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Karnataka High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 1224 (KAR)

Siraj Baig v. The Bangalore City Corporation

2010-11-29

B.V.NAGARATHNA, V.G.SABHAHIT

body2010
JUDGMENT Mrs. B.V. Nagarathna, J. : By an order of reference made by the learned Single Judge on 25.3.2000 the following two questions have been framed for an answer by the Division Bench: (1) Whether the principles of natural justice apply to decisions taken and Resolutions passed by the Corporation, in which, it cancels, annuls or modifies to the prejudice of a citizen, any decision resolution or order made or passed by a Standing Committee? (2) Whether the power to cancel or annul a decision conferred upon the Corporation by Rule-27 of Schedule-I to the K.M.C. Act, is available even in regard to Resolutions passed by the Standing Committee, in exercise of its Appellate jurisdiction under Sec.444 of the Act? 2. The petitioners herein have filed the Writ Petition seeking quashing of resolution bearing No.12/445 dated 19.7.99 passed by the first respondent produced as Annexure-‘D’ and consequential notices dt. 21.9.1999 produced as Annexure – ‘D1’ to ‘D4’. The petitioners had made an application for obtaining a licence to run their business of selling beef from first respondent – Corporation. The said applications were rejected by the second respondent. Against the said order of rejection, the petitioners had preferred an appeal before the Standing Committee for Public Health, Education and Social Justice which rejected their appeal on 23.4.1998. Thereafter, the petitioners submitted a representation to the standing committee enclosing an endorsement issued by the Slum Clearance Board to the effect that the petitioners were residing in huts and conducting their business as per the records. The standing committee decided to reconsider the matter by conducting a spot inspection and by its resolution dt. 4.11.1998 directed issuance of licence in favour of the petitioners for selling beef in their respective shops as per Annexure ‘B’. When the matter stood thus, it appears that one of the Corporators wrote a letter to the Commissioner requesting the Corporation not to issue a license and the said letter was placed before the Council by the Commissioner along with his note dt. 12.1.1999 requesting the Council to take a decision on the said letter. A resolution was passed by the Council in Subject No.12/445 to the effect that the license should not be granted to the petitioners, vide Annexure ‘C’ which is challenged herein. Consequently, notice was issued to the petitioners calling upon them to close down their shops, failing which legal action would be taken. A resolution was passed by the Council in Subject No.12/445 to the effect that the license should not be granted to the petitioners, vide Annexure ‘C’ which is challenged herein. Consequently, notice was issued to the petitioners calling upon them to close down their shops, failing which legal action would be taken. The said notices are at Annexures ‘D1’ to ‘D4’. The petitioners have also challenged Annexures ‘C’ and ‘D1’ to ‘D4’ in the Writ Petition. 3. After service of notice in the Writ Petition, the respondents filed their statement of objection contending that after the Standing Committee had passed an order in favour of the petitioners one of the corporators had written a letter to the Commissioner requesting the corporation not to issue licence and the said letter was placed before the corporation Councillors along with his notice dated 12.1.1999 to take a decision and the letter was placed before the corporation-council and the resolution was passed by the council in subject No.12/4445 to the effect that the licence should not be issued to the petitioners. 4. Rejoinder to the statement of objections was filed by the petitioners stating that the Standing Committee by its resolution dated 4.11.1998 had allowed the appeal and granted licence to the petitioners as per Annexure-B that Rule 27 of Schedule-I of the Act does not enable the counsel to move a resolution to seek cancellation of the licence granted by the Standing Committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conferred under the statute and that the said Rule would not enable a corporator to move the corporation against any resolution passed by the committed in exercise of its original jurisdiction. That the statute confers power only on the Commissioner to make a reference to the Corporation against any decision of the Committee passed under its appellate jurisdiction and unless any reference is made by the Commissioner under Section 444 of the Act, the decision of the Standing Committee would be final and if a reference is made by the Commissioner to the Corporation the decision of the Standing Committee would be final. Therefore, it is impermissible for the councilor to question the resolution of the Standing Committee and seek its reversal by the corporation as it is only the Commissioner who can seek for reference under Section 444 of the Act. Therefore, it is impermissible for the councilor to question the resolution of the Standing Committee and seek its reversal by the corporation as it is only the Commissioner who can seek for reference under Section 444 of the Act. Admittedly, in the instance case, the Commissioner had not referred the matter to the Corporation and hence, the decision of the Standing Committee has to be taken as final. Therefore, the reliance placed on Rule 27 is wholly mis-placed according to the petitioners. 