, flora and fauna; the protection of which is a Fundamental Duty cast on us as has been enshrined in Article 51A of the Constitution of India.” 80. In addition to the aforesaid, it is the emphatic contention of the learned counsel, that the falsity of the submissions made in the statement of objections (filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5) clearly emerges from the documents appended therewith. In this behalf reference is being made to paragraph 16 of the statement of objections which is being extracted hereunder:- “16. It is submitted that neither the National Mineral Policy 2008 nor the Karnataka Mineral Policy 2008 permit anybody to export the mineral outside the limits of India. Instead the same encourages the “value addition” to the minerals through the establishment of Industrial Units. It is submitted that neither the National Mineral Policy 2008 nor the Karnataka Mineral Policy 2008 permit anybody to export the mineral outside the limits of India. Instead the same encourages the “value addition” to the minerals through the establishment of Industrial Units. A copy of the National Mineral Policy and Karnataka Mineral Policy are sought to be produced at Annexures-R9 & R10 respectively. It is further submitted that the MINING LEASE AND MINING AGREEMENTS intended to be executed between the mining lease holders and the Departments of Mines and Geology and Forests also do not provide for any kind of export of mineral outside the limits of India. A specially inserted Clause 3-A makes the position clear. Merely because a word “export” found in the agreement cannot be construed as a permission to export the mineral outside the limits of India. It is not correct to contend that mining lease holders have an absolute right to sell and dispose off the mineral in the manner liked by them. The words “TRANSPORTATION” and “STORAGE” contained under Section 4(1A) to the Act connotes “total control” of the State over the mineral, which cannot be misconstrued. A copy of the Mining Lease is sought to be produced at Annexure-R11.” 81. Thereupon, learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the Karnataka Mineral Policy, 2008 (Annexure R-10, with the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5) and expressly drew our attention to paragraph 10.4 which is reproduced hereunder:- “10.4 Co-ordination with Ports Department of the State and Central Government to upgrade, expand and develop existing and new seaports in Karnataka to export minerals and value added products.” In addition to the aforesaid, learned counsel also invited the courts attention to the National Mineral Policy, 2008 (Annexure-R9, with the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5). From the National Minerals Policy, learned counsel invited the courts attention to paragraph 8, which is being extracted hereunder:- “8. Foreign Trade: Minerals continue to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings. The policy of export shall keep in view the dynamics of mineral inventories as well as the short, medium and long term needs of the country. Efforts shall be made to export minerals in value added form as far as possible. Foreign Trade: Minerals continue to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings. The policy of export shall keep in view the dynamics of mineral inventories as well as the short, medium and long term needs of the country. Efforts shall be made to export minerals in value added form as far as possible. The indigenous mineral industry shall be attuned to the international economic situation in order to derive maximum advantage from foreign trade by carefully anticipating technology and demand changes in the international market for minerals. The import of mineral based material shall be coordinated as far as possible with the indigenous development of mineral based industries. Areas of cooperation with countries with complementary resource base shall be developed for mutual advantage. The approach shall be to make available mineral based materials to domestic users at reasonable prices as determined by market forces. A long term export policy would provide stability and prove to be an incentive for investing in large scale commercial mining activity. To develop mining as a modern stand alone industry substantial investment is required. Assurances on export of minerals will be a key factor for investment decisions particularly on FDI in the sector. The Export Policy should be based on a clear long term strategy for export of minerals taking these aspects into consideration.” Based on the extracts from the Karnataka Mineral Policy, 2008, as also, the National Mineral Policy, 2008, it was sought to be asserted, that the factual position depicted in the statement of objections is only aimed at thwarting the claim of the petitioners. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the submissions advanced by the respondents, based on the statement of objections filed jointly on behalf of respondents 1 to 5, deserve an outright rejection. 82. We find no justification in recording the same reasons over and over again. Suffice it to state, that when dealing with the fifth contentions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, we have examined the basis, as well as, the justification projected at the hands of the State government in issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. We have during the consideration of the issues already canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, approved the basis, as well as, the justification, expressed by the State government, in issuing the impugned orders. We have during the consideration of the issues already canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, approved the basis, as well as, the justification, expressed by the State government, in issuing the impugned orders. For exactly the same reasons as have been recorded by us while dealing with the fifth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners, we find no merit even in the seventh contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The Eighth contention (… the impugned orders are not sustainable under the doctrine of overbreath and under the doctrine of proportionality): 83. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that even if it is presumed that the State executive had the jurisdiction and authority to pass the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 (with the object of preventing illegal mining of iron-ore within the State of Karnataka), the action taken at the hands of State government, cannot be sustained under the doctrine of overbreath, and under the doctrine of proportionality. In this behalf, it was pointed out, that the State government has adopted a blanket approach, in prohibiting export of iron-ore mined in Karnataka, without reference to those who are genuinely involved in bona fide mining activities, as against, those who are involved in illegal mining operation. It was submitted, that the action of the State government, taken through the impugned orders, would not affect the activity of illegal mining. It was asserted, that even after the issuance of the impugned orders, illegal mining activity has not been prevented, and is still continuing unabated. It was pointed out, that what has been prevented is, the export of iron-ore mined in the State of Karnataka, at the hands of those engaged in legal and legitimate mining activities. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that since only export of iron-ore had been banned by the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, illegally mined iron-ore in the State, is still available for domestic use, within the State. As a matter of illustration, learned counsel for the petitioners posed certain questions to himself. Firstly, whether the State government should use a sledgehammer to prevent an unauthorized activity, when the said activity can be taken care of with the use of only a hammer? As a matter of illustration, learned counsel for the petitioners posed certain questions to himself. Firstly, whether the State government should use a sledgehammer to prevent an unauthorized activity, when the said activity can be taken care of with the use of only a hammer? And still further, whether the State government should use a hammer, to prevent an illegal activity, when the said activity can be prevented by a fly-flapper/fly-swat? It was submitted, that the action taken by the State executive, is disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved. It was the pointed submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the action taken by the State government is wholly unreasonable, and as such, is unsustainable in law. In order to substantiate his aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on State of Madras v. V.G. Row, 1952 SCR 597. He relied on the following observations recorded therein: “…. Both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorized. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for the people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.” He also placed reliance on Teri Oat Estates (P) Limited v. U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , and drew our pointed attention to the following: “43. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the respondents are entitled to: (1) resumption of the land, (2) resumption of the building, and (3) forfeiture of the entire amount paid or deposited. Having regard to the extreme hardship which may be faced by the parties, the same shall not ordinarily be resorted to. 44. The situation, thus, in our opinion, warrants application of the doctrine of proportionality. 45. The said doctrine originated as far back as in the 19th century in Russia and was later adopted by Germany, France and other European countries as has been noticed by this Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India. 46. By proportionality, it is meant that the question whether while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. 46. By proportionality, it is meant that the question whether while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority “maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve.” 47. This Court as far back as in 1952 in State of Madras v. V.G. Row observed: “The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.” 48. The principle started gaining momentum in other countries and it was applied and developed in England as noticed by Lord Diplock in R. v. Secy. Of state for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind. The principle started gaining momentum in other countries and it was applied and developed in England as noticed by Lord Diplock in R. v. Secy. Of state for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind. This Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India while opining in concurrence with the judgment of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service that the extent of judicial review should ordinarily be limited to illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, observed that they are only the broad grounds but did not rule out addition of further grounds in the course of time and also noticed “Brind”. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by the Privy Council in the case of Elloy De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing and others, (1991) 1 Appeal Cases 69, wherein it was held as under: “But their Lordships are not persuaded that the restrictions set out in section 10 without qualification would meet the condition that they be reasonably required for the proper performance of the civil servant’s functions. A blanket restraint on all civil servants from communicating to anyone any expression of view on any matter of political controversy would in the view of their Lordships be excessive. It would not satisfy the qualification in the Constitution that the restriction be reasonably required for the proper performance of their functions. Their Lordships recall the observation made by the majority of the European Court of Human Rights in Vogt. v. Germany (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 205, 237238, para.59 in relation to the duty of loyalty of a teacher under the particular provisions of German law: “Even so, the absolute nature of that duty as construed by the German courts is striking. It is owed equally by every civil servant, regardless of his or her function and rank. It implies that every civil servant, whatever his or own opinion on the matter, must unambiguously renounce all groups and movements which the competent authorities hold to be inimical to the Constitution. It does not allow for distinctions between service and private life; the duty is always owed, in every context.” Section 10(2)(a) then cannot survive as it stands. That indeed was accepted by the Court of Appeal. It does not allow for distinctions between service and private life; the duty is always owed, in every context.” Section 10(2)(a) then cannot survive as it stands. That indeed was accepted by the Court of Appeal. But what that court sought to do was to secure its validity by endeavouring to apply the presumption of constitutionality and taking the view that there should be implied in the subsection some such words as “when his forbearance from such publication is reasonably required for the proper performance of his official functions.” Thereby the court sought to give effect to the legislative intention expressed in section 6 of the Civil Service Act that a civil servant should hold office subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Their Lordships cannot regard that solution to the problem as a permissible one. While it may be justifiable on occasion to imply words into a statute where there is an ambiguity or an omission and the implied words are necessary to remedy such a defect, in the present case subsection 10(2)(a) is perfectly clear and entire, free from any ambiguity or omission. As Lord Diplock explained in Attorney-General of The Gambia v. Momodou Jobe [1984] A.C. 689, 702, the presumption of constitutionality is: “but a particular application of the canon of construction embodied in the Latin maxim magis est ut res valeat quam pereat which is an aid to the resolution of any ambiguities or obscurities in the actual words used…” Secondly, Parliament has made express provision in section 10(3) to cover situations where publication of information or expression of opinion may be permitted and it is difficult in the light of the existence of express provision to read in by way of implication some further exception. Thirdly, their Lordships are not persuaded that the formula proposed by the Court of Appeal meets the intention of section 12(4) of the Constitution. By virtue of section 6 of the Civil Service Act the Act and the Constitution must be read together, and where necessary the one must be understood to be qualified by the other. But where section 12(4) refers to “the extent that the law in question makes provision….. By virtue of section 6 of the Civil Service Act the Act and the Constitution must be read together, and where necessary the one must be understood to be qualified by the other. But where section 12(4) refers to “the extent that the law in question makes provision….. (b) that imposes restrictions upon public officers that are reasonably required for the proper performance of their functions” the reference must, even if it includes an implied provision, at least be not to an implied provision which simply echoes the description of the kind of provision which may lawfully be made. But that does not end the matter. Even if the solution proposed by the Court of Appeal were to be adopted their Lordships are not persuaded that the validity of the provision can thereby be secured. What the solution seeks to do is to remove the excessive scope of the express terms of the subsection. But in view of their Lordships it fails effectively to achieve that. One principle which has to be observed here is that of legal certainty. This was succinctly expressed by the European Commission on Human Rights in G. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 6 March 1989, Application No.13079/87, 60 D. & R. 256, 261, where it was stated that “legal provisions which interfere with individual rights must be …. formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.” The critical question then is whether the prohibition in Section 10 (2) as qualified by the Court of Appeal produces a rule sufficiently precise to enable any given civil servant to regulate his conduct. The rule applies to all civil servants without distinction so that it is left to the individual in any given circumstances to decide wither he is or is not complying with the rule. Their Lordships are not persuaded that the guidance given is sufficiently precise to secure the validity of the provision. It is to be noticed that the provision is fenced with a possible criminal sanction in section 32 of the Act and it is necessary that in that context a degree of precision is required so that the individual will be able to know with some confidence where the boundaries of legality may lie. It cannot be that all expressions critical of the conduct of a politician are to be forbidden. It cannot be that all expressions critical of the conduct of a politician are to be forbidden. It is a fundamental principle of a democratic society that citizens should be entitled to express their views about politicians, and while there may be legitimate restraints upon that freedom in the case of some civil servants, that restraint cannot be made absolute and universal. But where the line is to be drawn is a matter which cannot in fairness be left to the hazard of individual decision. Even under the formulation suggested by the Court of Appeal the civil servant is left with no clear guidance as to the exercise of his constitutional rights. Further, the provision remains too wide in its scope and possible application. The principle here was expressed by Brennan J. in the United States Supreme Court in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 432-433, in these terms: “The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused, or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application …. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions…. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” Similar views may be found in Gooding v. Wilson (1972) 405 U.S. 518, 521, and in the passage in the judgment of Kania C.J. in Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 594 which was quoted by Redhead J. in the present case. A further formulation of the deficiency of the proposed solution can be found in the principle that an enactment construed by severing, reading down or making implications into what the legislature has actually said should take a form which it could reasonably be supposed that Parliament intended to enact. The proposed solution requires the subsection to be applied on a case by case basis, amounting for all practical purposes to a retrospective imposition of liability on those civil servants considered by the court to have fallen on the wrong side of the line. The proposed solution requires the subsection to be applied on a case by case basis, amounting for all practical purposes to a retrospective imposition of liability on those civil servants considered by the court to have fallen on the wrong side of the line. That would be an altogether different provision from that which Parliament enacted. In this context reference may usefully be made to the observations of Sopinka J. giving the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board) (1991) 82, D.L.R. (4th) 321. In that case the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which prohibited public servants from “engaging in work” for or against a political party or candidate. It will be noticed that the statute did not prohibit freedom of expression as such and so would probably not have attracted the principle of overbreadth applied by the United States Supreme Court to First Amendment rights: see Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 413 U.S. 601. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada held the entire provision unconstitutional on the principle of “reading down”. Sopinka J. said, at p. 347: “The language of [the section] is so inclusive that [the trial judge] declined to provide any definition of its scope but rather preferred to deal with the activity of each of the plaintiffs individually in measuring the restriction imposed by the section against the Charter. The number of instances in which the operation of the section would otherwise have been in breach of …. the Charter is extensive. On the basis there is little doubt that in future other instances will arise which will require a similar reading down of the section. In the final analysis, a law that is invalid in so many of its applications will, as a result of wholesale reading down, bear little resemblance to the law that Parliament passed and a strong inference arises that it is invalid as a whole ….. In my opinion, it is Parliament that should determine how the section should be redrafted and not the court. In my opinion, it is Parliament that should determine how the section should be redrafted and not the court. Apart from the impracticability of a determination of the constitutionality of the section on a case-by-case basis, Parliament will have available to it information and expertise that is not available to the Court.” It is precisely the same considerations which in the view of their Lordships apply to the solution proposed by the Court of Appeal and render it inadequate to save the validity of the provision in question. Even if the subsection, with or without the supplementary provision sought to be implied by the Court of Appeal, satisfied the first of the two requirements already referred to, namely that was a restraint upon the freedom of civil servants “reasonably required for the proper performance of their functions”, it would still have to satisfy the second requirement of being “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” Their Lordships were referred to three cases in which that phrase has been considered. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v. The Sunday Times Newspaper [1995] 1 L.R.C. 168 Joffe J. adopted from Canadian jurisprudence four criteria to be satisfied for a law to satisfy the provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that it be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. These were a sufficiently important objective for the restriction, a rational connection with the objective, the use of the least drastic means, and no disproportionately severe effect on those to whom the restriction applies. In two cases from Zimbabwe, Nyambirai v. National Social Security authority [1996] 1 L.R.C. 64 and Retrofit (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Posts and Telecommunication Corporation [1996] 4 L.R.C. 489, a corresponding analysis was formulated by Gubbay C.J., drawing both on South African and on Canadian Jurisprudence, and amalgamating the third and fourth of the criteria. In the former of the two cases [1996] 1 L.R.C. 64, 75, he saw the quality of reasonableness in the expression “reasonably justifiable in the democratic society” as depending upon the question whether the provision which is under challenge “arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of the guaranteed right according to the standards of a society that has a proper respect for the rights according to the standards of a society that has a proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual”. In determining whether a limitation is arbitrary or excessive he said that the court would ask itself: “whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.” Their Lordships accept and adopt this threshold analysis of the relevant criteria. Their Lordships would be prepared to accept in principle that the first two of these criteria could be met in the case of civil servants once it is noticed that their special status, with its advantages and restraints, is recognized as proper in the administration of a free society. Bu the third criterion raises a question of proportionality which was developed in argument by junior counsel for the applicant and given rise to real difficulty for the respondents. The blanket approach taken in section 10 imposes the same restraints upon the most junior of the civil servants as are imposed upon the most senior. The point was made by Redhead J. that in the United Kingdom, there are classes of civil servants related to the seniority of the posts which they fill and a distinction is made between the classes as to the extent of any restraints imposed upon them in regard to their freedom of political expression. In the Civil Service act of Antigua and Barbuda a considerable analysis of the grades of civil servants is set out in Schedule 1 and it would plainly be practical to devise a comparable system of classification as has been adopted in the United Kingdom. Without some such refinement their Lordships are not persuaded that the validity of the provision can be affirmed. The Distinction between the different grades of civil servant and the application of the provision in particular circumstances to particular individuals cannot in their Lordships’ view sufficiently be made by the implied condition proposed by the Court of Appeal for the reasons which have already been set out. It was for the applicant to show that the restraint, with its qualification, was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and their Lordships are persuaded that that has been shown to be the case. It was for the applicant to show that the restraint, with its qualification, was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and their Lordships are persuaded that that has been shown to be the case. For the foregoing reasons it becomes unnecessary to explore the more particular issues relating to the particular proceedings of which the applicant complains. It follows from the view taken by the Lordships on the general issue that the interdiction and the intended disciplinary proceedings contravene the applicants’ constitutional rights. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be allowed and the orders pronounced by Redhead J. restored. The applicant is entitled to his costs in the appeal to the Court of Appeal and in the appeal to their Lordships.” 84. While considering the eighth contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is necessary to make a reference to the impugned orders date 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, so as to determine, what was the actual basis for passing the impugned orders. A perusal of the aforesaid orders refers firstly, to a D.O. letter dated 26.07.2010 of the Secretary to Government, Department of Commerce and Industries. It was mentioned therein, that the Director, Department of Mines and Geology, had furnished information through his letter (also) dated 26.07.2010, that the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Karwar, had seized eight lakh tones of iron ore meant for export. It was mentioned in the letter of the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Karwar, that the legitimacy of the aforesaid iron-ore, could not be determined in the absence of bar codes and holograms on the permits (on the basis whereof the aforesaid iron-ore had been transported). Through the aforesaid communication (dated 26.07.2010), the Deputy Conservator of Forests, sought a temporary prohibition on the export of six lakh tones of iron-ore, till such time as check posts were modernized with the required facilities. In another letter dated 26.07.2010 issued by the Director, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department, Karwar, it was mentioned, that iron-ore was being exported from Belikeri and Karwar Ports, for the last 4 to 5 years. It was asserted, that on account of the violation of the terms of contract for mining iron-ore, contracts of the companies concerned should be cancelled. It was asserted, that on account of the violation of the terms of contract for mining iron-ore, contracts of the companies concerned should be cancelled. It was sought to be asserted, that companies engaged in export of iron ore, were transporting iron ore without obtaining permission from the Karnataka Pollution Control Board, and other authorities. In the aforesaid communication it was also asserted, that the aforesaid activity of export was being carried out in violation of the Indian Ports Act, 1908, as also the Karnataka Ports (Land