JUDGMENT J.S. KHEHAR, C. J. Respondent No. 1 herein M/s Acme Telepower Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit under Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970 before the District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar. While contesting the suit, the appellants herein inter alia pleaded, that the District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to try the suit, because no part of the cause of action had arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of district Udham Singh Nagar. 2. The proviso to Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970 provides, that where a counter claim for revocation is made by the defendant, the suit along with the counter claim, would be transferred to the High Court for adjudication. Based on the alleged fact, that a counter claim had been filed by the appellants herein, the suit along with the counter claim, were transferred to the High Court for adjudication. Before this Court also, based on the plea, that the District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to try the suit filed by respondent No. 1, the appellants assert, that this Court also had no jurisdiction to try the same. 3. On 02.05.2008, this Court framed as many as 9 issues. After the issues were framed, they were read out to the parties. Neither of the parties required the Court to frame any additional issues. Thereafter, this Court commenced the process of recording evidence. While the process of recording evidence was in progress, the appellants herein moved Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 7593 of 2009 under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that additional issues on the maintainability of the transferred proceedings, be framed. The pointed prayer made by the appellants was for framing two preliminary issues. The two proposed issues are being extracted hereunder: “1. Whether the suit is barred as no part of cause of action has occurred within the territory of District Udham Singh Nagar? 2. Whether the civil courts in District Udham Singh Nagar, and thereafter the Hon’ble High Court in view of Section 104, 105 & 107 of the Patent Act has the jurisdiction to try the suit? 4. Whether the suit is barred as no part of cause of action has occurred within the territory of District Udham Singh Nagar? 2. Whether the civil courts in District Udham Singh Nagar, and thereafter the Hon’ble High Court in view of Section 104, 105 & 107 of the Patent Act has the jurisdiction to try the suit? 4. While disposing of Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 7593 of 2009, a learned Single Judge of this Court passed the following order on 09.09.2009: “This is Application No. 7593 of 2009, moved on behalf of the defendants, for framing additional issue on territorial jurisdiction with regard to which plea is raised in Para 11 of the written statement. Heard learned counsel for the parties. After hearing the parties, as many as 9 issues were framed on 2nd of May 2008, by this Court. It is observed in Para 4, after framing the issues that the issues were read over and explained to the parties, and no other issue was pressed. Now, at this stage when the recording of oral evidence of the parties is in progress, learned counsel for the defendants argued that additional issue on territorial jurisdiction be framed. This Court would have no hesitation in framing additional issue on territorial jurisdiction also even at this stage, but in the present suit counter claim has been filed by the defendants, and thereby they have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court, and as such, this Court, in the circumstances of the case, do not think it just and proper to frame additional issue on territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the Application No. 7593 of 2009 is rejected.” 5. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 09.09.2009, the appellants have filed the present Special Appeal. 6. When the instant Special Appeal came up for hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 raised an objection about the maintainability of the same. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, therefore called upon us, to determine whether or not, the instant Special Appeal was maintainable, before venturing into the merits of the claims raised by the rival parties. Through the instant order, we propose to deal with the objection raised by respondent No. 1, as to the maintainability of the present Special Appeal. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, therefore called upon us, to determine whether or not, the instant Special Appeal was maintainable, before venturing into the merits of the claims raised by the rival parties. Through the instant order, we propose to deal with the objection raised by respondent No. 1, as to the maintainability of the present Special Appeal. 7. In order to demonstrate that the instant Special Appeal is not maintainable, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, in the first instant, placed reliance on Rule 5, contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. Rule 5, relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, is being extracted hereunder: “5. Special appeal. – An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” Based on Rule 5, it is the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 (extracted herein above) is not a “judgment”, and as such, an intra-court appeal is not competent as against the same. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, having read and re-read Rule 5 (extracted herein above), emphatically points out, that a special appeal under Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952 is only maintainable against a “judgment”, whereas the order dated 09.09.2009 can only be referred to as an “interim order”, and not a “judgment” wherefrom a special appeal is competent. 8. In order to substantiate his first contention, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 placed reliance on a judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in TV Tuljaram Row vs. MKRV Alagappa Chettiar, (1912) ILR 35 Madras 1. Relying on the observations recorded in paragraph 18 of judgment in TV Tuljaram Row’s case (supra), it is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the controversy raised in the aforesaid case was identical to, that which is subject matter of consideration herein. It was submitted, that the defendant in TV Tuljaram Row’s case (supra) had moved an application for framing additional issues. A learned Single Judge, sitting on the original side, dismissed the same. Thereafter, the defendant preferred an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1865. The question referred to the Full Bench, in the course of the adjudication of the aforesaid appeal was, whether the order refusing to frame additional issues, was a “judgment” within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent referred to above. The Full Bench answered the issue in the negative. Meaning thereby, that the Full Bench of the Madras High Court arrived at the conclusion, that the “order” passed by the learned Single Judge (sitting on the original side) refusing to frame additional issues, did not constitute a “judgment”. Based on the aforesaid decision, it is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that in the instant controversy also, for the same reasons as were recorded by the Madras High Court, the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 cannot be treated as a “judgment”. Based on the aforesaid, it is the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the instant Special Appeal is not maintainable, within the scope and ambit of Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. 