Judgment :- Pratap Kumar Ray, J: Assailing the order dated 25th September, 2008 passed in Original Application No.281 of 2007 (LRTT) by the West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal, this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the applicants of original application. The impugned order read such: “ The case of the applicants is that one Debendranath Dey Sarkar of Baishnabghata P.S. Tallygunj Sadar, Dist. 24 Pgs. South was the owner of the subject land measuring about 48.27 acres by virtue of a partitiion suit amongst his co-sharers, hereafter referred to as the subject land, situated at Mouza Atghora, J. L. 5, Khatian No.30. The partition deed was of the year 1945. Since after partition, said Debendranath Dey Sarkar remained in right, title and possession thereof. Out of the subject land, 47.50 acres of land were known as “Barkhel Bheri” and the rest agricultural lands. Said Debendranath Dey Sarkar died on 19.12.49, leaving behind his wife Mrinalini who died on 23.6.90, son Hirendranath Dey Sarkar also since deceased on 24.10.02 and three daughters viz., Renuka Ghosh, Latika Basu and Sefalika Basu since all deceased. Hirendranath Ghoshleft behind him his son Rahul, daughters Swapna and Krishna Dutta. Renuka Ghosh left behind four daughters and Latika Basu left behind three sons and one son’s widow. This is as per the genealogy chart mentioned in the application. It is the case of the applicants that the properties left by Dhirendranath Dey Sarkar were equally inherited by his son Hirendranath and wife Mrinalini according to Hindu Women Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Women Right to Property (Amendment Act) 1938 from 1.4.37 as interpreted in a decision of the Federal Court, reported in AIR 1941 F.C 72. Thus, the widow, Mrinalini became the owner of half of 47.50 acres of non agricultural land. The said widow had to depend upon her son Hirendranath Dey Sarkar during the settlement operation under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. It revealed that the entire property left by Debendranath Dey Sarkar stood recorded in the name of his son Hirendranath Dey Sarkar alone and the R. S. record of rights to the effect was claimed to be erroneous. It revealed that the entire property left by Debendranath Dey Sarkar stood recorded in the name of his son Hirendranath Dey Sarkar alone and the R. S. record of rights to the effect was claimed to be erroneous. Further more, widow Mrinalini by a registered deed in the year 1960 created a trust appointing her son Hirendranath as a sole trustee in respect of the trust property which was to be administered in terms of the recital in the trust deed. However, in the R.S., there was omission of recording of 5 acres of land. The names of subsequent purchasers from said Hirendranath Dey Sarkar from the R.S. recorded land stood recorded during L.R. settlement works. In the year 1976, a proceeding was initiated u/s 14T(3) under the WBLR Act, where Hirendranath Dey Sarkar was allowed to retain 17.22 acres of land and 11 decimal of land was vested, considering the raiyat’s family as a five members unit and the land as non irrigated. Till that time, no proceeding under the WBEA Act was initiated either in the name of Hirendranath or her mother Mrinalini. In the year 1986 the Revenue Officer initiated a proceeding u/s. 6(5) of the WBEA Act, upon submission of B form by said Hirendranath for retention and vesting of ceiling excess land. In that proceeding, an ex parte order was passed allowing retention of 15 acres non agricultural land and directing vesting of 10.68 acres of non agricultural land. It is the submission that no notice was served in the said proceeding. It is alleged that after initiation of a 7A proceeding, being case No.31/76, there was no warrant to initiate a 6(5) proceeding under the WBEA Act. The order of vesting was challenged to be contrary to law. It was also alleged that no notice u/s. 10(2) of the WBEA Act was served and as such, said order of vesting cannot be effective inasmuch as the interest of intermediary for retention of land could not be affected even thereafter. On coming to know about the vesting in the B.R proceeding the applicant, said Hirendranath filed an application for correction of record of right, but it was not done. On coming to know about the vesting in the B.R proceeding the applicant, said Hirendranath filed an application for correction of record of right, but it was not done. Again in the year 1992, on the basis of the amended Act, 1981, a notice was purportedly issued as the raiyat did not file any return in form 7AA, though the concerned raiyat had no knowledge of such notice and in that proceeding taking the raiyat’s family as four members unit, 17.22 acres of land was ordered to be retained and the rest 14.44 acres to be vested and for taking over possession notice was issued for appearance on 11.9.92 and on that date, the concerned raiyat was shown absent, though no notice was served. That was the proceeding in connection with reopening of the earlier proceeding under the provision of the WBLR Act. In that proceeding, the raiyat was held to hold land 31.66 acres and 14 bighas were held to have been transferred. However, according to the concerned raiyat about 5 acres of land were not accounted for in the R.S. record of right. It is alleged that Revenue Officer concerned did not take note of the character of the trust properties and the effect of