JUDGMENT By the Court.—These are two special appeals i.e. Special Appeal No. 388 of 2010 against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.2.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 10196 of 2010 hereinafter referred to as 1st Appeal and Special Appeal No. 387 of 2010 against the judgment of another Single Judge dated 23.2.2010 passed in writ petition No. 7212 of 2010, hereinafter referred to as the 2nd Appeal. 2. As both the appeals are clubbed and they need a decision on the same issue, are taken up together. 3. Both the special appeals came to be filed in relation to the orders passed by the learned Single Judges touching the powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice in relation to the appointment of certain persons as daily labour to discharge certain work. Besides aforesaid two appeals there are large number of other appeals and more than dozen of writ petitions which are also directed to be clubbed with these two matters for being decided by the Bench. As on date we could not bifurcate large number of matters so clubbed due to paucity of time as most of them relate to the appointment in the district judgeship either on Class IV or on Class III posts or even in the establishment of this Court made much earlier. 4. As on date in these two appeals argument on the question of grant of interim stay to the orders of learned Single Judge was only heard. There is restraint order passed in writ petitions by which the establishment has been restrained from giving effect to certain exercises which but for the small formalities is otherwise complete. 5. To make it more precise the writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 has been directed to be listed and heard in due course but three directions are issued which are to be quoted here for convenience : (a) In view of the conceded position by the High Court through its counsel as noted above, no further appointment on Class IV posts covered by Rule 4(a) of the Rules, 1976 in the establishment of the High Court both at Allahabad and at Lucknow, shall be made in any capacity except after due publication in newspapers having wide and adequate circulation. (b) It shall be open to the High Court to take work or not to take work either from the respondents No. 4 to 16 or any such engagements that have been made along with the said respondents on or any date subsequent to the date of their appointment in the establishment of the High Court. However, they shall not be paid their salary without the leave of the Court. (c) Respondents No. 4 to 16 and similarly situate persons shall not be regularized nor they shall be granted any preference in terms of Rule 4 at the time of regular appointment. 6. Similarly in the writ petition No. 7212 of 2010 although writ petition has been directed to be heard and decided in due course but following restraint order has been passed : “Accordingly the respondent High Court is restrained from giving effect to the selections in any manner whatsoever. The selected candidates are reported to have not been issued any letters of appointment so far nor have they been permitted to join. Accordingly the High Court shall neither issue any letters of appointment to such selected candidates nor shall they be permitted to join or receive any benefits arising out of the selections.” 7. Before we start to deal with the matter we are to hurriedly notice the relief sought in writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 and writ petition No. 7212 of 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the 1st writ petition and 2nd writ petition respectively). 8. In the 1st writ petition main relief as claimed is as below : (1) issue,a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to consider the candidature of the petitioner on the post of the peon for which application has been submitted on dated 11.1.2010 and earlier application dated 11.1.2007 and 3.1.2006 was duly recommended by the Hon’ble Justice R.P. Mishra and Justice C.P. Mishra. (2) Issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents if the petitioner is suitable and fit for appointment on the post of the class IV and appointment letter be issued to him. 9. (2) Issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents if the petitioner is suitable and fit for appointment on the post of the class IV and appointment letter be issued to him. 9. In 2nd writ petition the main relief as claimed is hereinafter quoted below : (1) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to permit the petitioner for participation in interview for direct recruitment of car drivers. (2) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents, if the petitioner found eligible, appointment letter of direct recruitment of car drivers be issued. 10. Now in the light of the relief so claimed in both writ petitions and the pleadings as set forth, keeping in mind the fact that no final decision has been given , we are to test the merits/correctness in the order of injunction so granted by a lengthy exercise in both the orders under challenge. 11. Before we come to the issue and start discussion on the subject in the light of the relief so claimed in the writ petitions and the scope of the writ petitions and the issues which could have been touched and final mandate could have been given as in both the judgments very lengthy observation about system, about manner in which appointment on Class IV post and otherwise is being made by Hon’ble the Chief Justice is written, we are also to notice/observe certain facts although not with the purpose to match the competitive language/approach of learned Single Judges. 12. Although in the light of pleadings and relief so claimed in the writ petition and the arguments so advanced in the appeal, this court in brief can immediately say that the injunction so granted by the learned Single Judges are beyond the scope and the issue and the relief so claimed in the writ petitions and thus such kind of grant has been always dis-approved by the Apex Court in series of judgments but as lot of pain has been taken in commenting on the Institution and system, we are also to write something which we feel relevant for the purposes of our satisfaction and for passing orders on the stay application in the present appeals. 