Judgment : N. Kumar, J. The petitioners herein have preferred these writ petitions challenging the order passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal quashing condition No.2 imposed in the order of appointment issued to the respondents stating that they are juniors to the 1998 batch recruitees and directing that the respondents will be treated as seniors to the 1998 batch recruitees. 2. The petitioners were selected as Group-A Officers (Assistant Commissioners), whereas in the other writ petitions, the petitioners were selected as Group-B Officers (Tahsildars). The Government of Karnataka by their letters dated 03.11.1997 and 04.02.1998 requested the Karnataka Public Service Commission (KPSC) to make recruitment for 103 Group ‘A’ posts and 300 Group ‘B’ posts in accordance with the Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment made by Competitive Examination) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as `the Rules’). On receipt of such request the KPSC advertised the vacancies vide notification dated 09.03.1998 inviting applications from eligible candidates. The KPSC after completing the selection process, published a provisional select list of 403 candidates on 28.09.2001. After publication of the said list, one Linganna Kuchabal and others filed applications before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal in Application Nos.7901 to 7909/2001 alleging certain irregularities in the valuation of answer scripts and praying for a direction to the KPSC to revalue the answer scripts. The Tribunal disposed of the said applications by their order dated 06.02.2002 directing the KPSC to revalue all the answer scripts and to publish a revised select list. Against the said decision of the Tribunal, the KPSC filed Writ Petition Nos.12548 to 12589/2002 before this Court and this Court by order dated 11.10.2002 and 04.07.2003 directed the KPSC to conduct a random review of the answer scripts examiner-wise in respect of 19 optional subjects and one general studies and to complete re-valuation before 15.08.2003 and publish the select list by November 2003. The order of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court by one K.Channegowda and others in Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No. 11589 to 11639/2003. The Special Leave Petition came to be dismissed on 06.10.2005 upholding the order of the High Court. Thereafter, KPSC completed the selection process and published the select list on 28.02.2006 and forwarded the same to the Government for issue of appointment orders. 3. The Special Leave Petition came to be dismissed on 06.10.2005 upholding the order of the High Court. Thereafter, KPSC completed the selection process and published the select list on 28.02.2006 and forwarded the same to the Government for issue of appointment orders. 3. In the meanwhile, the Government also requested the KPSC by letter dated 16.11.1999 for making recruitment to 63 Group ‘A’ posts and 128 Group ‘B’ posts in accordance with the Rules. Accordingly, the KPSC issued a notification dated 15.12.1999 inviting applications for several Group-A posts in the Karnataka Civil Services including 20 posts of Assistant Commissioners (Group-A), 40 posts of Tahsildars (Group-B) and one post of Assistant Director of Agricultural Marketing (Group-B). Preliminary examinations were conducted from 27.02.2002 to 26.08.2002. The results of the main examination were published on 28.02.2004. One Maltesh Guttan and others filed applications before the Tribunal praying for a direction to the KPSC to revalue certain answer scripts. The Tribunal by an order dated 29.11.2005 directed the KPSC to continue and complete the process of selection and publish select list subject to final orders of the Tribunal. The KPSC completed the selection process and published the select list on 28.11.2005, inter alia, selecting 20 candidates for the post of Assistant Commissioners in the Karnataka Administrative Service (Junior scale), 40 candidates for the posts of Tahsildars and one candidate for the post of Assistant Director of Agricultural Marketing and forwarded the select list to the Government. 4. The Government issued notifications dated 25.01.2006, 01.02.2006 and 10.02.2006 appointing the persons selected in pursuance to the 1999 notification in terms of the select list dated 28.11.2005. In the order of appointment issued to them in paragraph-2 it is stated that, the Government had intimated the KPSC by its letters dated 03.11.1997 and 04.12.1998 that all the vacancies existing up to the year 1997 are to be filed up. In pursuance of which KPSC issued a notification on 09.03.1998 and after completing the selection process a select list of candidates is published. The said list is under litigation before the Tribunal, High Court of Karnataka and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The candidates belonging to 1998 batch were not responsible for the delay and hence they should not be made junior to the appointees of 1999 batch. The 1999 batch appointees should be considered as juniors to the 1998 batch candidates. The said list is under litigation before the Tribunal, High Court of Karnataka and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The candidates belonging to 1998 batch were not responsible for the delay and hence they should not be made junior to the appointees of 1999 batch. The 1999 batch appointees should be considered as juniors to the 1998 batch candidates. Hence it was stated that the candidates belonging to 1999 batch would be treated as juniors to the candidates belonging to the 1998 batch. 5. Aggrieved by the said paragraph-2 of the appointment order, the respondents made a representation to the Government to delete the said condition. As they received no response, they filed an application before the Administrative Tribunal seeking for deletion of the said condition in their appointment order. The persons appointed in pursuance of the 1998 list who are treated as their seniors were all made respondents in those applications. 6. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal after hearing both the parties, after taking note of the statutory provisions and the various judgments relied on by both the parties, came to the conclusion that condition No.2 imposed in the order of appointment issued to the respondents to the effect that they would be juniors to the 1998 batch recruits is opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution of India and came to the conclusion that it is liable to be quashed. According to the Tribunal, the said condition is arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable and it shocks its conscience and therefore as the said condition is opposed to public policy, mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, they adjudged the said condition as void. Consequently, condition No.2 was quashed. The respondents were treated as seniors to the 1998 batch recruits. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, these petitioners who are candidates selected in the 1998 batch have preferred these writ petitions. 7. Sri N. B. Bhat, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners before us contended that when a notification was issued to fill up 403 vacancies and a competitive examination was conducted and the persons who were selected in the said examination could not be given appointment, because of the pending litigation, no fault could be placed at their doors. 7. Sri N. B. Bhat, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners before us contended that when a notification was issued to fill up 403 vacancies and a competitive examination was conducted and the persons who were selected in the said examination could not be given appointment, because of the pending litigation, no fault could be placed at their doors. In those circumstances, notification issued to fill up the vacancies which arose after filling up the aforesaid 403 vacancies, merely because the appointment order was issued to those persons in the said list earlier to the persons whose names find place in the earlier list cannot become seniors. In those circumstances, the appointing authority, the Government had the power to protect the interest of persons selected in pursuance of the earlier notification and therefore they had imposed condition No.2 which is just, reasonable, not arbitrary as held by the Tribunal. In the case of the inter se seniority among the Officers selected under a particular list, it is the date of their appointment and the length of service which would be crucial in deciding their seniority. When persons are selected on the basis of a competitive examination, more meritorious could be senior to the less meritorious. Even in the case of recruitment by selection, merit is the only criterion to decide the seniority. But all these principles have no application to a case where seniority has to be fixed between the persons selected under two different select list in pursuance of two different notifications and therefore he submits the order passed by the Tribunal is illegal and requires to be interfered with. 8. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that these notifications are issued to fill up a particular number of vacancies. 8. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that these notifications are issued to fill up a particular number of vacancies. Candidates who are appointed to vacancies as per the notification cannot become juniors to the vacancies which arose subsequently and therefore for the purpose of deciding the seniority between the persons mentioned in the two select list which is prepared in pursuance of two notifications, the persons whose names find a place in the list in pursuance of the earlier notification should be construed as seniors to the persons whose name find a place in the list in pursuance of a subsequent notification and therefore, he submits that viewed from any angle, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and requires to be set aside and condition No.2 which is imposed is reasonable. It is to be restored. It was further contended that the respondents after receiving the appointment order joined duty without any protest. It is thereafter they have chosen to challenge the order. As they did not challenge the said condition before joining the duty, they have acquiesced and therefore they are estopped from challenging the said appointment order. The learned Counsel appearing for the other petitioners adopted the aforesaid argument. 9. Per contra, Sri P. S. Rajagopal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that it is settled law that not one can claim a right of appointment merely because his name finds a place in the selection list. It is only after a person is appointed and joins duty, he gets a right and for the purpose of seniority it is the date of entry into that particular cadre and the length of service which is the criteria for deciding the seniority. Even though the petitioners in this case were selected in pursuance of an earlier notification, it is the respondents who were appointed at the earlier point of time and therefore, persons who joined duty earlier would be senior to persons who joined duty later. That is precisely what the Tribunal has held and therefore the order of the Tribunal do not call for any interference. He further contended that within 15 days from the date of joining duty, under the service conditions they were expected to raise voice by making a representation which they have done. That is precisely what the Tribunal has held and therefore the order of the Tribunal do not call for any interference. He further contended that within 15 days from the date of joining duty, under the service conditions they were expected to raise voice by making a representation which they have done. When their request was not considered by the authorities, they had no option except to approach the Tribunal and they have done it at the earliest point of time. In the facts and circumstances of this case there is no acquiescence or estoppel as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In support of their respective contentions, both the learned Counsel have relied on the various judgments of the Apex Court. 10. In the light of the above facts and rival contentions, the point that arises for our consideration in these batch of writ petitions is as under: Whether the persons recruited under earlier notification in respect of specific vacancy would lose their seniority to persons, who are selected under subsequent notification, merely because they were appointed earlier in point of time? 11. The facts are not in dispute. The recruitment process was initiated to recruit 103 group A’ post and 300 group ‘B’ posts. On 9.3.1998, notification was issued for recruitment. After completing the selection process, a provisional list of 403 candidates was published. On 28.9.2001 the said list was challenged by the persons, who were not selected. An order of revaluation came to be made, which order was upheld by the Apex Court. After revaluation, a revised selected list was published on 28.2.2006. In terms of the said list, the appointment orders were issued on 6.4.2006, 15.4.2006 and 2.6.2006. 