JUDGMENT 1. Writ Petitioner a private Housing Co-operative Society formed by employees of the Indian Telephone Industries, has presented this petition for questioning the legality of the notification issued by the State Government exercising its powers under Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (for short `the Act’) dropping acquisition proceedings in respect of an extent of 1 acre 22 guntas of land in Sy.No.20/10A of Yellukunte Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and Bangalore District. 2. It is for quashing of this notification, the present writ petition is filed seeking the following prayer:- “Issue a writ of certiorari or any other order or direction as deemed fit, quashing the Notification, denotifying, the land in Sy.No.20/10A measuring 1 acre 22 guntas under No.RD/107/ACB/2007 dated 1.09.2010 (Annexure-A) passed by the 1st respondent.” 3. Petition is on the premise that the subject land figuring in the withdrawal notification at Annexure-A was subject matter of a preliminary notification dated 28.1.1985 issued by the State Government proposing to acquire an extent of 57 acres of land in this village comprised in different survey numbers for the benefit of forming a layout by the petitioner-society so that the society can develop that land and carve out sites and distribute it amongst the members of the society. 4. While the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, it appears was followed by a Section 6 (1) notification dated 24.01.1986 and it is further followed by passing of an award on 24.8.1987, it is also the further version of the petitioner that in terms of the provisions of Section 16 of the Act as amended by the Karnataka Act, a notification under Section 16(2) of the Act, was also issued by the State Government, evidencing taking possession of two parcels of land, one being the subject matter of Annexure-A and another parcel of land measuring 36 guntas and 1 gunta of Phut Kharab land located in Sy.No.20/8 of the village as per the notification issued vide Annexure-E and this being followed up by yet another official memorandum dated 8.7.2004, copy at Annexure F to the petition, including that the possession of subject lands i.e., 1 acre 22 guntas in Sy.No.20/10A has been handed over to the petitioner-society. 5. 5. It is in the background of such pleadings that the petitioner has approached this Court seeking for quashing of the notification under Annexure-A contending that the government has no power to issue the withdrawal notification under Section 48 of the Act after all such developments; that the government could not have exercised its power for dropping the acquisition proceedings in respect of 1 acre 22 guntas of land, when once the government in the first instance has taken possession of the subject lands from the land owners in the year 2000 and also having handed over possession to the petitioner-society in the year 2004 and therefore, with the petitioner having virtually become the owner of the land and the petitioner-society having deposited the amount of compensation payable to the land owners before the acquisition officer for the entire extent of 57 acres etc., there was no way of the government exercising power under Section 48(1) of the Act; that it is without jurisdiction and that the notification deserves to be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari etc. 6. Notices had been issued to respondents. Respondent No.1 – the State of Karnataka and respondent Nos.2 to 4 claiming to be the legal heirs of the original kathedar one Muniswamy Reddy, and others, who claim interest under them represented by counsel. Respondent No.1 State Government is represented by Sr. Venkatesh Dodderi, learned AGA and respondents 2 to 10 are represented by counsel Smt. Sandhya Prabhu. Statement of objections have been filed on behalf of the State Government. 7. The most important aspect is that the State Government has taken the stand that the State has neither taken possession of the subject lands nor had it handed over actual possession of the subject lands to the petitioner-society and therefore, it is not as though the State Government has been denuded of its powers under Section 48 (1) of the Act. 8. Though no counter has been filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 20, submission of Smt. Sandhya Prabhu, learned counsel for these respondents is that the respondents are very much in possession of the lands, they have remained in possession all along and earlier proceedings before this Court is proof of the lands having remained in their possession. 9. I have heard Sri. 9. I have heard Sri. G.L. Vishwanath, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Venkatesh Dodderi, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and Smt. Sandhya Prabhu, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 10. 10. Sri.G.L. Vishwanath, learned counsel for the petitioner has made very vehement and spirited submissions to contend that the said notification is per se bad in law; that the State Government could not have exercised its power under Section 48 (1) of the Act, once the land is vested in the State particularly, after the State Government took possession of subject lands as per Annuexure-E and even thereafter having handed over possession of the very land in favour of the petitioner-Society as per Annexure-F in the year 2004, the State Government can never exercise its power under Section 48 (1) of the Act and therefore, the notification suffers from this basic illegality. 