JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.—Both these appeals arise out of one common judgment of the First Appellate Court. One of these appeal has been filed by the plaintiff and the other filed by the defendant. Both the appeals are being decided under one common judgment. 2. Heard Sri Y.S. Saxena, learned counsel for the plaintiffs and Sri Kshitiz Shailendra, learned counsel for the defendant in both the appeals. 3. Facts in short on record of the present second appeals are as follows : Duli Chand @ Dulli is admittedly the ancestor of the plaintiffs and defendants. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the pedigree flowing from Duli Chand, which is as follows : Duli Chand @ Dulli Mohan Poosey Doodhraj @ Khem Karan Smt. Mula Pooran Mal Smt. Roopania Kalyan Das = Smt. Prano Devi Narain Das Hori Lal Lachhman Pd. Ram Chandra Smt. Renuka Ganga Devi (Defdt.) = Smt. Lilawati = Prakashwati (Defdt.) (Plaintiff) Ram Gopa Shiv Swarup Shanti Swarup Har Pal (Pltff.) (Pltff.) (Pltff.) (Pltff.) 4. Mohan issueless son of Duli Chand predeceased his father, therefore, properties possessed by Duli Chand devolved upon Poosey @ Khem Karan and Doodh Raj in equal share i.e. half share each Doodh Raj executed a gift-deed in 1893 of certain portion of joint Hindu property in favour of Moola, his daughter. Moola did not have any male child and therefore, property possessed by her was inherited by her daughter Roopania. So far as the other branch of male antecedents is concerned, Poosey @ Khem Karan had only one son, namely, Pooran Mat and Pooran Mal in turn also had only one son, namely, Kalyan Das. Kalyan Das is stated to have purchased the property which was gifted to Moola by her father Doodhraj from Roopania vide sale-deed dated 19th March, 1995. Kalyan Das is stated to have executed a will of the entire property possessed by him on 19th August, 1965 in favour of one of his son’s wife, namely, Smt. Lilawati. In the will deed, it is mentioned that the property which is being bequeathed in favour of Lilawati was self acquired property of Kalyan Das and the share which he had in the undivided joint Hindu family property. 5. In the will deed, it is mentioned that the property which is being bequeathed in favour of Lilawati was self acquired property of Kalyan Das and the share which he had in the undivided joint Hindu family property. 5. The will deed dated 19.8.1965 was subjected to challenge by grand son of Kalyan Das, namely, Narain Das and his wife Ganga Devi by means of Original Suit No. 65 of 1969. 6. On behalf of plaintiffs it was contended that gift deed executed by Dodhraj in favour of his daughter namely, Moola on 29th June, 1893 was in respect of undivided share in joint Hindu family property qua which Doodhraj had no authority to execute the said gift deed. As a consequent thereto, the transfer by Roopania, the subsequent inheritor of the property by way of sale-deed in favour of Kalyan Das was without any authority. It is, therefore, submitted that the entire property possessed by Kalyan Das was his share in undivided joint Hindu family property. In respect of such property, he could had a right to execute the will only to the extent of his share which he possessed on the date grand sons were born. Therefore, to that extent the will deed is bad. Plaintiffs also sought declaration that they had 5/16 share in the property. 7. Suit was contested by the defendants. It was claimed that the sale-deed executed by Roopania in favour of Kalyan Das was a valid transfer and in no case could be objected to by the legal heirs of Kalyan Das on the principles of acquiescence. Even if Doodhraj as per the Hindu Laws had no right to transfer his share of the undivided joint Hindu property in favour of his daughter the gift-deed of 1893, cannot be questioned for collateral purposes at such a belated stage. For the same reasons he submits that sale-deed executed by Roopania on 19th March, 1915 also cannot be questioned. The property purchased by Kalyan Das has to be treated as self acquired property and therefore, he had a right to bequeath the same. 8. The suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 18.12.1976. The validity of the Will and the property transferred thereunder was upheld. The property purchased by Kalyan Das has to be treated as self acquired property and therefore, he had a right to bequeath the same. 8. The suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 18.12.1976. The validity of the Will and the property transferred thereunder was upheld. It was further recorded that the Suit No. 87 of 1976 under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act based on the same Will was decreed in favour of Leelawati whereas the suit filed by the plaintiff being Suit No. 112 of 1976 for partition of the grove land was dismissed after upholding the Will. The finding so recorded by the Revenue Court would be binding and would operate as res judicata between the parties. The family partition of the year 1920-22 was also not accepted. 9. Not being satisfied the plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No. 02 of 1977 which has been partly allowed and it has been held that Kalyan Das could execute a Will in respect of his share only in the co-parcenery property. It has been held that the plaintiff had 1/8th share in the house and in the shop while the findings recorded in respect of land and grove by the Revenue Courts would be binding on the principle of res judicata. 