sale of such properties too. It was the case of the applicants that widow Mrinalini was the owner of half share of non agricultural land. But that has not been considered and thereby the subject land was illegally ordered to vest. As no steps taken for correction of record of right, the applicants filed OA 2519/00 and that application was disposed of by this Tribunal directing the BLLRO, Sonarpur to supply the record of rights and challenging that order, a writ application was filed before the Honble High Court and the Honble Court by an order dt. 27.4.01 directed this Tribunal to dispose of the application as filed by the applicant Hirendranath. Thereafter this Tribunal by an order dt. 4.7.01 directed to re-hear 14T(3) case No.31/76 afresh and as was not done, a contempt application was filed and by an order dt. 25.1.02, 14T(3) case No.31/76 was ordered to be stayed and the applicant was given opportunity to file an application u/s.50 and pursuant thereto, the concerned authority initiated a misc. Thereafter this Tribunal by an order dt. 4.7.01 directed to re-hear 14T(3) case No.31/76 afresh and as was not done, a contempt application was filed and by an order dt. 25.1.02, 14T(3) case No.31/76 was ordered to be stayed and the applicant was given opportunity to file an application u/s.50 and pursuant thereto, the concerned authority initiated a misc. case No.1/02 and order was passed for correction of record of rights taking into account the transfer effected by the said raiyat for which L.R. appeal No.49/02 was filed before the DLLRO, Alipore and the said appeal is pending for decision before the SDLLRO, Baruipur. Meanwhile, the concerned raiyat Hirendranath died and a 7A proceeding case No.1/01 was initiated and disposed of without hearing the legal heirs for which appeal No.55/05 was filed before the DLLRO, Alipore and pending for hearing. During such pendency, the applicants as the legal heirs of deceased Hirendranath filed an application on 15.7.05 before the DLLRO, 24 Pgs. South for review of the 6(5) proceeding by laying the claim of half share of the total non agricultural land left by Debendranath under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. As no action was taken to review the said proceeding, OA 2729/05 was filed and this Tribunal by an order dated 7.6.06 idsmissed the said application challenging which the applicants went before the Honble High Court in WPLRT No.468/06 and the Honble Court by an order dated 8.8.06 set aside the order dated 7.6.06 passed by this Tribunal and directed BLLRO, Sonarpur to take necessary steps of hearing the applicants and private respondents and thereafter to pass a reasoned order. The Honble Court also granted an interim order of status quo. The order of the Honble High Court was accordingly communicated to the BLLRO, Sonarpur which was received by them on 24.8.06 and the appropriate proceeding was initiated long after the receipt of the order. The applicants appeared at the hearing on 18.10.06 and till 8.1.07,no further notice was received and on 9.1.07 they came to know about the passing of the impugned order. The impugned order dt. 18.10.06 was claimed to be antedated. At any rate, the impugned order is assailed to be a very cryptive one without any reasons and without any review of the order passed in B.R. 523/86 and accordingly, the order is liable to be set aside. The impugned order dt. 18.10.06 was claimed to be antedated. At any rate, the impugned order is assailed to be a very cryptive one without any reasons and without any review of the order passed in B.R. 523/86 and accordingly, the order is liable to be set aside. At the hearing, the provision of law as to entitlement of half of the share of the total of non agricultural land by the widow was canvassed and also judgement of the Federal Court was quoted, but the same was not considered for which the impugned order required to be quashed. Accordingly, they prayed for setting aside the impugned order dated 18.10.06 as the said order was not in the true spirit of the order of the Honble Court dt. 8.8.06 . Accordingly, prayer was made not to give further effect or to act pursuant to the impugned order dated 18.10.06 and to issue direction for review B.R. case No.523/86, so that 50 per cent share of the total of non agricultural land left by Debendranath could be accounted for as the land of widow Mrinalini and for forbearing to make a settlement till such decision. The application No. OA 281/07 was accordingly admitted and direction was issued for steps for effecting service and calling for the records. Thereafter affidavit in opposition was filed by state respondent nos.1 to 4. The opposition was sworn by BLLRO in the office of the respondent No.2. In the opposition, it was contended that the application was not maintainable being barred under the provision of 10(2) and 10(3) of the WBLRTT Act, 1997. It was the submission in opposition that R.S record of right was framed u/s. 44(2) of the WBEA Act in the name of the intermediary concerned and such recording got presumptive value u/s. 44(4) of the WBEA Act. It was further contended that the intermediary concerned Hirendranath Dey Sarkar filed return in form B and it was never agitated against the recording of his name or non recording of the name of his mother. OA 2519/00 was also filed, so also other applications thereto claiming inheritance of 47.50 acres of land by him alone. But challenging L.R record of right in