Judgment : V. DHANAPALAN, J. Heard Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned-senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This appeal arises out of the order, dated 111. 2009 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No. 19132 of 2009 in and by which, the transfer order, dated 37. 2009 issued against the respondent by the first appellant transferring him from Chennai to Tuticorin, came to be set aside. 3. The respondent joined the services of the appellant Insurance Company as an Assistant Administrative Officer in the year 1987 by way of direct recruitment and thereafter, he was promoted as Scale II Officer in the year 1991 and subsequently as Scale III Officer in the year 2003. At present, he is working as Divisional Manager, Division V at Chennai. The appellant Company has introduced a Transfer Mobility Policy for Class I Officers. As per the said policy, in the year 2008, the appellant Company has prepared station-wise list of Officers liable to be transferred and since the respondent was the senior most Scale III Officer in Chennai Region having stationed for nearly 17 years, he was considered for transfer. Accordingly, by order, dated 7. 2009 the respondent was transferred from Chennai to Tuticorin Divisional Office as Divisional Manager. 4. According to the respondent. His father who is aged about 74 years, has been diagonised with “Malignant Rectal Cancer” at Jipmer Hospital, Pondicherry and was operated at Apollo Hospitals, Chennai on 30.9.2006. The present condition of his father warrants frequent change of colostomy bag 2-3 times a day coupled with regular medication and constant monitoring of the progress of the Malignant Adenocarcinoma with Chemotheraphy, Radiations, etc. In such conditions, there should always be an attendant to take every care of his father and since the mother of the respondent already passed away, there is no person available except the respondent. In such circumstances, the respondent was unable to comply with the transfer order which was issued against him, transferring from Chennai to Tuticorin and if he leaves his father and joins duty at Tuticorin office, he would be put to irreparable injury. 5. Apart from the above, the respondent has also raised grounds of mala fide intention on the part of the appellant Company in transferring him to Tuticorin. 5. Apart from the above, the respondent has also raised grounds of mala fide intention on the part of the appellant Company in transferring him to Tuticorin. According to the respondent, since he had not complied with the directions of the second appellant in making a report in favour of one K. Inbaraj, who is a senior Branch Manager, in the matter of departmental proceedings, the transfer order was motivated and inflicted against the respondent. 6. In view of the above stated circumstances, having aggrieved over the transfer order, the respondent has come before this Court by way of a writ petition. .7. The appellant Company resisted the above said writ petition by filing a counter affidavit stating, inter alia, that in order to ensure transparency in the matter of transfers, the appellant Company introduced a Transfer Mobility Policy for Class I Officers. As per the said policy, an officer who completes five years of service will be considered for transfer and for this purpose, the Company prepares a station-wise seniority list of all Officers posted in every station. In respect of Scale I and II, normally 10% of the Officers are subjected to transfer while 20% of the Officers in respect of Scale III and the transfer would be effected only on the basis of seniority list. Following the said Policy, in the year 2008, the appellant Company prepared station-wise list of Officers liable to be transferred wherein, the respondent was considered as senior most Scale III Officer having completed 17 years of service in Chennai. Therefore, by order, dated 5. 2008, the respondent was transferred to Hyderabad Region, Andhra Pradesh. However, on a representation made by the respondent to the appellant Company requesting to consider his case on humanitarian grounds since his father’s health condition was precarious, the respondent was exempted from transfer. Again, for the year 2009, the appellant Company prepared a station-wise list of Officers liable to be transferred and since the respondent was considered as senior most Officer liable for transfer and keeping in view of his representations regarding his father’s health condition, while taking into consideration the decision by the Committee not to transfer the respondent outside the State of Tamil Nadu, the appellant Company transferred the respondent from Chennai to Tuticorin Divisional Officer, Tuticorin, by its order, dated 7. 2009 inasmuch as there is a vacancy at Tuticorin Divisional Office. 8. 2009 inasmuch as there is a vacancy at Tuticorin Divisional Office. 8. Having considered the rival submissions made on either side as well as the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned single Judge of this Court, by his order, dated 111. 2009, allowed the writ petition, setting aside the transfer order only on humanitarian consideration while considering the health condition of the father of the respondent. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant Company has come forward with the present writ appeal. .9. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, would vehemently contend that the respondent has been in Chennai for the past 17 years having deprived of another incumbent of the appellant Company to function in the said post and he is not having any vested right to have a permanent hold of his post in Chennai in preference to other persons. He would further contend that in fact, during the year 2008, the appellant Company prepared a station-wise list of Officers liable to be transferred and the respondent being the senior most Scale III Officer in Chennai Region, by order, dated 5. 