( 1 ) HEARD learned AGP Mr. A. L. Sharma for petitioners. ( 2 ) THE petitioners have challenged the common award passed by the Labour Court, Bhavnagar in Reference Nos. 55 to 59 of 1992, 64 of 1992, 78 and 79 of 1992, Exh. 31, dated 18. 7. 2009. 2. 1 The Labour Court, Bhavnagar has granted reinstatement to each workman except workman Nathabhai Tapubhai and Jayaben Meghabhai, who expired during pendency of reference before the Labour Court, Bhavnagar. The Labour Court, Bhavnagar has awarded only consequential benefits in favour of legal heirs and representatives of deceased Nathabhai and Jayaben. The Labour Court, Bhavnagar has not awarded any amount of back wages in favour of any workman while granting only reinstatement in service but, Labour Court, Bhavnagar has granted consequential benefits in favour of the workmen. ( 3 ) LEARNED AGP Mr. Sharma has raised contention before this Court that labour Court has committed gross error in deciding reference and come to conclusion that each workman has completed continuous service of 240 days within preceding 12 months from date of termination. He also submitted that documents which are produced by petitioners have not been properly considered and examined by labour Court. The record which has been produced and details given by petitioners, from that none of the workman has completed 240 days continuous service as required under Section 25b of the I. D. Act. He submitted that service has not been terminated by petitioners but, workmen themselves have stopped coming and there is no written order of termination has been issued by petitioners against workmen. He also submitted a specific letter was written to present workmen for joining the work but, respondents workmen did not reply to the same and did not turn up for the work and therefore, labour Court has committed gross error in granting relief in favour of respondents workmen. The benefit of continuity of service is not granted by labour Court in favour of respondents workmen while only granting reinstatement, that is also bad and contrary to law. The workmen have not established relationship between petitioners and workmen as an employer and employee. The burden of proof is upon workman to prove 240 days continuous service as required under Section 25b of the I. D. Act which has not been proved by workmen. Therefore, burden is not shifted upon employer to disprove these facts. The workmen have not established relationship between petitioners and workmen as an employer and employee. The burden of proof is upon workman to prove 240 days continuous service as required under Section 25b of the I. D. Act which has not been proved by workmen. Therefore, burden is not shifted upon employer to disprove these facts. The respondents workmen were daily wager who were engaged for some work and when no work was available, they were not provided the work by petitioners, that cannot consider to be a termination of such workmen. Therefore, according to his submissions, the labour Court has committed gross error in giving direction of reinstatement in favour of respondents workmen. He submitted that as and when work required, by letter dated 21. 10. 1991, 12. 11. 1991 and 18. 12. 2991 request was made to workmen to report for duty but workmen have not reported for duty. Therefore, labour Court has committed gross error in allowing reference in favour of respondents workmen. He also submitted that details of presence which were prepared on basis of documents Exh. 35 to 49 where daily list of daily workmen for one month period has been produced on record as referred in Para. 6 of the award which has not been properly appreciated by Labour Court. Except that, no other submission is made by learned AGP Mr. Sharma on behalf of petitioners. ( 4 ) I have considered submissions made by learned AGP Mr. Sharma and also perused the common award in question. Before the labour Court, statement of claim was filed by workmen in support of their claim. All the references were consolidated on 29. 3. 1995 vide Exh. 10 and vide Exh. 35 dated 12. 9. 1997. According to workmen, they were working for more than 8 years as a daily wager with petitioners, receiving daily wage of Rs. 24. 75 ps. and their services were terminated by petitioners in April,1991. Thereafter, demand was made by letter dated 2. 8. 1991 and ultimately, matter has been referred by the Conciliation Officer to concerned labour Court for adjudication. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to workman, provisions of Section 25 (F), (G) and (H) of the I. D. Act have been violated by petitioners while terminating services of workmen. Thereafter, demand was made by letter dated 2. 8. 1991 and ultimately, matter has been referred by the Conciliation Officer to concerned labour Court for adjudication. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to workman, provisions of Section 25 (F), (G) and (H) of the I. D. Act have been violated by petitioners while terminating services of workmen. The reply was filed by petitioners and according to reply, workmen were working on daily wage basis as a labourer and none of the workmen has completed 240 days continuous service and as and when work required they were called by petitioners and lastly, on 21. 10. 1991, 12. 11. 1991 and 8. 12. 1991 by Regd. A. D. letter, workmen were called by petitioners but, they were not remained present and not resumed the duty and therefore, according to reply, there is no termination order passed by petitioners. Before the labour Court, each workman was examined and gave evidence and documents have been produced on record. The petitioners have also produced muster of daily rated employees as referred in Para. 6 and Shri Aniruddh Trivedi was examined being Dy. Executive Engineer vide Exh. 31. The defence which has been taken by petitioners that workmen stopped coming to duty and there was no termination made by petitioners. According to workmen, no documents have been given by petitioners to the workmen about appointment, muster card, identity card, pay slip and voucher. Therefore, it is very difficult for workmen to prove presence during the period where they were remained in service. Vide Exh. 23 and Exh. 55, prayer was made by workmen before labour Court to direct the petitioners to produce relevant records before labour Court. Certain decisions have been considered which have been relied by workmen before labour Court as referred in award. The written arguments were produced on record by petitioners vide Exh. 53 and according to written arguments, none of the workmen has completed 240 days continuous service and burden is upon the workmen to prove it, which has not been proved by workmen. Therefore, labour Court should not have to presume 240 days completed by each workman. Vide Exh. 17, Katuben was examined; vide Exh. 19 Bhikhabhai Mohanbhai was examined; vide Exh. 7 Jakalben Mohanbhai was examined and they were required to work on Madhiya road doing miscellaneous work receiving Rs. 24. 