10. The plaintiff and the defendant have filed these separate second appeals against the part of the judgment of the First Appellate Court in so far as it is adverse to them. 11. Counsel for the plaintiff made reference to paragraph 212, 212(2), 216, 233(1), 235 and 258 of Mulla’s Commentary on Hindu Law which according to his is authentic and binding for adjudicating the rights of the parties. It has been stated that a married daughter could not be a member of Joint Hindu family and, therefore, no female can be a co-parcener under Mitakshara Law. Therefore, on the date of execution of the gift-deed by Doodh Raj in favour of Moola i.e. 28.6.1893, such gift-deed could not be made in favour of a person who was not a co-parcener. With reference to paragraph 258 it is stated that no co-parcener can dispose of his undivided interest in co-parcenery property of Will. He can only make a gift of his interest with the consent of the other co-parcener. With reference to paragraph 258 it is stated that no co-parcener can dispose of his undivided interest in co-parcenery property of Will. He can only make a gift of his interest with the consent of the other co-parcener. This was law as was existing prior to Hindu Succession Act, 1956. With reference to paragraph 257 it is contended that a co-parcener can approach the Court for setting aside the gift in its entirely even in respect of his own interest in the property executed when it is made in favour of remaining co-parcener. It has, therefore, been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the suit was liable to be decreed in its entirety as all subsequent transfer would fall automatically as Moola got no legal right under the gift. 12. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that both the Courts have found that the Will as executed was strictly in accordance with law. It is contended that property obtained by the grandfather Kalyan Das by different modes namely sale-deeds etc. in the 18 and 19 century cannot be permitted to be re-opened by the plaintiff who draws their title from Kalyan Das. Plaintiff has stepped into the shoes of Kalyan Das and cannot question the transfers obtained by Kalyan Das. He submits that in view of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the property possessed by female shall be held by her as full owner and such acquisition can be by way of gift. It is explained that the gift by Doodh Raj in favour of his daughter in the year 1893 as well as sale-deed executed in favour of Kalyan Das in 1915 cannot be disputed after expiry of more than 50 years. Reference has also been made to paragraph 225 and 226 of the Mulla’s Hindu Law which provides that a father could gift some property to his daughter. Lastly it is contended that the judgment of the Revenue Court passed in proceedings under Section 229-B and Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has attained finality between the parties and, therefore, the plaintiffs are estopped from disputing the correctness or otherwise of the Will. With regard to the Appeal filed by the defendants, it is contended that the Will was in two parts : (a) Self acquired properties of Kalyan Das. (b) 1/3rd share in the co-parcenery property. With regard to the Appeal filed by the defendants, it is contended that the Will was in two parts : (a) Self acquired properties of Kalyan Das. (b) 1/3rd share in the co-parcenery property. The Court below has mis-directed itself in recording that it was in respect of self acquired property. 12-A. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have examined the records. The First Appellate Court framed five points for determination which are as follows : “1. Whether the disputed property was ancestral or self acquired in the hands of Kalyan Das ? 2. Whether Kalyan Das executed a Will in favour of Smt. Lilawati on 2.8.1965 and was that Will genuine, valid and binding on the parties ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs-appellants had subsisting interest in the disputed property. If so, what was their share therein ? 4. Whether Kalyan Das had purchased half share of the grove from Smt. Roopaniya ? If so, its effect ? 5. Whether the suit in respect of grove was maintainable or was it barred by res judicata ?” 13. With regard to point No. 1, after noticing the evidence and the pedigree, it has been noticed that the gift was executed by Doodh Raj in favour of Moola on 29.6.1893. On the strength of gift-deed Moola became the owner of the property which in turn devolved upon Rupania, the daughter of Moola. The undivided share so inherited by Rupania was purchased by Kalyan Das by registered sale-deed on 19.3.1915. The Court thereafter proceeded to hold as follows : “In the year 1893 the gift had been created and hereafter in the year 1915 sales of that bequeathed property was again made to the male lineal coparcener hence it can certainly be presumed that the gift and the sale were both the consent of the coparceners. The Khasra of 1302 F. corresponding to 1895 A.D. Ex. 3 disclosed that at that time Doodraj and Pooran Mal were alive. Pooranmal had only one son Kalyan Das who would have been about 8 years old at that time. None of them ever challenged that gift which further lent strength to the application that it was with the consent of the other coparceners. 