9. Based on the aforesaid, it is the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the instant Special Appeal is not maintainable, within the scope and ambit of Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. 9. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in M/s Kisan Udyog and another Vs. United Bank of India & others, AIR 1990 Allahabad 8, wherein in paragraph 4, the Court had categorically arrived at the conclusion, that the refusal to frame additional issues did not result in deciding any rights and obligations of the parties. Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment is being extracted hereunder: “4. In the instant case the plaintiff has filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 52479/- together with interest at the rate of 13% per annum. This amount has been claimed in view of the alleged advance having been made. It is alleged on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants executed an agreement. In any case it is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the amount is due and is recoverable from the defendants. No doubt, the defendants may resist the claim in the Court. However, if by such a refusal to frame issues a serious prejudice is being caused to the plaintiff or the defendants then it is always expedient for the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction in framing such issues to facilitate the parties to adduce evidence in the light of pleadings on the basis of which issues were framed. In the instant case I do not find that any prejudice would be caused to the defendant applicant. It is the discretionary power of the trial court to frame additional issues if it finds it necessary for determining the lis between the parties but merely refusal to frame additional issues does not give a right to the parties to prefer a revision as by such refusal to frame such additional issues neither the rights nor the obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon. As no right or obligation of a party is determined by refusal to frame additional issues it cannot be held to be deciding a case so as to attract the expression “case which has been decided..” Based on the finding, that refusal to frame additional issues does not result in deciding the rights and obligations of the contesting parties, it is contended that the impugned order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 09.09.2009, cannot be treated as a “judgment” falling within the meaning of Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. Thus viewed, it is submitted, that the impugned order, rendered by a learned Single Judge, is not assailable through an intra-court appeal. As such, it is submitted that the instant Special Appeal is not maintainable. 10. The second contention advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 was based on a reading of Section 104 and Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Both the aforesaid provisions are being extracted hereunder: “104. Orders from which appeal lies- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders- (ff) an order under Section 35 A; (ffa) an order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under Section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this .” section 1. Appeals from orders. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this .” section 1. Appeals from orders. - An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely- (a) an order under Rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court, except where the procedure specified in Rule 10A of Order VII has been followed; (b) * * * (c) an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (d) an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte; (e) * * * (f) an order under Rule 21 of Order XI; (g) * * * (h) * * * (i) an order under Rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; (ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 of that Order is appealable. (k) an order under Rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit; (l) an order under Rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave; (m) * * * (n) an order under Rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application ( in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (na) an order under Rule 5 or Rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person; (o) * * * (p) orders in interpleader-suits under Rule 3, Rule 4 or Rule 6 of Order XXXV; (q) an order under Rule 2, Rule 3 or Rule 6 of Order XXXVIII; (r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX; (s) an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order XL; (t) an order of refusal under Rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit, or under Rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal; (u) an order under Rule 23 or Rule 23A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court; (v) * * * (w) an order under Rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review.” Having invited this Court’s attention to the provisions extracted above, it is the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate an appeal in respect of an order passed under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, it is submitted, that even if Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply in terms to a Special Appeal, yet the orders referred to as appealable therein, would constitute a valuable guideline for arriving at the conclusion, whether or not such orders constitute “judgments” at the hands of a Single Judge, so as to be assailable by filing a Special Appeal under Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. 11. 