the name of some other persons, he filed an application for correction of record of right in his name. OA 2519/00 was also filed, so also other applications thereto claiming inheritance of 47.50 acres of land by him alone. But challenging L.R record of right in the name of some other persons, he filed an application for correction of record of right in his name. The applicants filed an application for review of the proceeding only on 15.7.05 before the DLLRO, South 24 Pgs which is an after thought attempt to hold excess land. No application by Hirendranath or his mother was ever filed challenging the R.S. record of rights. On the other hand, Hirendranath filed B form for retention of 25.68 acres of non agricultural land. The mother of Hirendranath also did not file any choice of retention and after about 50 years of the finality of the matter, they have risen up claiming the right on account of deceased Mrinalini. On the basis of the direction in OA 2519/00, the matter was dealt with u/s.50 of the WBLR Act against which appeal No.49/02 was filed and pending and as regards determination of ceiling under sec. 14T (3) another appeal No.55/05 was filed and pending. Further more, in OA 2729/05 all the aspects were dealt with by this Tribunal and thereafter WPLRT No.468/06 also stood disposed of by the Honble High Court and the matter was attended to and disposed of by the impugned order. It was asserted that on the basis of choice of retention, intermediary Hirendranath was allowed to retain 15 acres of non agricultural land and the rest 10.68 acres remained vested. There was no question of violation of the natural justice as the intermediary concerned was very much present at the hearing. The possession of the vested land was also taken over in accordance with law. In the above view of the matter, it was contended in the affidavit in opposition that the instant application was fit to be dismissed. As against the affidavit in opposition, the applicants filed an affidavit in reply more or less reiterating their case as made out in OA 281/07. It was contended that the question of limitation and non availing of the remedial measures was advanced at the time of hearing on the point of admission, but those contentions stood negatived and there was no occasion to re-agitate those points. It was contended that the question of limitation and non availing of the remedial measures was advanced at the time of hearing on the point of admission, but those contentions stood negatived and there was no occasion to re-agitate those points. It was reiterated that widow Mrinalini was entitled to proportionate share of non agricultural land under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act which was also fortified by the Federal Court decision and other decisions quoted by them. The order required a searching scrutiny as to the transfer of some of the properties of the subject land, despite being within the trust property. At any rate, a proceeding against the intermediary Mrinalini was required to initiate and her share should not have been clubbed with the land of intermediary Hirendranath and in OA 2513/05 was submitted to be not in accordance with law and the case advanced by the applicants for which Honble Court directed BLLRO, Sonarpur to review the said B.R case, but the review was not made, keeping in view of the direction of the Honble High Court and the provision of law as advanced in the written argument and oral submission. The prayer made in the original application was accordingly reiterated in the affidavit in reply filed by them. The matter was heard with reference to the averments in the application and annexures thereto; the affidavit in opposition, the affidavit in reply and the respective submission advanced by the parties as also the proposition of law and cited decision. We have also perused the reports and the record of rights as produced by the State authorities during hearing. The main submission on behalf of the applicants were found to be reiterating their case that in view of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 and the amendment Act 1938 read with judgement of the Federal Court reported in AIR 1941 FC 72, the widow of Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar is entitled to inherit half of the share of the properties i.e. 23 and odds acres of non-agricultural lands and in respect of the trust property created in the name of ‘Smt. Mrinalini Dey Sarkar Trust Estate’ both the son and the mother are to be the owners of 50% share of the said property. It is the submission that RS record of rights were erroneously prepared recording the entire property in the name of son only i.e. Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar and also BR case No.523/86 under section 6(1) of the WBEA Act, 1953. It was further contended that in O.A No.2519 of 2000(LRTT) this Tribunal by order dt. 4.7.2001 while quashing the orders both of 1976 and 1992 proceedings, directed the BL&LRO, Sonarpur to initiate a fresh proceeding in accordance with the amended provisions of the WBLR Act considering the total of land held by him on 15.2.71 and the size of the family as on that date within specified time, as a result of which Misc. Case No.417 of 2001 was initiated and disposed of on 19.4.2002 and challenging the said order LR appeal No.49 of 2002 stood filed and is still pending. However, in proceeding u/s 14T(3) started by the BL&LRO, Sonarpur in misc. case No.1 of 2001 the said proceeding was disposed of by the order dated 26.8.2002 and in that proceeding there was no disclosure of the nature of sale deeds by the intermediary as no transfer was effected in respect of any land as also the entire trust property should not have been included and challenging the said order LR Appeal No.55 of 2005 was filed and is still pending ( at some places reference is made as LR Appeal No.50 of 2005). The copies of memo of both the appeals were filed pursuant to our direction. It is the submission in the supplementary affidavit that when such proceedings were drawn, the applicants had no knowledge about the entitlement of the widow of the deceased to inherit half of the property left by Debendranath Dey Sarkar as regards nonagriculture lands. So, the prayer for review was made in respect of BR Case No.523 of 1986 u/s 6(1) of the WBEA Act. But as no action was taken OA No.2729 of 2005 was filed and this Tribunal by order dated 7.6.06 rejected the prayer and the applicants went before the Honble Court in WPLRT No.468 of 2006 and the Honble Court by order dated 8.8.06 has set aside the order and directed the BL & LRO to review the order dated 22.10.86 in B.R case No.523 of 1986 and the result is the impugned order dt. 18.10.06 passed in the said review proceeding which is now assailed before this Tribunal. It is submitted that the impugned order is a cryptic one and not in accordance with the direction in the order passed in WPLRT No.468 of 2006. On the other hand, the submission of the Ld. Govt. Representative was that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with the provisions of law and there can be no ground for making any interference. It was contended that till before the filing of the review application on 15.7.05 before the DL&LRO, 24 Parganas for a review of the 6(1) proceeding, there was no any whisper as to non-recording of any part of the subject land in the name of the widow Mrinalini both during the Rs as well as LR Operation works and this Tribunal by order dt. 7.6.06 rejected such prayer in O.A No.2729 of 2005 (LRTT). It was contended that pursuant to order passed in WPLRT No.468 of 2006 the BL&LRO considered and disposed of the review matter by order dt. 18.10.06 and that too upon consideration of all materials and provisions of law and also hearing both the parties. It was the submission that the prayer for review of the BR proceeding was an afterthought one with a view to grab land more than the prescribed ceiling. Upon having had given due consideration to the submission made by the parties and also upon having had considered the materials on record we are pleased to dispose of the matter by passing the order following thereafter: Decision with reasons: It is matter of record that the RS record of rights was framed and finally published recording the subject land in the name of the intermediary Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar alone. Such recording according to the provision of sec. 44(4) of the WBEA Act attained finality and got the presumptive value. At no stage of RS settlement work, any dispute was raised by Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar or by Mrinalini, mother of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar, since both deceased, challening the correctness of the record of rights. Materials on record disclosed that said Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar submitted return in Form ‘B’ treating the entire lands as his own and the subsequent proceeding followed in accordance therewith. In other words, it was the disclosure made that the entire 47.50 acres of land were inherited by him alone. Materials on record disclosed that said Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar submitted return in Form ‘B’ treating the entire lands as his own and the subsequent proceeding followed in accordance therewith. In other words, it was the disclosure made that the entire 47.50 acres of land were inherited by him alone. It further appears that during the LR settlement, while dispute could have been raised as to fictitious transfer by several deeds from the subject land, no point could be raised as to non recording of any portion of the subject land in the name of Mrinalini, since deceased, widow of deceased Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar. It is further revealed that counter to such fictitious transfer OA No.2519 of 2000 was filed and an order for initiating a proceeding u/s 50 of the WBLR Act got obtained and having lost the case, LR appeal No.49 of 2002 got filed and said appeal is still pending and in that proceeding there was no any whis per as to alleged erroneous RS record of rights in the subject plots. So also no any prayer was made by said Mrinalini during her lifetime. Again, as against the determination of ceiling u/s 14T(3), the concerned intermediary appeared and under the provision of law certain land stood vested and challenging that order the LR appeal No.55 of 2005 was filed and said to be still pending. From the memorandum of this appeal as submitted pursuant to our direction, there appears nothing to hold that the question of record of rights as regards 50% share out of total 47.50 acres of non-agricultural land was ever raised for adjudication. In other words, during the lifetime both of Hirendranath Dey Sarkar as well as Mrinalini, the question of alleged erroneous RS record of rights did never arise and only