75 ps. daily wage from petitioners. Vide Exh. Therefore, labour Court should not have to presume 240 days completed by each workman. Vide Exh. 17, Katuben was examined; vide Exh. 19 Bhikhabhai Mohanbhai was examined; vide Exh. 7 Jakalben Mohanbhai was examined and they were required to work on Madhiya road doing miscellaneous work receiving Rs. 24. 75 ps. daily wage from petitioners. Vide Exh. 19 Shir Vasrambhai was examined; and Shamu Tapu was also examined and they are related to each other and considering evidence of workmen as well as Shri Aniruddh Trivedi, witness of petitioners, certain decisions have been relied by both parties before labour Court. Thereafter, issues have been framed by labour Court and it has been decided in Para. 10 by the labour Court. The labour Court has considered evidence of witness of petitioners vide Exh. 31. This witness has admitted before labour Court that he is not knowing the concerned workmen those who were appointed or engaged for doing miscellaneous work on Bhavnagar-Ahmedabad shot road doing work on road and they were engaged in the year of 1990-91. The repairing work of road is a continuous work and it required 15 to 17 daily wager and witness is not aware about that what work has been carried out by these workmen. The labour Court has come to conclusion that no engagement order has been given by petitioners, even no termination order is also given by petitioners and witness of petitioners is not having any information or personal facts in respect to nature of work performed by workmen. It is not an appointment made by petitioners to the workmen on project, for that there is no written order has been issued in favour of workmen. Therefore, labour Court has considered definition of 'retrenchment' with an exception Section 2 (oo) (bb) of I. D. Act. The details of working days which statement was produced by petitioners vide Exh. 12 where names of labourers means workmen concerned and working days have been given which was prepared by petitioners on basis of documents. On basis of aforesaid documents, witness of petitioners at Exh. 31 has made clear statement that none of the workmen has completed 240 days continuous service. But in cross-examination, said witness has admitted that muster roll, pay register are maintained by petitioners and only xerox copy of presence register statement was produced on record but original presence register was not produced on record. 31 has made clear statement that none of the workmen has completed 240 days continuous service. But in cross-examination, said witness has admitted that muster roll, pay register are maintained by petitioners and only xerox copy of presence register statement was produced on record but original presence register was not produced on record. Vide Exh. 35 to 49 again details of working days has been produced on record along with Exh. 12 statement in respect to each workman. But, it is necessary to note that statement at Exh. 12 pertains to only year 1990-91 where there is an ambiguity in respect to days of each workman. The reasoning given by Labour Court, however considering details of working days in respect to each workman produced on record by petitioners, the labour Court has come to conclusion that petitioners have not produced any original record before the labour Court but, merely a statement which has been prepared has been produced vide Exh. 12 and Exh. 35 to Exh. 49 where considering working days of each workman, none of the workmen has completed continuous service of 240 days, as required under Section 25 (B) of I. D. Act. Looking to documents which has been produced on record Exh. 12, Exh. 35 to Exh. 49, some of the workmen were also in service in the year 1989. Therefore, labour Court has come to conclusion that on basis of evidence of workmen, they were completed 240 days continuous service in each year with petitioners but, that facts have not been disproved by petitioners before labour Court while leading proper evidence on record or while producing relevant original documents on record. Therefore, labour Court has relied upon decision of Apex Court reported in 2007 (1) SCC (Lands) 961 and the decision reported in 2005 (1) GLH 340 . Considering various decisions which have been relied by workmen and also considering Exh. 58 the record produced by petitioners where details have been given that some of the persons were newly appointed or engaged by petitioners after termination of respondents workmen. After appreciating aforesaid evidence on record Exh. 58, the labour Court has come to conclusion that after 1983, number of labourers have been taken on duty and they are at present also working with petitioners. The witness of petitioners vide Exh. After appreciating aforesaid evidence on record Exh. 58, the labour Court has come to conclusion that after 1983, number of labourers have been taken on duty and they are at present also working with petitioners. The witness of petitioners vide Exh. 31 is not having any knowledge in respect to nature of work performed by workmen and no letter has been produced on record dated 21. 10. 1991 12. 11. 1991 and 19. 12. 