Judgment :- 1. Writ Appeal Nos.2818-2819/2010 is filed against the order dated 11.06.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.7167-7168/2009. Writ Appeal Nos.2761-62/2010 is also filed against the aforesaid order. While the first of the aforesaid cases is filed by the first petitioner in the aforementioned writ petitions and the second of the writ appeals are filed by the second petitioner in the aforesaid writ petitions, Writ petitions, Writ Appeal Nos.3113/2010 and 3125/2010 is filed by the third respondent in the respondent in the aforementioned writ petitions. Since these writ appeals arise out of the common order passed in the writ petitions, they have been heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status before the learned single Judge. 3. A temple by name of Polali Rajarajeshwari Temple which is claimed to be one of the oldest temple in the District of Dakshina Kannada and classified as ‘A’ Grade Temple has four Hereditary-Trustees hailing from different families. Two of them are from Bunt Families, known as Ullipady Gutty and Ammumje Guttu. The other two Hereditary Trustees are said to be belonging to the family of Archakas and the family of Thantri respectively. The four Hereditary Trustees have to elect the Managing Trustee from amongst them. According to the petitioners for the last several decades, the Managing Trusteeship used to be held from among Ullipady Guttu and Ammunje Guttu families. In the year 1942, one Sri. Ramanath Marla succeeded to the post of Hereditary Trustee of the Temple from Ullipady Guttu family when he was part of the Ullupady Joint Family and was residing at Malai Village and succeeded to the Hereditary Trusteeship under the Aliya Santhana Law. That the third respondent and his mother had filed O.S.No.31/1950, before the subordinate Civil Judge, Mangalore and by judgment and decree dated 31.3.1953, the third respondent and his mother and others had taken their share and separated from Ullipady Guttu Family as also on the basis of award also passed in the said litigation viz., RIA.No.1165/1952. That the third respondent and his mother had filed O.S.No.31/1950, before the subordinate Civil Judge, Mangalore and by judgment and decree dated 31.3.1953, the third respondent and his mother and others had taken their share and separated from Ullipady Guttu Family as also on the basis of award also passed in the said litigation viz., RIA.No.1165/1952. According to the petitioners, apart from determining the shares in the respective properties owned by the Ullipady Guttu Family, one of the issues involved was with regard to the Hereditary Trusteeship, apart from certain customary obligations and liabilities which were to be performed by the person who inherited, the Hereditary Trusteeship, in the form of ‘Viniyoga’ and also performing obligations at Polali Temple and also at Ullipady Guttu House which includes the performance of Daivadakola periodically. According to the petitioners, after the demise of Sri. Ramnath Marla, Akkamma’s successors were allotted the Trusteeship of the temple and in view of the decree of partition her successor was Sri. Ramesh Naik-4th respondent who because the hereditary trustee. It is the case of the petitioners that on the death of Ramanath Marla, Sri. Ramesh Naik who succeeded to the Hereditary Trusteeship could not have transferred the trusteeship to a non-member of Joint Family without the consent and concurrent of the family members i.e., descendents of Akkamma Naik who are as follows: (a) Sri. Ramesh Naik, (b) Sri. Subash Chandra Naik, (c) Sri. Jayaram Alva, (d) Sri. Arunkumar Alva, (e) Sri. Suresh Naik (f) Sri. Uday Kumar Alva and (g) Sri. Kiran Kumar Alva. 4. According to the petitioners, a representation was made by Sri. Ramesh Naik to transfer the trusteeship in favour of Sri. Taranath Alva and when the same came to the knowledge of Sri. Uday Kumar Alva, he made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner on 12.10.2008 and made another representation on 10.03.2009. The other members also made representations. In the meanwhile an enquiry was conducted by the jurisdictional Inspector of the Department of Hindu Religion Endowments and he submitted his report on 15.01.2009. Uday Kumar Alva, he made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner on 12.10.2008 and made another representation on 10.03.2009. The other members also made representations. In the meanwhile an enquiry was conducted by the jurisdictional Inspector of the Department of Hindu Religion Endowments and he submitted his report on 15.01.2009. According to the petitioners, the Commissioner without considering the objections raised by the petitioners and the other members of his family appointed the third respondent as a Hereditary Trustee by order dated 16.3.2009 which is produced as Annexure – G. It is the case of the petitioners that Hereditary Trusteeship could not have been transferred at the instance of one of the hereditary Trustees without the consent of the other claimants to a person who has no right to succeed and one who is separated from the Joint Family by virtue of a decree of partition and that the third