5. Thereafter, the order of reference dt. 25.3.2000 was passed by the learned Single Judge referring the aforesaid two questions to the Division Bench. The reason for referring the matter was because it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the resolution passed by the Corporation was without authority of law and inasmuch as Rule 27 of Schedule I of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘KMC Act’, for short) which empowers the Corporation to annul any resolution passed by any standing committee in exercise of its quasi judicial powers of Appeal under Sec.441 of the Act, can, in accordance with sub section (2) of Sec.444, be brought up before the Corporation, only by way of a reference made by the Commissioner within 60 days of the date of the Resolution and in the absence of any such reference, the Corporation cannot in exercise of its powers under Rule-27, interfere with or annul a resolution passed by the concerned Standing Committee in exercise of its statutory appellate powers. It was alternatively argued that the impugned Resolution of the Corporation was in any case violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no notice or opportunity of being heard had been provided to the petitioners before the resolution passed by the Standing Committee was cancelled. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that such an opportunity was essential and failure of that requirement would render the decision of the Corporation illegal. In support of the said submission reliance was placed on a decision of a learned Single Judge (K.A. Swami.J) of this Court in the case of Vasudevachar C & Another vs. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore and Others, reported in 1987 (1) KLJ P-372. 6. In support of the said submission reliance was placed on a decision of a learned Single Judge (K.A. Swami.J) of this Court in the case of Vasudevachar C & Another vs. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore and Others, reported in 1987 (1) KLJ P-372. 6. Per contra, it was contended on behalf of the Corporation that another learned Single Judge of this Court (M.P. Chadrakanth Raj Urs J) in the case of Gopal. R. vs. The Bangalore City Corporation & Another, reported in 1987 (2) KLJ 152 had held that the power exercisable by the Corporation under Rule-27 of Schedule-I, was not quasi-judicial in nature and that the said power being plenary and sovereign in character, any Resolution passed in exercise of any such power was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 7. On a reading of the two decisions, the learned Single Judge found that there was a clear division of opinion with regard to the question of giving an opportunity of being heard to a party who had succeeded before the standing committee and the same being an essential requirement before the Corporation can annul, rescind or cancel the Resolution passed by a Standing Committee constituted under the Act and in view of the conflict in the aforesaid two decisions and so as to resolve the conflict and bring about certainty in the position of law, the Reference in question has been made. 8. At this stage, it is necessary to advert to the facts and reasoning of the two aforesaid judgments. In the case of Vasudevachar C & Another vs. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore and Others, reported in 1987 (1) KLJ 372, by an order dt. 25.7.1984 which was a provisional order-cum-notice, it was provisionally held that the petitioners had put up an unauthorized construction in the second floor of the premises and to show cause why demolition should not be ordered and further directed them to refrain from proceeding further with the construction work. Since the petitioners did not show any cause as the order dt. 25.7.1984 was served on them on 26.7.1984 giving them only three days’ time to show cause, the order confirming the provisional order came to be passed on 28.7.1984, directing the petitioners to demolish the first floor and the staircase in the second floor, holding that those constructions were unauthorized. 25.7.1984 was served on them on 26.7.1984 giving them only three days’ time to show cause, the order confirming the provisional order came to be passed on 28.7.1984, directing the petitioners to demolish the first floor and the staircase in the second floor, holding that those constructions were unauthorized. There was an appeal filed by the petitioners against the aforesaid order before the Standing Committee of the Corporation, which by its decision dated 20.2.1985 (Annexure ‘D’) permitted the petitioners to compound and pay the compounding fee of 25 percent of the construction cost. However, there was a reference made by the Commissioner of the Corporation under Section 444(2) of the Act to the Corporation against the decision of the Standing Committee dt. 20.2.1985 and the Corporation on the basis of the reference made by the Commissioner passed a resolution reversing the decision of the Standing Committee and further directed that the unauthorized construction should be demolished. The contention of the petitioners in the said Writ Petition was that when the Standing Committee of the Corporation had decided the matter in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction permitting the petitioners to compound and pay the compounding fee equivalent to 25% of the construction cost, the Corporation could not have reversed that decision without even affording opportunity of showing cause to the petitioners and of hearing them. 9. On a reading of sub section (2) of Sec.444 of the Act and Rule 27 of the Rules made