after their deaths that the present applicants i.e. legal heirs of Hirendranath Dey Sarkar have come forward to present a case that 50% of the nonagricultural land out of total 47.50 acres ought to have been recorded in the name of Mrinalini and ought not to have been clubbed with the land of Hirendranath Dey Sarkar. As in sec. 44(4) of the WBEA Act, the matter of finality as to the record of rights under the WBLR Act has attained in view of the provisions of sec. 51A(9) of the WBLR Act. As in sec. 44(4) of the WBEA Act, the matter of finality as to the record of rights under the WBLR Act has attained in view of the provisions of sec. 51A(9) of the WBLR Act. As under section 44 (2a) of the WBEA Act as to the raising of dispute about the finally published RS record of rights, under the LR Act there is provision of different stages of settlement works like filing objection u/s 51A(1) against draft publication and provision for filing application u/s 51A(1) as against final publication of the record of rights though within time prescribed under the said provision. The resort to the remedies could have been availed of by appropriate application and even suo moto by the authorities concerned. In the present case as already pointed out no such resort was taken by the Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar or by Mrinalini since both deceased, during their lifetime, neither the authorities concerned ever raised any suo moto proceeding. We have considered the anxious submission of the ld. Advocate for the applicants as to the question of inheritance of at least 50% of the nonagricultural land left by Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar by his wife Mrinalini under the provisions of Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 in terms of the judgement by the Federal Court in AIR 1941 FC 72 and also the decisions reported in AIR 1968 Cal. 83 copies of which were produced before us at the time hearing. There is no disputing the proposition of law as annunciated in the earlier judgement (AIR 1941 FC 72) to contend that the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 and the amended Act 1938 did not operate to regulate to succession to agricultural land in the Governor’s provinces and do operate to regulate devolution by survivorship of property other than agricultural land and that the subject of devolution by survivorship of property other than agricultural land is included in entry 7 of List 3, the concurrent list. In the later decision ( AIR 1968 Cal 83 ) the Honble Court in para 18 observed that the Federal Court in the said judgement (AIR 1911 FC 72) construed the word ‘property’ in a restricted sense as to exclude agricultural land and came to the conclusion that no part of the Act, namely, Hindu Women’s Rights to Property was beyond the legislature’s powers. In that judgement the observation of the Federal Court was quoted as, “…….. No doubt if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governor’s provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it, and whether or not it does so must depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word ‘property’ in the Act. In that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the legislature; but when a legislature with limited and restricted power makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other ………”. However, in the later decision there involved a case of pre-emption and the question arose whether the vendor’s husband died before or after the Constitution came into force i.e. 26th January, 1950. There the lower appellate Court sent back the matter on remand for a fresh decision after consideration whether the vendor’s husband died after the enforcement of the constitution and in the event the vendor’s husband died after that enforcement, the preemption was to be dismissed as after the enforcement of the constitution, the legislative incompetence was held not to continue as regards agricultural land in the Governor’s provinces. Such order of remand was held to be not appropriate deducing ratio from the Federal Court’s judgement as referred to above. While not disputing the above proposition of law, the subject land being pre-dominantly non-agricultural one, the question remains whether the matter has now assumed the question of adjudication of right, title and interest pure and simple. After all, revenue record of rights is not a document of title and it has got presumptive subject to rebuttal. There is no disputing that neither Hirendranath Dey Sarkar nor Mrinalini Dey during their lifetime ever raised any such dispute about the erroneous RS record of rights on the basis of which the vesting proceeding both under the provisions of WBEA Act u/s 6(1) as well as under the WBLR Act u/s 14T(3) got initiated. It is not that no option was exercised or no hearing was given to the intermediary RS recorded owner. It is not that no option was exercised or no hearing was given to the intermediary RS recorded owner. To recall ‘B’ form was submitted exercising choice of retention when the entire property were shown to be on the ownership of the intermediary Hirendranath Dey Sarkar alone. It was a question of a statutory vesting u/s 4 read with sec. 5 of the WBEA Act and unless the intermediary chooses to exercise retention, the entire estate of the intermediary stood vested. Undisputedly, no any choice of retention stood filed even by Mrinalini Devi and as such the share