JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This petition is directed against a revisional order dated 5th of October 2007 by which the eviction suit of the respondent landlord has been decreed. 3. The relevant facts are that the respondent landlord is the owner of House No. 65, Khatriyana Mohalla in Jhansi where the petitioners were the tenants of a shop at Rs. 500/- per month. The landlord filed Suit No. 66 of 1997 against the petitioner tenants with the allegation that the disputed premises was built in 1991 where both the petitioners were taken as tenants in 1992 when a rent note was also executed between them. However, the petitioners fell in arrears of rent from January 1997 and neither paid the arrears nor vacated the premises despite notice dated 26.6.1997, therefore, the necessity to file the suit. 4. The petitioner No. 1 did not file his written statement and proceedings against him were taken ex parte vide order dated 28th of January 1998. Petitioner No. 2 filed his written statement, admitting the tenancy but denied that it was a new construction and U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable as the building was built about 20 years ago. It was further stated that when the landlord refused to accept the rent, it was sent by money order which was also refused and therefore, rent was deposited under Section 30 of the Act in Misc. Case No. 87 of 1997 and after filing of the suit, it is being deposited in the Court. The service for notice was denied and it was also pleaded that the landlord had taken a premium of Rs. 1.5 lacs when the house was given on rent but no receipt was given. 5. After the parties had led their evidence, the trial Court disbelieved the documentary evidence filed on behalf of the landlord, including the rent note to prove that it was a new construction whereafter it went on to hold that the Act was applicable. It further held that the notice was duly served, but went on to hold that though rent of five months was due, it was tendered to the landlord within 30 days of the notice through money order which was refused and therefore, the tenant was not a defaulter and dismissed the suit. 6. It further held that the notice was duly served, but went on to hold that though rent of five months was due, it was tendered to the landlord within 30 days of the notice through money order which was refused and therefore, the tenant was not a defaulter and dismissed the suit. 6. During pendency of the revision, the landlord filed certain more documents in order to prove that the building was newly constructed and not covered by the Act. After relying upon various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court, the Revisional Court held that it had the jurisdiction to examine the question whether the Act did apply to the disputed premises and went on to hold that it was a new construction on the basis of the map, notice, assessment, rent note etc. and after holding that the Act did not apply, on the basis of documents already filed in the trial Court, it decreed the suit and thus this petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Revisional Court could not have set aside the findings of fact based on record returned by the trial Court and at best, he could have remanded the matter for decision afresh. He has relied upon a Single Judge judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Sri Rohit Rastogi v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur, (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 37903 of 1998) decided on 14.12.2004 and the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani (Smt.) and another, 2007 (8) SCC 609 . 8. No doubt, normally a Revisional Court is precluded from re-examining a question of fact and taking a contrary view without there being any jurisdictional error involved. In the present case, the question whether it was a new building and Act No. 30 was applicable, is a mixed question of law and fact, as held by the Apex Court in Mundri Lal (supra). The Revisional Court after relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Swarup v. Lilawati, 1980 ALJ 651 and two decisions of this Court rendered in the cases of Om Prakash v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Bijnor, 1984 (2) ARC 58 and Bhopal Singh v. VII Addl. The Revisional Court after relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Swarup v. Lilawati, 1980 ALJ 651 and two decisions of this Court rendered in the cases of Om Prakash v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Bijnor, 1984 (2) ARC 58 and Bhopal Singh v. VII Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur, 1988 ARC 309, has held that such a jurisdictional fact can be examined in a revision under Section 25 of the Small Causes Court Act. The learned Single Judge in the case of Rohit Rastogi (supra) after taking note of various decisions but without expressing any opinion, held that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, the Revisional Court could not come to a different conclusion and if it deferred with the findings recorded by the trial Court, it should remand the matter to it. A perusal of the said judgment shows that no question of jurisdictional fact was involved in that case. However, in the present case apart from the jurisdictional fact involved, the parties were allowed to lead additional evidence which was taken on record and after hearing the parties on that question, the Court has rendered a finding which on the strength of the evidence on record, does not appear to be vitiated. Once the petitioner had entered his evidence in rebuttal of the additional evidence and has failed to show how he has suffered by the fact that the case was not remanded, he cannot raise such a plea now. Accordingly, the argument cannot be accepted. 9.It is then urged that the finding of the Revisional Court about the error in the map and the plan submitted is perverse and even the assessment order w.e.f. 1991-92 was passed during the pendency of the proceedings in 2000. 10. The issue has to be examined in the background of the fact that the landlord had pleaded that the shop was constructed in 1991, apart from a bald denial by the tenant, no date of construction was mentioned. The landlord had produced certified copy of the map, the notice and certified copy of the assessment order apart from the receipt of payment and on this basis appellate Court retuned a finding that the first assessment of the disputed shop was made in 1991. The landlord had produced certified copy of the map, the notice and certified copy of the assessment order apart from the receipt of payment and on this basis appellate Court retuned a finding that the first assessment of the disputed shop was made in 1991. The Apex Court in several decisions including in the case of Saleem v. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar and others, 1998 (2) ARC 617 has held that in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, construction of a building is deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction on the date on which the first assessment comes into effect. After finding that the assessment was made in the year 1991-92, the Court rightly held that that was the date of completion of the building. Merely because the assessment order was passed in the year 2000 would not ipso facto mean that it is motivated. The petitioner has not been able to point out any evidence to show that the assessment order was either fabricated or motivated. Therefore, the argument cannot be accepted. 11. Lastly, it is urged that the Court below had wrongly placed the burden of proving the rent note on the petitioner and therefore, the judgment is vitiated. 12. It is not denied that the landlord had pleaded that the rent note was written in the handwriting of petitioner No. 1 who did not file any written statement nor entered the witness box to deny the execution of the rent note. It also found that one of the attesting witnesses had also proved the rent note to have been executed by petitioner No. 1 and after considering the fact that both parties admitted that the shop was taken on rent on 1.7.1992, it went on to hold that the rent note was proved and the tenant could not bring any evidence including in the nature of an opinion of an expert to disprove it. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the burden was placed upon the petitioner. Therefore, this argument also has no substance. 13. No other point has been urged. 14. For the reasons above, this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected. ————