thereunder it was held that the same did not provide for any opportunity of hearing or notice being issued by the Corporation. But the provisions which enable the Corporation to reverse the decision of the standing committee would adversely affect the person in whose favour the standing committee has decided and by necessary implication, it was held that by providing an opportunity of hearing to the concerned person in whose favour the standing committee has decided by issuing notice was necessary or otherwise it would result in setting aside the order which is passed in favour of a person without complying with the requirements of principles of natural justice as no person could be condemned without opportunity of showing cause and of hearing and no right or the property or the benefit of any decision rendered in favour of a party could be affected without hearing the said person. Accordingly, it was held that the mandate of issuing notice to show cause and affording an opportunity of hearing were implied in sub section (2) of Section 444 of the Act or otherwise it would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Since in the case no show cause notice was issued and no opportunity of hearing was afforded, the resolution of the Corporation was held to be unsustainable and accordingly the Writ Petition was allowed, reserving liberty to issue notice to the petitioners stating the ground on which the Corporation intended to reverse the decision of the standing committee and affording sufficient time to the petitioners therein to show cause and thereafter to hear them to take a decision in the matter in accordance with law. Till then the respondent – Corporation were directed not to proceed to demolish the unauthorized construction in question. 10. In contra distinction to the aforesaid decision, in the case of Gopal R. vs. The Bangalore City Corporation & Anr., reported in 1987 (2) KLR 152, it is held that when the Court is satisfied that the plenary power is exercised then it cannot subject the Corporation to any writ of certiorari as it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and such plenary power is exercised the municipal government and therefore, the question of hearing the aggrieved party also does not arise and that, any other view would make it impossible for the Corporation to discharge its duties and functions or exercise its powers, if at every stage they have to hear the persons who are likely to be affected by such discharge of duties and functions in exercise of its powers. 11. In the aforesaid case the facts are that the Corporation had rejected grant of license under Sec.343 of the Act to run a non-vegetarian restaurant on Shivagangamutt Road, Chamarajpet, against which an appeal was filed challenging the order of the Commissioner before the standing committee – Public Health, of the Corporation which allowed the appeal subject to certain conditions. Soon thereafter, the matter was placed before the Corporation of the City of Bangalore at the request of the Chairman, Standing Committee Taxation. Very soon after the standing committee had allowed the appeal and resolution was moved by one of the Corporators that the licence should not be granted which was voted upon, unanimously adopted and passed. Soon thereafter, the matter was placed before the Corporation of the City of Bangalore at the request of the Chairman, Standing Committee Taxation. Very soon after the standing committee had allowed the appeal and resolution was moved by one of the Corporators that the licence should not be granted which was voted upon, unanimously adopted and passed. Under the circumstances, it was held that Rule 27 of the Rules which confers wide powers on the Corporation cannot be said to be quasi judicial in nature, it is plenary or sovereign powers of the municipal government and therefore, it cannot be said that the power exercised is quasi judicial and therefore must contain reasons. 12. Before answering the questions under reference, it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Act with regard to grant of licences. Sec.443 of the Act deals with general provisions regarding licences, registrations and permissions. Section 444 reads as follows: “444. Appeal from Commissioner to Standing Committee – (1) An appeal shall lie to the Standing Committee from – (a) any notice issued or other action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner - (i) under Sections 138, 247, 248, 249, 252, 308, 309, 321 (3), 322(1), 328(1), 329, 330, 337, 345, 347, 354, 355 and 358; (ii) under any bye-law concerning house drainage or the connection of house drains with Corporation drains; or house connections with Corporation water supply of lighting mains. (b) any refusal by the Commissioner to grant permission to construct or reconstruct a building under Section 301 or 315; (c) any refusal by the Commissioner to grant permission under Sections 135, 234, 326 or 354; (d) any refusal by the Commissioner to grant a licence under Sections 346, 353, 365 or sub-section (2) of Section 372; or (e) any order of the Commissioner made under sub-section (4) of Section 443 suspending or revoking a licence; (f) any other order of the Commissioner that may be made appealable by rules made under Section 421; (2) If, on any such appeal, the Standing committee reverses or substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, he may, within sixty days of the date of such decision, refer the matter to the Corporation, and pending the decision of the Corporation on such reference, the Commissioner shall not be bound to give effect to the decision of the Standing Committee. (3) The decision of the Standing Committee or where the matter has been referred to the Corporation as aforesaid, the decision of the Corporation shall be final.” 