Ritu Raj Awasthi, J.- Heard Sri Anuj Kudesia, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Dhruv Mathur, appearing for the respondent and perused the record. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 23.2.2006, passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the matter of arbitration between the Jamuna Construction Company, Lucknow Vs. U.P. Samaj Kalyan Nirman Nigam Ltd, Lucknow. 3.The facts giving rise to the present writ petition in short are as under: The Sports Authority of India, New Delhi awarded the work of construction of its Sub-Centre, Sports Authority of India, Kanpur Road, Lucknow to the petitioner of this writ petition and for execution of the said work, the petitioner had entered into an agreement on 26.6.2002, on back to back basis with the respondent-company, which is said to be in the partnership. The work was required to be completed within the stipulated period of time and in case of default the agreement was terminable in accordance with Clauses 18 and 14 of the said agreement. The opposite party failed to complete the work. Ultimately vide letter dated 1.2.2003, the opposite party was directed to hand-over the work of synthetic hockey field and horticulture and landscaping to the authorized committee. The said agreement contained an arbitration clause to the effect that in case of any dispute or differences in between the parties, the same shall be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three Arbitrators, one each to be appointed by the employer and the contractor, the third arbitrator shall be chosen by the two arbitrators so appointed by the parties and shall act as a Presiding Arbitrator. 4. The opposite party invoked the arbitration clause and the first meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal was held on 30.6.2003. The statement of claim was filed on 16.8.2003 and the written statements were submitted in November, 2003, against which the opposite party submitted rejoinder and also some of the documentary evidences. The additional pleas were allowed by way of amendment in the meeting dated 27.9.2004 by the Arbitral Tribunal and it was decided that the preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability of the claim in the light of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, shall be decided at the time of final hearing. The additional pleas were allowed by way of amendment in the meeting dated 27.9.2004 by the Arbitral Tribunal and it was decided that the preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability of the claim in the light of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, shall be decided at the time of final hearing. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has framed several issues, including the issues relating to the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner regarding maintainability. An application dated 13.11.2005, was moved by the petitioner with the request to first decide the preliminary objection before proceeding any further. However, the learned Tribunal rejected the said application mainly on the ground that the petitioner had itself accepted that the question of preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the claim filed by the opposite party was a mixed question of facts and law and it requires evidences, which have not been closed as yet and, therefore, the same would be decided at the time of making of the final award. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that in the impugned order the reasons given by the learned Arbitral Tribunal for rejection of the request of the petitioner for deciding the preliminary issue first are wrong and on erroneous assumptions. No useful purpose would be served if the learned Tribunal continues with the arbitration proceeding on merits and ultimately comes to conclusion that the claim filed by the opposite party was not maintainable. The arbitration proceedings will consume unnecessary time and public exchequer and will cause irreparable loss to the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the opposite party is not a registered partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In Section 69 of the said Act the effect of non-registration of the firm is provided, according to which the opposite party has no legal entity to sue or to be sued. Hence, the entire proceedings before the learned Tribunal were not maintainable. It was further submitted that all the relevant material was available with the Corporation and the right of the claimant firm to sue can be established on the basis of evidences and arguments of the parties. The evidences can not be split into parts as the same are to be recorded as a whole. It was further submitted that all the relevant material was available with the Corporation and the right of the claimant firm to sue can be established on the basis of evidences and arguments of the parties. The evidences can not be split into parts as the same are to be recorded as a whole. In order to establish the claim, the certificate of registration of partnership firm is required, which the opposite party had not filed even after completion of documentary evidences. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the 'agreed procedure' as mentioned in the impugned order was for the purpose of deciding the claim by adducing evidences etc. and in no manner it can be presumed that the petitioner had agreed that the question of maintainable may be decided at the time of final award. Moreover, in any case even if it is presumed that the petitioner had agreed that the question of maintainability may be decided at the time of final award even then the learned Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner dated 13.11.2005, as the documentary evidences filed by the opposite party were closed and keeping the question of the maintainability still open after closure of the documentary evidences was not justified as the question of maintainability was to be decided on documentary evidences but the opposite party had not filed any documentary evidence to prove that it is a registered partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act. 8. Sri Anuj Kudesia, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the legal proposition held by the Hon. Supreme Court is that the question of maintainability is to be decided first before proceeding further with the matter and the settled proposition of law cannot be changed even with the consent of the parties. As such the learned Arbitral Tribunal has, in fact, committed a misconduct in not deciding the preliminary issue of maintainability raised by the petitioner. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following case laws:- 1.Gagandeep Pratishthan Pvt. and others Vs. Mechano and another, (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 475 (Para-6). 2.Manubhai J. Patel and another Vs. Bank of Baroda and others (2000) 10 SCC 253 (Para-7) 9. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following case laws:- 1.Gagandeep Pratishthan Pvt. and others Vs. Mechano and another, (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 475 (Para-6). 2.Manubhai J. Patel and another Vs. Bank of Baroda and others (2000) 10 SCC 253 (Para-7) 9. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the present writ petition has been filed invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, which has supervisory control over all the courts. Since the Arbitral Tribunal has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it, therefore, the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable. 10. He submitted that the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of S.B. Petroleum Company Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 , is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Hon. Supreme Court in para 25 has observed that an order passed under Section 11(6) of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the Chief Justice of the High Court or his nominee, is an administrative order and such order could not be subjected to judicial review. In Paras-9 & 12 of the said judgment, it is observed that normally any Tribunal or authority conferred with a power to act under a statute has the jurisdiction to satisfy itself that the conditions for the exercise of that power existed and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not interfere in matters unless appealable but in the present case the impugned order is not appealable, hence the writ petition is fully maintainable. 11. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision in the case of Navyug Radiance Senior Secondary School Society and another Vs. Registrar Firm Societies and Chits U.P. and other 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB) (Paras-13,15 & 16), to submit that a person aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal or quasi judicial authority under the statute can maintain a writ petition under Articles 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Registrar Firm Societies and Chits U.P. and other 2002 (4) AWC 3050 (LB) (Paras-13,15 & 16), to submit that a person aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal or quasi judicial authority under the statute can maintain a writ petition under Articles 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that Annexure No. 5, to the writ petition is the order dated 30.10.2004, passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal and it is to be read as a whole in order to understand as to under what circumstances the petitioner had agreed before the learned Arbitral Tribunal that the question of applicability of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is the mixed question of facts and law and can be decided at the time of giving of the award. In fact, in the meeting dated 27.9.2004, the amendment in the written statement was allowed and at that time it was agreed that the question of maintainability may be decided at the time of the final award but since the opposite party has failed to file the affidavit of witness, Sri S.C. Gupta for more than one year and had not submitted the certificate of registration of the claimant- firm. As such the application dated 13.11.2005, requesting to recall the order dated 27.9.2004 to the extent of deciding the question of maintainability at the time of final award, was moved and it was requested that the question of maintainability of the claim may be first decided. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, provides the effects of non-registration of the partnership firm and no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm, against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. 14. 14. Sub clause (2) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. 15. Sub clause (3) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, provides that the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect dissolution of a firm or dissolved firm. 16. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the words 'or other proceedings' as mentioned in sub-clause (3) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, includes the arbitration proceedings. 17. In support of his contention, learned counsel also relied upon the decisions of Hon. the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Chandra Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders, AIR 1964 SC 1882 (Paras 3,4 and 5) and Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kochhar Construction Work and another, (1998) SCC 559 (Para-3). 18. Further relying on the judgments in the case of Sri Baba Commercial Syndicate and another Vs. Channamasetti Dasu and another AIR 1968 AP 378 , U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Vs. Jain Construction Co. and another (2004) 7 SCC 332 (Para-7) and Delhi Development Authority (Supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, is fully applicable in the matters relating to arbitration proceedings. As such the learned Tribunal by the impugned order dated 23.2.2006, has grossly erred in rejecting the application of the petitioner to decide the preliminary issue of the maintainability first as it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to have decided the preliminary issue of maintainability raised by the petitioner. The impugned order would cause irreparable loss to the petitioner and put it to unnecessary extra expenditure which would ultimately burden the public exchequer. 19. Sri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, learned Sr. Advocate and Mr. Dhruv Mathur, Advocate, appearing for the opposite party has, at the very outset, submitted that the present writ petition against the arbitration proceeding is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost. 19. Sri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, learned Sr. Advocate and Mr. Dhruv Mathur, Advocate, appearing for the opposite party has, at the very outset, submitted that the present writ petition against the arbitration proceeding is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost. The impugned order is an interlocutory order passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal by which the application moved by the petitioner has been rejected. The writ petition against the interlocutory order passed during Arbitration proceedings is not maintainable. 20. Sri Raghvendra Kumar Singh and Mr. Dhruv Mathur, Advocates further submitted that Section 19 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Moreover, the Arbitral Tribunal may on its own decide the procedure to be followed and conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate. 21. It has been vehemently submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner had agreed before the Tribunal that the question of maintainability of the claim in view of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is a mixed question of facts and law and the same be decided as a preliminary issue in the final award. In this regard, Sri Raghvendra Singh has referred to the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal on 27.9.2004, a copy of the order issued in pursuance of which on 30.10.2004, has been annexed as Annexure No. 5, to the writ petition. In the said order, it has been observed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal that the learned counsel for the parties agreed that the question of applicability of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is a mixed question of facts and law and the same can be decided only after adducing the evidence and detailed arguments from both the parties and the question shall be decided as a preliminary issue in the final award. 22. 22. His further submission is that once the parties to the contract had agreed before the Arbitral Tribunal that the preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability be decided at the time of final award then the petitioner could not have subsequently insisted to the Tribunal to decide the said issue first before proceeding any further. It was the procedure agreed between the parties and the Tribunal cannot deviate from the 'agreed procedure' to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 23. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following case laws: a. S.B.P. Company Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 (Paras 45,46 & 47) b. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. M/s. Darshan Lal and others 2007(25) LCD 278 (Paras 8 & 9). c. State of U.P. Vs. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. (1996) 6 SCC 22 24. The main questions which have cropped up for consideration before this Court are; (1) As to whether a writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in the arbitration proceedings held under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and (2) As to whether Arbitral Tribunal was justified in refusing to deviate from the 'agreed procedure' in view of the scheme and provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, especially the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act? 25. So far as the question of maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, it is the settled legal position that the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is to provide an alternative forum for speedy redressal of the grievances by ousting the jurisdiction of the regular courts and by also keeping the Arbitral Tribunal free from the rigours of the procedural law generally followed in the Courts. In this regard certain relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, are quoted below: Section 5 - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part". Section 16 - Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. Section 16 - Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. -(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,- (a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. (3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. (4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either of the cases referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified. (5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) and, where the arbitral takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. (6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance with Section 34." Section 19 - Determination of rules of procedure.- (1) The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 (1 of 1872). (2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. (3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate. (4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (3) includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence." 32. (3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate. (4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (3) includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence." 32. Termination of proceedings.-(1) The arbitral proceedingss shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). (2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings where- (a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute. (b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or (c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible. (3) Subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral proceedings." "Section 34 - Application for setting aside arbitral award - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if - (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that - (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral procedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that - (i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India Explanation - Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal; Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award." Section 37 - Appealable orders. - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely;- (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal- (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub- section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 26. The Hon. Supreme Court in the case S.B.P. Company, (Supra) in paragraph 45, held as under:- "45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal appealable. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chose by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible." "46. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage." "47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows: (i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows: (i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. (ii) The power under Section 11(6) of the Act, in its entirely, could be delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another Judge of that Court and by the Chief Justice of India to another Judge of the Supreme Court. (iii) In case of designation of Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, the power that is exercised by the designated Judge would be that of the Chief Justice as conferred by the statute. (iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. These will be his own jurisdiction to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the designated Judge would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the Chief Justice or the designated Judge. (v) Designated of District Judge as the authority under Section 11(6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (vi) Once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with the orders passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. (vii) Since an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the designated Judge of that Court is a judicial order, an appeal will lie against that order only under Article 136 of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. (vii) Since an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the designated Judge of that Court is a judicial order, an appeal will lie against that order only under Article 136 of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. (viii) There can be no appeal against an order of the Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court designated by him while entertaining an application under Section 11(6) of the Act. (ix) In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Section 16 of the Act. (x) Since all were guided by the decision of this Court in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. V. Rani Construction (P) Ltd. and others (2002) 2 SCC 388 under Section 11(6) of the Act have been made based on the position adopted in that decision, we clarify that appointments of arbitrators or Arbitral Tribunals thus far made, are to be treated as valid, all objections being left to be decided under Section 16 of the Act. As and from this date, the position as adopted in this judgment will govern even pending applications under Section 11(6) of the Act. (xi) Where District Judge had been designated by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act, the appointment orders thus far made by them will be treated as valid; but applications if any pending before them as on this date will stand transferred, to be dealt with by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned or a Judge of that Court designated by the Chief Justice. (xii) The decision in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltde. V. Rani Construction (P) Ltd. is overruled." 