Judgment ( 1. ) This is a second appeal u/s 78 (2) of M.P. Cooperative Societies Act (in brief Act) against the order of Additional Registrar Co-operative Societies passed in cross appeals No., 78-66/08 and 78-29/08 before him on 5.2.2009. ( 2. ) According to the brief facts of the case the appellant is a State level Dairy Cooperative Federation whose Respondent is a terminated employee. The respondent was posted as Asst. Manager Production in 1991 in the appellants production unit at Mangaliya Indore where having come to be reported that there is a loss of sixty thousand liter milk valuing Rs. 57,000/ - caused by the respondent to the appellant. On 16.5.97 the respondent was accordingly given a show cause notice and disagreeing with the explanation submitted by him based on the enquiry report received by the appellant the service of the respondent were dispensed with by the order of appellant-1 dated 17.3.99. The respondent challenged the termination order before Honble High Court by Writ Petition No. 1063/2000 which was disposed of by Honble High Court on 29.8.2000 with the direction that the appellant shall take a decision on the representation/appeal submitted before the Federation. The appellant federation accordingly vide its order dated 2.3.2002 maintained the termination order and rejected the appeal of the respondent. A revision against the order was preferred before Cooperative Tribunal u/s 77 (14) which having been registered as 154/02 was disposed of with the finding by the Tribunal on 17.11.2005 that the same was not maintainable. The respondent accordingly u/s 55 (2) filed the service dispute before the Registrar in 2005 which u/s 66 (1) was transferred to Deputy Registrar, Head Quarter. DR in this case registered as 55-203/2007 in his order dated 5.5.2008 set aside the order of the appellant and ordered the reinstatement of the respondent. The appellant as well as the respondent filed cross appeals before the Registrar which have been decided simultaneously as above by the impugned order of Additional Registrar Head Quarter on 5.2.2009. This second appeal is against this order. ( 3. ) Following substantial question were formulated for the consideration of this case - i) Whether the Courts below did not follow the procedure, in deciding the case? ii) Whether the findings of Courts below are perverse and against the documents? iii) Whether without deciding the issue on D.E.Court below can interfere in the quanum of punishment? ( 3. ) Following substantial question were formulated for the consideration of this case - i) Whether the Courts below did not follow the procedure, in deciding the case? ii) Whether the findings of Courts below are perverse and against the documents? iii) Whether without deciding the issue on D.E.Court below can interfere in the quanum of punishment? iv) Whether the first appellate Court did not discharge its duties properly in not deciding the case of appeal No. 78-29/08. ( 4. ) We take up all the 4 questions at a time as they are connected to each other and there are other questions emerging out of discussions which we will take up afterwards. ( 5. ) According to the learned counsel for the appellant Shri. D.K. Saxena the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court seem to be inclined to hold that the departmental enquiry conducted against the respondent was faulty. However, neither of them has taken care to order a fresh enquiry from the stage it was found faulty based on the well established principle of law in this respect. According to the learned counsel for Courts below have simply not formed this view just to avoid their indulgence in the quantum of punishment. Thus, the safer way out that they have invented is to decide the case on merits and set aside the order of the appellant federation. ( 6. ) The learned counsel for the appellant relying on 2009 (2) Weekly Notes 100 page 307 argued that the first appellate Court should have considered the oral and documentary evidence produceed before the lower Court as its level first. Then only he should have passed the impugned order. The argument which the learned counsel forwarded in support of his view that the enquiry should have been held to be faulty is primrily on the ground that since the Managing Director of the Federation was not agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer the ground on which the respondent has been punished were not shown to him. As the same was not done according to him, the case for the lower Courts deserved to be remanded back for fresh enquiry. ( 7. ) We find that the Managing Director has recorded in his order dated 17.3.99 some reasons for her not agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. As the same was not done according to him, the case for the lower Courts deserved to be remanded back for fresh enquiry. ( 7. ) We find that the Managing Director has recorded in his order dated 17.3.99 some reasons for her not agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. According to her it could not be concluded on the basis of the evidence produced before the Enquiry Officer that there was no such shortage of milk. Therefore while recording in her order that she will not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer she only held the respondent responsible for gross negligence therefore while terminating him from the post she has also ordered the respondent to make the payment of Rs. 57,000/- to the appellant. As a matter of course it is not the case of enquiry being faulty because it is at the stage of disciplinary authority where the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not agreed upon. Since it is at the level of the disciplinary authority and not the enquiry officer for which the lower Courts should have remanded the case back for fresh enquiry as argued by the counsel for the appellant. It is also important to note that the plaintiff in his suit before the Registrar has not pleaded that the enquiry was defective and it is also not a ground in the appeal as well. Therefore we do not find it to be a supportive argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is a case of defective enquiry and it should have been dealt accordingly. ( 8. ) The most important aspect emerging out of later discussions is that whether the service dispute has been filed in time or not. The counsel for the appellant submitted in his written argument that the service dispute filed by the Respondent before the Registrar on 4.4.02 was hopelessly barred by time. According to the counsel the trial Court must have formed issues for deciding this first in the same stage. According to him the mistake has been committed by the First appellate Court as well. The counsel in this respect specified his reliance on 2004 RN 196= 2004 (3) MPLJ 