Judgment : HARISH TANDON, J This revisional application is directed against an order no. 67 dated April 23, 2007 passed by the learned 5th Bench, City Civil Court at Kolkata in Misc. Case no. 1421 of 2006 whereby dismissing an application for review filed by the petitioner. The opposite party invited tender for supply of 36 k.m. of 80 m.m. diam brass jacketed strainers and other documents. The tender submitted by the petitioner was accepted and a standard contract was executed. The petitioner quoted the rate at Rs. 604 per metre which includes all charges excluding the excise duty and sales tax together with Rs. 74.90 per mrtre as excise duty amounting to Rs. 26,96,400/-. It was further contended that Clause 10 of the Standard Contract provides that taxes, duties, licenses and other charges levied by the authorities in the buyer’s country on the goods shall be borne by the buyer and for such taxes, duties, licenses or levies for which the seller is liable will be reimbursed by the buyer upon due proof of liability and payment which means that the payment of excise duty is admissible only on production of authenticated document. It was the further case of the opposite party that excise duty levied on a brass jacketed strainer is up to Rs. 20 lakhs shall be nil but from Rs. 20 lakhs to Rs. 75 lakhs shall be @ 5% with surcharge @ 5% on excise duty and above Rs. 75 lakhs shall be Rs. 2,88,750/- plus duty on the value exceeding Rs. 75 lakhs @ 15% plus 5% surcharge on excise duty. In view of such governing law relating to excise duty the petitioner has received an excess payment of Rs. 6,13,867/- from the opposite party. On the basis of the aforesaid fact the opposite party filed the suit for recovery of the said sum of Rs. 6,13,867/- together with interest of Rs. 2,76,240.15 p aggregating to Rs. 8,90,107.15 p and decree for further interest @ 18% from the date of institution till its realization. The opposite party initially contested the said suit by filing the written statement, the primary defence taken was that the agreement provides for payment on account of excise duty @ Rs. 74.90 p. per metre. It is further contended that the opposite party cannot resile from the agreement. The opposite party initially contested the said suit by filing the written statement, the primary defence taken was that the agreement provides for payment on account of excise duty @ Rs. 74.90 p. per metre. It is further contended that the opposite party cannot resile from the agreement. It further appears that after the filing of the written statement the petitioner did not take any steps as a consequence whereof the suit was taken up on an ex perte board and was decreed ex parte on 30th July 2002. By virtue of such decree the petitioner was directed to pay the said sum of Rs. 8.90 lacs. On July 17, 2003 the petitioner filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for setting aside of the said ex parte decree upon condonation of delay. The said application for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of dismissal of its application for setting aside the ex parte decree before this Court. The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the said appeal. After the dismissal of the said appeal the petitioner filed an application for review of the said ex parte decree dated July 30, 2002 along with an application for condonation of delay. By an impugned order the court below dismissed both the applications i.e. An application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as an application for review. Assailing such order the petitioner has filed the instant revisional application. It is for the first time contended in the application for review by the petitioner that there was a concluded contract between the parties and the rate, as quoted, was inclusive of excise duty and other taxes and after acceptance of the unit price which is inclusive of excise duty, the opposite party in effect has given a go-bye to clause 10 of the general condition of contract. The said order was further sought to be reviewed on another ground that the opposite party being state cannot stand on twofolds i.e. on one hand accepting the quotation which is inclusive of the excise duty and on the other hand after coming to know that the petitioner has got the exemption on excise duty, asking for refund of the excise duty. Another ground which was taken in the review application is that subsequent to the passing of an ex parte decree the competent authority under the Central Excise Act, 1944 has held that the petitioner has not charged any extra amount as central excise duty. It is admitted by the petitioner that in preferring an application for review there is a delay of 1455 days and it is sought to be contended that the ground on which the review is sought for is subsequent to the passing of the said ex parte decree and the petitioner was pursuing its remedy under Order 9 rule 13 as per the advice of the lawyer and for such the petitioner should not be deprived of its legal right in seeking the review of the ex parte decree. Mr. P. K. Das, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner strenuously argued that the said ex parte decree is not sustainable inasmuch as there is an embargo created under section 11D of Central Excise Act, 1944 wherein the power has been conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise to adjudicate the excise duty collected by the person. He further contends that once an authority is vested with the power to decide and/or adjudicate a particular issue, the civil court’s jurisdiction is impliedly taken away. He relies upon a judgment of the apex court in case of Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs. LML Ltd. (Scooter Unit), Kanupr reported in (2000) 3 SCC 579 that in the event of realisation of excise duty from its customer the matter is to be dealt with by the Assistant Commissioner and the court should not interfere in such matter. He further argued that the court can take into consideration of a subsequent event while deciding a review application and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Board of Control for Cricket, India & Anr. Vs. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 592 . To the same effect he relies upon a judgment of this Hon’ble Court in case of Bimal Kumar Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Badal Chandra Dutta reported in 1975 (1) CLJ 71. Another argument advanced by Mr. Vs. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 592 . To the same effect he relies upon a judgment of this Hon’ble Court in case of Bimal Kumar Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Badal Chandra Dutta reported in 1975 (1) CLJ 71. Another argument advanced by Mr. Das in support of the revisional application that the lack of jurisdiction connotes error of law and such error is an error on the face of the record and should be corrected as early as possible. To buttress his submission he relies upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in case of Bommadevara Venkatarayulu Naidu vs. Lanka Venkata Rattamma Garu reported in AIR 1939 Madras 293 and also relies upon a judgment of this Court in case of Lahiri & Co. Vs. Makhan Lal Basak reported in AIR 1935 Cal 153. Mr. Das tries to impress that the court having no jurisdiction, if passes a decree, such decree is nothing but nullity and can be assailed even in collateral proceeding. He refers section 11 D of the Central Excise Act 1944 as quoted below: “Section 11D. Duties of excise collected from the buyer to be deposited with the Central Government. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any order or direction of the Appellate Tribunal or any Court or in any other provision of this Act or the rules made there under, every person who is liable to pay duty under this Act or the rules made thereunder, and has collected any amount in excess of the duty assessed or determined and paid on any excisable goods under this Act or the rules made thereunder from the buyer of such goods in any manner as representing duty of excise, shall forthwith pay the amount so collected to the credit of the Central Government. (1A) Every person, who has collected any amount in excess of the duty assessed or determined and paid on any excisable goods or has collected any amount as representing duty of excise on any excisable goods which are wholly exempt or are chargeable to nil rate of duty from any person in any manner, shall forthwith pay the amount so collected to the credit of the Central Government. (2) Where any amount is required to be paid to the credit of the Central government under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), as the case may be, and which has not been so paid, the Central Excise Officer may serve, on the person liable to pay such amount, a notice requiring him to show cause why the said amount, as specified in the notice, should not be paid by him to the credit of the Central Government. (3) The Central Excise Officer shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by the person on whom the notice is served under sub-section (2), determine the amount due from such person (not being in excess of the amount specified in the notice) and thereupon such person shall pay the amount so determined. (4) The amount paid to the credit of the Central Government under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) or sub-section (3), as the case may be, shall be adjusted against the duty of excise payable by the person on finalisation of assessment or any other proceeding for determination of the duty of excise relating to the excisable goods referred to in sub-section (1) and sub-section (1A). (5) Where any surplus is left after the adjustment under sub-section (4), the amount of such surplus shall either be credited to the Fund or, as the case may be, refunded to the person who has borne the incidence of such amount, in accordance with the provisions of section 11B and such person may make an application under that section in such case within six months from the date of the public notice to be issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise for the refund of such surplus amount.” He contends that the power is conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise to determine the dispute on account of any excess money paid on the excisable goods on account of excise duty. He further contends that if an authority is vested with the power to determine conclusively under the Special Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted by necessary implication. Mr. Prasanta Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the state/opposite party vehemently opposed and disputed the contention of the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner did not take any objection as to the lack of jurisdiction in its written statement and thus is precluded from taking such point in review. Mr. Prasanta Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the state/opposite party vehemently opposed and disputed the contention of the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner did not take any objection as to the lack of jurisdiction in its written statement and thus is precluded from taking such point in review. He further contended that the review is not maintainable merely on the basis of a subsequent event. His further contention is that under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and/or rule framed thereunder, there is no express bar upon the civil court to adjudicate the said matter. He strenuously argued that the petitioner assailed the said ex parte decree by taking recourse to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and having unsuccessful up to this Court has resorted the remedy of review with an intention to frustrate the decree passed in favour of the opposite party as long as back in the year 2002. In support of his contention that the review cannot be made merely on the basis of a subsequent event he placed reliance upon a judgment of the apex court in case of M/s. A.C. Estates Vs. Serajuddin & Co. reported in AIR 1966 SC 935 . To substantiate further he placed reliance upon a judgment of this court in case of Sudananda Moral & Ors. Vs. Rakhal Sana & Ors. reported in AIR 1927 Cal 920 and a judgment of the Punjab High Court in case of Lachhmi Narain Balu Vs. Ghisa Bihari & Anr. reported in AIR 1960 Punjab 43. He further placed reliance upon a judgment of Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao Vs. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao reported in 27 Indian Appeals 197. Having considered the submission of the counsels appearing for the respective parties it appears that the opposite party filed a suit simpliciter for recovery of money against the petitioner in the City Civil Court at Calcutta praying for a decree for refund of the excess amount paid on account of an excise duty. The petitioner having appeared in the said suit and initially contested by filing written statement but no specific defence was taken that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been ousted or there is no conferment of the jurisdiction upon the civil court to adjudicate such dispute. The petitioner having appeared in the said suit and initially contested by filing written statement but no specific defence was taken that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been ousted or there is no conferment of the jurisdiction upon the civil court to adjudicate such dispute. The entire defence runs counter to the claim made by the opposite party on facts and my endeavour to find out a slightest whisper as to the lack of jurisdiction failed. The petitioner, though, appeared in the said suit but ultimately did not contest, resulting thereby, the said suit was decreed ex parte. An attempt was made by the petitioner to set aside the said ex parte decree by taking recourse to the provisions contained under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the said application was dismissed by the trial court and an appeal against such order which was filed before this court was also dismissed by the Division Bench. I feel some of the dates are relevant for adjudication of the instant revisional application. The suit was decreed ex parte on 30th July 2002 and an application for setting aside the said ex parte decree was filed on 17th July 2003. However the notice issued by the Central Excise authority was on 28th March 1994 the order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Central excise on 12th February 2004 holding that the petitioner has not collected an extra excise duty. The petitioner received the copy of the said order of March 18, 2004. The application for setting aside the ex parte decree was dismissed on June 28, 2005 and an appeal against the said order was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this court on March 7, 2006. The review application is filed on August 29, 2006. Thus, from the above-noted facts it is not in dispute that the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Central excise was passed when an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was pending. There was no attempt made on the part of the petitioner to bring to the notice of the court about the said fact. It is a settled law that a judgment being a nullity can be assailed even in a collateral proceeding. There was no attempt made on the part of the petitioner to bring to the notice of the court about the said fact. It is a settled law that a judgment being a nullity can be assailed even in a collateral proceeding. The petitioner was keeping silent and did not bring to the notice of the opposite party or of the court that an order has been passed by the competent authority under the Central Excise Act, 1944. It was not even whispered that the impugned decree suffers from lack of jurisdiction. On a bare perusal of section 11 D of the said Act every person who is liable to pay duty under the Act has collected any amount in excess of duty assessed or determined and paid on any excisable goods, shall pay the amount so collected to the credit of the Central Government. It implies that a person who is an assessee under the said Act has a responsibility to pay the tax duly collected and in the event of collection of tax from the buyer in excess to what has been paid such dispute shall be determined by the Central Government Excise Officer. It obviously does not imbibe in it a dispute between a buyer and a seller arising out of a contract. It is well-settled that an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless such jurisdiction is expressly excluded or by necessary implication. In case of an exclusion by necessary implication by a particular Act does only after examination of the scheme of the said Act in order to find out the adequacy and/or sufficiency of the remedies provided therein and also to find out that the determination of all the questions about the right and liability shall be determined by a special forum. If a particular Act contains no mechanism or machinery, certainly a suit lies (see AIR 1969 SC 78 (Dhulabhai Vs. State of MP & Anr.) : AIR 1966 SC 893 (Ram Swarup & Ors. Vs. Shikar Chand & Anr.) : (2000) 3 SCC 689 (State of AP Vs. Manjeti Lazmi Kantha Rao (dead) by L.RS). If a particular Act contains no mechanism or machinery, certainly a suit lies (see AIR 1969 SC 78 (Dhulabhai Vs. State of MP & Anr.) : AIR 1966 SC 893 (Ram Swarup & Ors. Vs. Shikar Chand & Anr.) : (2000) 3 SCC 689 (State of AP Vs. Manjeti Lazmi Kantha Rao (dead) by L.RS). Applying the above test section 11 D of the Central Excise Act does not apply to a contractual field between a seller and a buyer where the dispute relates to a payment of an excess amount on account of excise duties and other levies. This is a suit where the opposite party as plaintiff sought for the relief on account of fraudulent act of the petitioner to receive an excess money on account of excise duty not chargeable and /or leviable, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be said to be ousted by implication of section 11 D of the Central Excise Act 1944. I do not find that Section 11 D of the Central Excise Act 1944 has any manner of application in the instant case. Thus, the judgment relied upon by Mr. Das that lack of jurisdiction is an error apparent on the face of the record has any applicability. There is no dispute to the legal proposition that the review against an order or a decree is maintainable but the same should be considered and decided within the parameters as laid down under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure. There is no dispute to the legal proposition that the review against an order or a decree is maintainable but the same should be considered and decided within the parameters as laid down under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure. It would be profitable to quote order 47 Rule 1 which reads thus : “Application for review of judgment – (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved – (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or hen, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for the review.” A review can be entertained if the person seeking review establishes the discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within its knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or some other sufficient cause. There is no doubt that taking recourse to the setting aside the ex parte decree as envisaged under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code and dismissal of the said application as well as an appeal therefrom does not preclude the person from challenging the said decree either in appeal or