JUDGMENT These two second appeals arise out of a common judgment and decree dated 10.07.1995 in A.5.Nos.6 and 39 of 1989 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Bhimavaram, wherein A.S.No.6 of 1989 was dismissed and A.5.No.39 of 1989 was allowed, and therefore, they are heard and being decided together. 2. The defendant is the appellant in these two appeals. The respondent herein filed 0.5.No.160 of 1994 in the Court of the Principal District Munsiff, Bhimavaram. For convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. The plaintiff is a temple registered under the provisions of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short, "the 1987 Act"). The defendant is the tenant of the temple in respect of certain agricultural lands. The whole dispute pertains to the alleged liability of the defendant to pay the differential lease amounts. Under the lease agreement, the defendant should pay Rs.1,650/- per acre towards rent, if he raises paddy crop and 1/3rd of the said rent, if he raises second crop. It is further agreed between the parties that if the defendant raises Sugarcane crop, he should pay Rs.1,795/- in addition to the sum of Rs.1,650/- per acre. Disputes arose between the parties on the rents payable. The plaintiff insisted that as the defendant raised Sugarcane crop and also second crop, he was liable to pay the additional rent as stated above. On the ground that the defendant committed default in payment of the said rents, the plaintiff approached the Tenancy Court under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short, "the 1956 Act") for eviction of the defendant. The said proceedings were registered as ATC No.43 of 1983 before the Special Officer, Bhimavaram constituted under the 1956 Act. The Tenancy Court rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant has raised Sugarcane crop in place of paddy crop and also second crop. On that premise, the Tenancy Court rejected" the eviction proceedings, initiated by the plaintiff on the ground of wilful default of the rents by dismissing the ATC on 31.03.1988. It is admitted that the said order has become final, as the same was not questioned by the plaintiff by way of an appeal or otherwise. The said order was marked as EX.B1 before the Trial Court in the suit. It is admitted that the said order has become final, as the same was not questioned by the plaintiff by way of an appeal or otherwise. The said order was marked as EX.B1 before the Trial Court in the suit. The defendant has taken a stand before the trial Court that as the findings of the Tenancy Court on the same issues were rendered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant, the order of the Tenancy Court constitutes res judicata. The said plea was rejected by the trial Court on the following reason. "It is true that EX.B1 order in ATC.No.43 of 1983 clearly discloses that the above said case filed by the present plaintiff devasthanam against the present defendant for eviction and that said case was ultimately dismissed on the ground that plaintiff devasthanam received rent subsequent to filing of the said case and in the said order it is observed that the defendant has not raised any sugarcane crop and that finding is not binding on this court as the said finding will not operate as res judicata. As per the decision reported in Mylavarapu Chitn Sanyasi Prasada Rao vs. Runku Lakshmayya (1966 (1) An. W.R. at page 241). In the head note of the said decision it is observed that:- "Hence, the decision of the Tenancy Court whether the tenant was a defaulter or not is a decision on incidental matters and it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tenancy court and as such it cannot operate as res judicata on general principles of law." 3. Eventually, the trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 05.12.1988, partly decreed the suit by holding that the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs.5,867/towards makthas and subsequent interest on Rs.4,690/- at 6% per annum. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant filed A.S.No.6 of 1989 while the plaintiff filed A.S.No.39/89 feeling dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree, whereby the trial Court has partly disallowed the claim of the plaintiff. While the appeal of the defendant was dismissed, the plaintiff's appeal was allowed by the lower appellate Court. Therefore, the defendant filed these two appeals. 4. At the hearing, Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that the findings of both the Courts below on the issue of res judicata are not sustainable. While the appeal of the defendant was dismissed, the plaintiff's appeal was allowed by the lower appellate Court. Therefore, the defendant filed these two appeals. 4. At the hearing, Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that the findings of both the Courts below on the issue of res judicata are not sustainable. He placed reliance on Section 11 CPC in general and Explanation VIII to it in particular and contended that the findings of the Tenancy Court operate as res judicata between the parties and therefore the civil Court cannot entertain the suit and grant relief to the plaintiff. 5. Opposing this contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the Courts below have given cogent reasons for holding that the findings of the Tenancy Court does not bind the civil Court on the authorities referred to therein and therefore the concurrent findings rendered by the Courts below cannot be interfered with. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Prior to the commencement of the provisions of the 1987 Act, the Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions were not exempted from the provisions of the 1956 Act. Therefore, like any other party, the religious and charitable institutions were required to approach the Tenancy Courts for eviction and recovery of rents. The plaintiff approached the Tenancy Court by filing ATC.No.43 of 1983, wherein the same questions, which were raised in the suit, were raised. The Tenancy Court conclusively rejected the pleas raised by the plaintiff. 8. Section 11 CPC bars the Court to try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. 9. The doctrine of res judicata is based on public policy and founded on two principles, namely; (i) nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, meaning, no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause and (ii) public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation. 9. The doctrine of res judicata is based on public policy and founded on two principles, namely; (i) nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, meaning, no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause and (ii) public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation. Section 11 CPC is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but it is, merely a statutory recognition thereof (State of Karnataka and another v. All India Manufacturers Organization and others ( (2006) 4 SCC 683 ). The main purpose of the doctrine is that once the matter has been determined in the former proceeding, it should not be open to the parties to re-agitate the same again and again. 10. The Parliament introduced Explanation VIII to Section 11 CPC by Act No.l04 of 1976, which reads as under: "An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised." 11. In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1) (1994) 2 SCC 14 = 19994 (1) ALT 25 (ON) the Supreme Court discussed the case law on this aspect and traced the historical background of the amendment to Section 11 CPC and held as under: "The result that would flow is that an order or an issue which had arisen directly and substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent court or tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction, which includes pecuniary jurisdiction, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that such court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent court to try the subsequent suit." 12. In the instant case, admittedly, the Tenancy Court was the special forum competent to decide the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant when ATC.No.43 of 1983 was instituted. The question which was directly and substantially in issue in that ATC was whether the defendant fell in arrears of the lease amounts on account of his raising Sugarcane crop instead of paddy crop and second crop. The question which was directly and substantially in issue in that ATC was whether the defendant fell in arrears of the lease amounts on account of his raising Sugarcane crop instead of paddy crop and second crop. The claim for arrears of rents was based on the said allegation made by the plaintiff. The Tenancy Court had returned a categorical finding that the defendant has not raised the Sugarcane crop or the second crop. Having failed before the Tenancy Court, the plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of the purported arrears on the same plea that the defendant has raised Sugarcane crop and second crop as well and thereby incurring the additional liability. 13. In my considered opinion, the issues raised in the suit were directly and substantially in issue, which were raised by the plaintiff and decided by the Tenancy Court. Under Explanation VIII, as interpreted by the Apex Court in the above judgment, even though the Tenancy Court had limited jurisdiction at the relevant time to order for eviction and was not competent to entertain the suit after the advent of 1987 Act, still its decision binds the parties to the litigation. The Courts below placed reliance on some of the judgments of this Court, which were rendered prior to the amendment of Section 11 crc Le., before introduction of Explanation VIII to the said provision and, therefore, they have no relevance. 14. For the abovementioned reasons, the judgments of both the Courts below are set aside and the appeal suits are dismissed. 15. In the result, both the second appeals are allowed.