11. In addition Sri.G.L. Vishwanath, learned counsel for the petitioner has very strongly urged that the State Government could not have unilaterally embarked upon to issue notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act, particularly, having regard to the antiquity of the acquisition proceedings being of the year 1985 and exercising power under Section 48 (1) of the Act for dropping the proceedings, after a lapse of about 25 years is not a bona fide or proper exercise of the statutory power, but more importantly the petitioner-society having not been put on notice and having not been given opportunity to make its stand clear and putforth any objections if it intends, to the issue of notification under Section 48 of the Act, the notification also suffers from the vice of having being issued in violation of principles of natural justice. 12. Learned Counsel would place strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE GOVERNMENT HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2001 SC 437 . 13. By drawing attention to the examination of this case, submission of Sri. 12. Learned Counsel would place strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE GOVERNMENT HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2001 SC 437 . 13. By drawing attention to the examination of this case, submission of Sri. Vishwanath, is that the petitioner-society being in the position of a beneficiary for whose benefit the subject lands were sought to be acquired and the acquisition of lands being in Yellakunte Village, Begur hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and having got concluded substantially even in the year 1987 and insofar as the present lands are concerned in the year 2004, there was no way for the State Government to have issued a notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act, without even showing the courtesy of providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner; that in the above cited judgment, the Supreme Court has very strongly deprecated the practice of not keeping the beneficiary informed, before embarking upon issuing of notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act for withdrawing from acquisition proceedings; that the Supreme Court has held that though the writ petition filed by the State Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association had come to be dismissed both by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had affirmed the dismissal, but nevertheless the Supreme Court had occasion to allow the appeal only for the reason that the beneficiary had not been given an opportunity of hearing before embarking upon Section 48 (1) notification and the ratio of the case is that the petitioner-society is the beneficiary in whose favour subject lands were proposed to be acquired and withdrawal of notification in respect of 1 acre 22 guntas of lands in the year 2010 and that too without notice to the petitioner-society is clearly within the vice of the law declared by the Supreme Court in this decision and that it can never be sustained in law. 14. 14. Countering such submissions, submission of Sri Venkatesh Dodderi, learned AGA, with reference to the original records is that it is not as though the issue of Section 48 (1) notification was without any opportunity to the petitioner, in fact representative of the petitioner had participated in the proceedings; that the record is a testimony to this and moreover it is submitted that the very President of the Society had also issued a `No Objection Certificate’ for issue of notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act and that the State Government having not taken possession of the subject lands, the lands neither vested in the State Government nor had the State Government lost is power to issue a notification under section 48 (1) of the Act; that the notification is quite valid in law and therefore, there is no merit and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 15. Smt. Sandhya Prabhu, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 10 apart from supporting the submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate also points out that the subject land is located at the periphery of the lands acquired by the society; that the respondent Nos.2 to 4 had remained in possession and that they had never lost possession of the lands and that the acquisition proceedings having not been concluded even after a lapse of 25 years from the initiation of acquisition proceedings, there was no other choice to the State Government except to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of this extent of land; that the action is justified not only on facts but also in law, therefore, urges for the dismissal of the writ petition. 16. I have perused the pleadings and bestowed attention to the submission made at the bar. The earlier orders passed by this Court in the earlier round of writ litigation, respondents claiming under them in terms of the order dated 25.2.2003 passed in W.P.Nos. 2503-11/2003 (LA HS), copy produced at Annexure-H and affirmed by order of the Division Bench dated 23.6.2003 passed in W.A.No.2999-3007/2003 (LA HS), copy produced at Annexure J to the petition , nowhere in the course of the order it is specifically mentioned that the respondents were not in possession not it is indicated that the writ petitioner was in possession. 2503-11/2003 (LA HS), copy produced at Annexure-H and affirmed by order of the Division Bench dated 23.6.2003 passed in W.A.No.2999-3007/2003 (LA HS), copy produced at Annexure J to the petition , nowhere in the course of the order it is specifically mentioned that the respondents were not in possession not it is indicated that the writ petitioner was in possession. In fact the relief sought for by petitioner against the respondents and some others was denied to that effect, only on the ground that a declaratory relief cannot be granted in favour of private persons in writ jurisdiction without examining the factual aspects and was dismissed on the ground that it is not a fit matter for examination in writ jurisdiction but a matter to be examined by the civil court. Such findings do not lead to the inference that either the petitioner was in possession or that the respondents were not in possession. 