Judgment : SANJIB BANERJEE, J The plaintiff claims a decree for eviction against the first defendant on the basis of what has been pleaded in the written statement of such defendant. The plaintiff suggests that for the determination of a lease or a tenancy by a lessee or a tenant to be complete, it is imperative that possession of the premises be handed over to the lessor or the landlord. The plaintiff insists that since it is admitted in the first defendant’s written statement that possession was not made over by the first defendant to the plaintiff and possession was, in fact, made over to the third defendant as a sub-tenant, the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession and there is no disputed fact that needs to be carried to a protracted trial. At the relevant time, the first defendant was a tenant in respect of a flat or office space at a well-known landmark on Chowringhee under the plaintiff. The second defendant, at the material time, was the owner of the entirety of the building. The third defendant is the present occupant of the concerned office premises, having come into possession thereof as a sub-tenant of the first defendant. The plaintiff refers to the written statements filed by the three defendants and the consistent case therein that possession of the premises had not been surrendered by the first defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff says that the entire mala fide exercise has been orchestrated at the behest of the second defendant. The insinuation is that there must have been substantial extraneous consideration for the first defendant to have removed itself from the relevant premises and allowed the third defendant in. The plaintiff suggests that it is inconceivable that the third defendant came to be ultimately in possession of the premises merely on the strength of the transaction that has been pleaded or what appears on paper. The plaintiff hints that the three defendants, particularly the first and the second, colluded with each other to effectively dispossess the plaintiff otherwise than in accordance with law and the statements in the written statements entitle the plaintiff to a judgment on admission. The plaintiff has claimed an immediate decree for eviction and for arrears of rent and licence fee on the plaintiff’s understanding of the admission made in the written statements. The plaintiff has claimed an immediate decree for eviction and for arrears of rent and licence fee on the plaintiff’s understanding of the admission made in the written statements. The plaintiff’s claim is summarised at the following subparagraphs of paragraph 23 of the petition: “(a) The respondent No.1 in its written statement as well as by way of letters dated 27th August, 1999 and 4th October, 1999 has categorically admitted that it has taken direct tenancy of the area in question from the respondent No.2. This amounts to transfer and/or assignment of the area in question by the respondent No.1 in favour of the respondent No.2 against the express directions of the petitioner. (b) The respondent No.1 in his written statement has admitted parting with possession of the area in question to the respondent No.3 with effect from 1st of September, 1999. (c) The respondent No.2 in his written statement has confirmed granting of direct tenancy of the area in question to the respondent No.1 with effect from 1st September, 1999. (d) The respondent No.2 has also admitted the sub-letting of the area in question by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.3. (e) In the written statement of the respondent No.3 it has admitted having taken possession of the area in question from the respondent No.1 under a sub-letting arrangement.” In the first defendant’s written statement it is pleaded that such defendant took the premises for office purpose and expected the central air-conditioning to function thereat. The first defendant has complained that since July, 1999 it did not receive water for the central cooling tower to allow air-conditioning facilities at the suit premises and the supply of water to the suit premises was altogether cut off thereafter. The employees of the first defendant and visitors to its office were denied the elevator service and there was inadequate lighting in the staircase; the lobby outside the suit premises and the common passages were left unclean; and, the plaintiff failed to provide services as stipulated in the agreement of March 1, 1979. The first defendant has said in its written statement that the plaintiff paid no heed to its complaints and by letters dated July 23 and July 29, 1999 the difficulties faced by the first defendant were brought to the notice of the plaintiff, but to no avail. The first defendant has said in its written statement that the plaintiff paid no heed to its complaints and by letters dated July 23 and July 29, 1999 the difficulties faced by the first defendant were brought to the notice of the plaintiff, but to no avail. At paragraph 12(v) of its written statement, the first defendant has pleaded as follows: “(v) This defendant also came to learn that the defendant No. 2 paramount owner of the suit premises have terminated the tenancy of the plaintiff and have filed a suit for eviction of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s right thus became precarious.” The first defendant claims to have issued a further notice to the plaintiff on August 9, 1999 that the suit premises were no longer usable and that since there was threat of eviction by title paramount the plaintiff was not entitled to any further rent. The written statement narrates that since there was failure on the plaintiff’s part to make available the necessary facilities at the suit premises, by letter of August 25, 1999 the first defendant terminated its tenancy agreement with the plaintiff and sought a direct tenancy under the second defendant. The first defendant has said that by a letter of August 26, 1999 the second defendant informed the first defendant that