13. 13. On a bare reading of both orders under challenge one can have the safe impression that the issue which has been analyzed in both the orders is far and far away from the scope and issue as involved in the writ petitions and specially relief so claimed. A very lengthy and healthy delivery with various mild and strong phrases and words can be only a matter of strong feeling against the system without any reference to the context. This may be more appropriately confirmed by this fact that in all eight judgments which are referred in the orders which will be just noticed, none of them have any application to the facts of the present case and they do not touch the subject as has been dealt. By taking note of general preposition and application of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the name of equity and justice all kind of comments on the powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice which is conferred on him under the constitutional mandate has been made which is not found to be either legally sound or at all needed unless there is challenge of his powers. 14. In one of the writ petitions as we have noticed the simple prayer is to issue writ of mandamus to the respondents to consider the candidature of the petitioner on the post of peon and if he is found suitable for giving appointment and in other petition also for a direction to the respondents to consider the petitioner’s participation in interview for the recruitment of car drivers and if he is found eligible to be given appointment. Thus there was a similar kind of claim in both writ petitions for giving suitable appointment might be on the complaint of others being given appointment by the same process and he being ignored. 15. On these facts, this is clear that the claim of petitioner was for certain grant by same process /mode as is being applied for others and thus it can be safely said that so far petitioner is concerned he did not make any complaint about the powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice rather he wanted to be a part and beneficiary of it which is said to be wrong according to the comments in the orders of the learned Single Judges. 16. 16. One of the question which will be ultimately posed and decided by this Bench can be that whether with this kind of relief so claimed, making all the comments on the powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice and that too with such firm and bold observations is at all unwarranted. 17. It has been repeatedly said by the Apex Court and otherwise that goes without saying that in the judicial side the Courts are to deal the issue so involved about rights and relief so claimed by a writ petitioner and it is not permissible for the Court to enlarge the scope of writ petition and then make totally unwarranted comments away from the subject/issue. 18. Courts are certainly to make comments on the system on the administration, about way of working/functioning of any official/authority how-so-ever big he may be, but there has to be an occasion to say/speak. Admittedly, the writ petition before the learned Single Judge was not a writ petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation making a complaint about the system and the procedure about the arbitrary/incorrect exercise of powers by Hon’ble the Chief Justice and in fact that could not be as P.I.L. Petitions are cognizable by the Division Bench of our Court. [19. We can hurriedly add our experience also while hearing running commentary of cricket matches by the commentator that the ball was not so bad but it was the talent of the batsman that he converted it into a boundary. 20. Here is the case where in fact, on the facts and in the manner with such a zeal the order is written for which it can be safely said that although there was no ball at all on which such a kind of stroke could have been played but it is only with the personal skill and laboured exercise volume has been created by giving it a legal shape with the support of several decisions of the Apex Court . 21. 21. The subject which has been dealt in both the orders may be certainly hot and with all kind of heat the order might have been written but the Bench will have to go through the entire matter with all cool by examining the legal aspect for its prima facie satisfaction in the light of relief so claimed and the points which may have a touch on the issue and at the same time noticing the judgments on which heavy reliance have been placed in both the orders of learned Single Judges]. 1[Paras 19 to 21 x x x] 22. We are to immediately notice the decisions one by one on which reliance has been placed in both the orders of learned Single Judges. 23. Reliance has been placed on the judgment given by the Apex Court in case of State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and others, (2009) 5 SCC 65 . 24. In the aforesaid matter appointments were made in various State Government departments without following procedure so provided on a regular basis and as the appointments were maintained by the High Court the Apex Court set it aside. 25. Another judgment is given in case of H.C. Puttaswami and others v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnatake High Court, Bangalore and others, 1991 Suppl (2) SCC 421. 26. In this judgment issue was about appointment of Clerk and Typist which is found to be regulated by the Rules called Karnataka Civil Services(Ministerial post) Recruitment Rules, 1966 and the powers to make selection under Rules was found to be vested in the State Public Service Commission and thus exercise by the Hon’ble Chief Justice was not approved by the Apex Court. 27. In the decision given by the Apex Court in case of Secretary State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , issue was of absorption/regularization of temporary casual daily wager or ad hoc employees who continued in public employment since long before to the constitutional scheme of public employment and therefore in that situation the Apex Court intervened. 28. 