Judgment :- D.K. DESHMUKH, J. 1. This Bench has been constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to answer the following question of law: “With reference to the provisions of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, whether Small Cause Court constituted under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act is a Court subordinate to the Bombay High Court on its original side?” 2. The events leading to the Constitution of this Bench are as follows: Suit No.514 of 1984 was instituted by Aderbad Co.op.Hsg. Society Ltd. claiming a decree of declaration that Defendants Nos.9 & 10 have procured membership of the Plaintiff-society by fraud and misrepresentation. A further decree of declaration was claimed by the Plaintiff-society that Defendants Nos.9 & 10 are not the members of the Plaintiff-society and/or are liable to be expelled as such. It appears that the Plaintiff-society in its General Body Meeting held on 6-2-2005 passed a Resolution resolving to revoke/cancel the nominal membership of the Defendants Nos.9 & 10. The Plaintiff/society, thereafter, approached the Deputy Registrar, Co.operative Societies for his approval to the Resolution of expulsion of Defendants Nos.9 & 10 from the membership of the society as required by the provisions of Section 35 of the Maharashtra Co.operative Societies Act. In the Civil Suit filed by the society, it appears that the Defendants Nos.9 & 10 took out Notice of Motion No.828 of 2005 seeking an interim order restraining the Plaintiff/society from prosecuting and proceeding with the application made by the society before the Deputy Registrar, Co.operative Societies, under Section 35 of the Co.operative Societies Act. When that Notice of Motion came before a learned single Judge of this court for hearing, an objection was raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Deputy Registrar, Co.operative Societies when he exercises the jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Co.operative Societies Act is not sub-ordinate to the single Judge of the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Hence, under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1963 he has no power to grant an injunction restraining the Plaintiff from prosecuting its application before the Deputy Registrar. On behalf of the Defendants Nos.9 & 10, before the learned single Judge reliance was placed on a judgment of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of William Jacks & Co. On behalf of the Defendants Nos.9 & 10, before the learned single Judge reliance was placed on a judgment of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of William Jacks & Co. (India) Ltd. v/s. Nilima Dinesh Prasad and others, AIR 1992 Bombay 126, to contend that the learned single Judge of this court sitting on original side exercising original civil jurisdiction has power to make an order of temporary injunction in relation to proceedings pending in the Small Causes Court constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882. The learned single Judge expressed his inability to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge who decided the case of William Jacks referred to above. According to the learned single Judge, the Deputy Registrar exercising jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Co.operative Societies Act is not subordinate to a learned single Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction sitting on the original side of the High Court, and therefore, he framed following issues, which according to him were required to be considered by the Larger Bench. i) Whether the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies hearing an application under section 35 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 can be regarded as a court for the purpose of section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act? ii) Whether a Single Judge of this Court sitting on the Original Side exercising ordinary ordinary civil jurisdiction would have a power to grant an injunction restraining the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies from hearing an application under section 35 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960? iii) Whether injunction can be granted by a Single Judge of this Court sitting on the Original Side and exercising Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, to a party to a suit before it restraining it from prosecuting an application under section 35 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies? 2. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. had filed two civil suits being Civil Suit No.2178 of 2001 and Civil Suit No.2177 of 2001 on the original side of this Court seeking a decree of specific performance of the lease agreement. In those suits, notices of motion were taken out by the Plaintiff praying for temporary injunction restraining the Defendants from filing proceedings under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in the Small Causes Court. In those suits, notices of motion were taken out by the Plaintiff praying for temporary injunction restraining the Defendants from filing proceedings under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in the Small Causes Court. By an order dated 2692006 which was a common order passed in both the Notices of Motion, Notices of Motion were rejected by the learned single Judge of this Court. Therefore, against the common order two Appeals were preferred by the Plaintiff being Appeal No.295 of 2007 and Appeal No.296 of 2007. When those Appeals came for admission before the Division Bench of this Court on 19th April, 2007 following order was passed: “Heard the learned Advocate for the appellants. Admit. Since the issue involved in the matter is similar to the one which came up for consideration before one of us (Shri D.G. Karnik, J.) and wherein the matter is directed to be referred to a larger Bench and for that purpose to be kept before the Hon’ble The Chief Justice, this matter will also have to be placed before the Hon’ble The Chief Justice along with the said matter i.e. the matter in Notice of Motion No.1259 of 2005 in Suit No.7 of 2004. Order accordingly.” 