12. Subsequent to initiation of the recruitment process to recruit 403 vacancies further vacancy arose. One more notification was published on 15.12.1999 to fill up the subsequent vacancies. KPSC conducted the examination. The list of persons, who passed in the written examination, who were further found eligible to attend to the personality test, was announced by way of notification dated 28.2.2004. Some of the applicants, who did not find their names in the list, moved the Tribunal challenging the said list and they wanted revaluation of their answer script. In the said process, an interim order came to be passed. After service of notice, the KPSC and others appeared and sought for vacating the interim order. Some of the applicants, who did not find their names in the list, moved the Tribunal challenging the said list and they wanted revaluation of their answer script. In the said process, an interim order came to be passed. After service of notice, the KPSC and others appeared and sought for vacating the interim order. Considering the said request, the Tribunal by its order dated 29.11.2005, modified the interim order of stay and allowed the KPSC to go ahead with the selection process, but they made it clear that the said selection shall be subject to final order. It is submitted that the said applications in Application Nos.3389-3411/2004 and another connected are still pending consideration before the Tribunal. After the interim order, the selection process was completed and final selection list was published on 28.11.2005. In pursuance to the final selection list, the appointment orders were issued on 25.1.2006 and 1.2.2006. 13. From the aforesaid undisputed facts, it is clear that the persons, who were selected in pursuance to the subsequent notification dated 15.12.1999, were appointed first and the persons, who were selected in pursuance to the earlier notification published in the year 1998, were appointed later. The selection list in pursuance to the notification dated 15.12.1999 was dated 28.11.2005 whereas the date of selection list in pursuance to the earlier notification dated 09.03.1988 was dated 28.2.2006. The Government while issuing the order of appointment to the persons selected in pursuance to the notification dated 15.12.1999 as per the selection list dated 28.11.2005 introduced in the appointment order Clause(2) to the following effect which reads as under: KANNADA 14. After setting out the selection process initiated to recruit 403 posts in pursuance to the notification dated 9.3.1998 and the litigation relating thereto and the fact that the final selection list in pursuance to the said notification is not yet finalised and no appointment order is yet issued, in order to protect the interest of those persons selected in pursuance to the earlier notification, they made it clear that though the appointment orders are issued to the persons selected under the selection list dated 28.11.2005 in pursuance to the notification dated 15.12.1999 earlier, they would be juniors to the persons to be appointed in pursuance to the notification dated 9.3.1998. It is that Clause in the appointment order which was challenged before the Tribunal by the persons selected in pursuance to the notification dated 15.12.1999 after joining duty. The contention was that in the Rule governing the selection, there is no statutory provision, which provides that the persons, who are not yet selected and appointed could be treated a seniors and therefore the said condition imposed in the appointment order is one without jurisdiction. 15. It is in this background, it is necessary to look into the statutory provisions governing the appointment as well as seniority and the decisions of the Apex Court. RULES GOVERNING SENIORITY 16. The Karnataka Government Servants’ (Seniority) Rules, 1957 provides for determination of seniority of a person in a particular cadre of service or class of post. Rule 2(a) reads as under: “2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained the seniority of a person in a particular cadre of service or class of post shall be determined as follows: (a) Officers appointed substantively in clear vacancies shall be senior to all persons appointed on officiating or any other basis in the same cadre of service or class of post; (b) The seniority inter-se of officers, who are confirmed shall be determined according to dates of confirmation, but where the date of confirmation of any two officers is the same, their relative seniority will be determined by their seniority inter-se while officiating in the same post and if not, by their seniority inter-se in the lower grade”. Rule 5(1) of the aforesaid reads as under:- The decision regarding the seniority of direct recruits to a service or to a class of post shall be made by the appointing authority at the time of their first appointment in one of the modes mentioned below: (a) when the recruitment is made on the result of a competitive examination, the order of seniority will be in the order of merit, or (b) when the recruitment is made by selection, the order of seniority will be determined by the order in which the candidates are arranged in order of merit by the appointing authority in consultation with the Public Service Commission or other authority making the selection. (c) when successful completion of a course of training is prescribed for recruitment to any post, the seniority of those recruited after such training shall be determined on the basis of the order of merit. (i) at the examination held at the end of such training or (ii) at the selection for such training when an examination is not held. The decision once shall be final and shall not be open to revision. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) the seniority of a candidate who assumes charge of a post after the period specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 12-A of the Karnataka State Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957, shall be determined as from the date on which he assumed charge of such post. 17. The Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment By Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 defines what is meant by available vacancies under Rules 2 (1), which reads as under: In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires- (i) Available Vacancies means the vacancies determined by the Government in accordance with the rules of recruitment applicable in respect of each service/cadre specified in Schedule I or the purpose of recruitment under these rules; It is the KPSC holds competitive examination to fill up those vacancies and decide eligibility of candidates and thereafter prepares list of candidates suitably for appointment. The list prepared under sub-Rule 2 of Rule 11 of the said Rules shall be prepared by the Commission in the Official Gazette and the copies thereof shall be forwarded to.