2008, was transferred to Hyderabad Region, Andhra Pradesh as per the Transfer and Mobility Policy of the appellant Company. Immediately thereafter, the respondent gave a requisition to the Chairman and Managing Director to exempt him from Transfer Mobility Policy and to retain him in Chennai for one year enabling him to attend the needs of his father, which was considered and taking a sympathetic consideration, he was let off from being transferred. However, for the year 2009, the appellant Company prepared station-wise list of Officers liable to be transferred and since the respondent was the senior most Officer, while taking the decision not to transfer the respondent outside the State of Tamil Nadu in view of the representations made by the respondent, by order, dated 7. 2009 he was transferred to Tuticorin Divisional Office as there is a vacancy. 2009 he was transferred to Tuticorin Divisional Office as there is a vacancy. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would submit that there is no mala fide on the part of the appellant Company as attributed by the respondent and having kept in mind the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant has rightly transferred the respondent to Tuticorin Divisional Office at Tuticorin and as such the transfer order is reasonable and the respondent has to accept and obey the same and there is no justification on his part in assailing his transfer order having remained in Chennai region for more than 17 years. He would further submit that as per Regulation 12 of the General Insurance (Rationalisation of Pay Scales and other conditions of service of Officers), 1975, the transfer of Officers from one station to another is envisaged and the appellant Company has adopted the Transfer Mobility Policy and rightly transferred the respondent to Tuticorin and there is no irregularity in such transfer. However, the learned single Judge has interfered with the same on humanitarian grounds while considering the health condition of the father of the respondent, which cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the respondent has been in Chennai Region for more than 17 years. 10. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel has relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Rajesh v. State of U.P. and Others JT (2009) 10 SC 187, wherein, it is observed that while dealing with the matters of transfer, the High Court should have appreciated the true extent of scrutiny into matter of transfer and the limited scope of judicial review and it cannot enter into an arena which did not belong to it. 11. With these contentions, the learned senor counsel appearing for the appellants sought for setting aside the order of the learned single Judge. 12. Per contra, Mr. 11. With these contentions, the learned senor counsel appearing for the appellants sought for setting aside the order of the learned single Judge. 12. Per contra, Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the transfer is tainted with mala fide intention, inasmuch as the respondent, being the Reporting Officer, had to forward a confidential report in respect, of one K.Inbaraj, Senior Branch Manager over his fabricating and manipulating documents for obtaining a loan to purchase a car and the second appellant being the Reviewing Authority ignored the confidential report of the respondent and in turn wanted to make the report in favour of the said K. Inbaraj and in the even of his noncompliance of his direction, the second appellant threatened the respondent that his promotion to next cadre would be jeopardized and since he did not accede to the direction of the second appellant, the order of transfer was inflicted against the respondent. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the learned single Judge has rightly set aside the order of transfer on humanitarian grounds having considered the genuine hardships expressed by the respondent in attending his father who is suffering from major ailment. With these contentions, the learned senior counsel sought for dismissal of the writ appeal. .13. It is the cardinal principle that a transfer is ordinarily an incident of service. The Court should not interfere with a transfer order which is made for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory or statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other and he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order, instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. Indisputably, the order of transfer is an administrative order and there cannot be a doubt whatsoever that the transfer is an incident of service and the same should not be interfered with save in cases where inter alia mala fide of the authority is proved. Indisputably, the order of transfer is an administrative order and there cannot be a doubt whatsoever that the transfer is an incident of service and the same should not be interfered with save in cases where inter alia mala fide of the authority is proved. It is also a settled principle that mala fide is of two kinds, one is malice in fact and the second is malice in law. Order in question would attract the malice in law if it was not passed on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer. It is one thing to say that the appellant is entitled to pass an order of transfer in an administrative exigency but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer passed in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, then the Court shall have power to interfere with the same. 14. Keeping in view the above legal position as well as facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the allegation made in respect of the non-consideration of the confidential report by the respondent in favour of K. Inbaraj, is a matter of administrative work and it cannot be attributed to the mala fide intention of the appellant Company in order to interfere with the same. In fact, during the year 2008, the station-wise list of Officers was drawn and this respondent was considered as senior most Officer and on that basis, while adopting the transfer policy, when he was transferred to Hyderabad Region, the respondent himself made a representation to the appellant Company to exempt him from the transfer policy and retain him at Chennai for one year. While that being so, it cannot be contended that the present impugned order of transfer is tainted with mala fide intention and inflicted against the respondent. Further, in fact, the learned single Judge