Rubi Devi Wife Of Sri Anil Tiwari v. The State Of Bihar
2010-02-03
DIPAK MISRA, RAVI RANJAN
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT Ravi Ranjan, J. 1. This application has been filed for condoning the delay of about 59 days in preferring this appeal. Heard the parties. On being satisfied with the sufficiency of cause shown, this Interlocutory Application is allowed and the delay in preferring this appeal is hereby condoned. Now, we proceed to consider this appeal on its merit. The writ petitioner-appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 4.2.2009 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1691 of 2009, has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The writ petitioner-appellant filed C.W.J.C. No. 1691 of 2009 for quashing the order dated 19.11.2008 (Annexure-9? to the writ application) passed by the District Collector, Bhojpur, Ara, whereby the employment of Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 on contractual basis as Panchayat Shiksha Mitra, was directed to be kept intact and continued. In addition to that, petitioner also sought a relief that Respondent authorities be directed to appoint the petitioner as Panchayat Teacher/Shiksha Mitra. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the short facts of this case are as follows: An advertisement was made vide Resolution No. 1079 dated 20.6.2002 for employment on the post of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra on contract basis in Nawadaben Gram Panchayat. Guidelines for such employment on contractual basis have been notified under the Resolution dated 21st of June, 2002, published in the Extraordinary Gazette of the State of Bihar. There were altogether six such posts, out of which three were for General Category. Petitioner alongwith others had duly applied for the same, however, she could not be appointed as six other persons including Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 were given employment by the concerned authorities. However, complaints were made against such appointment and an enquiry was made by the Block Development Officer, Udwant Nagar. Thereafter, appointment of Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 was cancelled by the concerned authorities. Subsequent thereof, the aggrieved Respondent Nos. 1 1 to 14 made a representation before the District Collector, Bhojpur, for re-consideration of their case. The District Collector, Bhojpur (Respondent No. 2) directed the District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, to re-examine/verify the matter and submit a report, who appointed the Deputy District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, as Enquiry Officer.
Subsequent thereof, the aggrieved Respondent Nos. 1 1 to 14 made a representation before the District Collector, Bhojpur, for re-consideration of their case. The District Collector, Bhojpur (Respondent No. 2) directed the District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, to re-examine/verify the matter and submit a report, who appointed the Deputy District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer aforesaid, thereafter, submitted his report and ultimately, the Respondent No. 2, passed the impugned order as contained in Annexure-9?, whereby he had directed that the employment of the Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 would continue. 4. The learned Judge had dismissed the writ petition completely disagreeing with the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the prescribed educational qualification for employment in question was matriculation only and as such the persons having superior qualifications ought not have been appointed. According to the case of the writ petitioner-appellant, had the concerned authorities confined themselves to the prescribed educational qualifications which was only matriculation, then, since the writ petitioner was having higher marks in matriculation, the selected persons would have been beyond the zone of consideration. Learned Judge has held that the requirement of matriculation was the minimum educational qualifications and the persons with superior educational qualification could always have been considered. 5. We have heard the parties and perused the records of this case. 6. The Respondent No. 3, the District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, Ara, has filed counter affidavit and the petitioner has also filed reply thereof. 7. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner-appellant that as per the guidelines issued for the purpose by the State, the basis of selection was to be the marks obtained by the candidate in matriculation or equivalent examination. However, the concerned Committee, in violation of the guidelines aforesaid, had taken the superior qualifications, as held by the Respondent Nos. 11 to 14, in consideration for the purpose of employment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra. On complaint made by some persons, the Block Development Officer, Udwant Nagar, Bhojpur, held an inquiry and found that there had been violation of the guidelines and, thus, the employment of the concerned Respondents were directed to be cancelled. However, Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 continued on their posts despite such communication by the Block Development Officer, Udwant Nagar, Bhojpur, to the Block Education Extension Officer, Udwant Nagar, Bhojpur.
However, Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 continued on their posts despite such communication by the Block Development Officer, Udwant Nagar, Bhojpur, to the Block Education Extension Officer, Udwant Nagar, Bhojpur. Thereafter, representations were made and an inquiry was held by the Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Nawadaben, Bhojpur, who submitted his report, wherein he had also recorded finding that the concerned appointment of Shiksha Mitra was made in violation of the guidelines. Same was the result when the matter was again enquired by the Block Education Extension Officer, Udwant Nagar himself and thereafter the order for cancelling the employment of Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 was issued and the same was communicated to the persons concerned. They, in their turn, made a representation to the Respondent No. 2, the District Collector, Bhojpur, for re-consideration of their case. Respondent No. 2, directed the District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, to re-examine the issue, who appointed the Deputy District Superintendent of Education, Bhojpur, as an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer had also found the irregularity/illegality in his report as the guidelines were not followed. It is submitted that despite the above facts, the Respondent No. 2 had allowed the Respondent Nos. 1 1 to 14 to continue on their posts. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the State submitted that the concerned employment was of the year 2003. The writ petitioner-appellant, if aggrieved, could have agitated the issue earlier as she was refused employment. However, she had approached this Court after a lapse of about six years. There is no explanation either in the writ petition or even in the memorandum of appeal for approaching this Court after such delay. It had also been submitted that the minimum qualification for appointment of Panchayat Shiksha Mitra was matriculation with 45% of marks. Learned Counsel drew attention of this Court towards the report of the Deputy District Superintendent of Education, as contained in Annexure-8? to show that there had been fatal lacuna in the earlier inquiry which was ex-parte. The Enquiry Officer has stated that, if the entire proceeding of appointment was in violation of the guidelines, then it is startling as to why the appointment of only four, out of six Shiksha Mitras were cancelled.
to show that there had been fatal lacuna in the earlier inquiry which was ex-parte. The Enquiry Officer has stated that, if the entire proceeding of appointment was in violation of the guidelines, then it is startling as to why the appointment of only four, out of six Shiksha Mitras were cancelled. The Enquiry Officer had also found that the exparte enquiry had led to the cancellation of the employment of the four Panchyat Shiksha Mitra which was not correct and had also recommended that their continuation on the concerned posts could be considered. The Respondent No. 2, had recorded in the impugned order that the then Sukh Suvidha Samiti had prepared the merit list on the basis of higher qualification due to the reason that the majority of the candidates were having such qualifications and many of the other candidates having matriculation certificates could not produce the original certificates. 9. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 submitted that one Kavi Tiwari had made a complaint leading to the cancellation of the employment of the Respondents concerned, however, the petitioner-appellant had never agitated this matter before any authority. The petitioner whose employment was refused by the authorities in the year 2003, could have well agitated the matter in time, however, she had chosen to file the writ petition before this Court after six years. This eloquently exposes the delay and laches on part of the petitioner. Quite apart from above, even on perusal of Annexure- 1? to the writ petition, it would appear that many other candidates were having higher marks in matriculation than the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner could not have claimed her employment on the basis of higher marks obtained in matriculation, to the exclusion of others. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that now new rules for employment and service conditions of Panchayat Primary Teachers have been framed in 2006 and the minimum qualification for appointment as the Panchayat Primary Teachers has been fixed to be Higher Secondary or Intermediate or any other equivalent examination. 10. Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that the writ petitioner-appellant was refused employment as far back as in the year 2003 but she never agitated the matter either before the authority concerned or by approaching this Court on earlier occasion.
10. Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that the writ petitioner-appellant was refused employment as far back as in the year 2003 but she never agitated the matter either before the authority concerned or by approaching this Court on earlier occasion. That apart, she had also not been able to demonstrate either before the writ court or even before this Court that she was the best qualified among all the candidates appeared so that she could have been appointed. However, this being an intracourt appeal, the appellant was required to bridge the crater of delay and laches, created by herself as she has approached this Court after a lapse of about six years. There is no statement explaining such unreasonable delay so that it could be held that she is not guilty of laches The concerned respondents have remained in employment for more than six years by now and in the meantime new rules have also come fixing minimum qualifications to be equivalent to the Intermediate. In our opinion, there has been negligence on the part of the appellant as she, by not approaching any authority or court against the refusal of appointment for about six years, it has to be inferred that she has given up her claim and now the rights of the concerned respondents should not be allowed to be disturbed due to lack of any reasonable explanation for the delay. In the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Digambar, reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1991, their Lordships of the Apex Court had held as under: 12.xxxxxxxxx Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 11.
11. Thus, in view of aforesaid premises, this Court finds that the appellant has measurably failed in making out a fit case for interference by this Court in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 13. I agree