13. Any person aggrieved by any notice issued or action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner under certain provisions of the Act or under certain by-laws, can appeal to the standing committee. If on any appeal the standing committee reverses or substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, then within 60 days of the date of such decision, the Commissioner may refer the matter to the Corporation and pending decision of the Corporation the Commissioner cannot give effect to the decision of the standing committee. The decision of the standing committee when the matter is not referred to the Corporation as aforesaid, is final. Therefore, Sec.444 itself provides that if the standing committee reverses, substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, the Commissioner may within 60 days of the date of such decision refer the matter to the Corporation and if the matter is referred to the Corporation, the decision of the Corporation shall be final and if the matter is not referred to the Corporation then the decision of the standing committee is final. 14. 14. Therefore, Section 444 not only deals with the provisions of an appeal from an order of the Commissioner to the Standing Committee, but further deals with the discretion of the Commissioner taking or not taking any action on the order passed by the Appellate Authority i.e., the Standing Committee. The Commissioner has the discretion to refer the matter to the corporation when the Standing Committee reverses or substantially modifies any action to be taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him and pending decision of the corporation on such reference the Commissioner cannot give effect to the decision of the Standing Committee. Therefore, when the matter is before the Corporation on a reference made by the Commissioner vis-à-vis the order passed by the Standing Committee, in such a case the Commissioner’s order would not be final. 15. The question however, in the instant case is as to whether the principles of natural justice would apply to the decisions taken and resolutions passed by the corporation when it modifies, cancels or annuls a decision made by a Standing Committee. On a reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 444 of the Act as regards the decision of the Standing Committee which is an appellate authority, the matter could be taken up by the Corporation by way of a reference made by the Commissioner. Section 444(3) states that when the matter has been referred to the Corporation, the decision of the corporation would be final. Therefore, whether the Corporation has to issue notice to citizen who has succeeded before the appellate authority before a decision is taken by the corporation and given opportunity of hearing in the matter is raised in this writ petition. Before answering the said question, it would be necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Act and determine the nature of power exercised by the various authorities of the Corporation. 16. Chapter V deals with the power and functions of the Corporation and other authorities. Section 57 pertains to general powers of the Corporation. Section 58 deals with obligatory functions of the Corporation and Section 59 refers to discretionary functions of the Corporation. Section 57 reads as follows: “57. 16. Chapter V deals with the power and functions of the Corporation and other authorities. Section 57 pertains to general powers of the Corporation. Section 58 deals with obligatory functions of the Corporation and Section 59 refers to discretionary functions of the Corporation. Section 57 reads as follows: “57. General Powers of the Corporation – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the rules, the regulations and the bye-laws made thereunder, the municipal Government of the city shall vest in the Corporation. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), it shall be the duty of the Corporation to exercise such powers, perform such functions and discharge such duties as are conferred on it by and under the Act and consider all periodical statements relating to the receipts and disbursements and all progress reports and pass such resolutions thereon, as it thinks fit.” A reading of the said section makes it clear that the Municipal Government of the City shall vest in the Corporation and the corporation shall exercise such powers and perform such functions and discharge such functions and discharge such duties as are conferred on it by and under the Act. 17. Section 62 deals with the functions of the Standing Committee, while Section 63 pertains to delegation of powers to Commissioner by Standing Committee. The said Sections has to be read to conjunction with Section 11 which speaks of four Standing Committees of the Corporation i.e., (a) the Standing Committee for taxation, finance and appeals; (b) the Standing Committee for public health, education and social justice; (c) the Standing Committee for town planning and improvement; and (d) the Standing Committee for accounts. 18. Section 62(1) states that the Standing Committee for taxation, finance and appeals shall deal with all matters relating to finance, taxation and appeals and all matters not specifically assigned to any other Standing Committee. Section 64 pertains to functions of the Commissioner and Sections 65 to 69 deal with various facets of the powers and functions of the Commissioner of the Corporation. Section 70 is with regard to powers of Councillors, the Standing Committees and Commissioner are the municipal authorities of the corporation charged with provisions of the Act as per Section 6 of the Act. Section 7 speaks about the constitution of the corporation. Section 10 deals with the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. 19. Section 70 is with regard to powers of Councillors, the Standing Committees and Commissioner are the municipal authorities of the corporation charged with provisions of the Act as per Section 6 of the Act. Section 7 speaks about the constitution of the corporation. Section 10 deals with the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. 19. Chapter VI of the Act deals with the Procedure of the Corporation and Committees. Under Section 71(2), notice of meetings shall be issued by the Council Secretary in consultation with the Mayor and the Commissioner specifying the agenda for the meeting and no subject not included in the agenda shall be taken up at the meeting except matters considered urgent by the Mayor or the chairman which may be considered if supplementary agenda in respect thereof has been circulated among the Councillors or members before the meeting. 20. Under Section 72 it is envisaged that the committees constituted under the Act and the Commissioner are bound to give effect to every resolution of the Corporation, unless such resolution is cancelled in whole or in part by the Government and if in the opinion of the Commissioner, any resolution of the Corporation or a committee constituted under this Act contravenes any provision of the Act or any other law or any rules, notification, regulation or bye-law made or issued under this Act or any other law, or of any order passed by the Government or is prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation, he shall, within fifteen days of the passing of the resolution, refer the matter to the Government for orders and inform the Corporation of the Committee as the case may be, of the action taken by him at its next meeting and until the orders of the Government on such reference are received, the Commissioner shall not be bound to give effect to the resolution. Under Section 73, the Corporation may call for extracts from proceedings of any committee constituted under the Act and similarly, the corporation can also require the Commissioner to produce the document, reports etc., as per Section 74 of the Act. The Commissioner has the right to attend the meetings of the corporation and taken part in the discussion, but he has no right to move any resolution or to vote. The Commissioner has the right to attend the meetings of the corporation and taken part in the discussion, but he has no right to move any resolution or to vote. The Councillors are restrained from taking part in discussion and voting on questions in which they have pecuniary interest as per Section 80. 21. Chapter XVII of the Act deals with licences and fees for various activities. Chapter XXI pertains to procedure and other miscellaneous matters. Section 443 are the general provisions regarding licences, registrations and permissions. Section 444 deals with appeal from Commissioner to Standing Committee, which has already been adverted to. On a conspectus reading of the said provisions which deal with the powers and function of various authorities, it is noticed that the corporation is a statutory body, the formation of which is by virtue of the Act and therefore, the powers, functions and duties of the corporation have to be exercised in accordance with the Act. In fact, Rule 27 of the Rules made under the Act specifically states that the Corporation cannot deals with any matter unconnected with the Municipal Administration except with the prior approval of the Mayor. The said Rule reads as under: “Matters unconnected with Municipal Administration – No resolution shall be moved, no motion shall be made and no discussion shall be held in respect of any matter unconnected with the Municipal Administration except with the prior approval of the Mayor.” 22. Under Rule 27 of the Rules made under the said Act no resolution can be moved or no motion can be made and no discussion can be held in respect of any matter unconnected with the municipal administration, except with the prior approval of the Mayor. 23. On a conspectus reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, it becomes clear that the Act prescribes specific powers, functions and procedures in respect of each of the authorities of the corporation. With regard to an appellate order passed by the Standing Committee, only a reference is provided to the corporation as envisaged under sub section (2) of Section 444 of the Act. With regard to an appellate order passed by the Standing Committee, only a reference is provided to the corporation as envisaged under sub section (2) of Section 444 of the Act. Therefore there is no other provision under which an appellate order of a Standing Committee can be considered by the corporation, therefore in our view a corporator cannot suo moto call for a discussion on an order passed by the Standing Committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and thereafter have a resolution passed thereon. The only manner in which the corporation can consider an appellate order of a Standing Committee is by way of a reference made by the commissioner under sub section (2) of Section 444 of the Act. Rule 27 of the Rules is a general Rule which cannot be passed into service in the