- (i) the Government together with the marks secured by each of the candidates in the written examination and personality test; and (ii) each candidate whose name is included in such list. (3) Candidates whose names are included in the list prepared in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall be considered for appointment to the vacancies notified in each of the services and groups of posts in the order in which their names appear in the list: Rule 12 declares that inclusion of a candidate’s name in the list by itself confers no right for appointment. 18. All these statutory provisions do not deal with the case of inter-se seniority of the persons recruited directly, under two notifications against the vacancies notified, to fill up the specific notified vacancies. 18. All these statutory provisions do not deal with the case of inter-se seniority of the persons recruited directly, under two notifications against the vacancies notified, to fill up the specific notified vacancies. In this context, it is necessary to notice the law declared by the Apex Court in the matter of inter-se seniority. DECISIONS 19. In the case of D K MITRA & ORS. – VS- UNION OF INDIA & ORS. REPORTED IN 1985 (SUPP) SCC 243 dealing with the case of promotees as well as direct recruitee when the names of direct recruitee did not find a place in the seniority list, they challenged the said seniority list. In that context, it was held as under at para 31: “In our opinion, the directly recruited Divisional Medical Officers are entitled to seniority only from the date of their entry into service and not from any anterior date, and therefore cannot enjoy a seniority above the petitioners. The date of appointment to a permanent vacancy, whether of a promotee or a direct recruit, will be date for determining the seniority of the officer. We may also observe that there is no ground for detaining the confirmation of the petitioners merely because the quota reserved for direct recruitment has not been filled.” 20. The Apex Court in the case of PRAFULLA KUMAR SWAIN –VS- PRAKASH CHANDRA MISRA AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 1993 SUPP (3) SCC 181 while dealing with the case of a direct recruitee, who was appointed as Assistant Conservator of Forests, after completion of training of two years, who challenged the seniority of the Forest Rangers, who were members of Orissa Subordinate Forest Service and were promoted as Assistant Conservators of Forests between his recruitment and the joining of service after training, who were promoted in the years 1981 and 1982 ought to have been assigned a place below him as per recruitment rules. In that context, the Supreme Court held as under: “29. At this stage, we will proceed to decide as to the meaning and effect of the words “recruitment” and “appointment”. The term “recruitment” connotes and clearly signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment. Certainly, this is not actual appointment or posting in service. In contradistinction the words “appointment” means an actual act of posting a person to a particular office. 30. Recruitment is just an initial process. The term “recruitment” connotes and clearly signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment. Certainly, this is not actual appointment or posting in service. In contradistinction the words “appointment” means an actual act of posting a person to a particular office. 30. Recruitment is just an initial process. That may lead to eventual appointment in the service. But, that cannot tantamount to an appointment. No doubt, Rule 5 talks of recruitment to Class II Service. We consider these are two sources of recruitment. Nowhere in the Recruitment Rules of 1959 it is specified that the services of a direct recruit under the Government shall be reckoned from the date of selection in the competitive examination. On the contrary, Regulation 12 (c) is very clear that the period of training is not to be reckoned as Government service. It is admitted before us that after the successful completion of training when the appointment order is issued the direct recruits are put on probation. Similar is in the case of the promotees. Both of them undergo probation. Therefore, in the light of these provisions it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the direct recruits that their seniority must be reckoned from the date of their recruitment.” 21. The Apex Court in the case of BHEY RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS –VS. HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 1994 SUPP (1) SCC 276 dealing with the seniority between the persons recruited under two advertisements held at para – 4 as under: “4…..It is well known that while determining the seniority of an officer, the date of his appointment is a more important factor than the date of his joining. In many compelling circumstances like accident, the distance at which a particular candidate resides and the time taken by him to join, cannot be ignored. So far the present case is concerned, respondents 6, 16, 17 and 28 were not only appointed before the appellants but they joined also before April 18. 1969 and date of the appointment of the appellants. The national seniority to the appellants with effect from January 1, 1969 shall not affect the seniority of respondents 6,16, 17 and 28. 5. This Court has examined the question of fixation of seniority inter-se between officers appointed from different sources i.e by promotion and by process of direct recruitment. 1969 and date of the appointment of the appellants. The national seniority to the appellants with effect from January 1, 1969 shall not affect the seniority of respondents 6,16, 17 and 28. 5. This Court has examined the question of fixation of seniority inter-se between officers appointed from different sources i.e by promotion and by process of direct recruitment. It is almost settled that while determining inter-se seniority amongst officers recruited from different sources or between officers appointed by the same process at different times, the date of entering in the service is relevant. A person who enters in the service first shall rank senior unless there is some rule providing otherwise which can be held to be consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.” 