respondent had separated from the Ullipady Guttu House. It is also contended that the 2nd respondent-Commissioner could not have exercised the power of the Deputy Commissioner who had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order as his order is opposed to the concept of the Hereditary Trusteeship. It is the contention of the petitioners that the Commissioner did not issue any notice to the family members including the petitioners. Accordingly, the writ petition was field contending that the impugned order dated 16.3.2009 was violative of Articles 14, 19, 25, 26 and 300A of the Constitution of India and that the order was passed in contravention of the Hereditary Trusteeship and accordingly, in the writ petition sought quashing of the impugned order and a direction to treat the first petitioner as the hereditary trustee as he is the next surviving male member of the Ullipady Guttu Family was also sought. 5. In response to the said writ petition, the first and second, the third and 4th respondents have filed their statement of objections. 6. The first and second respondents in the statement of objections stated that after one Sri. Ramanatha Marla, Sri. 5. In response to the said writ petition, the first and second, the third and 4th respondents have filed their statement of objections. 6. The first and second respondents in the statement of objections stated that after one Sri. Ramanatha Marla, Sri. Ramesh Naik was the successor to the office of the Hereditary Trustee from Ullipady Guttu Family and he retired on medical grounds and thereafter the senior most male member of the family had to succeed to the said office and after hearing the rival claimants, the second respondent-Commissioner passed the order appointing the third respondent as the Hereditary Trustee of the temple. It is also stated that the consent of descendants of Smt. Akkamma Naik branch was not necessary for succession as they are the youngest in the Ullipady Guttu Family and even otherwise, the claims of the petitioners had been considered by the second respondent who had also considered the report of the Inspector with reference to the records produced during the hearing of the claimants and passed the orders on merit. That the senior-most members had given their consent in favour of the third respondent and that the consent of the younger members was not necessary. According to these official respondents, there is no mention of trusteeship in the partition deed and it has not been given to any particular branch of the family that under Section 68 of the Act and in view of the order passed in W.P. No.13983/2005 by this court, the dispute regarding Hereditary Trusteeship has to be decided by the Commissioner and cannot be entertained by the Civil Court as there is a bar for the Civil Court to entertain such disputes and the second respondent/Commissioner has the jurisdiction to appoint Hereditary Trustees which has been rightly done in the instant case. That the Deputy Commissioner has rightly forwarded the proposal to the Commissioner who is the prescribed authority in respect of category-A institutions. That the office of the Hereditary Trustee has to be inherited by succession, but when there is a dispute among the family members, the authority under the Act have the right to decide the issue after hearing the parties as held by the court in W.P. No.13983/2005. That the office of the Hereditary Trustee has to be inherited by succession, but when there is a dispute among the family members, the authority under the Act have the right to decide the issue after hearing the parties as held by the court in W.P. No.13983/2005. That the Commissioner has rightly not accepted the report of the Inspector as it is opposed to law of succession and the documents produced during the hearing of the matter before the Commissioner. Accordingly, the official respondent sought dismissal of the writ petition. 7. The third respondent in his objection statement contended that the writ petition was misconceived. It was submitted that it was a practice that the senior-most male member of the Ullipady Guttu Family was to be appointed as the Hereditary Trustee to Sri. Durga Parameshwari and Sri. Rajaeshwari Temple and the said appointment is governed by the Madras Aliya Santhana Law. That one Smt. Ullipady Muthekke was the ancestral grandmother of respondent No.3 who had six children by name Smt. U. Seethamma Marla, Smt. U. Lakshmi Marla & Others. That Sri. Thimmappa Marla S/o. Smt. U. Lakshmi Marla being the senior-most male member of Ullipady Family at the relevant point of time was appointed as hereditary trustee and continued in the said post till 1944. Subsequently, Sri. Ramanatha Marla S/o. Sri. U. Seethamma Marla was the hereditary trustee from 1944 to 1985. Subsequently, Sri. Ramesh Naik-4th respondent S/o. Akkamma Naik being the eldest member of Ullippady Family was appointed as the hereditary trustee to said temple and that respondent No.3 was appointed as hereditary trustee to the said temple on relinquishment of the right of trusteeship by Sri. Ramesh Naik and the said respondent No.3 was appointed after obtaining no objection