JUDGMENT JAYA ROY, J. (1) THIS appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 3/8/1991 passed by Sri Jiwan Tigga, 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Sessions Trial No. 172/1990 whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. (2) THE prosecution case, in brief, is that Pano Soren (the informant) daughter of Jatu Soren of village Serandi lodged F.I.R. on 24- 6-1988 at about 6.45 a.m. at Manjhari P.S. stating therein that accused Supai Hansda son of Late Salku Hansda of village Maridih, P. S. Bahalda, District Moverbhlanj (Orissa), while living at village Legda P. S. Manjhari, District Singhbhum, developed intimacy with her. It is further alleged that the accused appellant used to meet her regularly and assured her that he would marry her and keep her as his wife. On this assurance and allurement, she regularly used to meet him at Legra Hat and on his command she went to Jahar Tungri in April, 1988 where he assured her that he would marry her and on that pretext forcibly cohabited with her for several times. THEreafter, she began to meet the accused appellant several times at Jahar Tungri, as a result of which she became pregnant. When she disclosed this fact to the accused appellant in May, 1988, the accused appellant again assured her that he will keep her as his wife. THEreafter, the accused appellant along with the informant came to her house and she informed her parents about their relationship. THE accused appellant also confessed before the parents of the informant and assured them also to keep the informant as his wife. He, with the permission of the parents of the informant, took the informant but on the way near Lagra Dungri, he left the informant and fled away. THEreafter, the informant returned to her house and informed her parents as well as villagers about the conduct of the appellant. THE father of the informant went to the Manki of village who convened a Panchayati according to the village customs. In the said Panchayati accused appellant Supai Hansda came and confessed his guilt but refused to keep the informant. Parents of the informant and the villagers tried to settle the matter but Supai Hansda did not agree to keep the informant Pano Soren as his wife. In the said Panchayati accused appellant Supai Hansda came and confessed his guilt but refused to keep the informant. Parents of the informant and the villagers tried to settle the matter but Supai Hansda did not agree to keep the informant Pano Soren as his wife. Hence the informant lodged this F.I.R. on 24-6-1988 against the accused appellant under Sections 376/493, I.P.C. After completion of investigation, the officer-in-charge of Manjhari Police Station submitted charge-sheet against the accused appellant under Section 376, I.P.C. THEreafter, after taking cognizance, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions after complying the legal formalities. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Amongst them P.W. 2 Lakhan Murmu and P.W. 3 Urgan Murmu have been tendered and P.W. 5 Jatu Soren (the father of the informant) has also been tendered for cross-examination from the side of defence. P.W. 1 Gopi Nath Murmu, P.W. 4 Gagan Soren, P.W. 6 Pano Soren (the informant), P.W. 8 Ganga Ram Biruwa, Manki of the village are material witnesses. P.W. 7 Dr. J. S. Soren is the lady Doctor who examined Pano Soren on 25-6-1988 at 10.55 a.m. P.W. 9 Damurdhan Biruwa is Pleader's clerk who has proved the F.I.R. as Exhibit-4. (3) DEFENCE has also examined three witnesses to prove his innocence, they are D.W.1 Diku Hembrom, D.W. 2 Chatur Marandi and D.W. 3 Ghoma Manjhi. The accused appellant has denied all the allegations levelled against him. (4) NOW let us examine the evidence of P.W. 6 Pano Soren who is informant as well as victim in this case. This witness has very specifically stated that she had got intimacy with the appellant three years before and used to meet him in Lagra Hat very often and not only that, she has accepted that she did not disclose the same to any body even to her parents. She used to go to meet the appellant accused frequently. It has further come in her evidence that the accused asked her to come to Jahar-Tungri and she went there. The appellant cohabited with her for several times. Thereafter, they used to meet each other regularly and having physical relationship between them. No doubt, she has stated that the appellant had assured her for a number of times that he will take her to his house and he will marry her. The appellant cohabited with her for several times. Thereafter, they used to meet each other regularly and having physical relationship between them. No doubt, she has stated that the appellant had assured her for a number of times that he will take her to his house and he will marry her. It is admitted fact that the prosecutrix cohabited with appellant for few years and spent several nights with her. We further find from her evidence that when she found herself pregnant, she informed her parents and both came to her parents and the accused appellant after giving assurance to her in the presence of her parents to keep her as his wife, took her with him but on the way near Lagra Tungri he left her and fled away. Thereafter, she went to the Manki along with her parents and the Manki convened a Panchayati, in which the accused appellant confessed his guilt but refused to take her to his house. Thereafter, the informant lodged this case against him. (5) THE contents of the Exhibit-3 the (Panchayati Report) also shows that Pano Soren stated before the Panchayat that on Wednesday at village Jahar Tungri, she was with the appellant for the whole night. When in the morning hour the appellant was about to leave the