and Shipping Fees) Act, 1961. Reference was also made, in the impugned orders, to the upheaval in public perception leading to discussions on the floors of the two legislatures in the State, wherein serious concerns were expressed about illegal mining of iron ore in Karnataka. The aforesaid even led to, the handing over of investigation in the matter to the Karnataka Lokayukta. The sole purpose of issuing the impugned order dated 26.07.2010, as is apparent from the aforesaid order itself was, to formulate guidelines, so as to, initiate necessary action with a view to curb unauthorized/illegal transportation/export of minerals from the State, in public interest. Insofar as the subsequent impugned order dated 28.07.2010 is concerned, it made reference to the seizure of approximately 8,05,991 metric tones of (allegedly) illegal stock of iron-ore from Belikeri Port, and approximately 1,15,399 metric tones of illegal stock of iron-ore from Karwar Port. Out of the aforesaid two stocks, about 65,409 metric tones at Karwar Port, was found to have been illegally exported. In respect thereof, the Forest Department had filed cases which were pending before this Court. Besides the illegal storage of iron-ore in the aforesaid two ports, it was found, that illegally mined iron-ore, was also being stocked in the other ports, with the intention of export thereof. Having taken into consideration, the quantity of iron-ore being illegally produced in the State, in comparison to the quantity of iron ore required for local use, as also for export, it was concluded by the State government, that iron-ore in excess of the permitted/authorized quantity, was being excavated. And a large quantity of the said illegally mined iron-ore was being exported to foreign counties. And a large quantity of the said illegally mined iron-ore was being exported to foreign counties. It was also mentioned in the second impugned order dated 28.07.2010, that in view of the seriousness of the issue in hand, investigation in the matter of illegal mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore came to be vested with the Karnataka Lokayukta, wherein, he was also required to suggest measures to counter the aforesaid activity. The latter impugned order also narrates the fact, that guidelines for mining and transportation of iron ore were being formulated so as to regulate the activity, through a fool proof system of transportation of iron-ore. In this behalf, it was asserted, that it was the intention of the State government to gather material necessary for implementing reformatory actions, with a view to control illegal mining activities and export of iron-ore, so that the State government could be in an effective position, to seize such illegally mined, transported and stored iron-ore. Accordingly, the State government prohibited the issuance of “mineral dispatch permits” for transportation of iron-ore, for the purpose of exporting the same from the State with immediate effect. 85. In view of the factual position depicted in the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, it is not possible for us to concur with the learned counsel for the petitioners, that illogical or unreasonable considerations were the basis for passing the impugned orders. It is also not possible for us to accept, that the action of the State government was discriminatory in any manner, or that, the petitioners were arbitrarily singled out for adverse action, as against those engaged in mining and transportation of iron ore for domestic use within the territories of India. In so far as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, we are satisfied, that the explanation tendered by the learned Advocate General, that as soon as iron ore travels beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the country, it becomes impossible to investigate, whether the same was obtained out of legitimate mining activity, and as such, it would also become impossible to prosecute those who may have exported iron-ore, obtained out of illegal mining activities. 86. 86. It was attractive to hear learned counsel for the petitioners canvass, that the State government had used a sledge-hammer when it could have used a hammer, or that, the State government had used a hammer when it could have used a fly-flapper or a fly-swat. The submission, however, remained unsubstantiated, as learned counsel did not suggest an alternative course of action, which could have been adopted in place of issuing the impugned orders, which would have been more reasonable, as also more proportionate, to the object sought to be achieved. On the subject under reference, the nature of allegations which were floating around, the public perception, and the Lokayukta’s interim report, the action taken by the State government by passing the impugned orders, may well have been the only possibly conceivable action at the hands of the State government. Thus viewed, it is not possible for us to accept, even the eight contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Ninth Contention ( …. the impugned orders ought to be set aside as they have no nexus to the object sought to be achieved): 87. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that there was no nexus of the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 with the object sought to be achieved. It was submitted, that it is not understandable how illegal mining can be prevented by banning export of iron-ore. In this behalf, the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that till the process of mining itself is allowed to continue, illegal mining also will continue. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, an unintelligible classification has been created by the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, inasmuch as, transportation of iron-ore for “domestic use” has been allowed to continue, whereas transportation of iron-ore for “export” has been banned. It was submitted, that there is no material on the record of this case to show, that illegal mining is only being carried out at the hands of exporters of iron-ore. It was contended, that the suppliers of iron-ore for domestic use, may equally be responsible for the alleged illegal mining. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that any action taken at the hands of the State government, so as to prevent the activity of illegal mining would be understandable. It was contended, that the suppliers of iron-ore for domestic use, may equally be responsible for the alleged illegal mining. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that any action taken at the hands of the State government, so as to prevent the activity of illegal mining would be understandable. However, it is not understandable how transportation of iron-ore, “for export” only, is subject matter of the prohibition envisaged in the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. It was pointed out, that by preventing honest entrepreneurs, as the petitioners herein, who are engaged in honest mining only, from areas ear-marked for licenced mining, and are carrying on the aforesaid activity within the parameters of the conditions prescribed, can be arbitrarily barred from the process of transportation of iron-ore, and thereby, prevented from honouring the export orders executed by them. This action at the hands of the State government, according to the petitioners, is clearly arbitrary and is impermissible in law under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 88. Insofar as the instant contention is concerned, learned counsel placed emphatic reliance on Vijay Kumar and others v. Government of NCT & others, 2008 (104) DRJ 447 . “19. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that Direction No.2 in the impugned notification makes a classification between goods carriages of upto 3000 kgs registered within and outside the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Such vehicles which are registered within the National Capital Territory of Delhi would be permitted to ply in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. However, those which are registered outside the National Capital Territory of Delhi would not be permitted to ply in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. It was further contended that this classification does not have any nexus with the avowed objective of minimizing Ambient Air Pollution in Delhi. Assuming for the moment that the objective behind the notification was the reduction of Ambient Air Pollution in Delhi it could very well have stipulated that no vehicles running on non-clean fuel would be permitted to ply within the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Assuming for the moment that the objective behind the notification was the reduction of Ambient Air Pollution in Delhi it could very well have stipulated that no vehicles running on non-clean fuel would be permitted to ply within the National Capital Territory of Delhi. If such a condition was imposed, perhaps, the petitioners would have no grievance because, according to them, their vehicles are all Euro-II complaint.” Reliance there from was placed on State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Committee of Management, Mata Tapeshwari Saraswati Vidya Mandir and others [ (2010) 1 SCC 639 ], wherein it is observed as hereunder:- “27. We entirely agree with the reasoning of the High Court that if it was the intention of the State Government to extend aid to un-aided institutions at the junior high school level for improving the quality of education at the said level, it ought not to have excluded those institutions which continued to run junior high schools, but had been upgraded for the purpose of imparting education at the high school intermediate college level. In other words, the object sought to be achieved by the notification of 9.9.2006, has no intelligible nexus with the object it wishes to achieve.” Reference was also made to Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev and another, (1992) 4 SCC 404 , wherefrom our attention was invited to the following: “22. In the case before us, the appellant was holding an office of profit but the matter does not end there. As already noted the next and most important requirement is whether that office was under the Government. In appreciating this aspect, we have to bear in mind, in interpreting these Articles, the object namely to avoid conflict between duty and interest and to eliminate the misuse of official position to advance private benefit and to avoid likelihood of influence of the Government to promote personal advantage. It must also be borne in mind that under these provisions the right to contest is being taken away on the ground of the said disqualification. Such a ban on candidature must have a substantial and reasonable nexus to the object that is to be achieved namely the elimination of possibility of misuse of the position. It must also be borne in mind that under these provisions the right to contest is being taken away on the ground of the said disqualification. Such a ban on candidature must have a substantial and reasonable nexus to the object that is to be achieved namely the elimination of possibility of misuse of the position. It is from this point of view that the right to appoint and right to remove the holder of the office in many cases becomes an important and decisive test. The source of payment for the office may also be taken into consideration but is not always a decisive factor. Likewise the control exercised by the Government may be one of the tests but as mentioned above that by itself is not a decisive test.” Relying on Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay and others, (2001) 7 SCC 425 , reference was made to the following observations: “28. While interpreting statutory provisions, courts have to be mindful of the consequences of disqualifying a candidate for being chosen as, and for being, a Member of the legislature on the ground of his holding an office of profit under the State or the Central Government, at the relevant time. The court has to bear in mind that what is at stake is the right to contest an election and to be a Member of the legislature, indeed a very important right in any democratic set-up. “A practical view, not pedantic basket of tests” must, therefore, guide the courts to arrive at an appropriate conclusion. A ban on candidature must have a substantial and reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, elimination of or in any event reduction of possibility of misuse of the position which the legislator concerned holds or had held at the relevant time. The principle for debarring a holder of office of profit under the Government from being a Member of Parliament is that such person cannot exercise his functions independently of the executive of which he becomes a part by receiving “pecuniary gain”. Under Article 102(1)(a), of course, Parliament has the jurisdiction to declare an “office” as not to disqualify its holder to be a Member of Parliament and likewise under Article 191(1)(a) the State Legislature has the jurisdiction to declare an “office” as not to disqualify its holder to be a Member of the State Legislatures. Under Article 102(1)(a), of course, Parliament has the jurisdiction to declare an “office” as not to disqualify its holder to be a Member of Parliament and likewise under Article 191(1)(a) the State Legislature has the jurisdiction to declare an “office” as not to disqualify its holder to be a Member of the State Legislatures. Moreover, apart from the office being an “office of profit”, it must also be an office under the State or Central Government.” 89. On the basis of the contentions noticed hereinabove, as also, the declared proposition of law, it was submitted that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 are liable to be set aside, both on account of the fact that the same violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as also, on account of the fact that the aforesaid action is discriminatory having no intelligible differentia which distinguishes the petitioners (ie., those who have been prevented from the activity of transporting iron-ore) as against, those who have been allowed to continue the aforesaid activity. 