from the eldest male members of the family by name Sri. Jagannatha Shetty and Sri. Sanjeeva Shetty. That the compromise decree in O.S. No.31/50 does not speak about the management of the temple or mode of appointment of Hereditary Trustee and therefore, the succession must be in accordance with the Madras Aliya Santhana Law from the eldest member of the Ullipady Family and not from Ullipady House. According to the third respondent, the petitioner had no locus standi to question the appointment of the third respondent since they were neither the eldest members of the Ullipady Family nor the third generation from Ullipady Muthekke D/o. Akkamma Naik. According to the third respondent, the petitioner had no locus standi to question the appointment of the third respondent since they were neither the eldest members of the Ullipady Family nor the third generation from Ullipady Muthekke D/o. Akkamma Naik. That after issuing necessary notice to the respondents and considering the objections the Commissioner passed the impugned order, which is in accordance with law. 8. In his additional statement of objections, he has stated that respondent No.4 the outgoing hereditary trustee had after consultation with other members of the family has nominated respondent No.3 to succeed him as hereditary trustee which was communicated to respondent No.2 which was received by him on 10.10.2008. That the nomination of the third respondent as hereditary trustee has not been set aside and therefore, the only remedy of the petitioners is to approach the civil court seeking necessary reliefs and not by invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. The fourth respondent in his statement of objections while making similar factual averments as the third respondent contended that Sri. Ramanath Marla was appointed as hereditary trustee for both the temples as he was the eldest member of the conglomeration of all the branches of the Ullipady Guttu Family. That after his death, for a period of five years, nobody was nominated as his successor and thereafter, Sri.Ramesh Naik the 4th respondent being the eldest male member of the family became the hereditary trustee with effect from 15.10.1990 and that since the 4th respondent has become old and wanted to relinquish the trusteeship and since the two immediate eldest members of the family were not inclined to hold the trusteeship of the two temples, the trusteeship was given to Sri. U. Taranath Alva the next immediate eldest member of the family who is the third respondent in the writ petition and though there was a decree passed in O.S. No./31/50, there is no mention about the devolution of the Hereditary Trusteeships to the branch of the family headed by Smt. Akkamma Naik and as per the custom and tradition, the eldest member of the Ullipaddy Guttu Family has become the Hereditary Trustee irrespective of the branch to which he belongs. That Sri. That Sri. Ramanath Marla continued as hereditary Trustee despite the partition which to place on 16.02.1953 even though he did not belong to the branch of the family headed by Smt. Akkamma Naik. He continued the Hereditary Trusteeship which belongs to the family as a whole and not a particular branch of the family and since the 4th respondent on account of his old age relinquished the post of Hereditary Trusteeship, the same was handed over to the third respondent since two other eldest members of the family declined to take up the said responsibility and that there is no irregularity in the said action. 10. According to the 4th respondent, the fact that subsequent to the partition Sri. Ramanatha Marla continued to be the hereditary trustee meant that a person who did not belong to the family of Smt. Akkamma Naik Kavaru has continued as the hereditary trustees and that it was too late in the day to come up with a new plea. Even though a branch of the family was allotted some property for the purpose of ‘viniyoga’ that did not imply that the right of the whole family to the hereditary trusteeship was given up. According to the 4th respondent, the senior-most member of the family has to function as the trustee of temples as long as he desires and that the petitioners may also become trustees of the temples at an appropriate point of time. but at this point of time, the petitioners cannot claim the said rights by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That the order of the Commissioner was passed on a proper appraisal of the facts including the representation of the petitioners after considering all aspects and the same does not suffer from any defect. That the intention of the petitioners was to make an attempt to re-open the partition which took place in the year 1953, which is an abuse of process of law. That the third respondent has already assumed charge as managing trustee and therefore, any order which would make him dysfunctional, could affect the management of the temple. Hence, the 4th respondent sought dismissal of the writ petition. 11. The petitioners have filed rejoinder to the statements of objections. 12. The learned single judge, after hearing both sides held that there are four hereditary trustees to the Polali Rajarajeshwari Temple. Hence, the 4th respondent sought dismissal of the writ petition. 