11. Besides, the aforesaid two issues (pertaining to the objection raised on behalf of respondent No. 1), learned counsel for respondent No. 1 also invited our attention to certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as also to certain facts, to canvass his claim on merits, so as to demonstrate that the plea of jurisdiction raised at the hands of the appellants was not sustainable in law. Learned counsel for the appellants also invited our attention to some judgments, as also to certain factual aspects pertaining to the controversy for the same purpose, i.e. to substantiate the plea of jurisdiction. Since, through the instant order, we propose to only deal with the objection raised at the hands of respondent No. 1, as to the maintainability of the instant Special Appeal, we shall not record or advert to the facts as also the provisions and precedents relied upon by the rival parties to canvass the merits of their claims. 12. In order to repudiate the submission advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, learned counsel for the appellants, in the first instant, placed reliance on a judgment rendered inter-parties by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s Acme Telepower Ltd. Vs. Sintex Industries Ltd. & another, 2008(2) UD 201, wherein inter alia an order dated 30.06.2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, was assailed at the hands of the appellant (respondent No. 1 herein), rejecting a temporary injunction application filed by the appellant. During the course of adjudication of the Special Appeal, filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 herein, so as to challenge the order dated 30.06.2008, a similar preliminary objection as has been raised in the present Special Appeal, was raised, by asserting that the Special Appeal was not maintainable. The contention at the hands of the respondents was, that the Special Appeal preferred to assail the order dated 30.06.2008, was not maintainable because the impugned order (dated 30.06.2008) was not a “judgment”. This Court, while disposing of the aforesaid Special Appeal (bearing No. 131 of 2008), arrived at the conclusion, that the order dated 30.06.2008 was a “judgment”. On the same analogy, and on the basis of the same legal precedents, the appellants canvass, that the instant Special Appeal filed against the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 is also maintainable. 13. This Court, while disposing of the aforesaid Special Appeal (bearing No. 131 of 2008), arrived at the conclusion, that the order dated 30.06.2008 was a “judgment”. On the same analogy, and on the basis of the same legal precedents, the appellants canvass, that the instant Special Appeal filed against the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 is also maintainable. 13. During the course of adjudication of the controversy, learned counsel for the appellants placed vehement reliance on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 SC 1786. In fact, in the earlier round of litigation between the parties (referred to in the foregoing paragraph), reliance had also been placed on the aforesaid judgment to arrive at the eventual conclusion. It is this judgment, which will have to be deciphered minutely to determine, whether the controversy has to be decided in favour of the appellants or respondent No. 1. In fact, both the issues canvassed by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, have been dealt with in the aforesaid judgment, and therefore, inferences drawn from the judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), would have the effect of settling both the issues projected by the learned counsel representing respondent No. 1. 14. Dealing with the first issue, first. In paragraphs 5 & 6 of the judgment in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), the first issue canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has been focused. Paragraphs 5 & 6 (afore-mentioned) are accordingly being extracted hereunder: “5. The substantial questions of law raised in this appeal by the Counsel for the parties are as to the scope, ambit and meaning of the word ‘judgment’ appearing in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and corresponding clauses in the Letters Patent of other High Courts. We might mention here that the significance of the word ‘judgment’ assumes a special importance in those High Courts which have ordinary civil jurisdiction depending on valuation of the suit or the action. These High Courts are Calcutta, Bombay, Madras as also Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir. The other High Courts do not have any ordinary civil jurisdiction but their original jurisdiction is confined only to a few causes like probate and administration, admiralty and cases under Companies Act. 6. These High Courts are Calcutta, Bombay, Madras as also Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir. The other High Courts do not have any ordinary civil jurisdiction but their original jurisdiction is confined only to a few causes like probate and administration, admiralty and cases under Companies Act. 6. It seems to us that the interpretation of the word ‘judgment’ appearing in the Letters Patent of the High Court has been the subject matter of judicial interpretation by decisions rendered by various High Courts in India. Unfortunately, however, the decisions are by no means consistent or unanimous. On the other hand, there appears to be a serious divergence of judicial opinions and a constant conflict between the High Courts regarding the true scope, ambit and meaning of the word ‘judgment’ appearing in the Letters Patent so much so that a colossal controversy has been raging in this country for more than a century. Several tests have been laid down by leading judgments of the Calcutta, Madras and Rangoon High Courts. Other High Courts have either followed one or the other of the leading judgments regarding the validity of the tests laid down by the three High Courts. The Calcutta High Court appears to have followed the leading case of its court in the Justices of the Peace for Calcutta Vs. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872) 8 Beng LR 433 where Sir Richard Couch, C.J. had laid down a particular test on a rather strict and literal interpretation of the Letters Patent. Later decisions of the Calcutta High Court have followed this decision of Sir Richard Couch, CJ with some modifications and clarifications. The Madras High Court has taken a very liberal view in its decision in TV Tuljaram Row Vs. MKRV Alagappa Chettiar, (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1). The Bombay High Court seems to have consistently taken the view that no interlocutory order can ever be said to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable from the order of a single Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Judge’) to a larger Bench. The Rangoon High Court speaking through Sir Page, C.J. in Dayabhai Jiwandas Vs. The Rangoon High Court speaking through Sir Page, C.J. in Dayabhai Jiwandas Vs. AMM Murugappa Chettiar, ILR 13 Rang 457: (AIR 1935 Rang 267) (FB) has placed a very narrow interpretation on the term ‘judgment’ and has almost equated it with a decree passed by a Civil Court.” The Apex Court dealt with the issue, on the basis of three sets of judgments, which had laid down certain tests to determine, when an order passed by a trial judge could be said to be a “judgment”. Reference was, first of all, made to a Division Bench judgment rendered by the Calcutta High Court in Case of Justices of the Peace for Calcutta Vs. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872) 8 Beng LR 433, where Sir Richard Couch, CJ, on the interpretation of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, observed as under: “We think that “judgment” in Cl. 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined.” From the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion, that the Calcutta High Court had laid down three parameters, to determine whether an order rendered by the trial court would be deemed to be a “judgment”. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are extracted hereunder: “82. An analysis of the observations of the Chief Justice would reveal that the following tests were laid down by him in order to decide whether or not an order passed by the Trial Judge would be a judgment: (1) a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties; (2) by determining some right or liability; (3) the order determining the right or liability may be final, preliminary or interlocutory, but the determination must be final or one which decides even a part of the controversy finally leaving other matters to be decided later.” The Supreme Court then examined the judgments rendered in Chandi Charan Saha Vs. Jnanendra Nath Bhattacharjee, 29 Cal LJ 225; Shorab Merwanji Modi Vs. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal. 727; Mohammed Felumeah Vs. Jnanendra Nath Bhattacharjee, 29 Cal LJ 225; Shorab Merwanji Modi Vs. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal. 727; Mohammed Felumeah Vs. S. Mondal, AIR 1960 Cal 582; and finally, a decision of the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in Dayabhai Jiwandas Vs. AMM Murugappa Chettiar, AIR 1935 Rangoon 267. With reference to the conclusions drawn in the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court observed as under: “89. With due respect to the learned Chief Justice and the Judges who agreed with him, we are unable to accept the interpretation of the word ‘judgment’ given by the Chief Justice which runs counter to the very spirit and object of the word ‘judgment’ appearing in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned Chief Justice seems to have fallen into the error of equating the word ‘judgment’ with ‘decree’ as used in the Code of Civil Procedure when, as pointed out above, the words ‘judgment’ and ‘decree’ used in the Code cannot form a safe basis to determine the definition of the word ‘judgment’ in the Letters Patent particularly when the Letters Patent has deliberately dropped the word ‘decree’ from ‘judgment’. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the view taken by the Chief Justice, Sir Page, is correct and accordingly overrule the same.” The Supreme Court also dealt with the judgment rendered in TV Tuljaram Row Vs. MKRV Alagappa Chettiar, (1912) ILR 35 Madras 1, wherein Sir Arnold White, Chief Justice, had laid down certain tests to determine, whether an order rendered by a trial court could be treated as a “judgment”. The tests formulated by Sir Arnold White, Chief Justice, are being extracted hereunder: “The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause. An adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. I think, too, an order on an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not instituted as a step towards judgment, but with a view to rendering the judgment effective if obtained)- e.g., an order on an application for an interim injunction, or for the appointment of a receiver is a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the clause.” Based on the aforesaid tests, the Supreme Court interpreted the decision rendered by Sir Arnold White, Chief Justice, as laying down six tests to determine, whether an order rendered by the trial court would constitute a judgment, in terms of the provisions of the Letters Patent. The observations rendered by the Supreme Court in this behalf are being extracted hereunder: “91. Analysing the observations of the learned Chief Justice it would appear that he has laid down the following tests in order to assess the import and definition of the word ‘judgment’ as used in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent: (1) It is not the form of adjudication which is to be seen but its actual effect on the suit or proceeding; (2) If, irrespective of the form of the suit or proceeding, the order impugned puts an end to the suit or proceeding it doubtless amounts to a judgment; (3) Similarly, the effect of the order, if not complied with, is to terminate the proceedings, the said order would amount to a judgment; (4) Any order in an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not being a step towards judgment) but is designed to render the judgment effective can also be termed as judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent, So far as this test is concerned, the learned Chief Justice had in mind orders passed by the Trial Judge granting or refusing ad interim injunction or appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver. (5) An order may be a judgment even if it does not affect the merits of the suit or proceedings or does not determine any rights in question raised in the suit or proceedings. (5) An order may be a judgment even if it does not affect the merits of the suit or proceedings or does not determine any rights in question raised in the suit or proceedings. (6) An adjudication based on a refusal to exercise discretion the effect of which is to dispose of the suit, so far as that particular adjudication is concerned, would certainly amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.” Reference was then made to the decision rendered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Shahzadi Begam Vs. Alakh Nath, AIR 1935 Allahabad 620, wherein the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court dissented from the view taken by the Madras High Court, by recording the following conclusions: “We would like to point out that the test laid down by the learned Chief Justice of the Madras High Court is put in too wide a language and cannot be accepted as laying down the correct criterion.” In continuation of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (referred to herein above), the Apex Court then referred to the Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Manohar Damodar Bhoot Vs. Baliram Ganpat Bhoot, AIR 1952 Nagpur 357, wherein the essential requirements of the term “judgment”, as used in the Letters Patent, were interpreted as under: “A judgment means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially, but conclusively in so far as the Court is concerned, the controversy which is the subject of the action. It does not include a decision which