if no appeal is filed by way of a review as the consideration in deciding the said application for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code is different than the consideration in dealing with an appeal or the review against the parent order. The jurisdiction conferred upon the court by way of an appeal is wider than the jurisdiction conferred upon the court exercising the review jurisdiction. Before an appellate court the entire matter is at large but when the matter is placed before the court exercising its review jurisdiction the same should be considered within the precincts of the statutory mandates i.e. Order 47 of the CPC. The discovery of a new and important matter or an evidence does not mean the discovery of a matter or evidence subsequent to the passing of the decree otherwise the next sentence “after the exercise of the due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time within the decree was passed” shall render superfluous. The apex court in case of M/s. A.C. Estates (supra) was pleased to hold : “After having made such a declaration it is not open to the Controller (while proceeding to fix rent under the second part of that section) on some ground which supervenes after the date of the order to rescind it. Our attention in this connection is drawn to s. 29 (5) of the Act which gives power to the Controller to review his orders on the conditions laid down under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. But this cannot be a case of review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter, for such matter has to be something which existed at the date of the order and there can be no review of an order which was right when made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event. Section 29(5) further gives power to the Controller to act under S. 151 or S. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 29(5) further gives power to the Controller to act under S. 151 or S. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 152 has no application in the present case for there is no clerical or arithmetical mistake here. Nor can the Controller in our opinion set aside an order which was right when it was made, under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as there is no question in such circumstances of subserving the ends of justice or preventing the abuse of the process of the court. We are therefore of opinion that the Controller had no power to set aside the order that had been made on August 9, 1956 for it was right when it was made. The view taken by the High court in this connection is correct.” The same view is taken by the Privy Council in the case of 27 Indial appeal (supra) in the following: “In the opinion of their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event. It is, however, easy to point out the inaccuracies of the decree as amended.” In the case of Lachhmi Narayan Balu (supra) the Punjab High Court has taken the same view that once a case is decided it is hardly permissible to review that decision merely on the ground that subsequent to the said decision some other decisions have to be taken. As far back as in the year 1997 this Hon’ble Court in the case of Sudananda Moral (supra) was pleased to hold that mere reversal of a judgment which was relied upon while deciding an issue cannot be a ground for review in the event of reversal by an appellate court. Mr. Das has heavily relied upon the judgment in the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India (supra) to the effect that subsequent event can be considered while exercising its review jurisdiction. Mr. Das has heavily relied upon the judgment in the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India (supra) to the effect that subsequent event can be considered while exercising its review jurisdiction. The factual matrix of the said case was that an order was passed by the court on mistaken belief that the board would be represented by its new office bearers and thus all parties were before it and an undertaking given by the senior counsel appearing for the board appeared to the Division Bench of the High Court to be misleading. In such pursuit of the matter the order was reviewed taking into consideration of a subsequent event which was suggestive of the fact that the order sought to be reviewed was passed on mistaken belief and was the outcome of a misleading statement from the bar. I am afraid that this is not the case here. Applicability of the judgment largely depends upon the facts of that case and a little difference in fact may lead to a different conclusion. The judgment of the apex court rendered in the case of M/s. A.C. Estates (supra) is three Judges and was not taken care by subsequent two Judges Bench in case of Board of Control for Cricket, India (supra). It is settled law that the decision rendered by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court is binding upon the inferior court even if a contrary view is taken by a two judges Bench in the latter pronouncement (see AIR 1974 SC 1596 Mattu Lal Vs. Radhe Lal (para 11), AIR 1976 SC 2547 State of UP Vs. Ramchandra Trivedi (para 22), Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar Vs. Trilok Nath Mehrotra (1998) 2 SCC 289 (para 4). Apart from the same as I have already indicated that the apex court in a subsequent judgment [Board of Control for Cricket, India (supra)] carved an exception to the general proposition that if subsequent event is of such magnitude and importance which really negates the recording in the order and is suggestive of the contention raised as to the real intendment of the parties can be taken into consideration. In other words the said subsequent event is taken into consideration in aid of finding out the real intendment of the parties and not otherwise. The apex court in case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Kamal Sengupta & anr. In other words the said subsequent event is taken into consideration in aid of finding out the real intendment of the parties and not otherwise. The apex court in case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Kamal Sengupta & anr. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 was pleased to observe in para 35: “The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are : (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier.” In view of the discussion made above I do not find any merit in the instant revisional application and is liable to be dismissed. However, I make no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties on urgent basis.