1991 by petitioners. From perusal of record and oral evidence of witness of petitioners, the work which was carried out by workmen is remained continued and also at present continued and petitioners are not able to prove the facts before the labour Court that workmen have left the job at their own volition and there is no question of termination by petitioners. The petitioners have not served any notice to workmen because of absence and no procedure has been followed before terminating services of workmen. The seniority list is also not published before 7 days in advance from date of termination. 5. 1 In light of the aforesaid evidence which are on record, the labour Court has come to conclusion that services of workmen has been illegally terminated, those who have completed continuous service of 240 days in a proceeding 12 months from date of termination and Section 25 (F), (G) and (H) of I. D. Act has been violated by petitioners. Therefore, only reinstatement order has been passed in favour of workmen without giving any back wages of interim period with consequential benefits. ( 6 ) IT is necessary to note that evidence of workmen remained as it is and according to their evidence, they were remained in service with petitioners for about more than 8 years and completed 240 days continuous service in different year. That facts remained unchallenged because there is no rebuttal evidence has been produced by petitioners before labour Court that they were not remained in service for a period of 8 years continuously with petitioners. The details of working days or presence of workmen which were given, it is not a complete details as observed by labour Court. Therefore, petitioners have produced certain records and certain records have not been produced before labour Court. The details of working days or presence of workmen which were given, it is not a complete details as observed by labour Court. Therefore, petitioners have produced certain records and certain records have not been produced before labour Court. So in absence of complete record for entire period, during which workmen were in service, the labour Court has relied upon evidence of workmen and come to conclusion that workmen have completed continuous service of 240 days during the period of 12 months from date of termination. ( 7 ) IN light of this background, in the recent decision of Apex Court in case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavada reported in 2010 AIR SCW 542, similar question has been examined by Apex Court. Relevant observations are in Para. 9 to 16 which are quoted as under : "9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the workman immediately after his services were terminated by the employer, had approached the conciliation officer and on failure of the conciliation proceedings, had approached the State government to make reference of the dispute for adjudication before the labour court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the workman had approached the labour court after a long lapse of time. It is further submitted, that, the workman in his evidence, categorically had made statement before the labour court that he had worked for more than 240 days in a preceding year and, since that evidence is not rebutted by the employer by producing the relevant oral and documentary evidence which would be in their possession, the labour court was justified in drawing adverse inference against the employer. It was further submitted, that, since the appellant failed to prove before the labour court by producing necessary evidence that the appellant industry is seasonal in nature, the labour court has not committed any error whatsoever, to accept the oral assertion made by the appellant before the labour court. It is further submitted, since the findings of the labour court cannot be said as perverse findings or based on no evidence, the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the findings of fact by the labour court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted, since the findings of the labour court cannot be said as perverse findings or based on no evidence, the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the findings of fact by the labour court in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10) From the facts as set out herein above and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the question that requires to be decided whether the labour court and the High Court was justified in allowing the claim of the workman. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not an industry as defined under Section 2 (J) of the Act, but it was its specific stand before the labour court and also the High Court that it is only a seasonal industry and employ workman like the respondent only during fishing season and are relieved at the end of the season and, therefore, the labour court and the High Court were not justified in not only directing the reinstatement of workman into service but also the payment of back wages. This submission of the learned counsel in the appeal requires to be answered with reference to Section 25a of Industrial Disputes Act. The Section is as under: "25a. Application of sections 25c to 25e.- (1) Sections 25c to 25e inclusive [shall not apply to industrial establishments to which Chapter VB applies, or--] (a) to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month; or (b) to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently. (2) If a question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the appropriate Government thereon shall be final. " 11) It is now well settled by several judgments of this court, that, where a workman is employed for a seasonal work or temporary period, the workman cannot be said to be retrenched in view of Section 2 (00) (bb ). It is relevant to take note of what is stated by this court in the case of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ram Kishan (1995) 5 SCC 653 , it was stated by this court : ". . . . It is relevant to take note of what is stated by this court in the case of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ram Kishan (1995) 5 SCC 653 , it was stated by this court : ". . . . that since the work done by the respondents is only a seasonal work, the respondents cannot be said to have been retrenched in view of what is stated in sub clause (bb) of Section 2 (00) of the Act. " 12) In the normal course, it is the decision of the appropriate Government which is final in determination whether the said industry is seasonal in nature. As has been observed by the labour court and the High Court, there has been nothing brought on record by the appellants to support their contention that fisheries is a seasonal industry. There has been no order from the Government which has been produced by the appellants to state that the fisheries industry is seasonal. There has been no mention of any decision on the part of the appropriate Government with regard to declaring fisheries as a seasonal industry. Therefore, we concur with the finding of the labour court wherein they have concluded that the appellant cannot be classified as a seasonal industry. 