22. In the case of SURENDRA NARAIN SINGH vs. STATE OF BIHAR REPORTED IN 1998(5) SCC 246 dealing with the candidates recruited against the earlier vacancies, recruitment by two modes proceeded side by side and candidates recruited by earlier vacancies were held to rank senior to those recruited by later vacancies. In that context it was held as under: 21. These 33 vacant posts were meant for the candidates who appeared for 15th examination under 1955 rules. These 33 vacancies were never carried forward when fresh advertisement was issued on 14/10/1974 for appointment of 152 Munsifs under the 1974 Rules. The 152 posts were created first time under the 1974 Rules because of amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code whereby the judicial powers of the Executive Magistrate came to be withdrawn and in order to cope with the additional work, these additional 152 posts were specially created under the 1974 rules. If this be so, the 33 vacancies of 15th Examination under the 1955 Rules continued to remain vacant until they were filled in by the supplementary list nominating respondents 3 to 34 by the BPSC. It is, therefore, in these circumstances it must follow that these 33 vacancies of 15th examination under the 1955 Rules continued to exist not only on 23.05.1975 but also on the date when respondents 3 to 34 came to be appointed. It is, therefore, in these circumstances it must follow that these 33 vacancies of 15th examination under the 1955 Rules continued to exist not only on 23.05.1975 but also on the date when respondents 3 to 34 came to be appointed. The appellants in Civil appeals Nos.1381-84 of 1991, therefore, cannot claim that they were appointed in 33 vacancies of the 15th examination under the 1955 rules when the advertisements did not include these 33 vacancies but on the contrary 152 new posts were created under the 1974 rules for which these appellants appeared, got selected and appointed. This in our considered view is the true interpretation of the above-quoted order of this court. It must, therefore, follow that the seniority given to respondents 3 to 34 over the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 138184 of 1991 cannot be said to be contrary to the above-quoted order of this court. 24 For the foregoing conclusions, we are of the view that respondents 3 to 34 who were appointed to the vacancies of 15th examination under the 1955 rules will have to be given seniority over the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.1381-84 of 1991, although they came to be appointed later than 23.05.1975 but against 33 vacancies which were then existing to which these appellants had not right”. 23. The Apex Court in the case of SURAJ PRAKASH GUPTA AND OTHERS – VS. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 2000 SC 2386 = 2000 (7) SCC 561 held at para 78 under: “78. We have next to refer to one other contention raised by the respondent direct recruits. They claimed that the direct recruitment appointment can be ante-dated from the date of occurrence of a vacancy in the direct recruitment quota, even if on that date the said person was not directly recruited. It was submitting that if the promotees occupied the quota belonging to direct recruits they had to be pushed down, whenever direct recruitment was made. Once they were so pushed down, even if the direct recruit came later, he should be put in the direct recruit slot from the date on which such a slot was available under direct recruitment quota. 79. This contention, in our view, cannot be accepted. Once they were so pushed down, even if the direct recruit came later, he should be put in the direct recruit slot from the date on which such a slot was available under direct recruitment quota. 79. This contention, in our view, cannot be accepted. The reason as to why this argument is wrong is that in service jurisprudence, a direct recruit can claim seniority only from the date of his regular appointment. He cannot claim seniority from a date when he was not born in the service. This principle is well settled in N K Chauhan v. State of Gujarat. (1977) 1 SCC 308 (at p.321) Krishna Iyer. J stated: “later direct recruit cannot claim deemed dates of appointment for seniority with effect from the time when direct recruitment vacancy arose. Seniority will depend upon length of service.” Again. In A. Janardhana v. Union of India (1983) 2 SCR 936 , it was held that a later direct recruit cannot claim seniority from a date before his birth in the service or when he was in school or college. Similarly it was pointed out in A N Pathak v. Secretary to the Government, 1987 Suppl. SCC 763 (at p.767) that slots cannot be kept reserved for the direct recruits for retrospective appointments.” 24. The Apex Court in the case of BALWANT SINGH NARWAL VS STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 2008 (7) SCC 728 , dealing with a case of persons who are appointed in pursuance of a select list at two different point of time held that after noticing the law laid down by Apex Court earlier they held the general proposition that their selection by Public Service Commission is merely recommendatory and it is not simply automatic appointment and that the appointing authorities should not give notional seniority without valid reasons from a retrospective date, which would affect the seniority of those who already entered service. Further they held in para 9 relying on Surendra Narain Singh Vs State of Bihar. “Candidates who were selected against earlier vacancies but who could not be appointed along with others of the same batch due to certain technical difficulties, when appointed subsequently will have to placed above those who were appointed against subsequent vacancies.” 25. Further they held in para 9 relying on Surendra Narain Singh Vs State of Bihar. “Candidates who were selected against earlier vacancies but who could not be appointed along with others of the same batch due to certain technical difficulties, when appointed subsequently will have to placed above those who were appointed against subsequent vacancies.” 25. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS RAFIQUDDIN AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 1987 SUPPLEMENT CASES SCC 401 = AIR 1988 SC 162 interpreting Rule 22 of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1951 which provided for determination of seniority of members in service on the basis of the year of competitive examination and not otherwise held that those persons who are appointed in accordance with the rules on the result of competitive examination are entitled to re-determination of seniority in accordance with Rule 22. Seniority of a candidate appointed to the service would depend upon the result of competitive examination and in the list prepared under rule 19. Claim to seniority under Rule 22 cannot be held upheld if candidate is not approved for appointment under rule 19 and not found his way to his service on recommendation of the commission. Therefore held claim to seniority on the basis of the year of competitive examination as contemplated by rule 22 is available only to those candidates who are approved by the commission on the basis of their marks in the written and viva voce tests at the examination. 