11. The petitioners have filed rejoinder to the statements of objections. 12. The learned single judge, after hearing both sides held that there are four hereditary trustees to the Polali Rajarajeshwari Temple. That O.S.No.31/1951 was filed by the third respondent and his mother for partition, which was decreed and the final decree proceedings were referred to arbitration and an award was passed and property was allotted to different shares. That the petitioners as well as respondent No.3 claim to be the hereditary trustees though they belong to different branch of the family and that on the representation made by the 4th respondent, the second respondent had passed the order appointing the third respondent as hereditary trustee. 13. Before the learned single Judge, learned senior counsel on both sides submitted that the opinion rendered by this court in W.P. No.30998/2009 decided on 9.4.2010 was applicable to the facts of the case. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that having regard to the decision rendered by this court in the aforesaid writ petition, the parties had to settle their dispute before a civil court as to who has to be the hereditary trustee. Learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent also concurred with the said submission, but stated that there cannot be a vacuum until the matter is decided by the civil court and the third respondent be continued as trustee until the civil court makes an interim arrangement to dispose of the suit. On the basis of the aforesaid submission, learned single judge held that the question as to who has to be the hereditary trustee falls within the realm of civil dispute which has to be decided by the Civil Court and therefore, Annexure-G impugned in the writ petition was quashed and observed that there shall not be a vacuum at the helm and therefore, directed the third respondent to continue as hereditary trustee till such time the suit is filed and an interim arrangement was made by the civil court as to who should take care of the temple. Accordingly, writ petitions were allowed on 11.6.2010 and the impugned order dated 16.2.2009 of the second respondent-Commissioner appointing the third respondent as hereditary trustee was set aside and it was directed that the third respondent would continue to manage the temple until the civil court decides by interim arrangement as to who should continue to manage the temple, pending disposal of the suit. In the aforesaid terms, the writ petitions were disposed of. As against the said order, the two petitioners and the third respondent have preferred these appeals. 14. We have heard the learned counsel Sri. K. Shashikiran Shetty for M/s. Shetty and Hedge Associates for the appellants in W.A.No.2818-19/2010, Sri. Jayakumar S. Patil, Learned Senior Counsel for Sri. S.R. Raviprakash for respondent No.3, Sri. Srivatsa, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. R. Rajagopalan and Sri. K.B. Bhandari Advocates for respondent No.4, Sri. K. Subbarao for M/s. Subbarao & Co., for respondent No.5 and learned Addl. Government Advocate Sri. K. Krishna for respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the aforesaid writ appeals. 15. On behalf of the petitioners/appellants it was contended that after the preliminary decree was passed in a partition suit O.S.No.31/50, the matter was referred to elders and an award came to be passed and that the question of hereditary trusteeship has to be decided by the Civil Court. That the learned single judge set aside the impugned order dated 16.3.2009, the third respondent ceased to be hereditary trustee. Therefore, the learned single judge could not have allowed him to continue in the said post. That the said order is beyond the scope of the writ petition. That the third respondent had walked out from the joint family once the partition decree had become final and therefore, no benefit could be bestowed on him in the writ petition filed by the appellants. In order to ensure that there was no vacuum in the hereditary trusteeship, the learned single judge ought to have appointed a successor from the appellants’ branch to succeed to the office after the 4th respondent had relinquished his right who is the 1st appellant and not confirmed what had been stated in the impugned order by directing the third respondent to continue in the office until the civil court made an interim arrangement. It is also contended that 4th respondent had no authority to transfer the hereditary trusteeship in favour of the third respondent who was not a member of Ullipady Guttu Family and the second respondent had no jurisdiction to confirm the internal arrangement made between respondent Nos.3 and 4 which had no force of law. It is, therefore, submitted on behalf of the appellants that the learned single judge though rightly quashed the impugned order at Annexure-G could not have directed that respondent No.3 had continued as a hereditary trusteeship. 