28. In the decision given by the Apex Court in case of Raj Kumar and others v. Shakti Raj and others, AIR 1997 SC 2110 , appointment was to the regular post related to the public works department and Rules known as Punjab Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Patwaries State Service Class III Rules(1955) was the matter of interpretation and a breach was found. 29. In the decision given by the Apex Court in case of Bhaskar Ranjan Ghosh v. Kamal Sen and others, 2000(4) ESC 2682, the issue was of appointment of teaching and non teaching staff of Secondary Schools according to the procedure so provided and thus a breach was found. 30. Another decision given in the case of Reliance Airport Developers (P)(Ltd.) v. Airport Authority of India and others, (2006) 10 SCC 1 , is a case where decision about joint venture partnership as a part of privatization policy of Government of India was in issue in which consideration of Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India was there. 31. Last judgment which was taken note by learned Single Judge is of the case of Devendra Kumar Pandey v. Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others, 2007(7) ADJ 720 : 2007(4) ESC 2832 . 32. In this case the matter relates to appointment of routine grade clerk and thus that is also not in issue at all. 33. On scrutiny of all the cases so noted in both the orders of learned Single Judge this court can firmly say that in none of the cases either various Rules of Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Rules or powers as given to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India has been referred or even was in issue, what to say about discussion and interpretation. 34. After having a look to the cases noticed above we are to notice two decisions of Apex Court which are exactly on the powers of the Hon’ble Chief Justice as conferred on him under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. 35. Before referring to the cases of the Apex Court as observed above, we are to quote Article 229 of the Constitution of India at this place : “Article 229 : Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts- 1. 35. Before referring to the cases of the Apex Court as observed above, we are to quote Article 229 of the Constitution of India at this place : “Article 229 : Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts- 1. Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of then court as he may direct: Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the court shall be appointed to any office connected with the court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. 1. Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the court authorized by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose. Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State. (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other moneys taken by the court shall form part of that Fund. 36. Reference can be given to a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Kalidas Batish and another, (2006) 1 SCC 779 which touches the issue. The observation of the Apex Court is contained in para 14 of the judgment which is relevant for our purpose and thus can be quoted here- “We note with regret that the High Court virtually sat in appeal, not only over the decision taken by the Government of India, but also over the decision taken by the Chief Justice of India, which is discarded by a side wind. In our view, the High Court seriously erred in doing so. In our view, the High Court seriously erred in doing so. Even assuming that the Secretary of the department concerned of the Government of India had not apprised him of all necessary facts, one cannot assume or impute to a high constitutional authority, like the Chief Justice of India, such procedural or substantive error. The argument made at the Bar that the Chief Justice of India might not have been supplied with the necessary inputs has no merits. If Parliament has reposed faith in the Chief Justice of India as the paterfamilias of the judicial hierarchy in this country, it is not open for anyone to contend that the Chief Justice of India might have given his concurrence without application of mind or without calling for the necessary inputs. The argument to say the least, deserves summary dismissal. 37. We can immediately take note of another judgment of the Apex Court in which powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice has been very elaborately dealt. 38. Reference can be given to the decision given in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and another, AIR 1998 S.C., 1079. 39. Instead of re-writing various observations of the Apex Court in our own language it will be better for us to quote certain paragraphs as are contained in the judgment of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (supra). Para 8. In order to appreciate and understand the status, powers and authority of the Chief Justice as also his constitutional position qua other Judges of the High Court, it would be necessary to delve into archives. 9. The British Government established the Supreme Court of Calcutta by a Charter issued in 1774. Clause 10 of the Charter, inter alia. “authorised and empowered from time to time, as occasion may require, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice.” 10. The Supreme Court of Calcutta was replaced by the High Court established under the High Courts Act, 1861. Section 9 of the Act provided as under : “Each of the High Courts to be established under the Act shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts abolished under the Act.” 11. Letters Patent was granted to the Calcutta High Court in 1865. Section 9 of the Act provided as under : “Each of the High Courts to be established under the Act shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts abolished under the Act.” 11. Letters Patent was granted to the Calcutta High Court in 1865. Clauses 4 and 8 of the Letters Patent, as amended in 1919, provided as under : “4. We do hereby appoint and ordain, that every clerk and ministerial officer of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal appointed by virtue of the said Letters Patent of the Fourteenth of May. One thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, shall continue to hold and enjoy his office and employment with the salary thereunto annexed, until