face of an express provision under sub section (2) of Section 444 of the Act. 24. In the instant case, it is noticed that at the instance of a corporator, the matter was taken up by the corporation and the impugned resolution was passed. When subsection (2) of Section 444 prescribes the procedure for reference of an order made by the Standing Committee by the commissioner then only the corporation would get jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the order passed by the Standing Committee. If no reference is made by the Commissioner, then, the order of the Standing Committed would be final as per sub-section (3) of section 444 of the Act. If a reference is made by the Commissioner to the corporation. Under the circumstances mentioned in sub section (2) of section 444 then the order of the Corporation would be final. Therefore in our view the corporator could not have suo moto called for a discussion on the order passed by the Standing Committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, hence the impugned resolution thus passed by the corporation is not in accordance with law and cannot be acted upon. 25. Therefore in our view the corporator could not have suo moto called for a discussion on the order passed by the Standing Committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, hence the impugned resolution thus passed by the corporation is not in accordance with law and cannot be acted upon. 25. In this context it is necessary to notice that in the case of Vasudeva Char, supra, a reference was made by the commissioner to the corporation in exercise of the powers under sub section (2) of section 444 of the At, while in the case of Gopal, a corporator had suo moto called for supra a discussion and a resolution was passed by the corporation, since we have held that in respect of an appellate order of a Standing Committee only a reference can be made by the commissioner at his discretion and in accordance with sub section (2) of section 444, the resolution passed in the instant case is without authority of law and therefore a nullity similarly, the resolution passed in the case of Gopal was without Jurisdiction as it was at the instance of a corporator. 26. Under the circumstances, while it can be said that the Corporation has plenary powers of a Municipal Government having regard to the nature of powers which is exercised by the corporation, it cannot also be said that all the powers exercised by the corporation are exclusively plenary and sovereign in nature as stated in the case of Gopal. R. v/s Bangalore City Corporation & Another referred to supra. In fact, when power is exercised by the Corporation by virtue of Sub Section (2) of Section 444 of the Act, such power exercised is on a reference vis-a-vis an order passed by an appellate authority i.e., Standing Committee and on a reference made by the Commissioner, when the Appellate Authority i.e., the Standing Committee reverses or substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him. In such a situation, essentially the Corporation would be going into the question as to whether the order passed by the Commissioner or the Standing Committee i.e., the appellate authority is right or not and therefore, while considering the matter on such reference, it is not the plenary power of the Corporation which is exercised, but it is in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. If it is accepted that the power exercised by the corporation by virtue of Sub Section (2) of Section 444 in the nature of quasi-judicial power the question that arises is, as to whether the said power can be exercised without following the principles of natural justice. Before answering the said question, it is necessary to understand the jurisdiction and scope of quasi judicial power. 27. In the instant case since the question is one with regard to the issuance of licence for running a beef stall the question that arises is as to whether the grant or cancellation of a licence for the purpose of running a business is a quasi-judicial function or an administrative function. Normally, the regulation of any business activity is by a licencing system. The judicial approach with regard to the grant of cancellation of a licence for the purpose of running a business is held to be a quasi-judicial function because it entails civil as well as pecuniary consequences for the licence cannot carry on the business without a licence. Thus, it has been held that it would be necessary for the licencing authority to follow principles of natural justice and give a hearing to the licencee before cancellation of a licence. On the same principle it has been stated that the Municipal Corporation has to observe natural justice when it has the power not to renew a licence for running a restaurant by an individual vide Raj Restaurant V/s. Municipal Corporation ( AIR 1982 SC 1550 ). If the question of granting or cancellation of a licence is a quasi-judicial function, then the requirement of complying the principles of natural justice is per se mandatory. 28. It is also necessary to understand the meaning of a quasi-judicial function. It is generally stated that any person or body having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially acts in a quasi-judicial manner. 