27. However, in the case of Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited Vs. Kewal Singh Dhillon (2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 128, the Hon. Apex Court has held that if the order passed in the arbitration proceeding has attained finality and there is no remedy of appeal against the said order, in such cases, even if it is a judicial order, the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, would be maintainable. The decision in the case S.B.P. Company, (Supra), does not bar such a writ petition. The decision in the case S.B.P. Company, (Supra), does not bar such a writ petition. Para -7 of the judgment in the case of Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited (Supra), is quoted below:- "7. The Act does not provide for an appeal against the order of the Chief Justice or his designate made under sub-section (4) or sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 11. On the other hand, sub-section (7) of Section 11 makes it clear that a decision of the designate under sub-sections (4),(5) or (6) of Section 11 is final. As no appeal was maintainable against the order of the designate and as his order was made final, the only course available to the appellant was to challenge the order, even if it is a judicial order, by a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India." 28. In the present case, the learned Arbitral Tribunal by the impugned order has rejected the application dated 13.11.2005, moved by the petitioner mainly observing that since the parties had agreed in the meeting held on 27.9.2004 and still agree that the preliminary issue is the mixed question of facts and law and not question of law alone, the same may be decided at the time of final award. Therefore, it would not be proper to deviate from the 'agreed procedure' as agreed to between the parties in the meeting dated 27.9.2004, the application was, therefore, rejected. 29. Moreover, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has not yet decided the question of maintainability and the same is still to be adjudicated upon by the learned Tribunal. This Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, shall not entertain the writ petition against an interlocutory order passed during the arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 unless some extraordinary circumstances exist and grave injustice is being done. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in- between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Hence, the present writ petition against the impugned order is not maintainable. 30. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner and the respondent had entered into an agreement with regard to the execution of some construction work. The said agreement contained an arbitration clause. Hence, the present writ petition against the impugned order is not maintainable. 30. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner and the respondent had entered into an agreement with regard to the execution of some construction work. The said agreement contained an arbitration clause. Some dispute arose between the petitioner and the respondent emanating from the said contract. The arbitration clause was invoked and the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, which comprises three arbitrators namely; Sri Dharam Vir (Presiding Arbitrator), Sri Y.K. Jain and Sri K.G. Srivastava (Arbitrators). Before the Arbitral Tribunal, an objection with regard to the maintainability of the claim of the respondent was raised by the petitioner on the ground that according to the petitioner the respondent was not a registered firm and thus it did not have a right to initiate the arbitration proceedings in view of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. However, the parties agreed before the Arbitral Tribunal that the question with regard to the maintainability is a mixed question of facts and law and the same be decided as a preliminary issue in the final award. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondent have not disputed the authenticity of the order dated 30.10.2004, emanating from the meetings of the Tribunal dated 18.9.2004 and 27.9.2004, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure no. 5, to the writ petition, wherein it was observed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal that the learned counsel for both the parties have agreed that the question of applicability of Section 69 of Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is a mixed question of facts and law and the same can be decided only after adducing the evidences and detailed arguments from both the parties and the question be decided as a preliminary issue in the final award. 32. 32. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in the meeting dated 27.9.2004, while allowing the amendment in the written statements, it was agreed by the parties that the preliminary issue with regard to the maintainability be decided at the time of final award because at that time no evidences were led by the parties, the respondent after adducing evidence failed to produce the registration certificate of the claimant firm and the affidavit of claimant witness, S.C. Gupta was also not being filed in spite of sufficient time being allowed to the opposite party as such the evidence was treated to be closed at that stage, therefore, the application dated 13.11.2005 was moved by the petitioner before the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the maintainability of the arbitration case first before proceeding any further in the matter as undue delay was being made by the claimant and the proceedings were unnecessarily lingered on, it is to be noted that the affidavit of evidence of S.C.Gupta, witness No. 2 was filed on 14.1.2006 and the same was taken on record by the learned Tribunal. It clearly shows that the evidence was not closed by the Tribunal. As such the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application dated 13.11.2005 was moved after the closer of the evidence is wrong and contrary to the record. Once it is an admitted fact that in the meeting dated 27.9.2004 of the Arbitral Tribunal, it was agreed by the parties that the preliminary issue of maintainability in the light of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, be decided at the time of final award, it means both the parties had agreed that the question of maintainability of the claim may be decided along with other issues at the time of final award. The issues with regard to the maintainability of claim by respondent were framed by the Tribunal while framing the issues for adjudication, as such there is force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per Section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal had agreed on the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in conducting its proceedings and there was no reason for the Arbitral Tribunal to deviate from the said 'agreed procedure' and decide the issues of maintainability first before deciding the other issues. The learned Arbitral Tribunal was as such justified in rejecting the application dated 13.11.2005. 33. So far as the various case laws cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned, all the judgments and judicial pronouncements cited by the petitioner are distinguishable on the facts of the present case as in none of the cases cited above, the parties had agreed to a procedure whereby the preliminary issue was to be decided in the final award. Moreover, in none of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner, the Arbitral Tribunal was permitted to deviate from an 'agreed procedure'. 34. This Court has not addressed itself with regard to the question of maintainability of the claim in the light of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as alleged by the petitioner. It is for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the same. 35. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is, accordingly dismissed. Interim order dated 28.3.2006, is vacated. The parties shall bear their own costs. Order Date: - 19.4.2010