26. From the aforesaid judgments, the law is clearly well settled in so far as deciding the inter-se seniority between direct recruitees and promotees. In so far as inter-se seniority between direct recruitees, normally there would not be any conflict, as persons who are directly recruited first would be seniors to persons who are directly recruited subsequently. The instant case in an exception. Therefore, broadly, these disputes could be placed under three heads. (a) Seniority between direct recruitees and promotees. (b) Seniority between direct recruitees in respect of posts for which two notifications have been issued. (c) Seniority inter-se between direct recruitees, recruited for specific post, by two independent notifications. (a) SENIORITY BETWEEN DIRECT RECRUITEES AND PROMOTEES. 27. Recruitment is just aninitial process that may lead to eventual appointment in the service. But that cannot tantamount to an appointment. (b) Seniority between direct recruitees in respect of posts for which two notifications have been issued. (c) Seniority inter-se between direct recruitees, recruited for specific post, by two independent notifications. (a) SENIORITY BETWEEN DIRECT RECRUITEES AND PROMOTEES. 27. Recruitment is just aninitial process that may lead to eventual appointment in the service. But that cannot tantamount to an appointment. It is well known that while determining the seniority of an officer, the date of his appointment is a very important factor to be taken into consideration. The date of appointment to a permanent vacancy, whether of a promotee or a direct recruitee, will be the date, for determing the seniority. A direct recruitee can claim seniority only from the date of his regular appointment. He cannot claim seniority with effect from the time when direct recruitment vacancy arose. He cannot claim seniority from the date when he was not born in the service. The seniority will depend upon the length of service. The slots cannot be kept reserved for the direct recruitees for retrospective appointment. A person who enters the service first shall rank senior, unless there is some rule providing otherwise, which is held to be consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Later direct recruitees cannot claim deemed date of appointment for seniority with effect from the time when direct recruitment vacancy arose. Seniority must be reckoned from the date of appointment to the said vacancy. Therefore, any dispute regarding the seniority between a direct recruitee and a promotee, the question to be considered is not when the vacancy arose, when the notification is issued, when the recruitment process began and when it ended. The test is, when the direct recruitee is appointed to the vacant post. If there is any delay in the direct recruitment process and in the mean while, promotions are given, promotees are appointed to the said vacant post, and it is thereafter direct recruitment takes place and are appointed, as promotees have already entered the said cadre putting a length of service from those that of a direct recruitee, they would be senior to the direct recruitees. When vacancies arise, the rules prescribe the percentage of vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment and promotion. No post is specifically ear-marked either for direct recruitment or for promotion. Those posts are intermingled. When vacancies arise, the rules prescribe the percentage of vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment and promotion. No post is specifically ear-marked either for direct recruitment or for promotion. Those posts are intermingled. It is only the percentage of posts which have to be filled up according to the rules, between the direct recruitment and promotion. If promotees are appointed first and thereafter the direct recruitees are appointed, for determining the seniority, the date of entry into the said cadre by the promotees and direct recruitees alone is to be taken into consideration. Who ever is appointed earlier, would be senior to the person who is appointed later. This is the settled legal position as declared by the Apex Court in the context of seniority between the direct recruitee vis-à-vis the promotees. (b) SENIORITY BETWEEN THE DIRECT RECRUITEES IN RESPECTS OF POSTS FOR WHICH TWO NOTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED. 28. Seniority between direct recruitees appointed under two notifications in respect of a particular number of vacancies, also fall in the same category. It is possible that in order to recruit persons to a particular number of vacancies by direct recruitment, when the vacancies to be filled up are not specific and distinct, instead of initiating recruitment proceedings in respect of all the vacancies at once, recruitment process may be initiated in instalments for various administrative reasons. Therefore a notification may be issued to fill up a particular number of vacancies out of total number of vacancies which exist on the date of notification. Subsequently, one more notification could be issued to fill up the remaining vacancies. In such an event, if the recruitment process initiated under the second notification is completed earlier and appointment orders are issued and persons are appointed, their seniority is to be counted from the date of their appointment, vis-à-vis persons appointed under the earlier notification. The persons appointed under the earlier notification in point of time, cannot claim any seniority over the persons appointed under the subsequent notification, who were appointed earlier to them. The reason is the said notifications are not issued to fill up any specified vacancies, and all the posts were vacant on the date of first notification. This is the principle which is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of BHEY RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS VS. HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS. The reason is the said notifications are not issued to fill up any specified vacancies, and all the posts were vacant on the date of first notification. This is the principle which is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of BHEY RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS VS. HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS. (c) SENIORITY INTER-SE BETWEEN DIRECT RECRUITEES RECRUITED FOR SPECIFIC POSTS BY TWO INDEPENDENT NOTIFICATIONS: 29. When the recruitment process is initiated to fill up specific vacancies, the persons are appointed after the recruitment process is complete, to those specific vacancies. When the recruitment process is initiated to fill up those specific vacancies, those vacancies can be filled up only out of the persons who are selected in the said recruitment process, which is initiated in pursuance of the notification. It is immaterial when they are appointed. Whenever they are appointed against those specific vacancies. Only after filling up the said vacancies, if vacancies arise, subsequent notification is to be