if any on her account due to non-retention stood vested free from all encumbrances with the notification u/s 4 read with sec. 5 of the WBEA Act. To reiterate, the intermediary, Hirendranath Dey Sarkar submitted ‘B’ form for retention of nonagricultural land of 25.68 acres and he was allowed to retain 15 acres of nonagricultural land and the remaining 10.68 acres recorded as ‘bill’ vested to the State. Now the legal heirs of the intermediary have agitated that 50% of the non-agricultural land was to be inherited by widow Mrinalini and that amount of land was to be excluded from the total land accounted in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Hirendranath Dey Sarkar. Not only that such approbation and reprobation are not permissible after a lapse of about 50 years coupled with non-availing of all the remedial measures for correction of the record of rights under the relevant provisions of the Act but that the matter has assumed the complexion of adjudication of right, title and interest which the revenue authorities are ill-equipped to undertake keeping in view the presumptive value of the record of rights as an act of possession. We do not think that any other order could have been forthcoming keeping in view the provision of law and the factual background of the case even by way of any appeal. We must make a note of observation as to the impugned order being not lucid and analytic too reflecting all the question of law involved but we refused to interfere on the ground that the inevitable outcome according to our perception of factual background and proposition of law applicable thereto could not have been different. In the above view of the matter we see no merit in making any interference in the impugned order dt. In the above view of the matter we see no merit in making any interference in the impugned order dt. 18.10.06 and accordingly O.A. No.281 of 2007 (LRTT) stands dismissed. Let a plain copy of the order duly countersigned by the Principal Officer of this Tribunal be made over the Ld. Govt. Representative for onward communication to the authorities concerned and certified Xerox copy to the parties in accordance with law. I agree. Md. M. J. Iqbal B. N. Das (Admn. Member) (Judicial Member)” Major Question of law involved in writ application: An important question of law about right of acquiring ownership over nonagricultural land by application of law of inheritance/succession to resist order of vesting of the said property to the State under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 by exercising right to retain the said vested land by the legal heirs of one Mrinalini who inherited the property as a life interest holder under Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 initially and became full owner of said properties under application of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 whether could be given effect to on application of relevant acts and rules namely Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, for brevity hereinafter referred to as Act of 1937, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, hereinafter for brevity referred to as Succession Act, 1956, West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 read with Rules thereafter hereinafter for brevity referred to as WBEA Act, 1953 and the concerned rules and constitutional provisions protecting property rights qua livelihood u/A 21 of the Constitution of India, is the subject matter for our decision. Admitted facts: one Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar was the owner of 47.50 acres of nonagricultural land recorded in the cadestral settlement records of rights and in revisional settlement record of rights prepared under Bengal Tenancy Act and West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act respectively as ‘beel’. Debendranath died intestate on 19th December, 1949 leaving behind one son Hirendranath and widow Mrinalini. At the relevant time of death Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 was existing. Mrinalini inherited half portion of said property as a life interest holder in terms of Section 3 of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 in equal share with son Hidrendranath. West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 came into effect from 12th February, 1954. At the relevant time of death Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 was existing. Mrinalini inherited half portion of said property as a life interest holder in terms of Section 3 of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 in equal share with son Hidrendranath. West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 came into effect from 12th February, 1954. A bigrayat proceeding was initiated under Section 6(5) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act by considering said non-agricultural land as of Hirendranath, wherein Hirendranath by submitting ‘B’ form retained admissible non-agricultural land retainable out of nonagricultural land of 47.50 acres recorded as ‘Beel’, 10.68 acres of said land was vested to the State under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. The Revenue Officer passed order of vesting on 22nd October, 1986. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into effect Mrinalini on application of Section 14 of the said Act exercised her right as a full owner of proportionate share of non-agricultural land possessed by her as life interest holder in view of transposition of her legal status from limited life interest holder to full ownership by application of Section 14 of the said Act and a deed of trust in respect of her property was made wherefrom some portion of the land was sold. Purchaser became riyat and record of rights was prepared in his name accordingly. An application seeking review of the order of vesting was filed by legal heris of Mrinali and Hirendra, contending, inter alia, that Mrinalini who became the life interest holder of half portion of the property measuring 47.50 acres of nonagricultural land, namely the concerned beel on application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, became absolute owner under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the legal heirs of Mrinalini, after Mrinalini breathed last on 23rd June, 1990, was legally entitled to retain the said property which was below the ceiling limit exercising choice to retain the property in terms of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. This application since was not considered seeking correction of R.S records of rights as finally prepared under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, matter was moved before the West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal in Original Application No.2729 of 2005 which stood dismissed. This application since was not considered seeking correction of R.S records of rights as finally prepared under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, matter was moved before the West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal in Original Application No.2729 of 2005 which stood dismissed. An application under Article 226 of the Constitutional of India registered as WPLRT No.468 of 2006, assailing the order of the Learned Tribunal below dated 15th July, 2005 passed in the said original application was moved. The Honble Division Bench (Cor. Pinaki Chandra Ghose & Ashim Kumar Roy, JJ.) by the order dated 8th August, 2006 in said WPLRT No.468 of 2006, quashed and set aside the order of the Learned Tribunal dated 7th June, 2006 and directed the concerned B.L.L.R.O, Sonarpur, for taking necessary steps by hearing the writ petitioner as well as other respondents on the issue in question and to pass an appropriate order in respect of declaration as declared by the concerned authority in the impugned order dated 22nd October, 1986 in Bigrayat case No.523 of 1986. In pursuance of the said order the Revenue Officer heard the matter and without adjudicating anything repeated his views rejecting the prayer, which again was challenged before the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in O.A No.281 of 2007 (LRTT). The legal heirs of Mrinalini and Harendranath moved the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal said Original Application No.281 of 2007 (LRTT) seeking appropriate direction for consideration of the application filed before Revenue Officer. By the order dated 25th September, 2008 Learned Tribunal below rejected the original application by holding, inter alia, (i) that there was no provision for review of the order passed in Bigrayat case No.523 of 1986 and finality of record of rights reached under Section 44(4) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act could not be disturbed and (ii) the claim to the property by the legal heirs of Mrinalini by application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 read with Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is a belated claim which could not be accepted after lapse of 50 years. Assailing the said order dated 25th September, 2008 passed by Learned Tribunal below, this writ application has been filed. Assailing the said order dated 25th September, 2008 passed by Learned Tribunal below, this writ application has been filed. Basic Points raised by writ petitioners: The basic contention of the writ petitioners in this application are as follows:- (i) That on death of Mrinalini’s husband Debendranath, on 19th December, 1949, Mrinalini became the life interest holder of half portion of the property measuring 47.50 acres non-agricultural land and said life interest transformed to absolute interest as owner on application of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. (ii) That Mrinalini had no responsibility to file any B form as she was holding the property below the ceiling limit as a life interest holder and after coming into effect of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 once she became absolute owner she exercised her right as title holder of property by transferring some portion of property which has been accepted by the State by recording name of subsequent purchaser. Mrinalini executed a Trust Deed forming a trust of her property. Mrinalini was in possession of the land and thereafter legal heirs are in possession and no possession has been taken over by the State by serving a notice under Section 6(5) read with 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and Rule 7 of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules. (iii) The right about choice of retention by the legal heirs of Mrinalini is still alive, a settled legal position on interpretation of Section 6(5), 10(2) of Estate Acquisition Act. (iv) The record of rights could be revised under the statutory provision of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and in terms of order of the Division Bench in earlier writ application