is on a matter of procedure, nor one which is ancillary to the action even though it may either imperil the ultimate decision or tend to make it effective. The decision need not be immediately executable ‘per se’ but if left untouched must result inevitably without anything further, save the determination of consequential details, in a decree or decretal orders, that is to say, an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done in relation to the facts of the controversy. The decision need not be immediately executable ‘per se’ but if left untouched must result inevitably without anything further, save the determination of consequential details, in a decree or decretal orders, that is to say, an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done in relation to the facts of the controversy. The decision may itself order that thing to be done or not to be done or it may leave that over till after the ascertainment of some details but it must not be interlocutory having for its purpose the ascertainment of some matters or details prior to the determination of the whole or any part of the controversy.” 15. Having noticed the aforesaid three sets of cases, the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), put the final seal on the matter by defining the term “judgment” in paragraph 113, as under: “It seems to us that the word ‘judgment’ has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds: (1) A final judgment – A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench. (2) A preliminary judgment – This kind of a judgment may take two forms – (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g. bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Sec. 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment – Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial Judge in a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiff’s case on his own evidence without being given a chance to rebut the evidence. As such an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial Judge would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly suppose the trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of O. 43, R.1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43, Rule 1, clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. The fact, however, remains that the order setting aside the ex parte decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is, therefore, appealable to a larger Bench.” Having thus concluded, the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra) went on to indicate illustrations / examples of orders, which ought to be treated as “judgments”, in paragraph 120 of the judgment. The position, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), can be understood, in the nature of the aforesaid illustrations, on a collective perusal of paragraphs 120 and 122. The aforesaid paragraphs are accordingly being extracted hereunder: “120. The position, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), can be understood, in the nature of the aforesaid illustrations, on a collective perusal of paragraphs 120 and 122. The aforesaid paragraphs are accordingly being extracted hereunder: “120. Thus, these are some of the principles which might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the trial Judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. We might, however, at the risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be treated as judgments: (1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant. (2) An order rejecting the plaint. (3) An order refusing leave to defend the suit in an action under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure. (4) An order rescinding leave of the trial Judge granted by him under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. (5) An order deciding a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of limitation, absence of notice under Section 80, bar against competency of the suit against the defendant even though the suit is kept alive. (6) An order rejecting an application for a judgment on admission under O. 12 Rule 6. (7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (8) An order varying or amending a decree. (9) an order refusing leave to sue in forma pauperis. (10) An order granting review. (11) An order allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh one. (12) An order holding that the defendants are not agriculturists within the meaning of the special law. (13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff. 122. We have by way of sample laid down various illustrative examples of an order which may amount to judgment but it is not possible to give such an exhaustive list as may cover all possible cases. (14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff. 122. We have by way of sample laid down various illustrative examples of an order which may amount to judgment but it is not possible to give such an exhaustive list as may cover all possible cases. Law with its dynamism, pragmatism and vastness is such a large ocean that it is well-nigh impossible for us to envisage or provide for every possible contingency or situation so as to evolve a device or frame an exhaustive formula or strategy to confine and incarcerate the same in a strait-jacket. We, however, hope and trust that by and large the controversy raging for about a century on the connotation of the term ‘judgment’ would have now been settled and a few cases which may have been left out, would undoubtedly be decided by the court concerned in the light of the tests, observations and principles enunciated by us.” 16. On the first issue, raised at the hands of the learned counsel representing respondent No. 1, our attention was also invited to a series of other judgments relied upon by the learned counsel representing the appellants, wherein conclusions on the issue in hand were drawn on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra). The judgments relied upon are briefly being noticed hereunder: a) Reliance was first of all placed on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore Paliwal Vs. S. Sat Jit Singh and another, (1984) 1 SCC 358, wherein a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had passed an order refusing the amendment of a written statement at the time of framing of issues. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held the intra-court appeal as not maintainable. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench by concluding, that though every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a “judgment”, yet those orders, which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned, are liable to be treated as “judgments”. The Supreme Court, however, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench by concluding, that though every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a “judgment”, yet those orders, which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned, are liable to be treated as “judgments”. Accordingly, it was held, that as the amendment of the written statement was sought at the time of framing of issues, which vitally affected the rights of the parties, and would result in injustice to the plaintiff, it merited serious consideration by the appellate court, as to whether or not the amendment should be allowed. The Supreme Court, relying on Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), set aside the order passed by the Division Bench, by requiring the High Court to decide the appeal preferred against the order passed by the trial court declining amendment of the written statement. b) Reliance was also placed on a Division Bench judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in State of U.P. and others Vs. Kumari Renu Tiwari & others, (1993) 2 UPLBEC 1325. The factual matrix in the instant controversy was, that a learned Single Judge had passed an order declaring that there was parity between regular lecturers and the respondent lecturers. The claim of parity had been adjudged by the learned Single Judge in an ex facie manner. The Division Bench, on the issue of maintainability of the Special Appeal preferred against the order rendered by the learned Single Judge, arrived at the conclusion, that the order under appeal affected the merits of the controversy directly involved in the writ petition itself. It was, therefore, concluded, that the order rendered by the learned Single Judge had all the trappings of a “judgment”. Based on the aforesaid conclusion, the Allahabad High Court held the Special Appeal as maintainable. c) Learned counsel for the appellants then made a reference to another decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society and another Vs. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, UP, Lucknow and others, 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB). In the aforesaid judgment, a learned Single Judge had passed an interim order, where certain findings were recorded. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, UP, Lucknow and others, 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB). In the aforesaid judgment, a learned Single Judge had passed an interim order, where certain findings were recorded. Additionally, a direction was issued to the Registrar to hold a fresh election of the Committee of Management within two months in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Rules framed thereunder. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, a Special Appeal was preferred on the ground, that the Registrar had no powers under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and yet, the learned Single Judge had passed the impugned order upholding the order of the Registrar, without recording any finding. After considering the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), it was concluded that the interlocutory order passed by the learned Single Judge amounted to the disposal of vital issues, which affected vital and valuable rights of the party, and as such, had trappings of a final order. As such, the Division Bench held the order passed by the learned Single Judge as assailable through a Special Appeal. d) Reference was made to yet another Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Hind Lamps Limited Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Agra and another, 2002 (3) AWC 1908. A learned Single Judge had allowed a writ petition at the initial stage, wherein the operation of the order dated 27.03.2002, passed by the respondents was stayed, without obtaining any counter affidavit. A further direction was issued, that fresh applications be invited in compliance with the Rules. It was also directed, that on the receipt of the applications, the same would be disposed of in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge, in the aforesaid manner, was held to have allowed the writ petition at the initial stage, without the receipt of any counter affidavit. On the issue of maintainability of the Special Appeal, it was concluded, that the impugned order, which had stayed the operation of the order dated 27.03.2002 whereby the appellant had been granted permission to lay off its employees, had resulted in requiring the appellant to take work from them, and to pay them full wages even when the work was not available. The impugned order rendered by the learned Single Judge was stated to have trappings of a final determination of the controversy, and as such, constituted a “judgment”. The Division Bench accordingly arrived at the conclusion, that the Special Appeal, preferred by the appellant was maintainable. e) Learned counsel for the appellants, last of all, placed reliance on yet another judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Prof. Y.C. Simhadri, Vice Chancellor, BHU and others Vs. Deen Bandhu Pathak, Student, 2001 (4) AWC 2688. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge entertained an application filed by the writ petitioner under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, on the ground that an earlier order passed by the learned Single Judge had not been complied with. By the said order, the learned Single Judge had permitted the addition of three persons as respondents in the application filed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Having done so, the learned Single Judge had issued notice to the said three persons, requiring them to appear before him personally. The aforesaid three persons, being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, preferred a Special Appeal. The maintainability of the aforesaid Special Appeal was upheld by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court by holding, that the question of jurisdiction was involved, and as such, the order rendered by the learned Single Judge fell within the meaning of the term “judgment” in Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. Based on the judgments rendered in the aforesaid cases, though not determining the framing (or non-framing) of issues, learned counsel for the appellants contended, that the same should be read in continuity of the illustrations / examples, depicted in paragraph 120 of the order passed by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), so as to arrive at a conclusion in respect of the maintainability of the present Special Appeal. 17. 