13) The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent had not worked for 240 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and, therefore, the respondent cannot claim any protection under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of the respondent before the labour court was that as he had completed working for more than 240 days in a year, the purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not complied with. 14) Section 25b of the Act defines "continuous service". In terms of Sub section (2) of Section 25b that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. In terms of Sub section (2) of Section 25b that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The respondent claims he was employed in the year 1985 as a watchman and his services were retrenched in the year 1991 and during the period between 1985 to 1991, he had worked for a period of more than 240 days. The burden of proof is on the respondent to show that he had worked for 240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue appears to be now well settled. This court in the case of R. M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer [ (2006) 1 SCC 106 ], has observed : "however, applying general principles and on reading the aforesaid judgments, we find that this Court, has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping up in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment of termination. There will also be no receipt of proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment of termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. " 15) Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. It is the contention of the appellant that the services of the respondent were terminated in 1988. The witness produced by the appellant stated that the respondent stopped coming to work from February, 1988. The documentary evidence produced by the appellant is contradictory to this fact as it shows that the respondent was working during February, 1989 also. It has also been observed by the High Court that the muster roll for 1986-87 was not completely produced. The appellants have inexplicably failed to produce the complete records and muster rolls from 1985 to 1991, inspite of the direction issued by the labour court to produce the same. In fact there has been practically no challenge to the deposition of the respondent during cross-examination. In this regard, it would be pertinent to mention the observation of three judge bench of this court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas [ (2004) 8 SCC 195 ], where it is observed: "a Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against this contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. " 16) It is not in dispute that the respondent's service was terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25f of Industrial Disputes Act. Section 25g of the Act provides for the procedure for retrenchment. The section reads- "25g. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. " 16) It is not in dispute that the respondent's service was terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25f of Industrial Disputes Act. Section 25g of the Act provides for the procedure for retrenchment. The section reads- "25g. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. " The labour court based on the pleadings and evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the services of some of the employees junior to the respondent was continued after the respondent was discharged from its duties. The dates of joining of some of the fellow employees of the respondent like Mohanbhai, Kalubhai and Nanjibhai were not produced by the appellants. The appellants have clearly failed to prove that the services of no junior employee was continued when the services of the respondent was terminated. Thus, the procedure laid down in Section 25g has also not been followed. The findings on facts by the labour cannot be termed as perverse and need no interference. " ( 8 ) RECENTLY, the Apex Court has examined similar aspect in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) Scale 613. Relevant observations are in Para. 17, 18, 19, 36 to 43, which is quoted as under : "17. " ( 8 ) RECENTLY, the Apex Court has examined similar aspect in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation reported in 2010 (1) Scale 613. Relevant observations are in Para. 17, 18, 19, 36 to 43, which is quoted as under : "17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39 (a) to (e), 43 and 43a in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923 . 18. In Y. A. Mamarde v. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (1972) 2 SCC 108 , this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: "the anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This Directive Principle of State Policy being conducive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity. " 19. The preamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every section of the society. In a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy of welfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State Industrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Indian Factories Act, Payment of Wages Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, the Employees Insurance Act, the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States. 36. 