28. It is also necessary to understand the meaning of a quasi-judicial function. It is generally stated that any person or body having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially acts in a quasi-judicial manner. Recently the Supreme Court has laid down the principles to characterize the function of an authority as quasi-judicial in the case of Indian National Congress v/s. Institute of Social Welfare ( AIR 2002 SC 2158 ) wherein it has been stated that where a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act; which act would prejudicially affect the citizen although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the citizen and the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, then decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial. 29. Sometimes it is stated that an authority may be called a quasi-judicial authority although it hardly involves any judicial element in its functioning and therefore, such an authority must be called as an administrative authority and not a quasi-judicial authority and thereby completely deny any element of natural justice being applied to it. However, it is relevant to note that even in the case of administrative authorities principles of natural justice are applied and as in the instant case when licences are to be refused or to be cancelled and therefore, the said function of the authorities is termed as a quasi-judicial function. Even if a particular function of an authority is not completely a quasi-judicial function or even if the authority is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, still it must act fairly. Therefore, according to a learned author fairness in the action of any authority is an inherent element even in the absence of there being any judicial element in the functioning of the authority. Procedural fairness therefore, has to be seen while considering the actions of decision-making bodies, even if such bodies are not characterized as a quasi-judicial body. 30. Therefore, according to a learned author fairness in the action of any authority is an inherent element even in the absence of there being any judicial element in the functioning of the authority. Procedural fairness therefore, has to be seen while considering the actions of decision-making bodies, even if such bodies are not characterized as a quasi-judicial body. 30. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, it is seen that when the matter is referred by a Commissioner of a Corporation, to the Corporation for the purpose of taking a decision on the order passed by the standing committee in its appellate jurisdiction, even if it is held for the sake of argument that the corporation does not act as the quasi-judicial body, nevertheless fairness in the action of the corporation is inherent. Therefore, whether the function being discharged by the Corporation on a reference made by the Commissioner is regarded as quasi-judicial or administrative, it must nevertheless be discharged with fairness. In this context it is relevant to refer to the decision of the House of Lords in the case of H (K)-an infant (1967 (1) All E R 226) wherein it has been held that whether the function being discharged by the administration is regarded as quasi-judicial or administrative, it must nevertheless be discharged with fairness. Following the dictum of the House of Lords in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill V/s. Chief Election Commissioner (AIR 1948 SC 851), the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Today in our jurisprudence, the advances made by natural justice for exceed old front years and if judicial creativity belies penumbral areas it is only for improving the quality of Government by injecting fair play into its wheels …… Law lives not in a world of abstractions but in a cosmos of concreteness and to give up something good must be limited to extreme cases. If to condemn unheard is wrong, it is wrong except where it is over borne by dire social necessity.” 31. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills v/s. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ) 32. Hearing has thus become the norm rather than an exception in administrative process in the present day. In fact the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v/s. Dr. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills v/s. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ) 32. Hearing has thus become the norm rather than an exception in administrative process in the present day. In fact the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v/s. Dr. Binapani Dei ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ) has held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. According to the Supreme Court Civil consequences means “civil consequences undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties material deprivations and non primary damages. It is a comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.” In fact the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court on this aspect is the case of A.K. Kriapak V/s. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ). Hearing is now made applicable in a variety of administrative proceedings without characterizing the function being discharged as administrative or quasi judicial. 