17. It is not necessary for this Court to go into further merits of the matter, but suffice to accept the version of the State Government, as such position is clearly indicated/evidence in the records also. Insofar as the legal position is concerned scope for exercising the power under Section 48 (1) of the Act is denied, as also the vesting of the subject lands in the State Government and so long as the possession of the lands are not taken, the title of the land remains with the owners and they having been in possession, there is no impediment to the State Government in issuing notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act, withdrawing from acquisition proceedings more so if the land owners have no objection for issue of a notification under section 48 of the Act. 18. Insofar as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association is concerned, the facts of that case clearly indicates that the State Government was acting more with mala fide intention than trying to defeat the social benefit sought to be achieved in favour of Members of State Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association and for whose benefit there was proposal by the authorities to form a layout and to carve out sites to be distributed to such members of the State Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association. 19. 19. In that case, on three occasions, preliminary notifications had been issued and due to some impediment or the other, the earlier two notifications had not been pursued, by following up with the issue of Section 6 (1) notification, even then on the 3rd occasion the State Government had come up with a declaration notwithstanding several impediments in the form of writ petitions by the land owners. The available records revealed that the State had not acted in a bona fide manner in issuing the withdrawal notification, but the relevant records were withheld from the Court and that it was under such circumstances the Supreme Court took the view that the Society for whose benefit the lands were proposed to be acquired should have the minimum courtesy of hearing before embarking upon for withdrawing from acquisition proceeding in respect of the lands of the Society. 20. Such is not the situation in the present case, the acquisition proceedings have been concluded and the government having issued notification under Section 48 (1) of the Act, only in respect of one parcel of land measuring and extent of 1 acre 20 guntas of land, as it was found and as submitted by the learned counsel that there were constructions already put up by these land owners in these lands and it was not possible for the formation of the sites by the petitioner-society. 21. But that apart the judgment of the Supreme Court in my opinion neither can be construed as a declaration of law nor as a discerning ratio laid down, which binds this Court only on the premise that the Supreme Court is a superior court in the hierarchy of our judicial system. 22. A declaration under Section 48 (1) of the Act can be issued only in a situation where the provision is interpreted or the meaning attributed to the word `beneficiary’ is the debate per se in the judgment. The word `beneficiary’ is not a statutory expression found in the Land Acquisition Act and therefore, in the context of the word `beneficiary’ if certain observations are made or even a finding is given, it cannot be construed as a declaration of law and insofar as the aspect of binding precedent with a discernible ratio according to Sri Vishwanath, learned Counsel for the petitioner is to be found in the very first paragraph of the judgment. 23. 23. I find the decision of the Supreme Court is one, more based on the necessity of the State Government to join issue on the question as to whether the beneficiary is entitled to be heard and as to whether the principles of natural justice is attracted and as to whether on a reading of the provisions of Section 48 (1) of the Act, it could be inferred that it is either included or excluded etc. 24. A judgment rendered based on no contest or on a concession is not an authority in law, nor can it be construed as having a ratio decidendi, which happens to be a binding precedent. In either view of the matter, I am of the opinion that there is no declaration of law or discerning ratio laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which can be taken as a binding precedent that emerges from this decision cited supra and therefore, this argument cannot be accepted. 25. Though Sri. Vishwanath, submits that the judgment of the Supreme Court has been followed by several other Benches of this Court, I am not very impressed as in the first instance, neither any law is declared nor a discernible ratio is to be found in the judgment of the Supreme court. Nothing further follows if any more judgments are rendered based on such a premise when there is no such ratio nor a declaration that can constitute a binding authority. 26. Moreover, in the present case, it is clear from the records that the petitioner had ample opportunity before the issue of Section 48 (1) notification and for this reason also the ratio, if any discernible or laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision relied upon by the counsel for the petition is not attracted to the facts of the present case and in the circumstances, there being no merit, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.