JUDGMENT N. ANANDA, J.—The appellant was the complainant in C.C. No. 34945/2001 initiated for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the Act’), alleging that respondent/accused had drawn a cheque favouring complainant for a sum of Rs. 70,000/- to discharge legally recoverable debt; on presentation, cheque was dishonoured; statutory notice caused by the complainant to accused was refused. 2. The accused while not disputing signature on the cheque had contended that the complainant, frequently visiting his house must have stolen blank signed cheque from the house of accused. The accused also contended that on 6.11.1996, he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 70,000/- from the complainant by pledging his L.I.C. Policy as a collateral security; during the month of October 1999, he settled entire loan amount with interest. After entire loan was discharged, the complainant demanded a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as penal interest. When the accused refused to pay, complainant has used stolen cheque to initiate complaint before trial Court. The accused has denied the receipt of statutory notice. The accused has contended that he had shifted his residence from house bearing No. 124, 20th Cross, K.R. Layout, J.P. Nagar 6th Phase, Bangalore to house bearing No. 78, 19th Cross, 20th Main, S.M.S. Layout, 5th Phase, J.P. Nagar, Bangalore 560078. 3. The learned trial Judge on appreciation of evidence has disbelieved the version of accused that complainant had stolen the cheque from his house. The learned trial Judge has also disbelieved the version of accused that he had paid entire loan of Rs. 70,000/-, which he had borrowed from the complainant. The learned trial Judge has held that complainant had caused statutory notice and accused avoided service of notice, therefore, there is deemed service of notice. The learned trial Judge convicted accused. The accused challenged the judgment of conviction in Criminal Appeal No. 671/2003. 4. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction by holding that there was no service of notice on accused, therefore, there was no cause of action for the complainant to initiate complaint. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court has found fault with the learned trial Judge, by holding that postal cover marked as Ex. P6. bears an endorsement “left the address” and there was no deemed service of notice. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court has found fault with the learned trial Judge, by holding that postal cover marked as Ex. P6. bears an endorsement “left the address” and there was no deemed service of notice. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court has relied on the admission made by the complainant that accused had left his previous house about one year prior to the date of examination of complainant before the trial Court. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court has referred to the provisions of General Clauses Act, which is not relevant to facts and circumstance of the case. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court holding that there is no proper service reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted accused. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court did not bother to answer other points, which were considered and decided by the learned trial Judge. Therefore, the complainant has filed this appeal. 5. I have heard Sri Raghavendra, K., learned counsel for the complainant and Miss Nethravathi, learned counsel for accused and I have been through the evidence and judgments of the Courts below. 6. The statutory notice was sent to accused under a registered post (RP-AD) on 6.6.2001. The same was returned. The returned postal envelope and acknowledgment was marked as Ex. P6. 7. As could be seen from the contents of Ex. P6, notice was sent to the respondent/accused, namely, Goverdhan Das, residing at No. 124, K.R. Layout, 20th Cross, 6th Phase, J.P. Nagar, Bangalore 560078. 8. As could be seen from postal endorsement, concerned postman had visited address of respondent on 7.6.2001, 8.6.2001, 9.6.2001, 11.6.2001 and 12.6.2001, on which day he had made an endorsement “left the intimation”. If addressee had left address, the concerned postman would not have made an endorsement that he had visited address of respondent on 7.6.2001, 8.6.2001, 9.6.2001, 11.6.2001 and 12.6.2001. Therefore, observation of learned Judge of I Appellate Court that concerned postman had made an endorsement as “left the address” is erroneous. 9. It is true, complainant during cross-examination on 14.11.2002 has admitted accused was not residing in the previous address and he had vacated previous house about one year prior to that date. The accused might have vacated his house on 6.6.2001. 9. It is true, complainant during cross-examination on 14.11.2002 has admitted accused was not residing in the previous address and he had vacated previous house about one year prior to that date. The accused might have vacated his house on 6.6.2001. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court relying on this admission has held that complainant being fully aware of shifting of residence by accused had deliberately sent notice to earlier address of accused. As already stated, complainant was examined on 14.11.2002. The complainant has deposed that accused had vacated his house in occupation about one year prior to 14.11.2002,which relates to 14.11.2001. Therefore, date of accused vacating his earlier house relates to 14.11.2001. The statutory notice was sent on 6.6.2001. As already stated, the concerned postman had visited the house of accused on 7.6.2001, 8.6.2001, 9.6.2001, 11.6.2001 and 12.6.2001. The learned Judge of 1 Appellate Court without properly reading and understanding postal endorsement has recorded an ambiguous finding. 