3. Pursuant to this order the matters were placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and the Hon’ble the Chief Justice referred these two Appeals being Appeal No.295 of 2007 and Appeal No.296 of 2007 to this Bench along with Notice of Motion No.828 of 2005. 4. When, Notice of Motion No.828 of 2005 was called for hearing before us, on 23rd July, 2010, the learned Counsel appearing for the Defendants Nos.9 & 10, who had taken out that Notice of Motion pointed out to us that by order dated 12-8-2009 passed by the learned single Judge of this court that Notice of Motion itself has been dismissed as infructuous, and therefore, Notice of Motion No.828 of 2005 does not survive for consideration. Therefore, an order was made by us on 23rd July, 2010, which reads as under: 1. While considering this Notice of Motion, the learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 4.4.2005 has framed certain questions of law which, according to him, arose in that notice of motion and requested the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to place the matter before the larger Bench. While considering this Notice of Motion, the learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 4.4.2005 has framed certain questions of law which, according to him, arose in that notice of motion and requested the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to place the matter before the larger Bench. Hence, this bench has been constituted for hearing the questions which have been referred to the Larger Bench by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 4.4.2005. It appears that by order dated 12.8.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court the notice of motion itself has been dismissed as infructuous. As the notice of motion itself does not survive for consideration, there is no question on Questions of Law referred to by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 4.4.2005, being considered by this Bench. 5. In view of disposal of Notice of Motion No.828 of 2005 only the question of law that arises in these two Appeals has to be considered. With reference to the order made by the Division Bench, quoted above, we have framed the question of law referred to above. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant relying on the provisions of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882, Constitution of India, the Letters Patent and the Civil Procedure Code submitted that the Small Causes Court is subordinate to this court on its original side within the meaning of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Counsel relied on following judgments, (i)William Jacks & Co. (India) Ltd. v/s. Nilima Dinesh Prasad and ors, AIR 1992 Bombay 126; (ii) Narayan Vithal Samant v/s. Jankibai Sitaram Samant and ors., AIR 1915 Bombay 146; (iii) Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v/s. His Lordship the Honourable Mr.Justice Tarkunde, 67 Bombay Law Reporter, page 214, (iv) Pirbhai Khimji v/s The Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company, 1872 (8) Bombay High Court Judgments at page 59; 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the Small Causes Court is not subordinate to the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction on its original side, because the Small Causes Court under Section 41 of the Small Causes Court Act has exclusive jurisdiction and therefore it is a court of coordinate jurisdiction and therefore is not subordinate to the High Court on its original side within the meaning of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raizada Topandas v/s. Gorakhdas Gokalchand, AIR 1964 SC 1348 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Cotton Corporation of India v/s. United Industrial Bank Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 1272 . 8. In so far as the Constitution of India is concerned, this High Court was a existing High Court. So far as existing High Courts are concerned, provision is made in Article 225 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under: 225. Jurisdiction of existing High Courts. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution: (Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction) Thus the powers of the Judges of this Court in relation to the administration of justice and the law to be administered remain the same as before the commencement of the Constitution, save and except, that it is modified by any provision of the Constitution or by the Legislation made by appropriate Legislature. So far as the powers of this Court before coming into force of the Constitution are concerned, we have to turn to the Letters Patent. By Clause 12 of the Letters Patent original jurisdiction was conferred on this Court to try suits. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent Reads as under: 12. Original Jurisdictions as to suits. And We do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immoveable property such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain, within such limits, except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court at Bombay, or the Bombay City Civil Court. 