ORAL JUDGMENT D.G. Karnik, J. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20th July, 2002 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Mapusa (for short "the Tribunal"), awarding compensation of Rs. 55,000/- on account of death of Mast. Suraj, the son of the Appellants. By this appeal, the Appellants claim enhancement of the compensation. 2. Master Suraj, (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") was the elder son of the Appellants, born on 12th January, 1986 and at the relevant time was studying in Lourdes Convent High School at Saligao, Bardez, Goa. On 5th September, 1997 at about 12.45 hours, he was proceeding on a bicycle from his residence at Salmona Aradim to a shop near Padmanabh building. At that time a bus bearing registration No. GA-O1-T-2329 belonging to the Respondent No. 2. which was being driven by the Respondent No. 1, came from opposite direction and knocked down the deceased. The rear wheel of the bus ran over the body of the deceased who succumbed to the injuries and died due to hemorrhage and shock. The Appellants who are the parents of the deceased filed a Claim Petition before the Tribunal claiming compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/-. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not appear and did not file any written statement. Respondent No.3-Insurance Company however, appeared and contested the claim. 3. Before the Tribunal, the Appellants examined five witnesses. The father of the deceased was examined as witness No. 1. pancha witness was examined as witness No. 2, one eye witness was examined as witness No. 3, informant was examined as witness No. 4 and Investigating Officer was examined as witness No. 5. After considering the evidence of the witnesses and in particular the eye witness, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the accident was caused solely on account of rash and negligent driving of the Respondent No. 1. The Tribunal then considered the claim of compensation and found that the claim of Rs. 4,00,000/- was excessive and exorbitant and reduced the claim to Rs. 55,000/-. Aggrieved by the reduction in the claim, the Appellants are in appeal. 4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.3-Insurance Company did not advance any argument on the question of negligence. The Tribunal then considered the claim of compensation and found that the claim of Rs. 4,00,000/- was excessive and exorbitant and reduced the claim to Rs. 55,000/-. Aggrieved by the reduction in the claim, the Appellants are in appeal. 4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.3-Insurance Company did not advance any argument on the question of negligence. The findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal that the accident was caused solely on account of the rash and negligent driving of the Respondent No. 1 which resulted into death of the deceased is therefore confirmed. 5. On the question of compensation, the learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was too low. With regard to the computation of compensation in case of a death of minor child the learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 , (2) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and others, (2006) 13 SCC 60, (3) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and others, (2007) 11 SCC 512 . 6. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 3 submitted that the Tribunal has applied the correct principles for determination of compensation in case of death of a minor child. He submitted that the amount of compensation of Rs. 55,000/- awarded by the Tribunal was just and adequate. In support, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and others, (2007) 11 SCC 120 . The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 further submitted that the rate of interest on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal at 12% per annum was excessive and, the interest ought not to have been awarded at more than 6% per annum. He submitted that under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the interest pendente lite as well as the interest subsequent to the award was in the discretion of the Court and should not have been granted in excess of 6% per annum. 7. The decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 is the leading decision in relation to the amount of compensation payable in respect of the death of a minor. 7. The decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 is the leading decision in relation to the amount of compensation payable in respect of the death of a minor. That has been referred to and applied in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and others (supra), Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and others (supra), as also in the case of Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and others (supra). It would, therefore, be appropriate to refer to the said decision. In that case, a fire broke out while Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) was celebrating 150th birth anniversary of its founder Sir Jamshedji Tata. In that fire 60 people including 26 children died. The parents of some of the deceased children felt that the State was protecting the officers of TISCO who were guilty of negligence and filed a Writ Petition for ordering prosecution of the officers as also direction for the payment of appropriate compensation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 15th December, 1993 came to the conclusion that the question of grant of compensation should be looked into by a person having expertise and requested Shri Y.V. Chandrachud, the former Chief Justice of India to look into the matter and determine the compensation payable to the injured persons. Shri Y.V. Chandrachud, submitted his report consisting of two parts to the Court. Part I dealt with the cases of death and part II dealt with the cases of burn injuries. So far as the award of compensation in cases of deceased children was concerned, Shri Y.V. Chandrachud divided them into