JUDGMENT : M.Y. Eqbal, J. This appeal by the appellants-Central Coalfields Limited is directed against the judgment dated 27.11.2008 passed in W.P.(S) No. 6867 of 2004, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the orders passed by the disciplinary authority terminating the services of the respondent and the order by which the appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass: The respondent, a security-guard in the appellants-Company, was proceeded departmentally for the charges that while he was on duty in the official residence of the Project Officer, a jeep bearing Registration No. BRY-2985 was stolen away from the respondents place of duty. The departmental proceeding was contested by the respondent and finally the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charge against the respondent was not fully proved. However, it was established in the enquiry that the key of the vehicle was kept with the respondent and he was the custodian of the key of the vehicle. The disciplinary authority after considering the second show-cause reply filed by the respondent, passed order of termination of his services. 3. The learned Single Judge has recorded a finding that when the disciplinary authority differed with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer that the charges were not proved, he was duty-bound to assign and inform the reasons of his disagreement with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. For better appreciation, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the impugned judgment are quoted herein below: 6. Apparently, the evidence as recorded in course of inquiry, does not confirm that the place from where the vehicle was allegedly stolen, was within the place of the petitioners duty. The charge, therefore, does not accuse the petitioner that theft of the vehicle had occurred on account negligence of duty on the part of the petitioner. It is under such circumstances, that the Inquiry Officer had found that charge against the petitioner was partly proved and not fully proved. In fact, from the details of the inquiry report, it is apparent that neither has the petitioner been accused of negligence in performance of his duty, nor has any charge been framed against him for negligence. Yet, the Disciplinary Authority has construed the findings in the inquiry report, that charge against the petitioner was "fully proved". In fact, from the details of the inquiry report, it is apparent that neither has the petitioner been accused of negligence in performance of his duty, nor has any charge been framed against him for negligence. Yet, the Disciplinary Authority has construed the findings in the inquiry report, that charge against the petitioner was "fully proved". By holding such view that charge against the petitioner has been fully proved in the inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has apparently differed from the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It is by now well settled that if the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority is duty bound to assign and inform the proceede the reasons on which it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. On a bare perusal of the impugned order, as passed by the Disciplinary Authority, it is apparent that the impugned order of termination of the petitioners services, is a non-speaking order, without assigning any reason as to why the punishment of termination of services was proposed against the petitioner, even though, the Departmental Inquiry did not confirm that the petitioner was found guilty of any act of negligence or dereliction of duty in respect of the work assigned to him. It is thus apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has not applied its mind to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, as recorded in the inquiry Report. 7. Even though, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, would not act as a court of appeal, to make a reappraisal of the evidences recorded in the Disciplinary Proceedings, but this Court would not hesitate to interfere where it finds that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority awarding severe punishment of termination of services, is basically perverse and is against the principles of natural justice. On considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does find that the impugned orders of the Disciplinary Authority and that of the Appellate Authority, are perverse and against the principles of natural justice and punishment of termination of service, as imposed against the petitioner, is highly disproportionate considering the findings of the Inquiry Officer that charge against the petitioner is partly proved. 4. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of termination of services of the respondent. 5. We have heard Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and, Mr. A. Anand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 6. The only question that falls for consideration is as to whether the learned Single Judge is correct in law in allowing the writ petition and quashing the order of termination of services of the petitioner-respondent and directing reinstatement on the basis of finding that the disciplinary authority was duty bound to assign reasons on which it disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and also on the finding that the order of termination of services of respondent was passed by a non-speaking order without assigning any reason. The law in this regard is no longer res integra. In the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam and Another Vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612 , Their Lordships held that if the dismissing authority differs with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusion in that behalf should be specified in the second notice. The disciplinary authority should specifically state that it differs from the findings of the inquiry officer and then intimate the nature of action proposed to be taken against him. 7. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. M.C. Saxena, 1998 (3) SCC 385 , the Supreme Court reiterated the law and held that when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, it must record reasons of his disagreement. If the disciplinary authority gives reasons for disagreeing with the findings of inquiry officer, the Court cannot interfere with those findings unless it comes to the conclusion that no reasonable man can come to the said conclusion. 8. In the instant case, as noticed above, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that no reasons were assigned by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the order of termination. 8. In the instant case, as noticed above, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that no reasons were assigned by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the order of termination. But in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge ought to have remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority for passing fresh order of his disagreement with the finding of the inquiry officer by giving conclusive reasons and to communicate the same to the respondent-delinquent and after receiving the show-cause, if any, a final order of punishment if any ought to have been passed. 9. We, therefore, without interfering with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, set aside only that part of the order whereby the learned Single Judge after quashing the order of termination, directed reinstatement. Consequently, the matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority for passing a fresh order after complying the requirement of law, as indicated herein above. 10. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this appeal is disposed of. Appeal disposed of.