issued for recruitment to the said subsequent vacancies. It is only on the assumption that the earlier vacancies are filled up by the recruitment process which is undertaken, the subsequent vacancies could be taken into consideration, for issue of notification, to recruit persons to the said subsequent posts. Persons who are recruited as against specific vacancies which arose subsequent to the earlier specific vacancies cannot be appointed against earlier specific vacancies for which recruitment process has commenced, but appointments are not yet made, on the ground those vacancies still remain unfilled or vacant. It is because, persons who were appointed to the subsequent vacancies cannot be appointed to the earlier specific vacancies as they are not recruited against those vacancies/posts. They did not file their application to the said posts. They were not selected in the recruitment process to fill up those vacant posts. Therefore, persons appointed against those subsequent vacant posts would necessarily have to be junior to the persons who are recruited to the earlier specific vacancies. Merely because the recruitment process for the subsequent vacancies was completed earlier in point of time and those selected were appointed at earlier point of time, they would not become seniors vis-à-vis the persons to be appointed as against earlier specific vacancies. FACTS OF THE CASE 30. In the State administration 403 vacancies arose as at the end of 1997. Merely because the recruitment process for the subsequent vacancies was completed earlier in point of time and those selected were appointed at earlier point of time, they would not become seniors vis-à-vis the persons to be appointed as against earlier specific vacancies. FACTS OF THE CASE 30. In the State administration 403 vacancies arose as at the end of 1997. It is to fill up these vacancies the first notification was issued. After the initiation of the recruitment process, subsequently 191 vacancies arose. It is to fill up those subsequent 191 vacancies the second notification came to be issued, and accordingly the recruitment process was also set in motion. These two notifications were issued to fill up specific vacancies. It cannot be disputed the persons appointed against these 403 vacancies will be senior to persons appointed against 191 vacancies in the normal course. 31. When notification was issued to fill up 403 vacancies, these 191 vacancies were not in existence at all. Till the recruitment process was initiated, to fill up these 403 vacancies, no recruitment process could have been initiated in respect of 191 vacancies. The basis for initiation of recruitment process in respect of these 191 vacancies is that, the recruitment to 403 vacancies would be completed and subsequent to such appointment, 191 vacancies arose subsequently and to recruit to such subsequent vacancies the subsequent notification was issued. The persons appointed in pursuance of the subsequent notification issued, cannot be appointed in place of 403 vacancies on the ground no appointment is yet made and it remains vacant. After issue of notification applications were received, examination was conducted according to rules. The draft select list was prepared and published on 28.09.2001 in pursuance of the first notification. Whereas the draft select list in respect of the second notification was prepared on 28.02.2004 and final list was prepared on 28.11.2005. If in pursuance of the draft select list dated 28.09.2001 if appointment orders had been issued and 403 vacancies had been filled up, in the normal course certainly they would be seniors to the persons whose name found place in the select list dated 28.02.2004. But unfortunately the select list dated 28.09.2001 came to be challenged before the Tribunal, the High Court and the Apex Court and the said list was set aside. The KPSC was directed to revalue the papers. But unfortunately the select list dated 28.09.2001 came to be challenged before the Tribunal, the High Court and the Apex Court and the said list was set aside. The KPSC was directed to revalue the papers. It was done and the select list came to be published only on 28.02.2006. Persons who were selected under the select list dated 28.02.2006 are not the cause for the delay in the publication of the select list. On the contrary they were victims of the litigation. Even the select list in pursuance of the second notification is challenged before the Tribunal. In fact the challenge is even before completion of the select list. It is virtue of the modification of the interim order, the select list came to be published in pursuance of the second notification. The said challenge still persists as those applications are not disposed of. But the fact remains that the persons who were selected in the second notification were not appointed to the said 403 posts which is subject matter of the first notification. The 193 posts for which second notification was issued cannot be placed above 403 posts for which the first notification is issued. If the judicial intervention in the selection process results in setting aside the select list, delay in recruitment process, which consequently results in delay in issue of appointment letters, that should not come in the way of deciding the rights of the persons who are selected in pursuance of an earlier notification. 32. It is in this background we have to appreciate the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Surendra Narain Singh where it is held that the candidates selected to earlier vacancies, but who are not appointed with other batch due to technical difficulties, when appointed subsequent to those appointed to the subsequent vacancies, were held to rank senior to those recruits to later vacancies. In the said case the notification was issued on 03.04.1973 under 1955 rules for 15th examination to fill up 200 posts which was vacant on the date of the notification. 152 posts to be filled up for general category and 48 posts were reserved for SCST. Though 48 posts were reserved for SCST only 15 from SCST category could qualify. In the said case the notification was issued on 03.04.1973 under 1955 rules for 15th examination to fill up 200 posts which was vacant on the date of the notification. 