two groups, first group consisting of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years and the second group consisting of children between the age group of 10 to 15 years. In the case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, the report suggested payment by way of compensation a uniform sum of Rs. 50,000/- to which the conventional figure of Rs. 25,000/- was added making a total compensation of Rs. 75,000/- So far as children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, the report suggested payment of compensation of Rs. 1,32,000/- to which a conventional amount of Rs. 50,000/- to which the conventional figure of Rs. 25,000/- was added making a total compensation of Rs. 75,000/- So far as children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, the report suggested payment of compensation of Rs. 1,32,000/- to which a conventional amount of Rs. 25,000/- was added, making the total compensation of Rs. 1,57,000/-. While doing so, he considered that the child between the age group of 10 to 15 years, could have attributed to the family at Rs. 12,000/- per annum after few years on being employed and applying factor of 11, the compensation was computed at Rs. 1,32,000/- plus conventional amount of Rs. 25,000/-. After considering the report of Shri Chandrachud, the Supreme Court held that in case of death of an infant the fact that the parents may not derive actual benefit during his life time will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will find a valid claim provided the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. Following the decision of House of Lords in the case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jenkins, 1913 AC 1, the Supreme Court awarded the compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years to which it added a conventional figure of Rs. 50,000/- making the total compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/-. So far as children between the age group of 10 to 15 years were concerned, the Supreme Court awarded the compensation of Rs. 3,60,000/- to which a conventional amount of Rs. 50,000/- was added, making the compensation of Rs. 4,10,000/-. It is no doubt true that while awarding the compensation of Rs. 4,10,000/- in case of death of child between the age group of 10 to 15 years, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that TISCO itself had a tradition that one child of every employee would be employed in the company and considering this fact, the Supreme Court held that the parents of the children between the age group of 10 to 15 years had a reasonable expectation that the deceased child would contribute at least Rs. 24,000/- per year to the family for a period of 15 years. 24,000/- per year to the family for a period of 15 years. Albeit on the peculiar circumstances in the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (supra), a little higher compensation was awarded in case of death of a minor child, the Supreme Court unequivocally accepted the principle that even in case of death of a minor child which was not contributing anything to the family, the parents were entitled to a compensation on the basis of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit of the contribution that the child would make to the family in case the child had lived. This principle has been followed in the subsequent cases by the Supreme Court. 8. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and others (supra), the Supreme Court held that in case of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during his life time but this will not necessarily bar the parents claim and prospective loss will find a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. The Supreme Court then awarded the compensation of Rs. 1,80,000/- to the parents of the child who had died on 7th May, 2002 at an young age of nine years. 9. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and others (supra), the Supreme Court observed that there are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendor of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased is a child, earning nothing but has a prospect to earn, the question of assessment of compensation becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are the claimants, relevant factor would be the age of parents. No doubt in that case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court enhancing the compensation from Rs. 51,500/- to Rs. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are the claimants, relevant factor would be the age of parents. No doubt in that case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court enhancing the compensation from Rs. 51,500/- to Rs. 1,52,000/-, but no specific reason appears to have been given how the computation was made. In fact in paragraph 7 itself of the decision, the Supreme Court has stated that the determination amount of compensation involves a good deal of guesswork. 10. In Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and others (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that even in case of death of a minor child who was not earning and not contributing anything to the family, his parents were entitled to a compensation and awarded compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of death of a child of 14 years in an accident which took place on 5th February, 1997. 