36. Therefore, it is clearly the duty of the judiciary to promote a social order in which justice, economic and political informs all the institution of the national life. This was also made clear in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) by Justice Mathew at para 1728, p. 1952 and His Lordship held that the Directive Principles nevertheless are: "andfundamental in the governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the judiciary are bound to enforce those directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience. " 37. In view of such clear enunciation of the legal principles, I am in clear agreement with Brother J. Singhvi that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. In doing so this Court should make an effort to protect the rights of the weaker sections of the society in view of the clear constitutional mandate discussed above. 38. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 39. Commenting on the importance of Article 38 in the Constitutional scheme, this court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others [ (1992) 2 SCC 643 ], held that equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet- the most commonly acknowledged- is that there shall be not be any privileged person or class and that none shall be above the law. This Court held that Art 38 contemplates an equal society [para 10, pg. 651]. 40. In Indra Sawhney and Others vs. Union of India and Others [1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that: "the content of the expression "equality before law" is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46. " [at Paras 643, pg. 633] 41. (3) SCC 217], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that: "the content of the expression "equality before law" is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46. " [at Paras 643, pg. 633] 41. Therefore, the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. That is why it was said in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and another vs. S. Naganatha Ayyar and others - [ (1979) 3 SCC 466 ], while interpreting the land reforms Act, that beneficial construction has to be given to welfare legislation. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court, made it very clear that even though the judges are "constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters" they should "also be responsive to part IV of the Constitution being "one of the trinity of the nation's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order". The Learned Judge made it very clear that when the Judges when "decode social legislation, they must be animated by a goal oriented approach" and the Learned Judge opined, and if I may say so, unerringly, that in this country "the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme. " [para 1, p. 468] 42. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid view and I share the anxiety of my Lord Brother Justice Singhvi about a disturbing contrary trend which is discernible in recent times and which is sought to be justified in the name of globalisation and liberalisation of economy. 43. I am of the view that any attempt to dilute the constitutional imperatives in order to promote the so called trends of "globalisation", may result in precarious consequences. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Here if I may quote the immortal words of Tagore: "we have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask "progress toward what, and progress for whom", it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path. " ( 9 ) IN light of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court where decision of this Court challenged before Apex Court by appellant Fisheries Department wherein also termination is of 1991 and Apex Court has considered that once the evidence is given by workman and on that basis, 240 days working has been established, then burden shifts upon the employer to produce all relevant record or evidence being a rebuttal evidence to disprove the facts stated by workman. That burden has not been discharged by petitioners before labour Court and therefore, according to my opinion, the labour Court has rightly come to conclusion on basis of evidence on record that workman has completed continuous service of 240 days within a meaning of Section 25 (B) of I. D. Act. ( 10 ) IT is necessary to note that Section 25 (B) (1) requires continue service of 1 years which has been completed by each workman irrespective of the fact, whether workman has completed 240 days continuous service or not. ( 10 ) IT is necessary to note that Section 25 (B) (1) requires continue service of 1 years which has been completed by each workman irrespective of the fact, whether workman has completed 240 days continuous service or not. Section 25 (B) (2) of the I. D. Act require to complete 240 days within a period of preceding 12 months from date of termination or considering entire Section 25 (B), if it is established by workmen before labour Court, then mandatory provision of Section 25 (F) of the I. D. Act is required to be complied with by the petitioners which has not been complied with being a undisputed facts and therefore, relief of reinstatement has been rightly granted in favour of workmen denying entire back wages of more than 20 years to the workmen with consequential benefits. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, according to my opinion, contentions raised by learned AGP Mr. Sharma cannot be accepted and looking to evidence on record, conclusion arrived at by labour Court, cannot be considered to be baseless and perverse. On the contrary, conclusion of labour Court is based on legal evidence and workmen's evidence remained unchallenged because evidence of petitioners Exh. 31 is not giving clear evidence before labour Court in respect to facts, and not proved documents which were produced by petitioners and also not proved working days of respondents workmen which were not having in knowledge of facts by said witness. Therefore, there is no rebuttal evidence produced by petitioners before labour Court, against the evidence of workmen. Therefore, according to my opinion, labour Court has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, there is no substance in present petition. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed.