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2010 DIGILAW 1204 (BOM)

Dhananjay Gopalrao Bahergaonkar v. The State of Maharashtra Through the Superintendent of Police

2010-08-16

A.V.POTDAR

body2010
Judgment : ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. By the present criminal application, u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the applicant has prayed to quash and set aside the FIR bearing No. B38/2010 registered with Shivaji Nagar Police Station, Beed for an offence punishable u/s 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code with section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 2. In response to the notice issued by this Court, respondent No.2-original complainant, appeared and filed his affidavit in reply on 02.08.2010. 3. Heard learned counsel for the applicant followed by learned APP and learned counsel for respondent No.2. 4. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the learned counsel for the parties, heard finally at the stage of admission. 5. Such of the facts, as are necessary for the decision of this application, may briefly be stated thus – a) CR No.B38/2010 came to be registered with Shivaji Nagar police station, Beed on 18th June 2010 on the complaint of respondent No.2, Akash Sadashiv Wadmare. It is alleged in the complaint that in front of his house, there is huge open space belonging to the applicant on which various persons have encroached. It is further alleged that the complainant and other persons of the said locality use the said open space as a road. It is alleged that on 18th June 2010, at about 10.30 a.m. when the complainant was proceeding to the house of his friend and was passing from the said open space, the applicant abused him in the name of his caste for using the said open space and also slapped the complainant on his face. Thereafter, the friend of the complainant and other persons rescued the complainant. Hence, the present complaint came to be lodged against the applicant. b) It appears that thereafter, the applicant approached the lower court seeking anticipatory bail, however could not succeed. c) Therefore, the applicant is before this Court u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing and setting aside the said FIR and has also prayed to release him on anticipatory bail during the pendency of the present criminal application. It further appears that vide order dated 5th July 2010, the applicant is protected by way of interim protection by this Court. 6. It further appears that vide order dated 5th July 2010, the applicant is protected by way of interim protection by this Court. 6. The applicant has contended that the property, over which the dispute has taken place between the applicant and the complainant, is the ancestral property of the applicant. It is also alleged that the applicant does not reside at Beed, however he is residing at Palghar, Dist Thane. Even brother and sisters of the applicant, who are co-owners of the said property, do not reside at Beed, however they reside outside Beed. It is also contended that as all the owners of the said property do not reside at Beed, they had decided to dispose of the said property and accordingly efforts were made by them in that behalf. It is further contended that some of the encroachers on the said property also intended to purchase the said property, however could not succeed. The applicant has also contended that even the complainant-present respondent No.2 also intended to purchase the said property, however as he also could not succeed and hence there was dispute. It is urged that the present complaint is nothing but a pressurize tactic to prevent the applicant and others from selling the property to others and hence prayed to quash and set aside the impugned FIR. 7. In the affidavit in reply, respondent No.2 has categorically admitted that the property, for which the dispute is going on, is the ancestral property of the applicant and his family members. He has further categorically admitted that the applicant and his family members intended to dispose of the property where the respondent No.2 and others reside. He has also admitted that as the property was agreed to sale in favour of some other person, who is also occupying the same and as respondent No.2 and others could not succeed in purchasing the same, there was unrest. Respondent No.2 has contended that now he has understood that the litigation, which he has initiated, would cause damage to the relationship between the applicant and respondent No.2 as well as between two sects of the society and hence to maintain harmony in the two communities he does not want to further prosecute the present complaint against the applicant. 8. Respondent No.2 has contended that now he has understood that the litigation, which he has initiated, would cause damage to the relationship between the applicant and respondent No.2 as well as between two sects of the society and hence to maintain harmony in the two communities he does not want to further prosecute the present complaint against the applicant. 8. Though the applicant and complainant have requested to compound the offence, and though the offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code are compoundable, yet there is hurdle in the way of compounding the offence punishable under the Atrocities Act. Now the point for consideration before this Court is as to whether the offence punishable under the Atrocities Act is compoundable in the eye of law or not. 9. The Apex Court, in the matter “B.S.Joshi V/s State of Haryana” reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 , has observed that the decision of Supreme Court in “Madhu Limaye V/s State of Maharshtra” reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in S.482 or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 10. Bearing in mind these observations of the Apex Court though there is no specific provision as to whether the offence punishable under the Atrocities Act is compoundable or not, yet considering the fact, which is evident from the affidavit in reply filed by respondent No.2 as well as the facts demonstrated in the application, that the dispute between the applicant and the complainant-respondent No.2 is a dispute over the property owned by the applicant and his family members and hence to secure ends of justice, the same can be compounded. It is further evident from the averments made in the application as well as facts stated in the affidavit in reply that respondent No.2 is also one of the occupant on the part of the said property. It is further evident from the averments made in the application as well as facts stated in the affidavit in reply that respondent No.2 is also one of the occupant on the part of the said property. It is contended in the affidavit in reply that as the occupants, who intended to purchase the property, could not succeed and hence there was unrest. It is also contended that now they have realized and understood the importance of maintaining harmony between the applicant and complainant as well as between the residents in the said property and, therefore, they have decided to settle the dispute. If two sects of the society have decided to settle the dispute to maintain harmony between them, then in such cases, this Court has to exercise the powers vested in the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Considering these aspects, this Court is of the considered view that though there is no express provision to compound the offence punishable under the Atrocities Act, yet this Court in the extra ordinary powers vested in it under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to secure ends of justice and to maintain harmony between two sects of the society, can compound the offence. 11. In the result, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause “B”. The FIR at CR No.B38/2010 with Shivaji Nagar police station, Beed against the applicant is hereby quashed and set aside. 12. Rule is thus made absolute. Application stands disposed of accordingly. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.