16. Per contra. It is submitted on behalf of the third respondent in the writ petition that the order impugned in the writ petition was passed by the second respondent in accordance with law that since the 4th respondent had relinquished his right to continue as hereditary trustee or managing trustee of the temple on account of his old age, after consulting the next two senior male members who refused to accept the said post, the third respondent who was the next in line was appointed as a hereditary trustee. That the Hindu Religious and Charity Endowment Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act for short) speaks about the hereditary trustee under Section 2(15) of the Act and that Annexure-G has been passed by the second respondent as the matter is within the purview of the Act in view of Section 3 and it is not required to approach the civil court in the instant case. That though the Supreme Court had stayed the order of the Division Bench of this Court which had struck down the Act, subsequently, the Supreme Court has vacated the stay with respect to Section 25 of the Act. Section 68 speaks about the bar of Jurisdiction of a civil court. That despite enforcement of the Act, the office of Hereditary Trustee is recognised under the Act. Therefore, the order of the learned single quashing Annexure-G is not in accordance with law. That the third respondent who is the appellant in W.A.Nos.3113 and 3125/2010 was appointed as hereditary trustee being the eldest member of the Ullipady Guttu Family obtaining no objection from two other elders. The same is a customary right prevailing in the family and the second respondent-Commissioner only recognised the said right which should not have been interfered with by the learned single judge. The same is a customary right prevailing in the family and the second respondent-Commissioner only recognised the said right which should not have been interfered with by the learned single judge. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the learned single judge quashing Annexure-G has to be set aside and the appointment of the third respondent as the managing trustee as the hereditary trustee has to be upheld. 17. Learned Senior Counsel for the 4th respondent has also concurred with the arguments advanced on behalf of the third respondent. Learned Addl. Government Advocate also supported the order passed by the second respondent. 18. Having heard the counsel on both sides and on careful scrutiny of the material on record, the only point that arises for our consideration is as to whether the order of the learned Single Judge calls for any interference in these appeals? 19. From the material on record, it is established that in respect of Pollali Rajarajeshwari Temple, there are four hereditary trustee and one of the trustee had always been from Ullipady Guttu Family. That in 1942, one Sri. Ramanath Marla had succeeded to the post of Hereditary Trustee of the temple and subsequently, on his death in the year 1985, the 4th respondent Sri. Ramesh Naik became the hereditary trustee of the temple in question and that since Sri. Ramesh Naik has relinquished his office and he did not wish to continue as hereditary trustee and the third respondent became the hereditary trustee. However, there is a dispute as to whether the office of the hereditary trusteeship has to be filled up by any senior member belonging to the Ullipady Guttu Family of from Ullipady Guttu House only subsequent to the decree of partition and the award made in O.S.No.31/50. it is in that context, the petitioners had filed objections before the second respondent who passed the impugned order dated 16.3.2009 vide Annexure-G. The learned single judge, on the basis of the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the third respondent held that the controversy has to be decided by the civil court quashing Annexure-G. 20. It is however, the contention of the third respondent that the second respondent-Commissioner has the jurisdiction to go into the question of appointment on hereditary trustee who is defined under Section 2(15) of the Act and that the learned single judge ought not to have quashed the impugned order and directed the parties to approach the civil court. At the outset it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Act, although a Division Bench of this Court has struck down the Act for the purpose of answering the contention of the learned Senior Counsel, representing the third respondent. “Section 2(15) ‘Hereditary office-holder’ means an office-holder, and ‘Hereditary Trustee’ means a trustee, of a Hindu religious institution or a charitable endowment succession to whose office devolves according to the rule of succession laid down by the founder or according to usage or custom applicable to the institution or endowment or according to the law of succession for the time being in force as the case may be;” “Section 3 Commissioner: (1) The State Government may, by notification, appoint an officer of the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service to be the Commissioner for Hindu religious institution and charitable endowments for the State of Karnataka. (2) The Commissioner shall be a corporate sole and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. (2) The