90. The question whether the action of the State Government in issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 has any nexus to the object sought to be achieved, cannot be treated to be a matter of very serious consideration in view of the conclusions repeatedly drawn by us during the course of determination of various issues canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The object sought to be achieved, was to stop activities related to illegal mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore in Karnataka. It has been asserted at the hands of respondents 1 to 5, that measures necessary to be adopted for the prevention of illegal mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore are being put in place, and rules are being suitably amended to ensure a complete check on all mining related activities in Karnataka. In this behalf, it is the case of respondents 1 to 5 that the State Government is engaged in the constitution of “special cells”, erection/construction of “composite check-posts”, installation of “closed circuit television” and “cameras”, “computerization” of check-posts, regulation of stockyard licences, and other similar measures. Can it be said that the aforesaid activities, which are being put in place by the State government, have no nexus to the object sought to be achieved” We are afraid not. Can it be said that the aforesaid activities, which are being put in place by the State government, have no nexus to the object sought to be achieved” We are afraid not. The main reason emerging out of the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned Advocate General was, that it was possible to search, get to, and deal with theft of iron-ore, so long as the mined ore remains in the country. But if the ore is permitted to leave the shores of India, it is impossible to identify, the particular mine (or mining area) from which it had been drawn. In the aforesaid situation, it becomes impossible to verify whether, the ore being exported was obtained out of legitimate operation, or out of illegal mining activity. As against the aforesaid, it was the pointed assertion of the learned counsel for the respondents, that there is no such predicament, in the case of iron ore which is to be used for processing in domestically located industry. Having considered the explanation tendered on behalf of the respondent State government, we are satisfied, that the choice of imposing the ban only on iron-ore meant for export, cannot be considered to be unreasonable, or without application of mind. The submission advanced by learned counsel, that illegal mining activities are still going on, is only conjectural in nature, and is not based on any substantive material. That apart, the process has been initiated only in July 2010, it will take some to catch up with those engaged in illegal mining operations. The action cannot be termed as arbitrary, or in violation of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are satisfied that there was a reasonable and legitimate purpose in limiting the ban only to “export” of iron-ore. Therefore, it is not possible for us to accept, that the action of the State government, was not object oriented, or that, its action had no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In view of the above, we find no merit in the instant contention as well. The Tenth contention (…. the impugned orders are not sustainable in law because the State government has not been able to substantiate the source of the exhaustive power exercised by it): 91. In view of the above, we find no merit in the instant contention as well. The Tenth contention (…. the impugned orders are not sustainable in law because the State government has not been able to substantiate the source of the exhaustive power exercised by it): 91. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 are executive orders. All executive orders, according to the petitioners, to be valid, must emerge from authority vested in the executive to issue the same. Referring to the various provisions (under the Mines and Minerals Act, the Lokayukta Act, the Foreign Trade Act and the Customs Act) to which this Court’s pointed attention was invited during the course of hearing, it was submitted that no power has been vested in the State executive under any of the statutes which can remotely suggest that the State government, had been vested with the authority to ban mining activity in the State of Karnataka, or could ban transportation of mined mineral within the State of Karnataka, or could ban export of mineral mined in the State of Karnataka. Having pointedly referred to the Mines and Minerals Act, as also to the Foreign Trade Act, it was the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that no such power can be deemed to have been vested with the State government to pass the impugned notifications dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. On the contrary, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the executive power under the aforesaid provisions exclusively rests with the Central government. It was, therefore, sought to be asserted, that it is only open to the Central government to pass an order on the subject sought to be traversed by the impugned orders. In this behalf it was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that it would be understandable if the source of executive power had been depicted in the impugned notifications dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. In this behalf, it was asserted by the petitioners that in W.P.No.24062 of 2010, the following ground in respect of the instant contention was specifically raised by the petitioners in paragraph 34(c). The said paragraph relied is being extracted hereunder:- “34(c). In this behalf, it was asserted by the petitioners that in W.P.No.24062 of 2010, the following ground in respect of the instant contention was specifically raised by the petitioners in paragraph 34(c). The said paragraph relied is being extracted hereunder:- “34(c). The State Government does not have any power or authority to impose such a ban restricting the Trade and Commerce between the States and another country or another State by way of an Executive Order. The direct and immediate effect resulting from the issue of the impugned orders would be to nullify the contracts entered into by the petitioners with foreign buyers. A contract validly entered into can, if at all, be nullified or its terms altered only by legislation by a competent Legislature and not by an executive order. The State Government totally lacks Legislative competence to alter contractual relations entered into for export of goods outside India must less by an executive order”. 92. In response to the aforesaid contention, it was pointed out that, the reply of the official respondents is only discernible from paragraph 36(c) of the statement of objections jointly filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5. Paragraph 36(c) from the statement of objections is reproduced hereunder:- “36(c). It is the duty of the State Government to prevent illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. It is no doubt true that the regulation of mines and development of minerals is subject to the control of the Union Government. However, as per Section 23(c) of the Act, it is the responsibility of the State Government to prevent illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. It is therefore, clear that the sphere of demarcation is apparent and it is the obligation of the State Government to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the movement of illegally mined minerals. The question of nullifying any contract does not arise. There is no assurance given by the State Government regarding export of iron ore.” Based on the aforesaid, it was asserted at the hands of the petitioners that the action of the respondents is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the State government. All the same as a matter of challenge, it was asserted, that the State government, may even now, come out with the source of the power under which the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were passed (if there is any). 93. All the same as a matter of challenge, it was asserted, that the State government, may even now, come out with the source of the power under which the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were passed (if there is any). 93. The instant contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners should have best been overlooked. During the course of hearing also, we had pointed out, that the same had already been advanced, on behalf of the petitioners, while canvassing the earlier contentions already noticed above. Yet learned counsel insisted, that the same was different and needed our pointed consideration. Despite the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, we are satisfied that the tenth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is actually, the first and fifth contentions rolled into one. While advancing the first contention, it was the assertion on behalf of the petitioners, that the source of the power to issue the impugned orders could only be traced from entry 23 of the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The power vested in the State government under entry 23 of the State List was, however, stated to have been exhausted after the Parliament had enacted the Mines and Minerals Act, by invoking entry 54 of the Union List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the first contention, we have recorded our conclusion to the effect, that the executive power to issue the impugned orders flows from Section 23C of the Mines and Minerals Act. While advancing the fifth contention, it was canvassed on behalf of the petitioners, that the subject of “export” fell squarely within the domain of the Parliament under entry 41 contained in the Union list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the fifth contention, while agreeing with the petitioners, that State governments do not have the power to issue executive orders on the subject of “export”, we have traced the power exercised by the State government, for issuing the impugned orders, to entries 1 and 2 contained in the State List under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In view of the conclusions recorded hereinabove, that the executive power exercised by the State government while issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 can be stated to have legitimately emerged from the Mines and Minerals Act, as also, from entries 1 and 2 of the State List contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, there was no valid or justifiable basis for pressing the instant contention. For an exhaustive consideration on the aforesaid issues, reference may be made to the conclusions drawn in furtherance of the first and fifth contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In view of the above, we find no merit in the tenth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The Eleventh Contention (… the impugned orders are liable to be set aside, on account of, non-compliance of the rules of natural justice): 94. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 have adverse civil consequences against the petitioners, and as such, could have only be issued after the petitioners had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations pointedly leveled against them. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 do not depict any express allegation against any of the petitioners. It was submitted, that the first imperative ingredient of the rules of natural justice was, to issue a notice to the person against whom an adverse order is contemplated, so as to make him aware of the dereliction at his hands, and/or on the basis whereof, action is proposed to be taken against him. It was the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the respondents in the present controversy, had not issued any such pointed communication to the petitioners, before passing the impugned orders. It is submitted that the aforesaid action was extremely essential, in the facts of these cases, because the impugned orders have an extremely drastic and devastating effect on the business activities of the petitioners, as also on others dependent on the petitioners. It was submitted, that the respondents are even now not aware of any unacceptable behaviour or activity of any of the petitioners (on the basis whereof the impugned orders could have been passed). It was submitted, that the respondents are even now not aware of any unacceptable behaviour or activity of any of the petitioners (on the basis whereof the impugned orders could have been passed). It was asserted, that even in the joint statement of objections filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 5, no pointed accusation has been leveled against any of the petitioners. In addition to the aforesaid, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that before adversely affecting the civil rights of any individual, it is imperative, under the rules of natural justice, to afford the concerned person(s), a right to respond to the allegations leveled against him. In this behalf, it was pointed out, that no such opportunity was ever afforded to the petitioners, so as to enable them to demonstrate that the action contemplated against them was unjustified. 95. In so far as the factual position concerned, in order to demonstrate, that the action taken against the petitioners was uncalled for, certain details were highlighted on behalf of the petitioners. On the issue of transportation of iron-ore, learned counsel for the petitioners invited the court’s attention to the fact, that a hologram is affixed on the permit granted to each and every truck carrying iron-ore. The transportation permit issued for carrying the iron-ore, depicts the place of origin of the iron ore, as also, the actual destination to which it was to be delivered. Besides the hologram, it was pointed out, that each transportation permit also has a bar-code, which could not be replicated for misused. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the petitioners are ready and willing to accept any further checks and measures, that may be desired by the State government, to ensure the prevention of illegal mining in the State of Karnataka. It was further the case of the petitioners, that it was wholly unreasonable for the respondents to arrive at any arbitrary assumption, and to take action in furtherance of the aforesaid assumption, and to take action in furtherance of the aforesaid assumption, without there being a grain of evidence depicting any kind of misconduct or dereliction at the hands of the individual petitioners. It was submitted, that the action taken against the petitioners has had the effect of preventing them from executing their contractual obligations. It was submitted, that the action taken against the petitioners has had the effect of preventing them from executing their contractual obligations. Pointing to the facts projected in the instant order, under the heading – “Preface to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners”, it was asserted, that the impugned orders have far reaching financial implications, not only to the petitioners, but also on the families of their employees. It was submitted, that the instant Sate action has adverse financial implications even for the State government, and its agencies. It was therefore asserted, that the impugned orders should not have been issued, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 96. The instant action, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, is akin to a black list order, whereby an entrepreneur is prevented from seeking any further contractual engagement. On the instant issue, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, that the declared proposition of law, even when the concerned authority wished to, black-list someone, or some party was valid, if it was initiated through a notice to the concerned party, followed by an opportunity of hearing. For the instant proposition, reliance was placed on State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ), wherein it is observed as under:- “12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr. S. Mitra. But the report, of that enquiry officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. Thereafter the first respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907 should not be accepted as the date of birth and without recording any evidence the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of the State.” Learned counsel placed further reliance on Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1989 SC 620 ), it is observed as under:- “4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realized that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order insofar as it directs blacklisting of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the blacklist in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the government is so entitled to do in accordance with law i.e. after giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness of otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of.” 97. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness of otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of.” 97. In our consideration, there can be no denial of the fact, that the petitioners are engaged in the activity of exporting iron ore from Karnataka. There can also be no denial of the fact, that the petitioners are in possession of valid mining licenses, on the basis whereof, they in the first instance mine iron-ore, and thereafter, transport the same to foreign counties. For the aforesaid purpose, the petitioners have executed valid contractual agreements, with parties overseas. There can also be no denial of the fact, that the ongoing activity of the petitioners in transporting iron-ore from the State of Karnataka to foreign countries, has been totally curtailed by the State government consequent on the passing of impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. Thus viewed, it is apparent, that the rights of the petitioners, may have been adversely affected by the impugned orders (if they are prevented from executing their obligations within a specified time frame). Accordingly there can be no escape from accepting, that the impugned orders, may have adverse civil consequences on the petitioners. It is also not a matter of dispute, that no opportunity was granted to the petitioners, so as to inform them of the basis for the contemplated action, and/or to afford them an opportunity of hearing, so as to enable them to project their individual view points. In that sense, even though the civil rights of the petitioners may have been affected, the rules of natural justice were not followed, before the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were issued. 98. The question which falls for our consideration, in the background of the acknowledged factual position noticed in the foregoing paragraph is, whether the action of the State government ought to be set aside because the State government had failed to follow the rules of natural justice before passing the impugned orders? 98. The question which falls for our consideration, in the background of the acknowledged factual position noticed in the foregoing paragraph is, whether the action of the State government ought to be set aside because the State government had failed to follow the rules of natural justice before passing the impugned orders? The declared legal position on the subject is, that it is imperative for every executive authority, to follow the rules of natural justice before adversely affecting the civil rights of any private individual, unless of course, there is an express or implied statutory enactment, which authorizes such action to be taken even without following the rules of natural justice. 99. Besides the aforesaid exception, whereunder, the rules of natural justice can be excluded, the legal position declared at the hands of the Apex Court, further cull out certain circumstances, wherein the rules of natural justice may not be followed, before the contemplated adverse action is taken. In this behalf reference may be made, in the first instance to Liberty Oil Mills and others vs. Union of India and others, (1984) 3 Supreme Court Cases 465, wherein the Apex Court observed as under: “15. ….. We do not think that it is permissible to interpret any statutory instruments so as to exclude natural justice, unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the court. Procedural fairness embodying natural justice is to be implied whenever action is taken effecting the rights of parties. It may be that the opportunity to be heard may not be pre-decisional; it may necessarily have to be pre-decisional where the danger to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent or where the action to be taken can brook no delay. If an area is devastated by flood, one cannot wait to issue show-cause notices for requisitioning vehicles to evacuate population. If there is an outbreak of an epidemic, we presume one does not have to issue show-cause notices to requisition beds in hospitals, public or private. In such situations, it may be enough to issue post-decisional notices providing for an opportunity. It may not even be necessary in some situations to issue such notices but it would be sufficient but obligatory to consider any representation that may be made by the aggrieved person and that would satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice. In such situations, it may be enough to issue post-decisional notices providing for an opportunity. It may not even be necessary in some situations to issue such notices but it would be sufficient but obligatory to consider any representation that may be made by the aggrieved person and that would satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice. There can be no tape-measure of the extent of natural justice. It may and indeed it must vary from statute to statute, situation to situation and case to case. Again, it is necessary to say that pre-decisional natural justice is not usually contemplated when the decisions taken are of an interim nature pending investigation or enquiry. Ad-interim orders may always be made ex-parte and such orders may themselves provide for an opportunity to the aggrieved party to be heard at a later stage. Even if the interim orders do not make provision for such an opportunity, an aggrieved representation seeking a review of the order and asking the authority to rescind or modify the order. The principles of natural justice would be satisfied if the aggrieved party is given an opportunity at the request. 21. …. As we have earlier pointed out while ex-parte interim orders may always be made without a pre-decisional opportunity or without the order itself providing for a post decisional opportunity, the principles of natural justice which are never excluded will be satisfied if a post-decisional opportunity is given if demanded.” Reference also deserves to be made to Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 , wherein it was held as under: “121. …. It is well to remember, as did Justice Holmes, that time has upset many fighting fights and one must always wager one’s salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. Our knowledge changes; our perception of truth also changes. It is true that notice was required to be given and notice has not been given. The notice which we have contemplated is a notice before the settlement or what is known in legal terminology as ‘pre-decisional notice’. Our knowledge changes; our perception of truth also changes. It is true that notice was required to be given and notice has not been given. The notice which we have contemplated is a notice before the settlement or what is known in legal terminology as ‘pre-decisional notice’. But having regard to the urgency of the situation and having regard to the need for the victims for relief and help and having regard to the fact that so much effort has gone in finding a basis for the settlement, we, at one point of time, thought that a post-decisional hearing in the facts and circumstances of this case might be considered to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of principles of natural justice as embodied under Section 4 of the Act. The reasons that impelled this Court to pass the orders of February 14/15, 1989 are significant and compelling. If notice was given, then what would have happened? It has been suggested on behalf of the victims by counsel that if the victims had been given an opportunity to be heard, then they would have perhaps pointed out, inter alia, that the amount agreed to be paid through the settlement was hopelessly inadequate. We have noted the evidence available to this Court which this Court has recorded in its order dated May 4, 1989 to be the basis for the figure at which the settlement was arrived at. It is further suggested that if an opportunity had been given before the settlement, then the victims would have perhaps again pointed out that criminal liability could not be absolved in the manner in which this Court has done on February 14/15, 1989. It was then contended that the Central Government was itself sued as a joint tort-feasor. The Central Government would still be liable to be proceeded in respect of any liability to the victims if such a liability is established; that liability is in no way abridged or effected by the Act or the settlement entered into. It was submitted on behalf of the victims that if an opportunity had been given, they would have perhaps pointed out that the suit against the Central Government, Government of Madhya Pradesh and UCIL cold not have been settled by the compromise. It was submitted on behalf of the victims that if an opportunity had been given, they would have perhaps pointed out that the suit against the Central Government, Government of Madhya Pradesh and UCIL cold not have been settled by the compromise. It is further suggested that if given an opportunity, it would have been pointed out that the UCIL should have also been sued. One of the important requirements of justice is that people affected by an action or inaction should have opportunity to have their say. That opportunity the victims have got when these applications were heard and they were heard after utmost publicity and they would have further opportunity when review application against the settlement would be heard. 124. So on the materials available, the victims would have had to express their views. The victims have not been able to show at all any other point or material which would go to impeach the validity of the settlement. Therefore, in our opinion, though settlement without notice is not quite proper, on the materials so far available, we are of the opinion that justice has been done to the victims but justice has not appeared to have been done. In view of the magnitude of the misery involved and the problems in this case, we are also of the opinion that the setting aside of the settlement on this ground in view of the facts and circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in abeyance and giving notice to the victims for a post-decisional hearing would not be in the ultimate interest of justice. It is true that not giving notice, was not proper because principles of natural justice are fundamental in the constitutional set up of this country. No man or no man’s right should be affected without an opportunity to ventilate his views. We are also conscious that justice is a psychological yearning, in which men seek acceptance of their viewpoint by having an opportunity of vindication of their viewpoint before the forum or the authority enjoined or obliged to take a decision affecting their right. Yet, in the particular situations, one has to bear in mind how an infraction of that should be south to be removed in accordance with justice. Yet, in the particular situations, one has to bear in mind how an infraction of that should be south to be removed in accordance with justice. In the facts and the circumstances of this case where sufficient opportunity is available when review application is heard on notice, as directed by court, no further opportunity is necessary and it cannot be said that injustice has been done. “To do a great right” after all, it is permissible sometimes “to do a little wrong”. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this is one of those rare occasions. Though entering into a settlement without the required notice is wrong. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we are of the opinion, to direct that notice should be given now, would not result in doing justice in the situation. In the premises, no further consequential order is necessary by this Court. Had it been necessary for this Bench to have passed such a consequential order, we would not have passed any such consequential order in respect of the same.” In Luga Bay Shipping Corporation vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Cochin, (1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 631, the Apex Court observed as under: “14. Taking takes us to the next contention namely, whether the unilateral action taken by the Board in assessing the damages is in violation of the principles of natural justice. At first blush, the argument made appears to be attractive but, on closer scrutiny, and having regard to the purpose and object of making the said provision entitling the Board to determine the quantum of damages, it would appear that the urgency of the situation demands that the Board should be allowed to determine the liability and claim payment or security for the same before the vessel leaves the shores of the country. We have already pointed out earlier the anxiety of the legislature to provide for immediate action to be taken before the vessel leaves the shore. Once it has left the shore, it would be impossible for the Board to recover the damage caused by the vessel to its property. We have already pointed out earlier the anxiety of the legislature to provide for immediate action to be taken before the vessel leaves the shore. Once it has left the shore, it would be impossible for the Board to recover the damage caused by the vessel to its property. In order to protect international trade and at the same time ensure that the damage caused to the property of the port is recovered before the vessel leaves the port, it seems essential that the Board should be empowered to determine the quantum of damages and ensure that the vessel does not leave the port before depositing cash or providing security for the same. Besides, to avoid dislocation of traffic, it is essential that the damage caused to the port or property of the Board is repaired without loss of time, for which funds would be required. In the circumstances, it is therefore inevitable that the power to determine the damage must vest in the Board for, otherwise, the vessel may leave the port and the Board would be left to suffer the damage without recovering it from the offending vessel. Therefore, while conceding that the right to be heard before the quantum of damage is determined is an important right, in the very nature of things and having regard to the urgency of the matter, public interest demands that before the vessel leaves the shores of the country, the estimated damage is paid to or secured by the Board. The interests of justice, insofar as the Board is concerned, would not be safeguarded is this power is not vested in the Board and consequently the vessel is permitted to leave the shores of the country without securing the damage. Besides, if the Master or Owner of the vessel desires to question the quantum of damages determined by the Board, the law does not preclude the filing of a civil suit in that behalf. In the civil suit, the basis on which the quantum of damages was worked out by the Board would be fully reviewed and that would provide a post-decisional hearing to the Master or Owner of the vessel. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the very nature of things, it is not possible that a pre-decisional hearing should be accorded to the Master or Owner of the vessel before the Board determines the amount of compensation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the very nature of things, it is not possible that a pre-decisional hearing should be accorded to the Master or Owner of the vessel before the Board determines the amount of compensation. Even if the Board can ensure that a port clearance is not granted to the vessel, that would not serve the objective as the continued presence of the vessel at the dock or port would block up traffic as urgent repairs would not be possible and the presence of the vessel would not permit other vessels to enter that area. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that in the very nature of things, a hearing before the quantification of damages by the Board is not possible. We, therefore, do not see any merit in this contention either.” Reference also deserves to be made to the decision in People’s Union for Civil Liberties and another vs. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580 , wherein the Court observed as under: “43. It is contended that before making the notification whereby an organization is declared as a terrorist organization there is no provision for pre-decisional hearing. But this cannot be considered as a violation of audi alteram partem principle, which itself is not absolute. Because in the peculiar background of terrorism it may be necessary for the Central Government to declare an organization as terrorist organization even without hearing that organization. At the same time under Section 19 of POTA the aggrieved persons can approach the Central Government itself for reviewing its decision. If they are not satisfied by the decision of the Central Government they can subsequently approach the Review Committee and they are also free to exercise their constitutional remedies. The post-decisional remedy provided under POTA satisfies the audi alteram partem requirement in the mater of declaring an organization as a terrorist organization. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664 , Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 ). (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664 , Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 ). Therefore, the absence of pre-decisional hearing cannot be treated as a ground for declaring Section 18 as invalid.” From a collective perusal of the judgment extracted herein above, it is possible to conclude, that in the following circumstances the requirement of following the rules of natural justice, may not precede the initiation of the contemplated action:- Firstly, where the damage to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent, and unless the action is taken forthwith, the purpose would be defeated. Secondly, where a decision is of an interim nature, and the original position would be restored after ascertaining the factual position and/or the required particulars. Thirdly, where the purpose would be defeated, if the order is not passed immediately. Or in other words, delay would defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. Fourthly, where public interest and/or the interest of justice, would not be safe-guarded, if the contemplated action is delayed. It is apparent from the conclusions derived from the judgments rendered by the Apex Court, as have been noticed in the foregoing paragraphs, balancing of public interest as also interest of justice, is a very important consideration before a legitimate claim can be raised under the plea of natural justice. In situations where public interest would be adversely affected, private interest of an individual will have to give way. In situations wherein the damage would be irretrievable (if the rules of natural justice were to be insisted upon), it would be open to the competent authority, so as to prevent the commission of such action, to by-pass the procedure envisaged under the rules of natural justice. Even where the recovery of the loss/harm would stand frustrated if the rules of natural justice were followed, the legal proposition declared by the Supreme Court, is in favour of preventing such harm and/or for making such recovery, by taking recourse to the remedial measures, without following the rules of natural justice. In all the aforesaid situations, the rules of natural justice can be avoided even though the action, would have adverse civil consequences. 100. In all the aforesaid situations, the rules of natural justice can be avoided even though the action, would have adverse civil consequences. 100. It is in the background of the aforesaid determination at the hands of the Apex Court, that we shall now venture to determine, whether, it was appropriate at the hands of the State government to have issued the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, without following the rules of natural justice. It is apparent from the factual position narrated at the hands of the State government, as also, the factual position expressed in the impugned orders themselves, that there was sufficient material with the State government to arrive at the conclusion, that extensive illegal mining of iron-ore was being carried out in the State of Karnataka, specially after mining of iron ore had become an extremely profitable venture (during the past few years). There was also adequate material, as has also been expressed in the impugned orders, that illegally mined iron ore was also being exported beyond the territories of Karnataka to foreign countries. The instant activity of export of iron ore, would result in a permanent loss to the State, not only as a matter of loss of State revenues (which the State would have earned through royalty therefrom), but also in terms of permanent loss of mineral wealth of the State. Not only that, after the illegally mined iron ore had traveled beyond the boundaries of India, it would be well nigh impossible, to recover the same, or to initiate criminal prosecution against those engaged with the said illegal activity. The choice with the State government was, either to allow the said activity to continue, and simultaneously, put in place measures to prevent the same. Or in the alternative, to stall the aforesaid illegitimate activity temporarily, till such time as regulatory measures (necessary to prevent the same) were put in place. The State government chose the latter course. In our considered view, the State government was fully justified in doing so, even without following the rules of natural justice. For our instant conclusion, we have applied the four inferences derived by us hereinabove, from the legal position declared by the Apex Court. Even if one of them were to be applicable, the rules of natural justice could have been avoided. For our instant conclusion, we have applied the four inferences derived by us hereinabove, from the legal position declared by the Apex Court. Even if one of them were to be applicable, the rules of natural justice could have been avoided. In so far as the instant case is concerned, each one of four situations carved out by us, is applicable to the controversy in hand. 101. Adverse civil consequences to the petitioners would emerge from a conclusion, that the petitioners have been deprived from fulfilling their contractual agreements, pertaining to export of iron ore. None of the learned counsel appearing before us, had drawn our attention to the breach of any term of contract executed by the petitioners. It was the pleaded before us, in any case, on behalf of any one of the petitioners, that a time schedule in their contract cannot now be fulfilled, as a result of afflux of time. In the absence of any such submission at the hands of the petitioners, it is difficult to conclude that the petitioners have suffered any adverse civil consequences, as a result of the passing of the impugned orders. It is therefore not even clear, in the facts and circumstances of the cases before us, that the petitioners could even demand compliance on the rules of natural justice. 102. In view of the considerations recorded in the preceding two paragraphs, we are satisfied, that the action of the State Government in not following the rules of natural justice, before issuing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, cannot be held to be unjustified or illegal in any manner whatsoever. We therefore find no merit even in the eleventh contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Twelfth contention (…. the impugned orders cannot be sustained, because the State government cannot affect the rights of others, for its own faults): 103. In the twelfth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners, the Court’s attention was invited to paragraph IX of the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondent No.6 ie., Union of India. Paragraph IX is being extracted hereunder: “IX. In the twelfth contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners, the Court’s attention was invited to paragraph IX of the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondent No.6 ie., Union of India. Paragraph IX is being extracted hereunder: “IX. In light of the increasing incidence of illegal mining, the Ministry of Mines had under taken the following measures to curb the menace of illegal mining: (i) State Governments have been asked to frame Rules under Section 23C of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 to enable them to provide for inspection, checking and search of minerals at the place of excavation, storage and during transit. The Rules would also provide for establishment of check-post and weigh-bridges at important centres. So far the State Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttarkhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have framed Rules under this Section. (ii) The State Governments have been advised to constitute Task Forces/flying Squads at both State and district levels for taking effective action against illegal mining. The Task Forces/Flying Squads are assigned the job of collecting information of the cases of illegal mining, taking action to curb such illegal activities and ensuring co-ordination among various agencies so that effective action is ensured against illegal mining. The Task Force at the State level would be headed by the Secretary, Department of Mining & Geology of the State Governments and includes State Police Department, State Transport Department, State Forest Department, Indian Bureau of Mines and State Pollution Control Board. At the District Level the Task Force would be headed by the District Collector and comprises of Superintendent of police, Deputy Collector (Revenue & Mining), District Mining Officer, District Forest Officer and officials from concerned districts of State Pollution Control Board and Transport Department. So far the States