has not dealt with the issue regarding mala fide but set aside the order of transfer only on humanitarian grounds. While that being so, it cannot be contended that the present impugned order of transfer is tainted with mala fide intention and inflicted against the respondent. Further, in fact, the learned single Judge has not dealt with the issue regarding mala fide but set aside the order of transfer only on humanitarian grounds. Even for this also, we are not in agreement with the learned single Judge as having regard to the fact that the respondent had been in Chennai Region for more than 17 years depriving of other incumbent of the appellant Company to function in the said place and further he was already let off from being considered for transfer by exempting him from Transfer Mobility Policy in the year 2008. Therefore, having already availed the benefit of exemption from being considered for transfer and remained himself for one year, there is no justification on the part of the respondent now in assailing the impugned order of transfer. 15. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Rajendra Singh Rajesh v. State of U.P. and Others (supra), wherein, in paragraphs 10 and 11, it has been observed as under: ”10. We are pained to observed that the High Court seriously erred in deciding as to Whether respondent No.5 was a competent person to be posted at Ghaziabad-IV as Sub Registrar. The exercise undertaken by the High Court did not fall within its domain and was rather uncalled for. We are unable to approve the direction issued to the State Government and Inspector General of Registration to transfer a competent officer at Ghaziabad-IV as Sub Registrar after holding that respondent No.5 cannot be said to be an officer having a better conduct and integrity in comparison to the petitioner justifying his posting at Ghaziabad Iv. The High Court entered into an arena which did not belong to it and thereby committed serious error of law. The only question required to be seen was whether transfer of respondent No.5 was actuated with mala fide or otherwise in violation of statutory rules. The transfer of respondent No.5 was not found to suffer from any of these vices. The High Court went into the competence and suitability of respondent No.5 for such posting. It is here that the High Court fell into a grave error. The transfer of respondent No.5 was not found to suffer from any of these vices. The High Court went into the competence and suitability of respondent No.5 for such posting. It is here that the High Court fell into a grave error. As a matter of fact, the impugned order of the High Court casts stigma in the service of respondent No.5 which may also act prejudicial to his interest in the pending appeal against the adverse remarks. 16. Therefore, having regard to the above proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that the learned single Judge ought not to have shown any indulgence even on humanitarian grounds to the respondent who keeps on agitating the transfer orders by remaining himself in Chennai for years together. In such view of the mater, we are unable to confirm the order of the learned single Judge. 17. However, the learned senior counsel for the respondent would submit that Clause (I) of the Transfer and Mobility Policy for Class-I Officers envisages power to modify/relax the provisions of the Policy by the Personal & Administration Committee of the Board/Board of the Company while dealing with the individual cases of genuine hardship of an Officer in a just and equitable manner or for meeting exigencies of work situation. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent has already made a detailed representation to the Chairman of the Company on the ground of genuine hardship and the same may be directed to be placed before the personal and Administration Committee of the Board/Board of the Company which is mentioned in Clause (I) of the Policy. The learned senior counsel would submit that the respondent would be satisfied if the Committee considers his additional representation regarding genuine hardships and passes orders one way or the other in accordance with law. He also filed an affidavit duly sworn to by the respondent undertaking that he will abide by the decision of the Board and ready to join the duty at the place of transfer if they order so. He also filed an affidavit duly sworn to by the respondent undertaking that he will abide by the decision of the Board and ready to join the duty at the place of transfer if they order so. On this aspect, when we enquired the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant regarding the representation of the respondent expressing his genuine hardship, on instructions, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, while refuting the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent, would submit that the respondent has already made a detailed representation, the same would be considered and passed orders only by the appropriate Committee under Clause J(3) and not by the Board of the Company under Clause(I) of the Policy as it deals only with the modification or relaxation of the provisions of the Policy. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the above submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties. Accordingly, while permitting the respondent to make an additional representation in the light of subsequent developments, we direct the competent authority concerned which deals with the transfer matter of the respondent, i.e. Committee of GM (p) and GM (Mktg.) along with the concerned Overseeing Executing of the RO, to consider the representation already made as well as additional representation being made by the respondent and pass orders in accordance with law, within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is needless to mention that as the respondent, without any agitation as undertaken by him, has to obey the orders of any nature that may be passed. However, till such orders are passed, the appellant Company is directed to maintain status quo as on date. With the above direction, this writ appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge will be substituted by this order. No costs.