9. It is, thus, clear that by virtue of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent this court had power to try civil suits in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Clause 13 of the Letters Patent confers extra ordinary civil jurisdiction on this court. Clause 13 of the Letters Patent reads as under: "13. 9. It is, thus, clear that by virtue of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent this court had power to try civil suits in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Clause 13 of the Letters Patent confers extra ordinary civil jurisdiction on this court. Clause 13 of the Letters Patent reads as under: "13. Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction And We do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay shall have power to remove and to try and determine, as a Court of extraordinary original jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any Court, whether within or without the Presidency of Bombay, subject to its superintendence, when the said High Court shall think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect or for purposes of justice, the reason for so doing being recorded on the proceedings of said High Court." Thus, Clause 13 empowers this court in exercise of its extra ordinary civil jurisdiction to remove and to try any suit falling within the jurisdiction of any court within or without the Presidency of Bombay, subject to its superintendence. Thus, the High Court was conferred with ordinary original civil jurisdiction as also extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction and in exercise of its extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction the High Court had power to withdraw to itself any suit from any court subject to its superintendence. Perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pirbhai Khimji, referred to above, shows this court had held in 1871, “There is no doubt that the late Supreme Court of Bombay had power by certiorari to remove suits pending in the Court of Small Causes in the cases specified in Sec.54 of Act IX of 1850 (the Small Causes Courts’ Act) It is further held, “In the present case I am of opinion that the Bombay Court of Small Causes must be considered to be subject to the superintendence of the High Court at Bombay, for the purpose of Sec.13 of the Letters Patent for the following reasons: Subject to the conditions prescribed in Sec.54 of Act IX of 1850, the High Court has authority, under that section, to remove causes from the Small Causes Court, and itself to try and determine them. By Sec.41 of the same Act, any general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of the Small Causes Court made and issued by the Judges of that court, are to be sent to the High Court, for approval of the Judges of that court, though they are to have force until disapproved. Then there is the power of this court (which has been from time to time exercised) to prohibit the Bombay Court of Small Causes from proceeding where it is acting without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, which is a power of the same kind as that exercised over the County Courts in england by the Superior Courts of Common Law at West-minister by means of a writ of prohibition. Then there is the power of reserving questions of law or equity for the opinion of the High Court, and the obligation to do so in cases above the value of Rs.500/-, on the application of either of the parties, to which I have already adverted. The decision of the High court on such reserved question is binding on the Small Causes Court, and Mr.Justice Phear, in the above cited cases of John Thomson, it is to be noticed, speaks of such a power of reference to the opinion of the High Court as a “modified form of appeal.” For the above reasons I am of opinion that the Bombay Court of Small Causes, though not subject in all respects, or perhaps generally to the superintendence of the High Court, nor, strictly speaking subject to its appellate jurisdiction at all is so far subject to its superintendence as to give the latter court, under Sec.13 of the Letters Patent, power to remove, and try and determine, any suit pending in the former court, when the High Court, for purposes of justice, shall think proper to do so. It is thus clear that in 1871 this court had held that Small Causes Court, Bombay constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act is subordinate to this court for the purpose of Clause 13 of the Letters Patent. We have not been shown any judgment which takes a view different from the one taken in Pirbhai Khimji’s case. It is thus clear that in 1871 this court had held that Small Causes Court, Bombay constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act is subordinate to this court for the purpose of Clause 13 of the Letters Patent. We have not been shown any judgment which takes a view different from the one taken in Pirbhai Khimji’s case. Thus, so far as this court is concerned, in view of the judgment of this court in Pirbhai Khimji’s case and the provisions of Clause 13 of the Letters Patent we have to take it as an established position of law so far as this court is concerned that for the purpose of Clause 13 of the Letters Patent the Small Causes Court is subordinate To this court when it exercises its extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent. The next provision of the Letters Patent which, in our opinion, is relevant is Clause 36. It reads as under: 36. Single Judges and Division Courts: And We do hereby declare that any function, which is hereby directed to be performed by the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, may be performed by any Judge or any Division Court thereof, appointed or constituted for such purpose, in pursuance of section One hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, 1915, and if such Division Court is composed of two or more Judges, and the Judges are divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on any point, such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges, if there shall be a majority, but if the Judges should be equally divided they shall state the point upon which they differ and the case shall then be heard upon that point by one or more of the other Judges and the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard the case including those who first heard it. 10. This Clause speaks of all judicial functions of the High Court. It is clear, therefore, that where a single Judge is performing judicial function on the original side of the High Court, he is as much a High Court Judge as a High Court Judge sitting singly on the Appellate Side. 10. This Clause speaks of all judicial functions of the High Court. It is clear, therefore, that where a single Judge is performing judicial function on the original side of the High Court, he is as much a High Court Judge as a High Court Judge sitting singly on the Appellate Side. Clause 36 of the Letters Patent makes no distinction between the Original and Appellate side. It says in terms that each and every function of the High Court can validly be performed by a single Judge sitting on either side of the Court. 11. A combined reading of Article 225 and Clause 36 of the Letters Patent shows that after the commencement of the Constitution the respective powers of the Judges in relation to administration of justice remain the same as before the commencement of the Constitution. These powers are, of course, subject to modification, by any provisions of the Constitution or by any law made by the appropriate Legislature duly empowered by the Constitution, which now includes the Letters Patent. Any Judge of the Bombay High Court may, therefore, perform all the judicial functions of that court in exercise of its extra ordinary original as also appellate jurisdiction. The judicial decision of a single Judge, whether given in exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction would be the decision of the High Court, as much as, any similar decision given by two or more Judges sitting together. The Division Bench of this court in its judgment in the case of Naresh Mirajkar, referred to above, has observed thus: “The distinction between the Original Side and the Appellate Side was brought into existence by cls.11, 12, and 13 of the Letters Patent. But if we turn to cl.36 of the Letters Patent, we find the same idea expressed though in different language. We have already quoted the clause and what is of prime importance are the use of the words “any function” in the opening part of cl.36 and the use of the words “in the exercise of its Original or Appellate jurisdiction” in the subsequent portions of the clause. The distinction is between a function to be performed and the Original or Appellate jurisdiction of the Court. The distinction is between a function to be performed and the Original or Appellate jurisdiction of the Court. What we have referred to in the preceding paragraph as the inherent or fundamental jurisdiction of the High Court is referred to in this clause as the “function” of the High Court in contradistinction with “appellate or original jurisdiction” . When Mr.Justice Tarkunde sitting on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court decided this matter, he was performing the function of the High Court, but a function within the Original Jurisdiction of the Court. He was, therefore, functioning as the High Court as much as any other Judge of the High Court, whether in the exercise of Original or Appellate jurisdiction. Nothing, therefore, turns upon this distinction between the Original Side and the Appellate Side of this High Court.” 12. Thus, we find that so far as provisions of Letters Parent are concerned, this court has original civil jurisdiction, extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction and Appellate jurisdiction. In exercise of its extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it has power to withdraw any suit from a subordinate court and at least since 1871 the Small Causes Court, Bombay has been held to be a court subordinate to the High court in exercise of its extra ordinary original civil jurisdiction. 13. A narrow question which is to be examined by us is whether in view of provisions contained in Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, this court in exercise of its original jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting any proceeding in the Small Causes Court constituted under the Presidency Small Clauses Court Act. Part III of the Act bears the heading `Preventive Relief’ and fasciculus of sections therein included provide for injunctions generally. Section 36 provides that preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction. Sec. 37 specifies the nature and character of temporary and perpetual injunctions. Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the Court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sec. 37 specifies the nature and character of temporary and perpetual injunctions. Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the Court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Permanent injunctions can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon merits of the suit and thereby defendant in the suit is perpetually enjoined from assertion of a right or from commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiffs. Section 38 sets out situations in which the court can grant a perpetual injunction to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in its favour, whether expressly or by implication. Sec. 38 is thus an enabling section which confers power on the court to grant perpetual injunction in situations and circumstances therein enumerated. Sec. 41 caters to the opposite situation. It provides that an injunction cannot be granted in the situation and circumstances therein set out. The Respondent relies on Sec. 41 (b) in support of its contention that the court had no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction because perpetual injunction could not have been granted by the Court in terms in which temporary or interim injunction was sought. Sec. 41 (b) reads as under: "41. An injunction cannot be granted: (a)................ (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; ......................." The predecessor of Sec. 41 (b), Sec. 56 (b) of the Specific Relief Act of 1887 repealed by 1963 Act read as under: "56. Injunction cannot be granted: (a)..................... (b) To stay proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought," A glance at the two provisions, the existing and the repealed would reveal the legislative response to judicial interpretation. Under Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought. In other words, the Court could stay by its injunction a proceeding in a court subordinate to the court granting injunction. Under Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought. In other words, the Court could stay by its injunction a proceeding in a court subordinate to the court granting injunction. The injunction granting stay of proceeding was directed to the Court and the Court has to be the Court subordinate to the one granting the injunction. This is based on the well recognized principle that the superior court can regulate proceedings in a court subordinate to it. It is implicit in this assumption and the language used in Sec. 56 (b) that the court could not grant injunction under Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act to stay proceeding in a court superior in hierarchy to the Court from which injunction is sought. But by judicial interpretation, a consensus was reached that as injunction acts in personam while the Court by its injunction cannot stay proceedings in a Court of superior jurisdiction; it could certainly by an injunction restrain a party before it from further prosecuting the proceeding in other courts may be superior or inferior in the hierarchy of courts. To some extent this approach not only effectively circumvented the provision contained in Sec. 56 of the repealed Act but denuded it of its content. The Legislature took notice of this judicial interpretation and materially altered the language of the succeeding provision enacted in Sec. 41 (b) replacing Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act while enacting Specific Relief Act of 1963. The Legislature manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Sec. 41 (b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personam, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Sec. 41(b) denies to the court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is not subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought. As a necessary corollary, it would follow that the court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is not subordinate to it. This change in language deliberately adopted by the Legislature after taking note of judicial vacillation has to be given full effect. 14. Thus, it is clear that the only question we have to determine is, can it be said that the Small Causes Court is subordinate to the original side of the High Court? The Presidency Small Causes Court Act was enacted in the year 1882. At that time the Bombay High Court existed having been constituted under the Letters Patent of 1860. In this context the provision of Section 6 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, in our opinion, are relevant. Section 6 reads as under: 6. The Small Causes Court shall be deemed to be a Court subject to the Superintendence of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be, within the meaning of the Letters Patent, respectively, dated the 28th day of December 1865, for such High Courts, and within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882) (and to be a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 6 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 (XVIII of 1879), and the High Court shall have, in respect of the Small Cause Court the same powers as it has under the (twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of Victoria, Chapter 104, section 15, in respect of Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction) 15. Perusal of the above quoted provision makes it clear that a clear declaration has been made that the Small Causes Court constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act was deemed to be a court subject to superintendence of Bombay High Court, which was constituted under the Letters Patent. Perusal of the above quoted provision makes it clear that a clear declaration has been made that the Small Causes Court constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act was deemed to be a court subject to superintendence of Bombay High Court, which was constituted under the Letters Patent. Under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, High Court had power to remove any suit from a court, which is subject to its superintendence and because of Section 6 the Small Causes Court was declared to be a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. Thus, because of Section 6, in our opinion, it can be safely said that the Small Causes Court was a court which was subordinate to the High Court which was constituted under the Letters Patent. Under the Letters Patent, as observed above, the High Court was exercising original civil, extra ordinary original civil and appellate jurisdiction. Section 6 declares the Small Causes Court to be subject to the superintendence of the High Court, which exercises all these three jurisdictions. In our opinion, therefore, there is no room to say that the Small Causes Court is not subordinate to the original side of the Bombay High Court. 