place, she locked his bicycle and let off the air of wheels of the bicycle and told him that she would also go with him as she was pregnant. She further stated that before this incident, she and the appellant met each other frequently. But she has not stated before the Panchayati that only on assurance of marriage given by the appellant, she consented to sexual intercourse. As such it is very clear that it is her afterthought only to implicate the appellant as she stated in the F.I.R. that the appellant gave her assurance of marriage and then only she consented for sexual intercourse. (6) MR. Khatri has contended that D.W. 1 Diku Hembram of village Longra Tola has stated in his evidence that Pano Soran was first married with Boro Manjhi of village Ulidih and thereafter, married Horat Manjhi of village Lagra tongi for the second time and third time she married one Buran Manjhi of village Khijri Mijri but now she is living in village Lagra Tongri and earning money by selling 'Haria' (country liquor) in the village. He has admitted that a Panchayati was convened in the village in this matter. D.W. 2 Chatur Manjhi has also supported the aforesaid facts. He stated in his evidence that six years before, his brother had brought Pano Soren and they lived together for some times but as she could not reconcile, she left him (his brother). He has also admitted about the Panchayati. MR. Khatri has pointed out that the informant has simply denied the aforesaid facts when she was asked about her earlier marriage with the aforesaid persons. According to the evidence of the Doctor P.W. 7 the informant Pano Soren, was well developed in sex character and there was no injury found on her body or on the private part of her body. She has further deposed that the informant Pano Soren was aged between 18-19 years at the time of her examination and she was having habitual intercourse. Thus, from the evidence of the Doctor it is very clear that on the date of the examination the informant, Pano Soren was major and she was sufficiently intelligent to understand the consequences of the act she was consenting to and its moral value and the inherent risk involved in it. It is a matter of utter surprise as we find from the evidence of P.W. 6 Pano Soren who mentioned in para 14 of her evidence that she earlier felt that she was made pregnant by the accused appellant but it was not so whereas she has very specifically stated before the Panchayati and in her F.I.R. that she was made pregnant by the accused appellant. This clearly shows her intention to put pressure on the appellant to marry her and to implicate him falsely in a criminal case. (7) P.W. 5 Jatu Soren who is father of the informant has also not stated anything to support the prosecution case, he has simply denied that Pano Soren the informant is lady of bad character. (8) MR. Khatri has cited a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his contention i.e. (2003) 4 SCC 46 : ( AIR 2003 SC 1639 ) Uday v. State of Karnataka, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed :- "21. (8) MR. Khatri has cited a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his contention i.e. (2003) 4 SCC 46 : ( AIR 2003 SC 1639 ) Uday v. State of Karnataka, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed :- "21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them". The State counsel opposed the contentions of the appellant's counsel but could not point out anything which can show that the appellant had cohabited with the victim only after giving her assurance of marriage and she consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused appellant on a belief that he would really marry her. (9) IN the instant case admittedly the prosecutrix was a grown up lady and she was in love with the appellant and she without informing her parents and other persons, used to meet the appellant frequently for last few years at the lonely place and cohabited with him. The only question which needs to be considered is whether she has consented to sexual intercourse after giving assurance of marriage by the appellant to her or not. The only question which needs to be considered is whether she has consented to sexual intercourse after giving assurance of marriage by the appellant to her or not. From scrutinizing the evidences of the witnesses including the informant on record and the contents of the Exhibit-3 the Panchayati report, it is clear that they were in love and they used to meet often. There is no such evidence that the first act of the sexual intercourse was done after giving assurance of marriage by the appellant to the prosecutrix. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, they make promises several times to get themselves married whatsoever obstacle may come in their way. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. IN such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are overcome with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was in love, not because he promised to marry her but because she also desired it. IN these circumstances it would be very difficult to impute to the appellant's knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise. IN any event, it was not possible for the appellant to know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to consent. (10) CONSIDERING all these circumstances, we find that the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the charge under Section 376,I.P.C. against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 3-8-1991 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Singhbhum at Chaibasa in S.T. No. 172 of 1990. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of bail bonds. He need not surrender. Appeal allowed.