47 Suhas Shrivastava and others v. Mst. According to the counsel the trial Court must have formed issues for deciding this first in the same stage. According to him the mistake has been committed by the First appellate Court as well. The counsel in this respect specified his reliance on 2004 RN 196= 2004 (3) MPLJ 47 Suhas Shrivastava and others v. Mst. Gyaso and others in which the Honourable High Court has held that it was the basic responsibility of the Court to first touch upon the point of limitation and proceed. The counsel submitted that the respondent may have been eligible for the benefit available u/s 14 of the limitation Act in this respect which is not the case. He has cited 1997 (2) WN 111 and 2007 (3) JLJ 80 = 2007 (2) MPLJ 257 , 1992 (I) MP WN 115 also in this respect. ( 9. ) The learned counsel also drew our attention towards para 25 of the plaint in which no specific pleading are there to support this case in respect of being barred by limitation. Since there were no specific pleadings forwarded by the respondent, even the benefit available u/s 14 of the limitation Act cannot be granted to him. ( 10. ) The learned counsel for the respondent Shri. Sanjay Bajpai submitted that after the revision was filed before the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of the order of the appellant federation. Further when the Tribunal on 17.11.2005 dismissed the revision, the service dispute was filed within 30 days before the Registrar on 16.12.2005. The counsel in this respect placed his reliance on following judgments passed by the Tribunal - FA 273/08 M.P State Coop. Bank v. P.N. Maheshwari judgment dated 19.1.2010 and SA 8/2008 District Central Cooperative Bank Tikamgarh v. Dwarka Prasad Sharma judgment dated 9.3.2008. ( 11. ) According to these citations the Tribunal has allowed suits filed after 30 days. We notice that the facts of the case cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are different. Bank v. P.N. Maheshwari judgment dated 19.1.2010 and SA 8/2008 District Central Cooperative Bank Tikamgarh v. Dwarka Prasad Sharma judgment dated 9.3.2008. ( 11. ) According to these citations the Tribunal has allowed suits filed after 30 days. We notice that the facts of the case cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are different. In this context the provision of section 14 of Limitation Act is very relevant which we reproduce as under "Exclusion of time of proceeding bonafide in Court without jurisdiction - (2) In computing the period of limitation for an application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Explanation - For the purpose of this Section - (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceedings was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; - (c) misjoinder of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction." ( 12. ) It is clear from a simple reading of the above provisions that the time which has been spent in prosecution with due diligence in wrong Court is to be excluded for the purpose of the consideration of the limitation. However the total time available for filing the dispute u/s 55 (2) is unmistakably 30 days only. There is no power of any condonation given to the Court of Registrar as held by Honble Supreme Court in Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Jagdalpur 2009 RN 42 =2009 (1) MPHT 113 (SC). ( 13. ) In the case in hand, the submission of the counsel for the respondent is this that according to him he has availed 30 days after his case was decided in appeal of the appellant Federation. He had another 30 days according to him available once the Tribunal on 17.11.05 has dismissed his revision No. 154/02. ( 13. ) In the case in hand, the submission of the counsel for the respondent is this that according to him he has availed 30 days after his case was decided in appeal of the appellant Federation. He had another 30 days according to him available once the Tribunal on 17.11.05 has dismissed his revision No. 154/02. This is not the correct interpretation of law. The law is very clear in this respect. It is a limitation of total 30 days available for the respondent which is stipulated in the Act. 13-A. There are no specific pleadings forwarded by the respondent in the lower Court in his plaint before the trial Court in this respect in respect of condonation, if any. With the clear cut position of law in this respect that now emerges in the light of the latest judgments of the appellant Court in Noharlal Verma (supra), we find that the dispute filed by the respondent before the Registrar on 16.12.05 has to be taken to be barred by limitation. ( 14. ) Although the order passed by lower Court will deserve to be set aside on this ground only. However, we feel inclined to touch this case on the aspect of merits also so that the other side of the story may not remain neglected. Inspite of the pleadings forwarded by the counsel of the appellant that the orders of the lower Court are not in proper appreciation of the facts and are perverse in light of the evidence produced before them, we do not agree with it. It is the very stage of the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer that the respondent has not been found guilty. Enquiry Officer has very well proved in his report that there was no loss or shortage of milk as alleged in the charge sheet issued to the respondent. The Managing Director of the appellant federation not agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer in her wisdom could have further exercised her better sense by seeking explanation from the respondent on the ground on which she was not agreed with the report of the enquiry officer. Her order in this respect is vitiated one and it is certainly a bad order in the eye of law. Her order in this respect is vitiated one and it is certainly a bad order in the eye of law. The lower Courts have therefore not committed any error in quashing it and the learned Additional Registrar in First Appeal has also not holding it to be wrong is at fault. ( 15. ) However we are not at liberty to exempt the lower Court from the bounden responsibility of law abidance as has been held by the Honble High Court in Suhas Srivastava and others v. Mst. Gyaso and others cases very specifically that "since there is no specific findings of the appellate Court that whether the suit was barred by limitation, the first appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in present judgment." ( 16. ) We are therefore left with no alternative but to set aside the order of the First Appellate Court of Additional Registrar dated 5.2.2009 as well as the trial Court dated 5.3.2008 on this technical ground as such that the dispute filed before the Registrar was barred by limitation after allowing this appeal with no costs.