11. The common thread through the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is that the argument that even in case of the death of a minor child not earning anything and therefore not contributing to the family, the parents are entitled for the compensation. Apart from the traditional compensation for the loss arising out of emotional loss of a dear child, the Supreme Court has also taken into consideration legitimate expectation of the parents that the child on becoming major and at the old age of parents, would support and would contribute to the family. This is very much in consonance with the Indian tradition where the children were looked after and supported not only during their minority and even in the adulate hood for their education, food and residence till they became independent and capable of earning and having their family and the grown up children supporting, caring and looking after aged parents. This is a legitimate expectation of an Indian. The extent of support that the parents would expect or receive from a child would differ from case to case. The support would be normal in case of a child becoming an ordinary adult while the amount of monetary support may be higher where the child is well placed. The family background also plays an important role. The extent of support that the parents would expect or receive from a child would differ from case to case. The support would be normal in case of a child becoming an ordinary adult while the amount of monetary support may be higher where the child is well placed. The family background also plays an important role. The present status of the family could be one of the circumstance to be looked into for considering the future support. Looking to the surrounding circumstance of the present case show that the child came from a well to do family. He was admitted to a convent school and the parents could afford fees which are usually higher in case of convent and English Medium schools than the fees charged by the vernacular schools. The progress report of the deceased child was placed on record which shows B+ grade in studies almost continuously. The mark sheets and grades show that the deceased child was good and certainly better than average in education. He had passed IVth Standard and had secured more than 70% marks in each of the tests in the previous year. The school had certified him to be a good student. Taking this into consideration and also taking an average of the amounts of compensation of Rs. 1,80,000/- awarded in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and others (supra), a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- awarded in the case of Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and others (supra), I am of the view that a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- would be adequate compensation. While arriving at the average, I have not considered the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- only awarded in case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim, as too low and a sum of Rs. 3,60,000/- for awarded in case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, as too high as the compensations in those cases appear to have been awarded on peculiar facts of those cases. In addition, some compensation would have to be added as traditional customary compensation for emotional loss. I consider it appropriate to award a sum of Rs. 35,000/- towards emotional loss which makes the total claim of Rs. 1,75,000/-. 12. In addition, some compensation would have to be added as traditional customary compensation for emotional loss. I consider it appropriate to award a sum of Rs. 35,000/- towards emotional loss which makes the total claim of Rs. 1,75,000/-. 12. As regards the interest on the amount of compensation, Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 says that in any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest. Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 enables the Court to award interest even on the claim for damage. The word "current rate of interest" has been defined in Section 2(b) of the Interest Act, 1978 to mean the highest of the maximum rates at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposits (other than those maintained in savings account or those maintained by charitable or religious institutions) by different classes of scheduled banks in accordance with the directions given or issued to banking companies generally by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The Respondent No. 3 has not brought on record any material to show that 12% interest awarded by the Tribunal was excessive. The interest is usually awarded to compensate the person for the loss or the diminution in the value of rupee that occurs over a period of time. It is common knowledge that the buying power of the rupee has considerably decreased over a period of time. For buying certain a commodity say Rs. 100/- are needed today then buying the same amount of commodity after one year an amount of Rs. 100/- plus X would be required. This additional X amount is commonly called as inflation which is often measured in percentage terms over a period of time. Taking into double digit inflation figure of inflation prevailing currently even as per the official figures announced by the government which often are lower than the actual inflation of consumer price. 100/- plus X would be required. This additional X amount is commonly called as inflation which is often measured in percentage terms over a period of time. Taking into double digit inflation figure of inflation prevailing currently even as per the official figures announced by the government which often are lower than the actual inflation of consumer price. I do not find it appropriate to interfere in the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in awarding interest at the rate of 12% per annum. There is yet another reason for not interfering in the rate of interest is that no counter Appeal has been filed by the Respondent No. 3. In the absence of any counter Appeal or the cross objections also, I am not inclined to interfere in the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal. 13. For these reasons, the Appeal is partly allowed. The amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced to Rs. 1,75,000/-. The Respondent No. 3 shall also be liable to pay interest on this amount from the date of the Claim Petition (i.e. from 7th November, 1997) up to the date of the payment. The Respondent No. 3 is entitled to credit for the amount, if any, already paid which shall first be appropriated towards interest upto the date of payment and the balance; if any, towards the principal.