he be removed from such office and employment; and he shall be subject to the like power of removal, regulations, and provisions as if he were appointed by virtue of these Letters Patent. “8. We do hereby authorize and empower the Chief Justice of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from time to time, as occasion may require, and subject to any rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice, and due execution of all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the said High Court by these Our Letters Patent and it is Our further will and pleasure and We do hereby, for us. Our heirs and successors give, grant, direct and appoint, that all and every the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall have and receive respectively such reasonable salaries as the Chief Justice shall, from time to time appoint for each office and place respectively, and as the Governor-General in Council shall approve of. . . . .” 12. These Clauses, thus, gave power of appointment and removal of the staff to the Chief Justice. The power was to be exercised subject to such rules and restrictions as may be made by the Governor-General in Council. 13. When Government of India Act, 1915 was enacted, the above position was continued by virtue of Section 106 of the Act which, inter alia, provided as under:-”The several High Court. . . . . The power was to be exercised subject to such rules and restrictions as may be made by the Governor-General in Council. 13. When Government of India Act, 1915 was enacted, the above position was continued by virtue of Section 106 of the Act which, inter alia, provided as under:-”The several High Court. . . . . . . . . . . have . . . . . . .all such powers and authority over or in relation to the administration of justice, including the power to appoint clerks and other ministerial officers of the Court, as are vested in them by letters patent. . . . . . . “ 14. This position was not altered even by the Government of India Act, 1935. It may be mentioned that Section 241 of this Act specified the various authorities who could make appointments of persons holding civil posts under the Crown in India and frame rules relating to their conditions of service but Section 242(4) specifically provided as under : “(4) In its application to appointments to, and to persons serving on, the staff attached to the Federal Court or the staff attached to a High Court, the last preceding section shall have effect as if, in the case of the Federal Court, for any reference to the Governor-General in paragraph (a) of sub-section (1), in paragraph (a) of sub-section (2) and in sub-section (5) there were substituted a reference to the Chief justice of India and as if, in the case of a High Court, for any reference to the Governor in paragraph (b) of sub-section (1), in paragraph (b) of sub-section (2) and in sub-section (5) there were substituted a reference to the Chief Justice of the Court : Provided that : (a) the Governor may in his discretion require that in such cases as he may in his discretion direct no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the Provincial Public Service Commission; (b) rule made under the said sub-section (2) by a Chief Justice shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor-General or, as the case may be, the Governor.” 15. Thus, Chief Justice continued to be the highest authority so far as High Court staff was concerned. 16. Thus, Chief Justice continued to be the highest authority so far as High Court staff was concerned. 16. When Constitution came into existence, the power and status of the Chief Justice, as available under both the Acts, namely, Government of India Acts 1915 and 1935, were maintained. 17. Chapter V of the Constitution relates to “the High Courts in the States.” Under the constitutional scheme, there has to be a High Court for each State (See : Article 214). Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as may be appointed by the President from time to time. Article 223 provides that when the office of Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or any Chief Justice, by reason of absence of otherwise, is unable to perform the duties of his office, such duty shall be performed by such one or the other Judges of the Court as the President may appoint. Article 229 provides as under : “229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts.—(1) Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct : Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge of officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose: Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State. (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other moneys taken by the Court shall form part of that Fund.” 18. This Article makes Chief Justice of the High Court the supreme authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court officers and servants. This Article also confers rule-making power on the Chief Justice for regulating the condition of service of officers and servants of the High Court subject to the condition that if the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to have the approval of the Governor of the State. If the Legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate subject to the conditions made in that law. 38. What is, therefore, of significance is that although in Article 235, the word “High Court” has been used, in Article 229, the word “Chief Justice” has been used. The Constitution, therefore, treats them as two separate entities in as much as “control over Sub-ordinate Courts” vests in the High Court, but High Court administration vests in the Chief Justice. 39. The impugned direction whether the posts in the High Court on which Officers on deputation are appointed, can be managed by the High Court staff is patently contrary to the mandate of Article 229 vesting High Court Administration in the Chief Justice and purports to encroach upon his authority. 40. As pointed out above, under the constitutional scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justice in their own turn one day, but it is imperative under constitutional discipline that they work in tranquility. Judges have been described as “hermits.” They have to live and behave like “hermits” who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before time, at least, in some cases. 