the second defendant would give the first defendant direct tenancy of the suit premises and additional facilities, subject to the first defendant terminating its agreement with the plaintiff. The written statement proceeds to say that by a letter of August 27, 1999 the first defendant informed the plaintiff that since the plaintiff had failed to provide the requisite services at the suit premises and under threat of eviction by title paramount, the first defendant would obtain a direct tenancy under the second defendant and would attorn the tenancy in favour of the second defendant with effect from September 1, 1999. The first defendant has referred to correspondence exchanged between it and the second defendant on August 27, 1999, August 30, 1999 and September 1, 1999. By the letter of September 1, 1999 the first defendant apparently informed the second defendant that it had made alternative arrangements for its office and was desirous of subletting the suit premises to the third defendant. By the letter of September 1, 1999 the first defendant apparently informed the second defendant that it had made alternative arrangements for its office and was desirous of subletting the suit premises to the third defendant. By a letter of September 3, 1999 the second defendant appears to have permitted the first defendant to sublet the premises to the third defendant. It is unnecessary to refer to the other two written statements since the third defendant’s version is irrelevant in the context and since the second defendant’s version does not contradict whatever has been pleaded by the first defendant in its written statement. The plaintiff says that on the first defendant’s admission of the circumstances that culminated in the third defendant being inducted in the suit premises, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction. The plaintiff states that the law requires eviction to be down the chain; that a superior landlord cannot evict a sub-tenant and obtain possession since the eviction of the sub-tenant would result in the tenant being entitled to possession. The plaintiff submits that the legal consequence following the admission of the state of affairs is the inevitable entitlement of the plaintiff to possession of the premises. The plaintiff has relied on a judgment reported at (1979) 4 SCC 214 (V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal) and has placed paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report for the proposition that a tenancy actually terminates upon possession thereof being made over to the landlord. In the judgment reported at (1967) 3 SCR 343 (Hiralal Vallbhram v. Kastorbhai Lalbhai) that is next cited by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court recognised that a sub-tenant could not be ejected and possession made over to the landlord if the tenant-in-chief under the landlord had also not been ejected. The plaintiff refers to Section 19 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and to Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiff says that a decree for eviction is also permissible under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code and relies on a judgment reported at (2005) 11 SCC 279 (Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan) for such purpose. The plaintiff says that a decree for eviction is also permissible under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code and relies on a judgment reported at (2005) 11 SCC 279 (Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan) for such purpose. The plaintiff submits that if there is any admission by a defendant or if an admission can be inferred from the facts and circumstances without any dispute, a decree for eviction may be passed without the suit being required to be carried to trial. The first defendant has made several points including the fundamental principle that an admission has to be taken as a whole and a part of it cannot be culled out and another part ignored. The first defendant says that it was its perception that the threat at the relevant time by title paramount was real. The first defendant contends that neither the only nor the inevitable inference from the facts pleaded in its written statement would be that the plaintiff is entitled to possession. Several inconsequential contentions have been put forth by the first defendant that need, at least, to be recorded. The first defendant had applied for rejection of the plaint for the perceived defect in the notice issued under Section 13(6) of the 1956 Act. A second application for the same purpose was made on the ground that the suit was bad for multifariousness and misjoinder of causes of action and parties; it was also contended that the suit had been deliberately overvalued to bring it to this Court. The first defendant says that that there is a fundamental challenge as to the authority of this Court to receive the suit on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction which has to be assessed and in the first defendant’s application being dismissed liberty was reserved for the point to be gone into at the trial. The first defendant says that from an order of a Division Bench of this Court in continuation of the first defendant’s plea that the plaint relating to this suit ought to have been rejected, the first defendant applied for special leave to appeal. The order made by the Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petition permitted the question of law to be assessed in a subsequent special leave petition against the final decree in the event the decision in the suit went against the first defendant. The order made by the Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petition permitted the question of law to be assessed in a subsequent special leave petition against the final decree in the event the decision in the suit went against the first defendant. The first defendant suggests that in view of the previous orders in this suit there can be no question of