Commissioner shall be a corporate sole and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. (3) The Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as are conferred by or under the provisions of this Act and shall, subject to such general or special orders as the State Government may make, have powers of general superintendence and control for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act in respect of all Hindu religious institutions and charitable endowments in the State, and such superintendence and control shall include the power to pass any order which may be deemed necessary to ensure that such institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purpose they were found or exist.” “Section 68 Bar or Jurisdiction: Save as expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be decided or dealt with by an officer or authority under the Act or in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority is made final and conclusive.” 21. No doubt the hereditary office in the instant case is one falling within the provisions of Sec. 2(15) of the Act which defines the hereditary office holder and hereditary trustee. The powers of the Commissioner under Sec. 3 is the power of Superintendence and control for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act which includes the power to pass any order which may be necessary to ensure that the institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purpose they were found or exist. Sec.68 speaks about the bar of jurisdiction viz-a-viz the civil Court. However, the said section has a saving clause and it says that no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute in question which is, by or under this Act, requires to be decided or dealt by an officer or Authority under the Act, unless it is expressly provided. On a conspectus reading of the aforesaid provisions, what emerges is that civil Court would have jurisdiction to deal with an issue connected with a matter which would not come within the scope of the Act. On a conspectus reading of the aforesaid provisions, what emerges is that civil Court would have jurisdiction to deal with an issue connected with a matter which would not come within the scope of the Act. In other words, though the office of hereditary trustee is recognized under the Act, the question as to who should succeed to such an office is a question which would not come within the scope of general superintendence and control for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act which powers can be exercised by the Commissioner subject to general or special orders of the State Government. In the orders passed by the Commissioner what has to be ensured is that institutions are properly administered. On an understanding of the present dispute regarding the question of who should be the successor as a hereditary trustee in the instant case, we are of the view that the said dispute would squarely fall within the realm of the jurisdiction of the civil Court and is not one which can be decided by the Commissioner, particularly having regard to the fact that in the instant case the earlier suit decreed between the parties and the award made thereunder would have to be taken into consideration in order to determine the question. 22. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the decisions rendered by a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of M. Chitarajnandas Hedge V/s. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments, Bangalore and others (2010(6) KLJ 48), under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1926, wherein following the decision of the Apex Court in the case of V.S.Thiagaraja Mudaliar V/s. Bava C.Chokkappa Mudaliar & others ( AIR 1974 SC 944 ) it has been held that when there are disputed questions in relation to hereditary trusteeship, the same is required to be decided by a Civil Court and that the dispute as to the succession and trusteeship was not within the scope of provision of the said Act. It is also stated that there is no provision under the said Act, which would enable the Commissioner to decide as to succession and hereditary trusteeship and in the absence of any specific provision in respect of succession and hereditary trusteeship, the question as to whether the Commissioner could go into the disputed question as to the hereditary trusteeship was answered in the negative. In the aforesaid Act also Section 3(3) which is in parimateria with Section 3(3) of the Karnataka Act under consideration was expressly referred to and held that the words “supervision and control” does not necessarily imply that it should be in respect of hereditary trustee or otherwise. It is also held that with reference to Section 84(1)(b) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, the Apex Court has held that the dispute as to the succession and trusteeship is not within the scope of the provision of the said Act and in the absence of any specific provision in respect of succession and hereditary trusteeship, the question whether the Commissioner could decide the vexed question was answered by the Apex Court by holding that the Deputy Commissioner was not competent to go into the question as to which one of the competing claimants was the hereditary trustee and that has to be worked out in a separate suit. A perusal of the provisions of the Karnataka Act which is under consideration also does not give any indication that it is within the powers of Commissioner to decide the question of hereditary trusteeship. In fact, the definition of hereditary trustee in Section 2(15) of the Act clearly indicates that the rule of succession s required to be laid down by the founder or according to the usage or custom applicable to the institution or endowment or according to the law of succession for the time being. 