16. The next relevant provision, in our opinion, which has to be considered is the provision of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. It reads as under: 3. Subordination of Courts. For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Perusal of the above quoted provision shows that it declares that every court of Small Causes Court is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Thus, according to Section 3 of CPC the Small Causes Court is subordinate to High Court as also District Court. In the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Romila Jaidev Shroff v/s. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff, AIR 2000 Bombay 356, especially in paragraph 23, the court has observed thus: “23. Thus, according to Section 3 of CPC the Small Causes Court is subordinate to High Court as also District Court. In the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Romila Jaidev Shroff v/s. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff, AIR 2000 Bombay 356, especially in paragraph 23, the court has observed thus: “23. At the same time when of the several High Courts of this Country some of them happen to have Original Civil Jurisdiction by very compulsion of logic as and when it exercises its jurisdiction, the High Court has to be a District Court for that limited purpose and it as a result of it;s inclusion in that concept if the High Court on its original side loses its jurisdiction, it does. It needs to be clarified that the loss of the jurisdiction will be confined only to that part of the Original Civil Jurisdiction as, like in the instant case, is relating to the matters to be dealt with under the Family Courts Act. 17. In view of the judgment it may possibly be argued that when the High Court exercises its Original Civil Jurisdiction, it exercises the jurisdiction of a District Court, even then it will be superior to the Small Causes Court in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. 18. The learned single Judge has referred to the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Narayan Vithal Samant v/s. Janakibai Sitaram Samant & ors. , AIR 1915 Bom. 146. The question referred to the Full Bench in that matter was whether the High Court on the Original Side could grant an injunction in the form of an order of prohibition (i.e. a stay) addressed to a Subordinate Judge before whom the proceeding was pending. In the said judgment, this Court was pleased to answer the question in the negative and held that a Single Judge sitting in the exercise of the Court’s Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction could not order stay of the suit pending in the Court of a subordinate Judge at Ratnagiri. The basis of the judgment in the said matter of Narayan Vithal Samant revolved around the rules formulated by the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction by Judges on the Original and the Appellate Side. The basis of the judgment in the said matter of Narayan Vithal Samant revolved around the rules formulated by the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction by Judges on the Original and the Appellate Side. The question before the Court was with respect to a stay of proceedings before a Subordinate Court, i.e. a matter arising in the Court’s appellate jurisdiction In this context, and in view of the Rules framed by the High Court that Civil Jurisdiction of the Court on the Appellate Side shall be exercised by a Division Court consisting of two judges, the High Court was of the view that the order in question, having been made by a Learned Single Judge, was not without of his jurisdiction since by reason of the Rules such exercise could be done by a Bench. The position in law was clear that the jurisdiction of a Judge on the original side did not include the area i.e. Ratnagiri where the Suit of which stay was sought was pending. The question whether an order could not been made in personam by a Learned Single Judge restraining a party from proceeding with the suit in a Subordinate Court was kept open. In the said judgment, the Learned Judges, whilst commenting on the rules framed by this Court for the purpose of conduct of its business, observed that the provisions of the Letters Patent conferred jurisdiction of the Court as a body and that it is the Court which has jurisdiction to grant. It was however observed that inasmuch as it would not be convenient for the due administration of justice that the entire Court should have to sit for a valid determination of every suit, appeal and application, power is given to the Court to make rules for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction by one or more Judges within the limits and subject to the conditions prescribed by the rule. The Court was of the opinion that the power to frame rules was for the purpose of convenient administration of justice and to avoid the inconvenience of all Judges of a particular Court being required to conduct every suit/proceedings/applications. In fact, the judgment of Macleod, J. went further to state that an order in personam to restrain a party in a suit from proceeding with the suit in a subordinate Court would be with jurisdiction. In fact, the judgment of Macleod, J. went further to state