shortcircuiting of the trial that is contemplated. The other point canvassed by the first defendant is that the present application was made several years after the written statements were filed in the year 2002. The first defendant argues that the principle in the residuary article of the schedule to the Limitation Act should be made applicable even at the interlocutory stage and the plaintiff be precluded from making an application for judgment on admission nearly six years after the alleged admission was made. It is the more substantial point that needs to be seen. The first defendant refers to a judgment reported at (1987) 4 SCC 424 (D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish) that the rule of estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is subject to certain exceptions; that it is open to a tenant to claim that under threat of eviction by the paramount title-holder he had attorned in favour of the ultimate landlord. The first defendant has referred to a Division Bench judgment reported at AIR 2002 Cal 144 (Union Bank of India v. Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd.) which follows D. Satyanarayana and recognises that in order to constitute eviction by title paramount it is not necessary that the tenant should be dispossessed, but it may be sufficient if there was a threat of eviction and if the tenant as a result of such threat attorns to the real owner. The plaintiff has relied on the following passage from a judgment reported at (1977) 2 All ER 293 (Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd v. Associated Electrical Industries Ltd) to justify its conduct: “In the course of the discussion we were referred to many authorities, old and new. I have considered them all – and others, too – but the result can be stated thus: If a landlord lets a tenant into possession under a lease, then, so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbed by any adverse claim – then the tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title. I have considered them all – and others, too – but the result can be stated thus: If a landlord lets a tenant into possession under a lease, then, so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbed by any adverse claim – then the tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title. Suppose the tenant (not having been disturbed) goes out of possession and the landlord sues the tenant on the covenant for rent or for breach of covenant to repair or to yield up in repair. The tenant cannot say to the landlord: ‘You are not the true owner of the property.’ Likewise, if the landlord, on the tenant’s holding over, sues him for possession or for use and occupation or mesne profits, the tenant cannot defend himself by saying: ‘The property does not belong to you, but to another.’ But if the tenant is disturbed by being evicted by title paramount or the equivalent of it, then he can dispute the landlord’s title. …” The first defendant says that there is nothing new which has been said in its written statement and the stand of the threat of eviction by title paramount had been clearly mentioned in the pre-suit correspondence. The first defendant says that even though collusion and conspiracy between the defendants and fraud have been alleged in the plaint, there is no declaration which has been sought. The first defendant insists that the issue that arises out of the plaintiff’s assertion at paragraph 13 of the plaint has to be assessed upon oral evidence being received and the plaintiff cannot seek judgment on admission by relying on a statement made in the written statement that was merely a reiteration of the pre-suit stand. At paragraph 13 of the plaint it has been alleged that the first and second defendants were “wrongfully, illegally and fraudulently” contending that the surrender of tenancy by the first defendant was valid and that the first defendant had become a direct tenant under the second defendant. The first defendant says that whether there was any fraud or impropriety committed by the first defendant has to be ascertained upon oral evidence being received. The first defendant says that whether there was any fraud or impropriety committed by the first defendant has to be ascertained upon oral evidence being received. The argument is that since it is possible for a tenant, as an exception to the general rule of estoppel, to attorn to the paramount titleholder upon a threat of eviction by the paramount titleholder, as to whether or not such a situation had arisen in this case requires consideration. The second and third defendants submit that there is no admission in any of the written statements that the transfer was illegal. They refer to the second defendant’s suit against the plaintiff for eviction and the failure of the plaintiff to ensure that the first defendant was able to use the suit premises for the purpose for which it had been obtained. The plaintiff says that D. Satyanarayana has been virtually overruled by the Supreme Court in the dictum therein being limited to the facts of that case. The plaintiff refers to the judgment reported at (2002) 2 SCC 50 (Vashu Deo v. Balkishan). The plaintiff argues that in the judgment reported at (2005) 5 SCC 492 (Pramod Kumar Jaiswal v. Bibi Husn Bano) and another reported at (2002) 7 SCC 505 (S.K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma), the law laid down in Vashu Deo has been quoted. The plaintiff says that the threat of eviction has to be real for the tenant to attorn in favour of title paramount. The plaintiff has also referred to the decisions reported at (2002) 7 SCC 614 (Rita Lal v. Raj Kumar Singh) and 1999 (1) CWN 173 (J. Thomas & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Pawan Kumar Tibriwalla) to counter the other arguments made on behalf of the first defendant. The parties have also relied on the judgments reported at 1995 (1) Cal LJ 236 (Manick Chand Jajodia v. Lalchand Agarwal), 2001 (2) CHN 142 (Russel Properties & Estates v. Indian Alluminium Co. Ltd.) and (2010) 4 SCC 753 (Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust). For a plaintiff to be entitled to a decree on the basis of admission by the relevant defendant, the admission has to be taken as a whole. Ltd.) and (2010) 4 SCC 753 (Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust). For a plaintiff to be entitled to a decree on the basis of admission by the relevant defendant, the admission has to be taken as a whole. While the first defendant relies on D. Satyanarayana which speaks of the possibility of a threat of eviction by title paramount entitling a tenant to come under the exception to the rule recognised in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the judgments carried by the plaintiff show that the threat has to be real. The eviction suit by the ultimate landlord was instituted by the second defendant in the year 1983 and it does not appear that any meaningful steps were suddenly taken in the year 1999 for the threat that had persisted to become a real danger to the first defendant’s continued occupation of the premises. In the context of the present adjudication, it is not necessary to enter into any argument as to whether the threat of eviction by title paramount was real or imminent. What is relevant is that there was a perception of a threat. The first defendant has narrated the circumstances leading up to the first defendant attorning the tenancy in favour of the second defendant and of the property being sublet to the third defendant. There is more than a whiff of foul play that is apparent. But the issue is as to whether the admission of the state of affairs by the first defendant in its written statement would entitle the plaintiff to a decree for eviction. The first defendant has furnished its version of what transpired, its contemporaneous perception of things and the manner in which the tenancy was attorned in favour of the second defendant. It is the entirety of the bundle of facts, including the perception of the real threat of eviction of the first defendant, that has to be taken into account. It is possible that the first defendant’s version may not pass muster at the trial but the first defendant will not be precluded from asserting and trying to establish that its perception of the threat of eviction by title paramount was not imaginary. On an application for a judgment on admission, it has to be a take-it-as-a-whole-on-leave-it scenario. It is possible that the first defendant’s version may not pass muster at the trial but the first defendant will not be precluded from asserting and trying to establish that its perception of the threat of eviction by title paramount was not imaginary. On an application for a judgment on admission, it has to be a take-it-as-a-whole-on-leave-it scenario. There may be admission of a fact but the denial of the claim made in connection with the fact. The principle on which Order XII Rule 6 of the Code rests is a rule of evidence that admission is the best form of evidence. An admission, as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act, 1872, is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances, as referred to in the Act. In a suit by A for refund by B of money lent and advanced, A would not be required to prove the receipt of the money by B, if B admits the receipt thereof; but if B admits the receipt of the money but denies the liability on some cogent ground, the fact that B has admitted the receipt of the money from A will not result in the claim of A being allowed on such admission. A now has to prove only B’s liability as the factum of A having paid B is established by B’s admission. If, however, B admits the receipt of payment from A but denies the liability on some absurd ground (say, because of the weather), the legal consequence of the receipt of the payment and the absurdity of the ground for denying liability may result in B being found liable without any further ado. On the other hand, notwithstanding an admission of the fact if the denial of the liability is based on a ground that is possible to be justified by oral or other evidence, the legal consequence of the admission of the fact will not amount to admission of the liability. Even though there is a lurking suspicion that the threat in the present case by title paramount may neither have been real nor imminent, yet that would call for an assessment. Even though there is a lurking suspicion that the threat in the present case by title paramount may neither have been real nor imminent, yet that would call for an assessment. The circumstances culminating in the third defendant ultimately obtaining possession of the suit premises from the first defendant are apparent from the first defendant’s written statement and they have been corroborated by the second defendant and not contradicted by the third defendant. Yet, the admission that the plaintiff may take advantage of has to be of the entirety of what has been said by the first defendant; that is both the circumstances and the first defendant’s perception of the threat by title paramount. This is not the stage to assess the propriety of defence. If it could be said that as to whether or not there was any real or imminent threat was legally irrelevant, the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment on admission. But the plaintiff cannot take the admission of the circumstances and avoid the possibility of the inference therefrom that there was a real threat of eviction by title paramount. Strictly going by the quality and extent of admission necessary for a decree to be made on the basis thereof, the plaintiff falls short. GA No. 2602 of 2008 is dismissed without any order as to costs. Since written statements have already been filed, documents should be discovered, if not already done, by the end of November, 2010; inspection forthwith thereupon and the plaintiff will have liberty to seek an early listing of the suit in January, 2011. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.