40. Judges have been described as “hermits.” They have to live and behave like “hermits” who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before time, at least, in some cases. 40. After quoting various paragraphs of the decisions given by the Apex Court which is directly on the issue of power of Hon’ble the Chief Justice this Bench with all humbleness at its command is to observe at the cost of repetition that it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that Judges work in tranquility. Their mission is to supply light and not heat which has been found to be necessary by the Apex Court to run the High Court Administration . 41. After having an overall look to the powers of the Hon’ble Chief Justice it is clear that there is absolutely no discussion and any kind of interpretation in any of the judgments referred by the learned Single Judge rather there is a clear interpretation in two judgments favouring the powers which are referred in this order i.e. Union of India (supra) and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (supra). 42. Now we are to touch the facts also of the present case as placed from both sides. 43. In both the judgments of the learned Single Judge provisions of High Court Rules have been referred and quoted. We are just simply to observe that no selection/appointment on any regular post on regular basis has been made which could be in issue directly or indirectly and in fact there is no such challenge also in either of the petitions. 44. It has been emphatically said from the side of the appellant that certain persons were just engaged as daily labour to perform work in special situation and exigency for which there is no rule of any advertisement or of inviting applications. 45. Daily labour otherwise also means an engagement and not appointment as he is to discharge day to day work. We will have to finally understand the meaning of the word recruitment, appointment and engagement. If the appointment and engagement has the same meaning then there may not be any purpose of using two phrases for the same purpose. 45. Daily labour otherwise also means an engagement and not appointment as he is to discharge day to day work. We will have to finally understand the meaning of the word recruitment, appointment and engagement. If the appointment and engagement has the same meaning then there may not be any purpose of using two phrases for the same purpose. In fact appellants have clearly stated in the counter affidavit in the writ petition and otherwise in the special appeal that there was exigency of work, pressing need was there in respect to daily wage workers. In respect to drivers also it was clearly stated and documents were also filed in that respect that there is acute shortage of drivers in the High Court to drive the staff cars and in fact only 73 permanent post of drivers are there whereas the requirement of 105 drivers exists at present. To meet this demand 10 persons who know driving and having driving licence are working as drivers. Three daily wage labours are also working as such and 19 drivers have been called from different district courts. Out of ten persons working as drivers one has been suspended, two have become physically handicapped and two drivers are working at U.P. Sadan and thus in view of taking services of drivers from different judgeship i.e. Faizabad, Allahabad etc. after undertaking an effective exercise Hon’ble the Chairman, Staff Car apprised the situation to Hon’ble the Chief Justice who in exercise of his powers under Article 229 of the Constitution of India and High Court Rules gave approval to them. It was also stated in the counter affidavit that the District Judge, Allahabad made a request for return of drivers due to shortage in the judgeship itself and that too is the position with other judgeship also. 46. We have analysed the matter by referring to various legal aspects and also taking note of the factual premises but certainly this is all for recording a prima facie satisfaction to the issue as involved in this appeal as neither writ petition have been finally decided nor we are finally deciding the appeals. 47. It has been observed by the Apex Court time and again that in the service matters there is no scope of an argument just like a Public Interest Litigation and each and every matter is to be decided on the facts of that case. 47. It has been observed by the Apex Court time and again that in the service matters there is no scope of an argument just like a Public Interest Litigation and each and every matter is to be decided on the facts of that case. 48. We can refer to the decision given by the Apex Court in case of Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others, (1998) 7 SCC, 273. 49. In both the judgments of the learned Single Judge heavy emphasis has been given to Rule 4, Rule 41 and Rule 45 of the Rules for the finding, that exercise is not covered under those Rules and at the same time Allahabad High Court Staff Car Drivers (Conditions of Service and Conduct)/Rules 2000 has not been taken care. 50. We are just to notice that Rules about which observations are there do not make out any procedure for engaging daily wage labour. 51. Nobody has doubted/disputed about residuary powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice under Rule 41 and 45 of the Rules of 1976 and at the same time mandate of the Constitution of India under Article 229 and thus if that is also accepted and simultaneous restraint on his power as has been observed in the judgment of learned Single Judges then certainly both will be in contradiction with each other and both may not co-exist. We will have to say go bye to one i.e. either to the residuary powers given under the Rules along with Constitutional powers as given to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice under the Constitution of India or to the restrictions as being suggested on the powers of Hon’ble the Chief Justice. 