10. The accused has relied on lease deed purporting to be executed by his landlord in respect of house bearing No. 78, 19th Cross, 20th Main Road, Chengama Raja Garden, J.P. Nagar V Phase, Bangalore 560078. This lease deed was executed on 20.4.2001. The lease deed is written on a half sheet of paper. The contents of lease deed do not inspire confidence. The person mentioned as landlord was not examined before the trial Court. Even if contents of lease deed are accepted on their face value, we do not find date of delivery of premises to accused either on 20.4.2001 or on a subsequent date. 11. At this juncture, it is relevant to state that accused had relied on Ex. D2. The accused has not deposed that he had taken delivery of possession of premises on 20.4.2001. The accused was examined on 20.9.2003. The accused has contended that he vacated his earlier house on and after execution of alleged lease deed as per Ex. D2. The accused has not produced documentary evidence to show that he had left his previous house on 20.4.2001. In the normal course, if a person were to shift his residence, he has to necessarily inform the same to domestic gas supplier, telephone department and intimate postal department regarding change of postal address. The accused has not produced a scrap of paper to prove that he had shifted his residence on 20.4.2001. In the normal course, if a person were to shift his residence, he has to necessarily inform the same to domestic gas supplier, telephone department and intimate postal department regarding change of postal address. The accused has not produced a scrap of paper to prove that he had shifted his residence on 20.4.2001. The lease deed as per Ex. D2 is a concocted document. The Courts below have disbelieved the document marked as Ex. D2. 12. Thus from the above, it is clear that statutory notice as per Ex. P7 was sent to correct address of accused. The accused was not available at the time of delivery of registered post. The postman had visited the house of respondent on 7.6.2001, 8.6.2001, 9.6.2001, 11.6.2001 and 12.6.2001, on which day he had left intimation, which is clear from endorsement made in Ex. P6. As already stated, the learned Judge of I Appellate Court has misread this endorsement. Even in the copy of LIC policy held by accused, marked as Ex. D1, address of accused is shown as No. 124, 20th Cross, K.R. Layout, 6th Phase, J.P. Nagar, Bangalore 78. Therefore, finding of learned Judge of I Appellate Court that there was no proper service of notice cannot be accepted. The notice sent to accused was returned, as it was not claimed by accused. 13. In a decision reported in 1999 (8) Supreme 608 (in the case of K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another), the Supreme Court has held: “On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by “giving a notice” in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such “giving”, the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days “of the receipt” of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that “giving notice” in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer in the correct address.” 14. It is, therefore, clear that “giving notice” in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer in the correct address.” 14. Now adverting to the defence of accused, I find that accused has taken inconsistent and contradictory stands. 15. In a decision reported in AIR 2010 SC 1898 (in the case of Rangappa vs. Mohan), the Supreme Court has held: “The presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheques is largely in nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of ‘preponderance of probabilities’. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.” In the case on hand, accused has disputed that cheque was not issued to discharge legally recoverable debt. According to accused, he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 70,000/- from the complainant on 6.11.1996 by pledging his L.I.C. Policy as a collateral security and he was demanded to pay interest at 5% per month. In his evidence by way of affidavit, D.W. 1 has stated that he had settled entire loan amount during the month of October 1999 and obtained an acknowledgment dated 6.11.1996, duly signed by the complainant. This document was neither confronted to complainant nor it bears date on which loan was discharged. On the other hand, Ex. D1 gives an impression that on 6.11.1996, accused had pledged his L.I.C. Policy to secure loan of Rs. 70,000/-. The so-called endorsement at Ex. D1. does not relate to transaction between the complainant and accused. The endorsement reads “this policy is with SLMCB (Sri Lakshmi Mahila Co-operative Bank) from 27.10.1999.” The endorsement made on Ex. D1, does not convey any meaning. Above all, L.I.C. Policy obtained on the life of a person cannot be secured to raise loan. L.I.C. Policy obtained by a person is not a transferable security. Therefore, accused has miserably failed to prove plea of discharge. 16. The second version of accused that complainant had stolen a cheque from the house of accused is ridiculous. The accused has not made it clear as to why he had left signed blank cheque in his house. The accused does not give date on which he noticed theft of his signed blank cheque. The accused has no case that contents of cheque were filled up by the complainant. Therefore, theory of complainant stealing blank signed cheque from the house of accused and thereafter filling up contents of cheque for presentation and making use of the same to initiate complaint is totally absurd. Thus, defence raised by accused is hardly sufficient to rebut presumption available to complainant under Section 139 of the Act. 17. Therefore, theory of complainant stealing blank signed cheque from the house of accused and thereafter filling up contents of cheque for presentation and making use of the same to initiate complaint is totally absurd. Thus, defence raised by accused is hardly sufficient to rebut presumption available to complainant under Section 139 of the Act. 17. From the above discussion, it is clear that accused had untenable defence to avoid consequences of dishonour of cheque. In fact, the accused had short-lived success before I Appellate Court. At this juncture, it is necessary to reiterate that short-lived success of accused was due to misconception of facts by the learned Judge of I Appellate Court. Therefore, I hold that complainant has proved that accused has drawn disputed cheque in favour of complainant to discharge legally recoverable debt. On presentation, cheque was dishonoured. The complainant had caused statutory notice to the address in which accused was residing. The complaint was filed within period of limitation. The learned trial Judge on proper appreciation of evidence has held accused guilty of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. The learned Judge of I Appellate Court on misconception of fact and law reversed the judgment of trial Court. Therefore, the judgment of I Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 18. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER The appeal is accepted. The judgment made in Criminal Appeal No. 671/2003, on the file of XX Addl. City Civil Judge at Bangalore is set aside. The judgment of trial Court in C.C. No. 34945/2001, on the file of XVI A.C.M.M., at Bangalore is restored.