17. Based on the aforesaid conclusions recorded by the Supreme Court, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the antiquated judgments relied upon by the learned counsel representing respondent No. 1, are no longer good law, and that, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra) is the declaration of the position of law on the subject matter under reference. Inviting the pointed attention of this Court to the observations rendered by the Supreme Court under the head (2) “a preliminary judgment” (from paragraph 113 of the judgment, extracted above) and illustration (5) (from paragraph 120 of the judgment, extracted above) in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), it is submitted that there can be no doubt whatsoever, that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 is indeed a “judgment” within the meaning of the term judgment referred to in Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the rival parties on the first issue raised at the hands of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. We are satisfied, that there is no ambiguity whatsoever that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 negates the plea advanced by the appellants. The issues raised by the appellants could have resulted in the passing of a final order in the proceedings pending, between the parties herein, before this Court. Undoubtedly, the appellants have been made to contest the claim raised by respondent No. 1, in the suit filed by it under Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970, whereas, if he had been permitted to raise the preliminary objections, which he sought to press through the Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 7593 of 2009, he may have been able to avoid the entire exercise. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 affected vital and valuable rights of the appellants. It would also not be open to the appellants to raise a challenge to the ongoing proceedings between the parties, on the basis of the issue of territorial jurisdiction, at any stage hereinafter, once the framing of additional issues have been declined by the learned Single Judge. It would also not be open to the appellants to raise a challenge to the ongoing proceedings between the parties, on the basis of the issue of territorial jurisdiction, at any stage hereinafter, once the framing of additional issues have been declined by the learned Single Judge. The impugned order, therefore, has the effect of deciding an important aspect of the trail, which affects vital rights of appellants herein finally. The impugned order, must therefore, be construed to be a “judgment” so as to be appealable to a larger Bench under Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952. While recording our conclusion, it would also be necessary to notice, that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, cannot be taken into consideration because of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), which has the effect of declaring the law on the subject matter under consideration, as also because of other judgments of different High Courts based thereon, which were relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. 19. Insofar as the second issue canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is concerned, to repudiate the same, learned counsel for the appellants has again placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra). Insofar as the instant issue is concerned, the question deliberated by the Supreme Court was based on the submissions advanced before it at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. The aforesaid submissions were noticed in paragraph 13 of the judgment, which are being extracted hereunder: “13. Mr. Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted four important points of law dwelling on the various facts of the question at issue: (1) It was contended that the provisions of Section 104 read with Order 43, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “Code of 1908”) does not impose any bar on the trial held by the Trial Judge and thus by virtue of these provisions the Order impugned (the order of the trial Court refusing to appoint Receiver and to grant injunction) falls squarely under clauses (r) and (s) of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of 1908 and is therefore appealable to a larger Bench. In amplification of this contention it was submitted that the Trial Judge is governed by the procedure prescribed by the Code of 1908 in all matters and hence there is no reason why Order 43 Rule 1 should not apply to any order passed by the Trial Judge under any of the clauses of Order 43 Rule 1 read with Section 104. (2) Even if we assume that the Letters Patent was a special law which overrides the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the power under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 is in no way inconsistent with Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. Section 104 merely provides an additional remedy and confers a new jurisdiction on the High Court without at all interfering with or overriding the existing provisions of the Letters Patent. (3) Even if Order 43 Rule 1 did not apply in terms, the orders which have been mentioned as being appealable to a larger Bench could form valuable guidelines for the Court in arriving at the conclusion that such orders amount to judgments of the single Judge as contemplated by the Letters Patent. (4) Even if S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 does not apply, an order refusing to appoint a receiver or to grant injunction has the trappings and attributes of finality as it affects valuable rights of the plaintiff in an ancillary proceeding though the suit is kept alive and would, therefore, amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.” Here again, the Supreme Court examined conclusions drawn in a set of cases decided either by the Privy Council or by different High Courts in the country, and thereupon, recorded its own findings in paragraphs 26, 28, 33 and 34. The aforesaid paragraphs are being extracted hereunder: “26. Thus, a combined reading of the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to above leads to the irresistible conclusion that S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 clearly applies to the proceedings before the Trial Judge of the High Court. Unfortunately, this fact does not appear to have been noticed by any of the decisions rendered by various High Courts. 28. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the arguments of Mr. Unfortunately, this fact does not appear to have been noticed by any of the decisions rendered by various High Courts. 28. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the arguments of Mr. Sorabjee that in the instant case S. 