3 disclosed that at that time Doodraj and Pooran Mal were alive. Pooranmal had only one son Kalyan Das who would have been about 8 years old at that time. None of them ever challenged that gift which further lent strength to the application that it was with the consent of the other coparceners. Then after about 22 years there of Kalyan Das purchased that property from Smt. Roopania which implied further that the gift was accepted as a fait accompli and with full understanding the sale was got executed. Thus it was not a sham transaction and was meant to repurchase the property. It would follow, therefore, that half of the property was ancestral in the hands of Kalyan Das which he had acquired from his father Pooranmal and the remaining half property was the self acquired property under the transfer made by Smt. Roopania.” 14. Out of the entire property held by Kalyan Das, half of the property was self acquired. The Court after examining the evidence on record has recorded a categorical finding that Kalyan Das could execute the Will subject-matter of challenge dated 2.8.1965 in respect of entire self acquired property. It has been noticed that in Suit No. 87 of 1967 filed before the Revenue Courts under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as well as from the proceedings initiated by way of partition suit No. 112 of 1967 filed by the plaintiffs themselves, both of which were clubbed and decided together, the Will dated 2.8.1965 set up by Leelawati had been held to be a genuine transaction. Appeal against the order of the First Revenue Court has also been dismissed on 5.12.1969. The Appellate Court has proceeded to hold that even if the provisions of Section 11 CPC may not be attracted but the general principles of res judicata would apply qua the findings of the Revenue Court with regard to grove land and qua the legality of the Will set up by Leelawati. Such conclusion would be binding upon the parties. The Court, therefore, held that so far as the self acquired property of Kalyan Das are concerned, he had a right to transfer the same by way of Will and to extend the suit filed by the plaintiff has been dismissed. 15. Such conclusion would be binding upon the parties. The Court, therefore, held that so far as the self acquired property of Kalyan Das are concerned, he had a right to transfer the same by way of Will and to extend the suit filed by the plaintiff has been dismissed. 15. With regard to remaining properties a conclusive finding has been recorded that theory of partition during the life time of Kalyan Das and Laxman Prasad cannot be accepted in view of the evidence led by the parties and it has been held that Kalyan Das was a co-parcener in the undivided joint Hindu family property, he could not have executed a Will qua the entire ancestral property. It has been held that the plaintiffs had 1/8th share in the house and the shop only. 16. The finding so recorded by the Court below cannot be said to be perverse or based on non-consideration of evidence. It is not doubt true that Hindu Law as was then applicable and as has been stated in the various clauses of Mulla’s Hindu Law, referred to above, a female cannot be a co-parcener under the Mitakshara Law and, therefore, undivided co-parcenery interest could not be transferred or gifted to her. It is also true that in the facts of the case the father namely Doodh Raj had gifted his undivided interest in the house and shop in favour of his daughter Moola on 29.6.1893, the deed was more than 184 years old on the date of institution of the suit and further that Kalyan Das had purchased the same property which devolved upon Rupaniya, daughter of Moola under a registered sale-deed on 19.3.1915. The two transactions were sought to be challenged and reopened under a suit filed in 1969. The Appellate Court is legally justified in recording a finding that the plaintiff having stepped into the shoes of Kalyan Das being a legal heir and being a lineal descendant cannot be permitted to question the purchase of property by Kalyan Das himself from Roopaniya. The Court below has rightly held that the gift of 1893 as well as the sale-deed of 1915 were a fait accompli. 17. The said findings of the First Appellate Court are strictly in accordance with law. The Court below has rightly held that the gift of 1893 as well as the sale-deed of 1915 were a fait accompli. 17. The said findings of the First Appellate Court are strictly in accordance with law. The First Appellate Court is also legally justified in its view that the findings recorded by the Revenue Court in respect of the genuineness of the Will executed by Kalyan Das dated 19.8.1965 in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and the partition suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act operate as res judicata in respect of the grove and the land as the same was within the jurisdiction of Revenue Court. The Court has, therefore, rightly held that the genuineness of the Will has to be upheld. 18. The First Appellate Court in respect of ‘b’ category of property for the reasons recorded has rightly come to a conclusion that the plea of family partition during the lifetime of Kalyan Das could not be established by the defendants and, therefore, Kalyan Das could not have willed the undivided joint Hindu property except to the extent of his share. The First Appellate Court has found that the plaintiff had 1/8th share in the ancestral property i.e. other than that which was self acquired of the Kalyan Das and those covered by the judgment of the Revenue Court. Such findings of fact cannot be reappraised on examination of evidence by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 C.P.C. 19. In the opinion of the Court the judgment of the First Appellate Court has, therefore, to be affirmed. 20. In view of the aforesaid no substantial question of law arises. 21. The appeals are dismissed. ————