that an order in personam to restrain a party in a suit from proceeding with the suit in a subordinate Court would be with jurisdiction. In his opinion, a Single Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court was competent to restrain a party from proceeding with the suit in a subordinate Court. The majority decision of the Full Bench in Narayan Vithal Samant’s matter therefore leaves the question whether such an order in personam restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in a subordinate court can be passed. If it is accepted that the Small Causes Court at Bombay is subordinate to a Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction on the Appellate Side and is empowered to restrain a party from prosecuting proceedings in a subordinate Court, then, such Single Judge is functioning as the High Court. The settled law is that the artificial distinction drawn between the Appellate and the Original Side of the High Court under its Rules is only for the sake of convenience of administration of justice. Therefore, there can be no doubt that a Single Judge, whether in the exercise of Appellate or Original jurisdiction is the “High Court” and as such, the Small Causes Court at Bombay is subordinate to the High Court. The Small Causes Court at Bombay is subordinate to a Single Judge exercising Original jurisdiction and such a Single Judge has power to restrain a party from prosecuting any proceedings in a court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore in view of the statutory provisions, there can be no doubt that the Court of Small Causes at Bombay is subordinate to the High Court and subject to its overall superintendence. The limited question to be considered is whether such subordinate or superintendence is restricted to the Appellate Side of the High Court alone and does not extend to its Original Side. Acceptance of the proposition may lead to absurd and dangerous consequences. If such a proposition is accepted, it would mean that the Appellate Side of the High Court is superior and has superintendence over the Original Side of the High Court. Acceptance of the proposition may lead to absurd and dangerous consequences. If such a proposition is accepted, it would mean that the Appellate Side of the High Court is superior and has superintendence over the Original Side of the High Court. It is to prevent such a dangerous interpretation that the legislature, in its wisdom, specifically enacted Section 3 of code of Civil Procedure which provides that the Court of Small Causes at Bombay is also subordinate to a District Court. Therefore, even assuming that the High Court in the exercise of the Original Jurisdiction is equivalent to a District Court for the District of Mumbai, even then, by virtue of section 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Small Causes at Bombay is subordinate to a District Court and therefore subordinate to the High Court exercising Original Jurisdiction. The restriction contained in Section 41(b) of the Special Relief Act, 1963 does not come in the way of a Single Judge of this Court exercising Original Jurisdiction from restraining a party from prosecuting and/or instituting a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. In view of discussions set out above, the Court of Small Causes at Bombay is subordinate to the High Court and to a Single Judge exercising Original Jurisdiction therefore, the natural conclusion is that such Single Judge exercise Original Jurisdiction is empowered to pass an order of injunction restraining a party from prosecuting a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. 19. It was contended that because of the provision of Section 41 of the Small Causes Court Act and the Rent Act so far as the Original Side of the Court is concerned the Small Causes Court is a Court of coordinate jurisdiction. The submission is without any substance. Section 41 of the Small Causes Court Act and the Rent Act confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court to try suits between a landlord and tenant etc. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court to try such suits in its original civil jurisdiction is ousted. Hence, it can not be said that in so far as suit between a landlord and tenant etc. are concerned, the two courts have coordinate jurisdiction. In order to say that the two courts are courts of coordinate jurisdiction, both the courts must possess identical jurisdiction. Hence, it can not be said that in so far as suit between a landlord and tenant etc. are concerned, the two courts have coordinate jurisdiction. In order to say that the two courts are courts of coordinate jurisdiction, both the courts must possess identical jurisdiction. It is further to be seen that under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act the court restrains a party from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a subordinate court. It does not withdraw the proceeding which may be pending in a subordinate court to itself for trial. Therefore, while considering the provision of Section 41(b) the question whether the Court which grants the injunction has power to try the suit in relation to which injunction is granted is not relevant. 20. To conclude, therefore, we hold that with reference to the provisions of Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act the Small Causes Court constituted under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act is subordinate to the Bombay High Court on its Original side. 21. As the question referred to us for decision has been answered, the papers be placed before the appropriate court for decision of the Appeals.

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