152 posts to be filled up for general category and 48 posts were reserved for SCST. Though 48 posts were reserved for SCST only 15 from SCST category could qualify. Thus only list of 158 candidates was submitted as against 200 posts and they were appointed between March 1975 and 22.07.1975 as Munsiff’s under 1955 Rules. While the process the going on, on 14.10.1974 another advertisement under 74 rules was issued by BPSC for appointment of 122 Munsiffs to fill up additional temporary posts of Munsiffs created by Bihar Government. After conducting examination, 152 candidates sent by BPSC were appointed on 23.05.1975 and 17.11.1976 initially for a period of six months but said period extended till confirmation on 22.11.1975. Between 14.06.1975 and 04.08.1975 additional nine candidates as per merit list prepared under the 1955 Rules came to be appointed taking total number of appointments to 167 candidates comprising of 152 candidates of general category and 15 posts of SC/ST category. Resultantly, 33 posts of SC/ST candidates remained vacant for want of qualified candidates. The Government sometime in June 1976 de-reserved these 33 posts. The list of 33 candidates from the merit list under 1955 rules was forwarded to the Government and accordingly between 17.06.1976 to 01.09.1976 thus 33 candidates came to be appointed as Munsiffs who were confirmed on 09.03.1983 with effect from the dates they were appointed. Thus 33 candidates were given seniority over the appellants who are recruited under 1974 rules and were in fact appointed earlier to them. It is that seniority which was challenged and the Supreme Court up held their seniority on the ground that respondents 3 to 34 who are appointed to the vacancies of 15th examination under 1955 rules have to be given seniority over the appellants in Civil Appeal 1391/91 and though they came to be appointed on 23.03.1975 but against 33 vacancies which are then existing to which appellant had no right. This judgment though close to the instant case fall short of the facts of the case in as much as even the select list in this case was subsequent to the select list in pursuance of the second notification. 33. This judgment though close to the instant case fall short of the facts of the case in as much as even the select list in this case was subsequent to the select list in pursuance of the second notification. 33. In the absence of any rule providing for fixing of inter se seniority of those persons who are selected to distinct vacancies under two different notifications, merely because there is no specific rule, injustice that would be caused to the persons who are selected, if the general rule is applied cannot be ignored. The real test is if the well settled rule is departed, whether that would be consistent with articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. When there is no specific rule governing particular situation, to depart from the general rule, the rule cannot be insisted upon. What is to be seen in such circumstances, is departure from the general rule is valid or illegal and stands judicial scrutiny vis-à-vis article 14 and 16. Two notifications are issued in respect of distinct vacancies and the second notification is in respect of vacancies which arose subsequent to first notification. Persons who were ineligible to apply against the first notification such as age, educational qualification, etc., could apply against the second notification, as by that time, if they have acquired the necessary eligible criteria. Similarly, those who have failed in the written examination conducted in pursuance of the notification to fill up 403 vacancies, could also take the examination in pursuance of the second notification and stake their claim for recruitment. Those who passed in the examination in pursuance of the first notification did not take the subsequent examination. If they are to be placed higher than the persons who are recruited in pursuance of the earlier notification, it would be a travesty of justice and it results in heart burning in service. Merely because in one proceedings parties were lucky enough to get interim order modified and the selection process completed early, they cannot be conferred advantage of seniority when persons who were selected in pursuance of the first notification could not complete the selection process because of judicial intervention. None of the action of the courts should really affect the interest of the parties. None of the action of the courts should really affect the interest of the parties. The Government was conscious that if the selection process is completed and appointment order is issued in pursuance of the second notification, the persons to be selected under first notification would be prejudiced. The Government could have waited for the finalisation of the select list in respect of the earlier notification and after issuing appointment orders of the 1998 batch, they could have issued the appointment order in respect of 1999 batch. The appointment order of 1999 batch was issued on 25.1.2006 and 1.2.2006 whereas the appointment order was issued on 6.4.2006. 15.4.2006 and 2.6.2006. The difference is hardly few months. It was done in public interest. Therefore conscious decision was taken to appoint a person who were selected vide second list in public interest and at the same time to protect interest of persons who are selected vide first list. It is in this context the appointing authority has a right, at the time of appointment, in terms of rule 5 to prescribe seniority. The Government to protect the interest of persons to be appointed in pursuance of the first notification, made it clear after narrating the entire history, that these persons appointed under the first notification would be seniors to those appointed under the second notification. Though rule 5 set out above stipulates how seniority has to be worked out, the said rule is not exhaustive. Any condition imposed in respect of seniority in the appointment order should stand the test of articles 14 and 16. In this case it satisfies the said requirement. Persons who were appointed against the earlier notified vacancy should rank senior to the persons who are appointed against the subsequent notified vacancies, irrespective of the date of appointment and their joining duty. 34. Therefore we do not see any justification in the observation of the Tribunal that this condition shocks the conscience of the Court. Therefore a case for interference is made out. When the said condition is imposed to protect the interest of these innocent applicants who took examination in pursuance of the first notification, passed the examination, but for no fault of theirs, have to wait for nearly six years to announce the results. Therefore we are of the view that the Tribunal committed serious error in striking down the condition which was just and reasonable. Therefore we are of the view that the Tribunal committed serious error in striking down the condition which was just and reasonable. Hence we pass the following order: ORDER (1) All these writ petitions are allowed. The impugned order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is hereby set aside. (2) The condition No.(2) in the appointment order of the respondents is restored. (3) Parties to bear their own costs.