of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttarkhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have constituted Task Forces. (iii) Regular monitoring by the Central Government of instances of illegal mining, action taken by the State Government against such activities and other steps taken by State Government to curb illegal mining with the Secretaries of State Governments in the review meeting held for the purpose. (iii) Regular monitoring by the Central Government of instances of illegal mining, action taken by the State Government against such activities and other steps taken by State Government to curb illegal mining with the Secretaries of State Governments in the review meeting held for the purpose. In this context the State Governments have been asked to furnish quarterly returns in the prescribed proforma on instances of illegal mining and action taken by State Governments thereof to Indian Bureau of Mines, which are reviewed by the Central Government. (iv) The Ministry of Mines with a view to facilitate development of a holistic action plan at the State level using modern technology to curb illegal mining, has requested all the State Governments to prepare an Action Plan on the following points: a. Use of Satellite Imagery sourced from State Remote Sensing Organizations to curb illegal mining, b. Developing reliable mechanism in the State Government for collecting and monitoring of data regarding prices of various minerals, wherein the price trend could indicate possible chances of illegal mining in certain minerals, c. Developing a mechanism for integrated monitoring of information on movement of trucks/vehicles from mining areas to ports/markets/manufacturing units which use mineral ores, and correlating the same with the production data capture any spurt in mining activity, d. Maintaining and collecting information form ports, custom authorities, Ministry of Commerce on export of ores out of the country; e. Bar-coding, use of Holograms for transport permits, royalty, paid permits, etc. as a means of tracing unauthorized transport or sale of ores; f. Compulsory registration of all the end-users and issue of directives to the end-user industries to mandatorily check payment of royalty before purchase of ores for various manufacturing processes, with penalties for violations, g. Development of reporting mechanism for the traders of mineral ores and end-use industries to report receipt of ore for which royalty payments have not been made; h. Constituting and empowering Joint teams of officials from various Departments of the State Government including, Police, Forest, Revenue department to conduct checks and file cases, i. Coordinating and concentrating efforts of both State Government and Indian Bureau of Mines through combined inspection in specific areas in which illegal mining is suspected and to ensure safety and effective cessation of illegal mining. j. Creation of a Special Cell in Police force to tackle illegal mining. j. Creation of a Special Cell in Police force to tackle illegal mining. So far, States Government of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarkhand have prepared Action Plan in terms of the advice of the Central Government. (v) Advising States to set up Committees to coordinate action in relation to mining activities including illegal mining, transportation, including associating representatives of Railways and Ports. (vi) Held discussions with Ministry of Railways, as a result of which, the Railways have initiated action in Orissa to ensure proper accounts for transported ore, and the same can be replicated all over the country. (vii) Held discussions with the Ministry of Shipping which has issued an advisory to all the Port Authorities in the country to adopt measures similar to those introduced by Paradip Port Trust authorities to streamline the movements of consignment by road and rail upto the port for export purposes. The measures include providing list of mineral exporters to the State Government and m/o railways verifying receipt of minerals against valid permit/challan, and restricting unauthorized movement of minerals within the Port, etc. (viii) Held discussions with the Customs authorities who have informed that instructions have been issued to customs offices for sharing the details of minerals exported through the ports with the concerned State Governments on a regular basis as agreed for Goa. Identification of nodal officer of the State with whom exact modalities of information/data exchange would need to be worked out by Customs authorities in consultation with the concerned State Governments was the key issue from the point of view of customs. (ix) The steps taken by the State Government for curbing illegal mining in coordination with the various authorities has been discussed in Central Empowered-cum-Coordination Committee meetings held on 24.7.2009, 22.12.2009 and 18.6.2010 with the State Governments. The Ministry of Mines had been issuing various guidelines and suggestions on the issue and monitors the progress through this Central Committee. In the last meeting dated 18.6.2010, States were advised to nominate a nodal officer who will liaise with Railways, Port and Customs authorities to collect information on illegal mining on continual basis. As per information received, State Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Goa, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal have set up a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee. In the last meeting dated 18.6.2010, States were advised to nominate a nodal officer who will liaise with Railways, Port and Customs authorities to collect information on illegal mining on continual basis. As per information received, State Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Goa, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal have set up a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee. Other States have been request to ensure setting up of similar Committees at the earliest.” In addition to the aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioners also invited our attention to the statement of objections filed on behalf of respondent No.6, wherein in paragraph 5 of the statement of objections “regarding paragraphs 24 to 27” of the writ petition, it was asserted as under:- “Reg. Para 24: It is submitted that the State Governments have been sufficiently empowered under MMDR Act to take steps to prevent and curb illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. Imposition of a ban on issuing of Mineral Despatch Permits for transportation of iron ore for exports may not be the ideal measure to curb illegal mining. The State Governments had been advised to closely monitor and control the issue of Mineral Despatch Permits through coordinated checking mechanisms using the services and data maintained with various State Departments involved. The state had also been advised vide ministry of Mines letter dated 18.11.2009 to co-relate the production in mines with the transportation permits issued and the ore finally exported in order to detect illegally mined material. Para 25 & 26: The National Mineral Policy, 2008, lays down the policy framework for development of mineral sector and specifies in para 7.1 that mineral development will be prioritized in terms of import substitution, value addition and then exports. At the same time the Policy (in para 7.2) also states that conservation of minerals shall be construed not in the restrictive sense of abstinence from consumption or preservation for use in distant future but as a positive concept leading to augmentation of reserve base through improvement in mining methods, beneficiation and utilization of low grade and rejects and recovery of associated minerals. The policy (in para 8) also recognizes that minerals continue to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings, and the policy of export shall keep in view the dynamics of mineral inventories as well as the short, medium and long term needs of the country. The policy (in para 8) also recognizes that minerals continue to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings, and the policy of export shall keep in view the dynamics of mineral inventories as well as the short, medium and long term needs of the country. The Policy (in para 8) also recognizes that exports shall be made in value added form as possible. There are no restrictions in the MMDR Act, on the use of ore, unless the State Government has specifically imposed any such conditions in any particular Mining lease under Rule 27(3 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (MCR), after obtaining the approval of Central Government. It may therefore be observed that the Policy and the legislation do not at present provide for any restrictions on export of ore on any particular mineral as a class, but the legislation does provide for imposition of restrictions under Rule 27(3) of MCR in an individual mining lease. It is further submitted that the State Governments are the owners of minerals and control the grant of concessions in terms of the regulations set out in the MMDR Act, 1957, legislated by the Parliament. While the legislation regulates the entire system of grant of concessions, it is State Government mineral policy (in line with the National Mineral Policy) that determines the manner in which the State Government controls its mineral concession dispensation regime, and the mineral utilization regime. Para 27: It is submitted that in terms of Section 23C of MMDR Act, the State Government may frame Rules to control illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. Any step taken by the State Government in this regard under the said Rules would be in terms of MMDR Act. However, it is not clear whether the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 are linked to the said Rules. For this reason, the Central Government cannot comment on whether the impugned orders are in terms of MMDR Act. The contention of the petitioner that the local steel industries would control the price of iron ore is hypothetical, since the MMDR Act or the National Mineral Policy does not restrict the movement of ore within the country. For this reason, the Central Government cannot comment on whether the impugned orders are in terms of MMDR Act. The contention of the petitioner that the local steel industries would control the price of iron ore is hypothetical, since the MMDR Act or the National Mineral Policy does not restrict the movement of ore within the country. However, the contention of the petitioner that the natural resources would not be protected through ban on issue of transportation permits for export of iron ore has a point since efficient governance and controls at the field level by the State Government cannot be substituted by any order.” It is therefore submitted, that the action sought to be taken by the State of Karnataka, through the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 is wholly impermissible in law, as it is an abuse of the executive authority vested in the State government. It is the pointed contention of the petitioners, that the State government failed to take action, when it was called for, and now, it has passed blanket orders, to cover up its own faults, without any legal or valid justification. It is accordingly prayed that the impugned orders should be set aside. 104. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid twelfth contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In our considered view, it is a futile exercise for one wing of the executive, to blame another. Whether or not, certain measures could have been adopted so as to prevent illegal mining activities in Karnataka, by the State government, is a matter of the past, and as such, constitutes an irrelevant consideration. The issue of relevance is, that unscrupulous elements in Karnataka are engaged in plundering the State’s mineral wealth, by illegal means. They have to be stopped. Whether they ought to have been stopped earlier, is presently of no consequence. Whether some innocent parties would be affected, is also of no relevance. The only consideration relevant at the present juncture is, that illegal mining activities in the State have to come to an end. The nation’s mineral wealth, should not be permitted to be drained, at the hands of unscrupulous elements. The State must earn revenues as are due to it. Enforcing legal mining would ensure all that. The only consideration relevant at the present juncture is, that illegal mining activities in the State have to come to an end. The nation’s mineral wealth, should not be permitted to be drained, at the hands of unscrupulous elements. The State must earn revenues as are due to it. Enforcing legal mining would ensure all that. It is pointedly for achieving the aforesaid objective, that the impugned orders were issued by the State government on 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. We find no justification, in the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that since the State government had not taken appropriate measures in the past, it should be precluded from doing so, for the future as well. It is never too late to take the right measures. A court cannot be an impediment in any initiative of the government, to prevent illegal activities, specially of the magnitude alleged in the present case. Since the action of the State government appears to be bon fide, and for a good cause, it is not possible for us to accept the instant contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, to interfere with the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. For the reasons recorded herein above, we find no merit even in the instant contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Thirteenth Contention (… the impugned orders are not sustainable, because, they place the blame for the same on interim orders passed by the High Court): 105. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the blame for passing the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, has unwittingly been placed by the State government, on an interim order passed by this Court. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State government wishes to shift the responsibility of its own wrong actions, including framing of unacceptable rules, on to the shoulders of the High Court. In this behalf, learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to the averments made in paragraphs 14, 28 and 36(e) and (h) of the statement of objections, jointly filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5. The aforesaid paragraphs are being extracted hereunder:- “14. …. In this behalf, learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to the averments made in paragraphs 14, 28 and 36(e) and (h) of the statement of objections, jointly filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5. The aforesaid paragraphs are being extracted hereunder:- “14. …. Considering the recommendations and findings given by the Hon’ble Lok Ayukta, the Respondent – State has initiated several unauthorized transportation of iron ore. The Respondent – State has also formulated Rules called as “Karnataka Mineral (Regulation & Transport) Rules, 2008” by way of publication of a Notification in the Official Gazette of Karnataka at No.CI 12 MMM 2007 dated 20.03.2008 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 21 r/w Section 23(c) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 for the purpose of prevention of illegal mining and transportation of minerals. A copy of the same is sought to be produced as ANNEXURE-R2. Being aggrieved by the formulation of such Rules, several mining lease holders challenged the same before this Hon’ble Court in W.P.No.6985 of 2008 c/w W.P.No.16529 of 2007, W.P.No.18793 of 2007, W.P.No.18907 of 2007 and obtained interim orders of stay which is still continuing. A copy of the interim order is sought to be produced as ANNEXURE-R3. It is submitted that pursuant to the orders of this Hon’ble Court in a Public Interest Litigation in W.P.No.36301/2009 (H.S. Doreswamy and others vs Chief Secretary and others) seeking certain reliefs with regard to prevention of illegal mining and unauthorized transportation of iron ore outside the limits of India amongst others, the Respondent State has submitted an Action Taken Report dated 12.07.2010 for having implemented several recommendations and findings given in the report. A copy of the same is sought to be produced as ANNEXURE-R4. 28. By virtue of the interim orders passed by this Hon’ble Court, out of 16 Writ Petitioners, 8 Writ Petitioners have produced their documents, on which they wanted to pay the Forest Development Tax. Initially, all these 8 Writ Petitioners paid FDT nearly Rs.84.70 crores; whereas, on scrutiny of the documents produced by them to this Hon’ble Court, those 8 Writ Petitioners are liable to pay Rs.117.08 crores in addition to whatever has been paid. A copy of the Abstract and the Verification Memo are sought to be produced at ANNEXURE-R15. The matter is still pending consideration before this Hon’ble Court. A copy of the Abstract and the Verification Memo are sought to be produced at ANNEXURE-R15. The matter is still pending consideration before this Hon’ble Court. The rest of the Writ Petitioners are yet to produce their documents on which they are going to rely on pursuant to the orders of this Hon’ble Court as stated above. 36(e). Insofar as it relates to the movement of illegally mined ore/minerals, the State Government is under an obligation to take such steps as are necessary to prevent illegal mining and transportation. Under Section 23(c) of the Act, the State Government has already given effect to Rule framed as Karnataka Mineral (Regulations of Transport) Rules, 2008 and the validity of the said Rule is under question before this Hon’ble Court. Unless the validity of the Rules is first determined, the validity of the impugned orders cannot be examined. In view of the stay of the Rules as stated above a situation has arisen, which has resulted in illegal mining and transportation of such illegally mined minerals. To prevent all such activities of illegally mined minerals and its transportation, the State Government has now taken a decision not to issue M.D.Ps for the purpose of exports. The said decision is in accordance with the provisions of M.M.D.R. Act, 1957. 36(h). It is no doubt true that iron ore is a major mineral and Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 apply to the matter relating to mines and minerals. At the same time, M.M.R.D. Act, 1957 itself has entrusted the task on the State Government to prevent illegal mining and illegal transportation. It is in exercise of that power, the Rules in question have been framed. As the Rules have now been stayed, the State Government has issued the Government Order to prevent illegal mining and transportation.” 106. It was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that if the State government had actually framed rules under the Mines and Minerals Act, in consonance with law, and within the frame work of the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act, as also, the Constitution of India, the State government should have assailed the interim order passed by this Court, whereby the operation of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008, had been stayed by the High Court. It was, sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State government is itself violating legal norms, so as to harass genuine and bona-fide exporters of iron-ore any justification or cause, specially on account of the fact, that even during the course of hearing of the writ petitions, the State government has not been able to point out, any unauthorized or illegal activity conducted by any of the petitioners, who have been adversely affected by the impugned notifications dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. It was also sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State government desires to shift the blame for its own inactions, to the High Court. It was accordingly canvassed, that the impugned orders are not sustainable because they have been passed on the accusation, that the High Court had passed certain interim orders. 107. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on first blush seems reasonable and legitimate. It is difficult to assume, that an interim order passed by a Court would have had adverse effects, prompting the State government to initiate alternate measures by way of passing executive orders. As and when an interim order is passed by a court, views expressed by the rival affected party are taken into consideration. In case an interim order is passed at the back of the opposite party, it is open to the opposite party to move an application, for vacation or modification of the interim directions. No doubt, this court had stayed the operation of the provisions of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008, the State government neither sought vacation/modification of the interim directions, nor assailed the said orders by way of appeal. When the cases in hand came to be filed in this court, wherein the petitioners impugned the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010, the State government, for the first time, has raised a hue and cry about the passing of the aforesaid interim orders. For the first time, the learned Advocate General, sought the disposal of the controversy raised in the cases, where the said interim orders had been passed. The oral request made by the Advocate General, to dispose of the aforesaid cases was not opposed by the petitioners. For the first time, the learned Advocate General, sought the disposal of the controversy raised in the cases, where the said interim orders had been passed. The oral request made by the Advocate General, to dispose of the aforesaid cases was not opposed by the petitioners. On the consent of the rival parties, all the cases, wherein, the provisions of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008, had been assailed were heard and disposed of. On consent, the State government accepted certain modifications in the said rules. If the State government had taken recourse, to its present initiative, immediately after this Court had passed orders staying the operation of the Karnataka Mineral (Regulation and Transport) Rules, 2008, it may not have been necessary, even to pass the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. In sum and substance, the rules framed by the State government, have been revived subject to minor modifications therein. All the same, at the present juncture, it is futile exercise to blame the State government, for not having moved an appropriate application for modification or for recalling of the interim directions issued by this court, as also, for not having sought a final decision in the matter, or for not having availed of its appellate remedy. Nonetheless, it is not possible to loose sight of the fact, that the regulatory measures introduced by the State government by framing the aforesaid rules, which had come to be eclipsed by the interim directions issued by this court, now stand revived, with a few modifications. It is also relevant to keep in mind, that the basis depicted on behalf of the petitioners, to support the instant submission, was actually one of the many considerations which had weighed with the State government to pass the impugned orders. If all that was taken into consideration is examined collectively, the potentiality of the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners withers away. It becomes inconsequential. In that sense, no fault can be found with the State government for having taken into consideration the interim directions passed by this court. It is not as if, the interim orders passed by the High Court constituted the sole basis for passing the impugned orders. As a matter of fact, the interim orders passed by the High Court was just one of the facts in a series of facts taken into consideration. It is not as if, the interim orders passed by the High Court constituted the sole basis for passing the impugned orders. As a matter of fact, the interim orders passed by the High Court was just one of the facts in a series of facts taken into consideration. In that sense, the emphasis on the interim orders, as the sole basis for passing the impugned orders is not only misconceived, but is also fallacious. For the reasons recorded herein above, we are not impressed even with the last contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Conclusions and observations: 108. Despite our having considered a large number of submissions (thirteen in all) advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, as have been noticed individually herein above, we have found no infirmity in the impugned orders, on any of the grounds raised before us. We, therefore hereby, uphold the orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010. Thus viewed, all the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. 109. Despite the fact, that we have found no merit in the writ petitions, we are of the view, that for maintaining law and order all necessary measures should be permitted to be adopted without any interference. But while doing so, rights of the innocent parties should not be infringed, as far as it is practically possible. While examining the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners, we were satisfied, that the impugned orders were passed, for the sole aim and object of eradicating illegal activities related to mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore. Even though the dominant purpose expressed by the State government is laudable, yet the time taken to introduce regulatory measures cannot be endless. Nor can the rights of innocent people be affected for an unlimited length of time. If there is an unreasonable extension thereof, by delaying the implementation of the measures, for which the impugned orders dated 26.07.2010 and 28.07.2010 were passed, the same may have the effect of transgressing into unacceptable terrain. By a blanket order, without first distinguishing the wrong doers from those who are innocent, the executive government cannot adversely effect the civil rights of all those who are engaged in the export of iron-ore for an unlimited period of time. For, law supports only legitimate causes, and not, an abuse of the process of law. By a blanket order, without first distinguishing the wrong doers from those who are innocent, the executive government cannot adversely effect the civil rights of all those who are engaged in the export of iron-ore for an unlimited period of time. For, law supports only legitimate causes, and not, an abuse of the process of law. It may well be, legitimate for the State government, to take about six months, to put in place the contemplated measures, for regulating activities connected with mining of iron ore, in the State of Karnataka. If the aforesaid purpose is achieved, within the time expressed by the learned Advocate General, during the course of hearing, we are of the view that the exercise carried out by the State government, may well be reasonable and legitimate. We, therefore, hope and expect, that the State government would expedite the implementation of the measures for preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of iron-ore in the State of Karnataka. In case the State government fails to implement the measures, within a reasonable time, the intention of the State government, may itself be subject to suspicion. It is not uncommon in today’s world, to say something different, but to desire just the opposite. We may also record a note of caution here. The State government having taken such strong steps, cannot hereafter be heard to say, that illegal mining related operations are still going on in Karnataka. Having chosen to do as it desired, after the regulatory measures have been put in place, the State government shall have to bear the responsibility of ensuring, to the residents of the State of Karnataka, and to the citizens of India, that henceforth, no illegal mining related activities are carried out in the State. And, in case there is any lapse, the blame thereof, must squarely rest on the shoulders of the State government. We also wish and hope, that action initiated in respect of unauthorized activities relating to mining of iron-ore, shall be brought to a logical conclusion at the earliest, so that those who have violated the provisions of law, are appropriately dealt with. With the aforesaid observations, all the connected writ petitions are disposed of.