52. In fact we may not have any quarrel to various observations made in the judgments of learned Single Judge i.e. Constitutional dignatories cannot be permitted to act in arbitrary/discriminatory manner rather we are to add that everybody is supposed to act in a balanced manner having watch and considerate approach to all mankind in every matter but what to say to the Rules and the mandate of Constitution of India which gives supremacy for certain exercise to the Hon’ble Chief Justice in certain matters. 53. 53. So far case in hand is concerned we find that entire endeavor in the orders under appeal is to find out something out of the bush of his own even not complained by the petitioner. Thus before making any comment on the system and the institution there has to be a complaint, there has to be a platform and solid foundation which this court finds to be inherently lacking. 54. Learned Single Judges after recording their own reasons granted injunction to the respondents who are appellants before us from giving effect to the exercise and thus we are also to consider the matter in the similar manner and by leaving a detailed/exhaustive and elaborate thoughts at the time of final hearing we are also to pass orders in the light of opinion whatever we have formed. 55. At this stage we are also to notice basic principle of grant of a protection/stay in favour of any applicant. The stay/protection is given to a party to extend him immediate benefit of the orders about the relief what he claimed on a consideration that if that is not granted then irreparable injury will occasion.. To say in service matters there is transfer, suspension, reversion etc. In the matter of promotion, dismissal we normally do not grant any stay. Similarly if the relief is about demolition, dispossession etc. if case is made out we use to grant stay. 56. So far writ of mandamus is concerned relief is for a mandate to the respondents to do something in a particular way and according to our interpretation that is always to be given as a final relief and not as an interim measure as grant at interim stage may amount to be final relief. 57. We will have to express trust and faith in our Chief Justice about release of his discretion as permitted to him for these temporary daily wage engagements. Confidence in head of the family and that too possessed with constitutional special powers unless there is a serious challenge is to be accepted with all cool by leaving all kind of airs from its own mind and thoughts. This will be in the interest of system and the institution on which faith of public is firm. Confidence in head of the family and that too possessed with constitutional special powers unless there is a serious challenge is to be accepted with all cool by leaving all kind of airs from its own mind and thoughts. This will be in the interest of system and the institution on which faith of public is firm. Thus without any occasion and platform for the purpose, we are not to be shaken and we are not to release the pressure of our mind as that will not be a healthy exercise from any corner. [58. We are to decide a case on the facts of that very case in the light of legal aspects that is expected from us and thus it is not our job to wonder here and there to find out ways and means to criticise an institution in general although the issue is neither pleaded nor complained nor any relief in that respect is prayed and thus exercise will be said to be a bouncer serving no purpose.] [Para 58 x x x] 59. Here is the case where in fact no relief to the petitioner even as a interim measure has been given rather an injunction which was even not prayed either in the writ petition has been given which can be certainly said to be totally uncalled for and beyond the scope of writ petition. 60. Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate during course of argument made statement that the High Court is ready to consider the claim of the petitioner as and when occasion will arise and thus writ petition needs to be dismissed as infructuous with the aforesaid direction. 61. The reliefs claimed in the writ petition and stay application is for a direction about consideration of the petitioner’s claim and to give him suitable engagement/appointment like others and thus grant of injunction in both orders of learned Single Judge appears to be beyond the scope of the relief/prayer so made in the writ petitions and thus on that ground also keeping in mind the pressing need of the engagement of daily wage labour to discharge certain work as things are continuing from long with no complaint rather with all success and to the satisfaction of establishment this has to be permitted. The power of Hon’ble the Chief Justice as has been commented in the order of learned Single Judge whether at all was needed will be seen at the time of final hearing. 62. In the given set of facts this court is satisfied that injunction so granted by the learned Single Judges is beyond the scope of writ petition. 63. Before parting with the matter at this stage and while granting stay to the orders of learned Single Judges we are to notice the observations of the Apex Court in certain cases which will remind us the scope of scrutiny of a matter and to what extent directions can be given, specially to the issue/relief which is not claimed in the writ petition. 64. In the decision given by the Apex Court in case of Union of India v. EID Parry (India) Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 223 , in para 4 of the judgment following observation was made : “The suit was filed for recovery of excess demurrage allegedly charged by the appellant from the respondent. The claim depended upon the Goods Tariff Rules, specially the rule quoted above, which authorises the respondent to claim damages in respect of the entire block of wagons supplied to a party which does not empty those wagons at the siding within the time permitted for that purpose. There was no pleading that the rule upon which the reliance was placed by the respondent was ultra virus the Railways Act 1890. In the absence of the pleading to that effect, the trial court did not frame any issue on that question. The High Court of its own proceeded to consider validity of the rule and ultimately held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act, 1890 and consequently held it was ultra virus. This view is contrary to the settled law that a question which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject matter of any issue, could not be decided by the Court. The scope of the suit was limited. The pleadings comprising the averments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their written statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The scope of the suit was limited. The pleadings comprising the averments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their written statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The High Court therefore travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the rule to be ultra virus. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, on this question cannot be sustained. 65. In another judgment given by the Apex Court in case of Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 1126 the Bench while dealing with the powers of the Court to quash orders taking cognizance of an offence made strong recommendation to the government of U.P. to issue immediately an ordinance to restore provision of Anticipatory bail by repealing Section 9 of U.P. Act No. 16 of 1976 and empowering Allahabad High Court as well as Sessions Court in U.P. to grant anticipatory bail. The recommendation as made in the judgment of Som Mittal (supra) as contained in para 59 of the judgment is hereby quoted : “I, therefore, made a strong recommendation to the U.P. Government to immediately issue an Ordinance to restore the provision for anticipatory bail by repealing Section 9 of U.P. Act No. 16 of 1976 and empowering the Allahabad High Court as well as the Sessions Courts in U.P. to grant anticipatory bail.” 66. As there was a difference of opinion on legal issue the appeal in which the decision referred above was given was directed to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders upon which a bench of three Hon’ble Judges, in relation to the observations/directions as contained in the judgment of Som Mittal (Supra) referred above clearly opined that it was beyond the scope of issue before the court and thus the direction in that respect was set aside by the Apex Court. 67. The observation in this respect as contained in para 10 and 13 of the decision dated 21.2.2008 in case of Som Mittal (supra) is hereby quoted : "10. ‘The second issue involve the recommendations made to the Government of U.P. and directions issued to all States and Union Territories in paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment. 67. The observation in this respect as contained in para 10 and 13 of the decision dated 21.2.2008 in case of Som Mittal (supra) is hereby quoted : "10. ‘The second issue involve the recommendations made to the Government of U.P. and directions issued to all States and Union Territories in paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment. The appeal related to the question whether the complaint against the appellant disclosed the ingredients of an offence under section 25 of the Karnataka Shops & Commercial Establishment Act, 1961. The appeal did not relate to grant of anticipatory bail nor did it relate to rights of arrested persons. This court has repeatedly cautioned that while rendering judgments , courts should only deal with the subject matter of the case and issues involved therein . Courts should desist from issuing directions affecting executive or legislative policy or general directions unconnected with the subject matter of case. A court may express its views on a particular issue in appropriate cases only where it is relevant to the subject matter of the case. 13. In so far as the observations/recommendations, directions, in paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment, suffice it to say that they do not relate to the subject matter of the criminal appeal and being the expression of an expectation or hope by only one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench and not agreed by the other, is not a decision, order of direction of the Court. That being so, the directions, issued to the Secretary General of the Supreme Court, State Government and Union Territories, and recommendations to the Government of U.P. in the “aside” contained in Paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment are not directions to be complied with.” 68. On a consideration of the facts and totality of the circumstances this Court is convinced that injunction granted by the learned Single Judges in the orders under appeal are to be stayed and thus following directions are being given: (1) Direction as contained in the operative portion as (a) in writ petition No. 10196 of 2010 is stayed. We direct that engagement of class IV post covered under the relevant Rules in the establishment of High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow may take place as and when there is pressing need and exigency is there under orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice. We direct that engagement of class IV post covered under the relevant Rules in the establishment of High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow may take place as and when there is pressing need and exigency is there under orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice. (2) Direction given as (b) in writ petition, referred above is stayed. It is made clear that if High Court takes work from respondents 04 to 16 then they will be entitled to get their salary subject to final decision in the matter. (3) In respect to the direction given by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7212 of 2010 by which respondent High Court is restrained from giving effect to the selection in question, we direct that according to the select list engagement is to be given to them with the attached benefits which shall also abide by the final decision in the matter. 69. It is made clear that the aforesaid directions which this Bench has issued is on a prima facie satisfaction and on a deliberation of the issue and thus the exercise pursuant to our order is always to be treated subject to final decision as and when takes place. 70. Parties are to complete their pleadings in both the appeals so that if it is so required on moving appropriate application matter may be again considered. ————