33. Having said that, in the instant case, what we note is that the Standing Committee while considering the appeal from an order of the Commissioner acts as an appellate authority and is, therefore, a quasi-judicial authority. When the Standing Committee reverses or modifies any action taken are proposed to be taken by the Commissioner in the matter of grant of licences, then the Commissioner has the discretion to refer the case to the Corporation. When the Corporation acts on a reference, it is acting as a quasi-judicial body although a Corporation is essentially a legislative body. However, while acting on a reference from the Commissioner it acts as a quasi judicial body. Under the circumstances, the question that arises in the instant case is, keeping in mind the nature of the procedure, whether the person who has succeeded before the Standing Committee or a person who is unsuccessful before the Standing Committee and whose matter is referred to the Corporation has to be extended the opportunity of hearing before passing any resolution. Under the circumstances, the question that arises in the instant case is, keeping in mind the nature of the procedure, whether the person who has succeeded before the Standing Committee or a person who is unsuccessful before the Standing Committee and whose matter is referred to the Corporation has to be extended the opportunity of hearing before passing any resolution. In this context, it is necessary to note that the Corporation being a body constituted by virtue of the statute and being an elected body, obviously it would be difficult for the Corporation as a body to hear the person concerned before passing any resolution or taking a decision in the matter when the Commissioner has made a reference under Section 444(2) of the Act. The impracticality of the situation has to be taken into consideration inasmuch as the person concerned cannot be permitted to be heard by the Corporation as a body as such. Under the circumstances, it is our considered view that since an opportunity of hearing or of being heard in the context of acting fairly is a mandatory requirement even, in the context of a matter being referred to the corporation, at the stage of making the reference to the Corporation, the Commissioner would have to issue notice to the person concerned, giving a reasonable time to give his reply on the proposed reference and thereafter send the reference along with the reply, if any, received from the person concerned to the Corporation who would, on perusing the order of reference and also the reply if any, to the said order of reference given by the person concerned, take a decision with regard to the order passed by the Standing Committee. By such a procedure being followed there would not only be an opportunity for the person concerned to become aware of the fact that his matter has been referred to the Corporation for its decision but he would also have a say in the matter, by giving his reply to the notice issued by the Commissioner proposing to refer the matter to the Corporation. Further the corporation also would have the benefit of knowing the stand of the person concerned and on a perusal of the material on record the corporation can take a decision and pass an appropriate resolution to that effect. 34. Further the corporation also would have the benefit of knowing the stand of the person concerned and on a perusal of the material on record the corporation can take a decision and pass an appropriate resolution to that effect. 34. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the decision of this court in the case of Gopal R. V/s. the Bangalore City Corporation and another (1987 (2) KLJ 152) is not good law and that the decision of this court in the case of Vasudevachar C. and another V/s. the Corporation of the City of Bangalore and others (1987 (1) KLJ 372) is the correct approach. However, we have stated that the stage at which the notice has to be issued and the nature of hearing that has to be given in the matter when a Commissioner of the Corporation refers the matter under Section 444(2) of the Act to the Corporation. As already stated there can be no personal hearing of the person concerned in the matter, but at the same time, the rules of natural justice and fairness would be complied with sufficiently if the person concerned is made known of the proposal of the Commissioner to refer the matter to the Corporation and also to have an opportunity to give the reply or to have a say in the matter with regard to the proposed reference. Under the circumstances, the questions for reference are answered by holding that the principles of natural justice would apply to decisions taken and resolutions passed by the Corporation in which it cancels, annuls or modifies any decision or order passed by a standing committee and that the power to cancel or annul a decision conferred upon the Corporation by Sub Section (2) of Section 444 of the Act is with regard to resolutions passed by the standing committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction U/s. 444 of the Act. Hence the power to cancel or annual a decision of the standing committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction u/s 444 of the Act is not conferred upon the corporation by Rule 27 of Schedule I of the KMC Rules. Accordingly, we answer the reference. 35. Hence the power to cancel or annual a decision of the standing committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction u/s 444 of the Act is not conferred upon the corporation by Rule 27 of Schedule I of the KMC Rules. Accordingly, we answer the reference. 35. However, on the facts of the present case, since the impugned resolution is passed by the corporation not under sub section (3) read with Sub Section (2) of Section 444 of the Act, but at the instance of a Corporator virtually assailing the order of the Standing Committee in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the same is not in accordance with law. Hence the Annexure-C is quashed consequently the notices issued by the Corporation Vide Annexure D1-D4 are also quashed. Writ Petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.