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 does not in any way abridge, interfere with or curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge by Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. What Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 does is merely to give an additional remedy by way of an appeal from the orders of the Trial Judge to a larger Bench. Indeed, if this is the position then the contention of the respondent that S. 104 will not apply to internal appeals in the High Court cannot be countenanced. In fact, the question of application of the Code of Civil Procedure to internal appeals in the High Court does not arise at all because the Code of Civil Procedure merely provides for a forum and if Order 43, Rule 1 applies to a Trial judge then the forum created by the Code would certainly include a forum within the High Court to which appeals against the judgment of a Trial Judge would lie. It is obvious that when the Code contemplates appeals against orders passed under various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1 by a Trial Judge, such an appeal can lie to a larger Bench of the High Court and not to any Court subordinate to the High Court. Hence, the argument that Order 43, Rule 1 cannot apply to internal appeals in the High Court does not appeal to us although the argument has found favour with some of the High Courts. 33. There is yet another aspect of the matter which shows that S. 104 merely provides an additional or supplemental remedy by way of appeal and, therefore, widens rather than limits the original jurisdiction of the High Court. For instance, in this very case with which this Court was dealing, an order passed under S. 202 of the Companies Act was appealable to a larger Bench and yet it was argued that the order being of an interlocutory nature would not be a judgment and therefore no appeal would lie to the Division Bench. For instance, in this very case with which this Court was dealing, an order passed under S. 202 of the Companies Act was appealable to a larger Bench and yet it was argued that the order being of an interlocutory nature would not be a judgment and therefore no appeal would lie to the Division Bench. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court and it was held that against the order passed by a Trial Judge under the Companies Act, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 expressly authorizes and creates a forum for appeal against orders falling under various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1, to a Larger Bench of the High Court without at all disturbing, interfering with or overriding the Letters Patent jurisdiction. There are a number of other Acts also which confer additional powers of appeal to a larger Bench within the High Court against the order of a Trial Judge. Take, for instance, a case under the Arbitration Act. Suppose in a suit the matter is referred to arbitration and after the award is filed by the Arbitrator certain objections are taken, under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act an appeal would lie to a Larger Bench from the order of a Single Judge disposing of the objections taken by the parties against the award. Section 39 runs thus: “39. Appealable Orders. – (1) An Appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the orders: An Order – (i) superseding an arbitration; (ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case; (iii) modifying or correcting an award; (iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement; (v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement; (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 34. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 34. It cannot be contended by any show of force that the Order passed by the Trial Judge being an interlocutory order, no appeal would lie to the Division Bench or that the provisions of the Arbitration Act giving a right of appeal to a litigant from the order of a Trial Judge to the Division Bench in any way fetter or override the provisions of the Letters Patent.” Thereafter, having examined the judgments rendered by various High Courts, the Court recorded its final conclusions in paragraph 79 of the judgment, which is also being extracted hereunder: “79. Thus, after considering the arguments of counsel for the parties on the first two limbs of the questions, our conclusions are: (1) That there is no inconsistency between S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 and the appeals under the Letters Patent and there is nothing to show that the letters Patent in any way excludes or overrides the application of S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 or to show that these provisions would not apply to internal appeals within the High Court. (2) That even if it be assumed that Order 43, Rule 1 does not apply to Letters Patent appeals, the principles governing these provisions would apply by process of analogy. (3) That having regard to the nature of the orders contemplated in the various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1, there can be no doubt that these orders purport to decided valuable rights of the parties in ancillary proceedings even though the suit is kept alive and that these orders do possess the attributes or character of finality so as to be judgments within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and hence, appealable to a larger Bench. 15 of the Letters Patent and hence, appealable to a larger Bench. (4) The concept of the Letters Patent governing only the internal appeals in the High Courts and the Code of Civil Procedure having no application to such appeals is based on a serious misconception of the legal position.” Based on the conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court, as have been extracted hereinabove, it is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that there is no merit even in the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. 20. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. We however find no merit therein. It cannot be denied that the orders referred to in the different clauses of Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are illustrations of orders which finally decide the issue adjudicated upon, and are appealable. Yet, the different clauses of Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not constitute the exhaustive list of orders which can be passed by a trial court, and can be stated to have decided a matter / issue finally. This aspect of the matter has been clearly expressed by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), which clearly emerges from the observations / conclusions recorded in paragraphs 113, 120 and 122 of the aforesaid judgment (which have been reproduced above). Keeping in view the conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), and on the basis thereof, our determination on the first issue canvassed on behalf of respondent No. 1 to the effect that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 is a “judgment” and satisfies the term judgment used in Rule 5 contained in Section C of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952, we are of the considered view, that there is no merit even in the second contention advanced by the learned counsel representing respondent No. 1. 21. Having concluded, that the impugned order dated 09.09.2009 was in the nature of a “judgment”, we are satisfied, that the instant Special Appeal, preferred at the hands of the appellants, is maintainable.