23. In the instant case, the parties are at lis as to whether the rule of succession is applicable to the entire family of Ullipady Guttu or is restricted to Ullipady Guttu House, in which event the effect of the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 31/1950 has to be taken into consideration. 23. In the instant case, the parties are at lis as to whether the rule of succession is applicable to the entire family of Ullipady Guttu or is restricted to Ullipady Guttu House, in which event the effect of the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 31/1950 has to be taken into consideration. At this stage, it would not be appropriate to indicate as to whether the admitted partition between the parties and the decree passed in the aforesaid suit envisages the aspect with regard to the law of succession and trusteeship. Several decisions cited in the aforesaid judgments were also taken into consideration in the aforesaid judgment of who held that the vexed question of fact and law in relation to the custom and hereditary trustee which are required to be decided is outside the purview and scope and the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under the Madras Act. The same analogy applies to the Karnataka Act also and the parties are required to have their rights regarding hereditary trusteeship and succession to the said office to be adjudicated in a civil court. 24. Therefore, the contention of the 3rd respondent has to be rejected in view of the interpretation we have given to Sections 3 and 68 of the Act and on the Act and on the facts of the present case. Moreover, the learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent before the learned single judge conceded to the fact that the controversy regarding the appointment of a hereditary trustee in the instant case had to be decided by the civil court. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the learned single judge was justified in directing the parties to the civil court for adjudication of the dispute as to who has to succeed to the 4th respondents as the hereditary trustee. 25. Insofar as the contention of the petitioners/appellants with regard to the continuance of the third respondent as the managing trustee of the temple until an interim arrangement is made by the Civil Court being not in accordance with law is concerned, from the material on record, it is apparent that the 4th respondent on account of his age “82 years” as per the cause-title in the writ petition did not wish to continue as hereditary trustee and therefore, relinquished from the said office. Since the learned single judge set aside the order dated 16.3.2009 passed by the second respondent-Commissioner vide Annexure-G, the question as to who would fill the vacuum and hold the post as hereditary trustee was considered by the learned single judge and in view of the fact that the parties were directed to approach the civil court, if so advised, the third respondent was permitted to continue to manage the temple until the civil court decides as an interim arrangement as to who should continue to manage the temple, pending disposal of the suit. Since the petitioners themselves have contended that the controversy as to who should be appointed as the hereditary trustee had to be decided by a civil court which contention was also concurred with by the third respondent and in that view of the matter, Annexure-G was quashed by the learned single judge by directing the parties to approach the civil court till such time the suit is filed and an interim arrangement is made by the civil court and the learned single judge directed that the third respondent shall continue to manage the temple. The said direction in our view is in accordance with and consistent with the direction of the learned single judge directing the parties to approach the civil court to get the controversy resolved and thereby quashing Annexure-G. Therefore, the grievance of the appellants with regard to the third respondent continuing as a managing trustee is without any substance as the said direction is only in the nature of a temporary arrangement until the matter is decided as an interim arrangement by the civil court, pending disposal of the suit. Under the circumstances, the order passed by the learned single judge does not call for any interference in these appeals. Hence, the writ appeals fail and are accordingly, dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.