JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. HC Naidu on behalf of ST Corporation, learned advocate Mr. YN Pandya appearing for respondent workman. The petitioner Corporation has challenged award passed by Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar in reference IT no. 3/2006 exh 20 dated 30/12/2008. The Industrial Tribunal has modified punishment order dated 3/8/2004 in default case no. 143/2004 establishment order no. 286 to the effect that respondent workman is to be restored to his original scale, which was available to him prior to punishment order dated 3/8/2004 without giving monetary benefits or difference of salary or arrears of interim period. 2. Learned advocate Mr. Naidu raised contention before this Court that Industrial Tribunal has committed gross error in interfering with punishment, which was imposed by competent authority. He submitted that Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding given by Inquiry Officer. He submitted that workman has not challenged legality and validity of inquiry, then it is not open for Labour Court to go into finding recorded by Inquiry Officer. Therefore, interference by Industrial Tribunal while appreciating evidence led in departmental inquiry, Tribunal has committed gross error of jurisdiction. Therefore, present petition is filed by Corporation. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Naidu relied upon two decision of Apex Court in case of Employers, in relation to the Management of West Bokard Colliery of M/s TISCO Ltd v. Concerned Workman, Ram Pravesh Singh reported in 2008 (116) FLR 1107 (SC) and in case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Vinod Kumar, 2008 (116) FLR 382 (SC). 4. After relying upon both decisions in support of his submission, learned advocate Mr. Naidu submitted that once departmental inquiry is held valid and legal or accepted by workman then no interference is required from Industrial Tribunal to disturb finding and to modify punishment. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Pandya appearing for respondent workman submitted that Industrial Tribunal has power u/s 11 A of I. D. Act 1947 to interfere with such finding, even in case of departmental inquiry held to be valid. 6. He relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central bank of India, 2008 (119) FLR 96 (SC)., and referred para 19, 20 and 20(1) which are quoted as under: 19. In our opinion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal was quite justified in using its discretion. 6. He relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central bank of India, 2008 (119) FLR 96 (SC)., and referred para 19, 20 and 20(1) which are quoted as under: 19. In our opinion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal was quite justified in using its discretion. The scope of Section 11-A has been explained by this Court from time to time in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani [ (2006) 108 FLR 953 (SC); Mahindra Ltd. V. N.B. Narawade, (2005) 104 FLR 1218 (SC)] and M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, (2005) 105 FLR 155 (SC)]. Lastly, this Court has held that in L and T Komatsu Ltd. V. N. Uadayakumar [ (2008) 116 FLR 1139 ] that assaulting or giving abuses to the superior would justify the dismissal. We have carefully examined the facts in all the above cases and find that the appellant's case nowhere comes near the one described in all the above four cases. After all the Tribunal has to judge on the basis of the proved misbehaviour. In this case we have already recorded that the Tribunal was firstly correct in holding that the misbehaviour was not wholly proved and whatever misconduct was proved, did not deserve the extreme punishment of discharge. 20. on this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment of the learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single Judge held firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers vested in it under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge, as regards, Section 11-A, after quoting the same, observed: "Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come to its own conclusion whether in a given case the imposition of punishment of discharge or dismissal from the service is justified. It is for that purpose that the Tribunal is authorised to go into the evidence that has been adduced before the Inquiry Officer in details and find out whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal is commensurate with the nature of charges proved against the delinquent." 20.1 So far the finding of the learned Single Judge appears to be correct. However, the whole thrust of the judgment has changed merely because the Industrial Tribunal had found the inquiry to be fair and proper. However, the whole thrust of the judgment has changed merely because the Industrial Tribunal had found the inquiry to be fair and proper. The learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that if the inquiry is held to be fair and proper, then the Industrial Tribunal cannot go into the question of evidence or the quantum of punishment. We are afraid that is not the correct law. Even if the inquiry is found to be fair, that would be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed. That does not mean that the findings arrived at were essentially the correct findings. If the Industrial Tribunal-comes to the conclusion that the findings could not be supported on the basis of the evidence given or further comes to the conclusion that the punishment given is shockingly disproportionate, the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and/or interfering with the quantum of punishment. There can be no dispute that power under Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the Management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Besides, the Tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons. In our opinion the reasons given by the Tribunal were correct and the treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was perfectly justified. The Tribunal committed no error in observing that for good long 30 years there was no complaint against the work of the appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year 1982. The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact that the charges were not only trivial and were not so serious as to entail the extreme punishment of discharge. Here was the typical example where the evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not such as would have invited the extreme punishment. It was not as if the appellant had abused or had done any physical altercation with his superiors or colleagues. Here was the typical example where the evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not such as would have invited the extreme punishment. It was not as if the appellant had abused or had done any physical altercation with his superiors or colleagues. What was complained was of his absence on some days and his argumentative nature. Though the learned Judge had discussed all the principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as also the doctrine of proportionality and the Wednesbury's principles, we are afraid the learned Judge has not applied all these principles properly to the present case. The learned Judge has quoted extensively from the celebrated decision of M/s. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. V. The Management [ AIR 1973 SC 1227 ], however, the learned Judges seems to have ignored the observations made in para 32 of that decision where it is observed that: "The words "in the course of adjudication proceeds, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power of re-appraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct.. The Tribunal is at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out" We are surprised at the following observations of the learned Judge in para 7.1: "Nowhere during the course of the judgment the Tribunal appears to have followed the aforesaid guidelines or the Wednesbury test. When it was re-appreciating evidence and on the strength of it, was reaching to different conclusions and ultimately it has substituted the punishment, it was incumbent upon it to follow aforesaid guidelines. When it was re-appreciating evidence and on the strength of it, was reaching to different conclusions and ultimately it has substituted the punishment, it was incumbent upon it to follow aforesaid guidelines. It was only upon finding that the decision of the authority was illegal or that it was based on material not relevant or relevant material was not taken into consideration or that it was so unreasonable, that no prudent man could have reached to such decision or that it was disproportionate to the nature of the guilt held established so as to shock the judicial conscience, the Tribunal could have substituted the penalty. The entire text of award of the Tribunal does not indicate this." We are unable to agree with these observations." 7. This question has been examined by this Court in case of Rajkot Peoples Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Bharatbhai Hazare reported in 2008 (3) GLR 1937 , where decision of Apex Court in case of Cooper Engineer Ltd has been considered by this Court. The relevant observation made in para 29 is quoted as under: "29. It is equally important to understand the difference between validity of finding and validity of departmental inquiry. The finding is not a part of departmental inquiry. Both are different and distinct entity in entire departmental proceedings. If validity of departmental inquiry is not challenged by workman, then, he can challenge the validity of finding which is separate and independent being a conclusion or result of departmental inquiry. So, both the things can be challenged by workman independently from each other. Therefore, the view taken by Apex Court in JT 2007 (13) SC 404 and JT 2008(2) SC 272, if, it has to be implemented and held that in case when validity of inquiry is not challenged by employee, then, finding cannot be examined by Labour Court, then, it amounts to redundant the amendment of Section 11A which brought into statute with a particular object to remove the effect of decision of Apex Court in case of M/s. Indian Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and another (supra) reported in AIR 1958 SC 130 . Therefore, looking to the decision of Apex Court in case of The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Therefore, looking to the decision of Apex Court in case of The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd., (supra) what would be the legal effect of amendment of Section 11A, Labour Court has certainly power to examine the finding given by inquiry officer independently irrespective of challenge against departmental inquiry and Labour Court can differ with the conclusion of inquiry officer like an appellate authority. If this decision of The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd., (supra) of Apex Court, where, the entire law has been discussed after following the various decisions on the subject is binding as a precedent, otherwise, if it is not followed in light of recent two decisions of Apex Court, then, it amounts to restoring the original position which was prevailing prior to decision of Apex Court in M/s. Indian Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and another (supra) reported in AIR 1958 SC 130 , then, amendment of Section 11A becomes totally redundant, that is not the ratio laid down by Apex Court in aforesaid two recent decisions as referred above. There is no provisions in Industrial Disputes Act made that how the departmental inquiry is to be conducted and what procedure is to be followed. But, in Industrial Law, the procedure to be followed in departmental inquiry has been developed on the basis of various decisions given by Apex Court being an unwritten law and decision of Apex Court being a binding precedent being a law of land binding to all the Courts of India. Therefore, in case when preliminary issue decided by Labour Court in respect to legality of departmental inquiry either way, there is no justification by either party to challenge in higher forum just to stall the final adjudication or further proceedings pending before Labour Court. Such order on preliminary issue relating to departmental inquiry is not adversely affected either way to either party and it is not cut the legal right of either party which is necessary to be examined or compelled to examine by this Court and that is how, the observations made by Apex Court in case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd., (supra) would a ratio binding to this Court and must have to be followed any decision contrary to the aforesaid decision is not binding to other Courts." 8. Learned advocate Mr. Learned advocate Mr. Pandya also submitted that Industrial Tribunal has rightly re-appreciated evidence led in departmental inquiry and come to conclusion that misconduct which has been alleged against respondent workman is not proved. However, looking to evidence on record and acquittal in criminal case of respondent, punishment has been modified to set aside punishment of putting him into original scale of driver category by order dated 3/8/2004. No arrears or difference of salary paid to workman by Industrial Tribunal. 9. Therefore, according to him, Industrial Tribunal has sufficiently taken care to impose some punishment denying arrears and difference of salary for a period of more than four years and to restore original salary/scale in favour of respondent workman. Therefore, he submitted that no interference would require because Industrial Tribunal has not committed any error. 10. I have considered submission made by both learned advocates and considering reasoning given by Industrial Tribunal in para 8. According to Industrial Tribunal, workman has not challenged validity and legality of departmental inquiry before Industrial Tribunal, but finding and punishment order was challenged by workman. The Industrial Tribunal after re-appreciating entire evidence led in departmental inquiry has come to conclusion that looking to evidence of Shri Jani, who was victim in absence of medical certificate about injury and in absence of medical evidence about consuming liquor by workman. The complaint was filed by Mr. Jani. Even charge sheet was also issued after direction given by Depot Manager. According to Industrial Tribunal, allegation have been made against workman respondent is not proved against workman and in criminal case respondent workman has been declared acquittal. Looking to such kind of evidence led in departmental inquiry, industrial Tribunal has come to conclusion that punishment of putting him in minimum scale of driver category by order dated 3/8/2004 being a harsh punishment, which require to be modified while denying arrears and difference of salary and if punishment order is to be set aside, then it will meet end of justice between both parties. The Industrial Tribunal has exercised power u/s 11 A of I. D. Act 1947. The Industrial Tribunal has exercised power u/s 11 A of I. D. Act 1947. On that basis, Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine validity and legality of finding and re-appreciate evidence led in departmental inquiry and then to differ with conclusion of Inquiry Officer and examine it in light of evidence led in departmental inquiry that looking to misconduct in question as well as gravity of misconduct, punishment imposed by competent authority is proportionate or not? 11. This power has been properly and rightly exercised in this case, for that, industrial Tribunal is having jurisdiction. According to my opinion, industrial Tribunal has not committed any jurisdictional error in passing such award which in substance modifying punishment, which kept balance between both parties. Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Naidu can not be accepted. Hence, rejected. 12.The Industrial Tribunal has not committed any error which would require interference by this Court while exercising power under article 227 of Constitution of India. In view of above observation and direction, present petition is disposed of.