presided over by Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J, and the Revenue Officer was bound to consider the issue adjudicating the points taken namely the ownership of property by Mrinalini and thereafter by her legal heirs and the point that beel could not be vested under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. (v) That the Learned Tribunal below was wrong to reject the claim of property right by the legal heirs of Mrinalini on the ground of delay and also was wrong to hold that there was no scope of revision/review of the record of rights which was finally published under Section 44 (4) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1956. (v) That the Learned Tribunal below was wrong to reject the claim of property right by the legal heirs of Mrinalini on the ground of delay and also was wrong to hold that there was no scope of revision/review of the record of rights which was finally published under Section 44 (4) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1956. (vi) That no question of applicability of principle of ‘resjudicata’ urged by State in affidavit and limitation to raise claim over property, maintainable. Stand of State: This application has been opposed by the State respondent mainly on the following points:- (i) That after long delay of 50 years claim of title over property could not be claimed. (ii) That principle of res judicata is squarely applicable so far as claim of property right by legal heirs through Mrinalini on application of statutory provision of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 read with Hindu Succession Act and West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and the rules made thereof for the sole reason that the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the earlier writ application simply considered the issue relating to “beel” as raised before the Division Bench and accordingly referred the matter for consideration by the Revenue Officer on that point only. (iii) That the question relating to character of land as “beel” for bringing the same under the canopy of “tank fishery” has not been urged in the High Court in the present writ application. To appreciate the legal questions involved, the contral/pivotal issue which requires to be answered is about the right, title and interest of Mrinalini over the 50% of total nonagricultural lands left by Debendranath her husband, when admittedly Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 was existing on the date of death of Debendranath on 19th December, 1949. This question could be answered by application of relevant provisions of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Succession Act. The relevant provisions read such: Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 “Whereas it is expedient to amend the Hindu law to give better rights to women in respect of property: It is hereby enacted as follows:- Section 1-(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. (2) It extends to the whole of India, except Part B States. Section 2. (2) It extends to the whole of India, except Part B States. Section 2. – Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary the provisions of section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate. Section 3.-(1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow, all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies interstate to the same share as a son: Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a son’s son if there is surviving a son or son’s son of such predeceased son; Provided further that the same provisions shall apply mutates mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. (2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman’s estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. (4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the terms of the grant applicable thereto descends to a single heir or to any property to which the Indian Succession Act, 1925, applies. Section 4.- Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying interstate before the commencement of this Act. Section 5- For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect”. Section 4.- Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying interstate before the commencement of this Act. Section 5- For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect”. On bare reading of the said provision it appears that widow Mrinalini accrued limited life interest which may be called as “Hindu women’s estate” over the ½ portion of total nonagricultural lands, left by Debendranath, by equal share with son Harendra. The said act is applicable to non-agricultural land only due to decision of federal Court that Central Legislature had no power to legislate with regard to agricultural land in a governor’s province but same could be operated to regulate succession in respect of other kinds of property. Reference is made to the case on application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, the Hindu Womens Right to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 and a special reference under Section 213 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as done reported in 4 FLJ (1): 1941 (FCR) 12. The said issue was also considered in the case Umayal Achi vs. Laxmi Achi reported in (1945) FCR 1. The term women’s estate in larger connotation means all property which has come to a women by any means and from any source whatsoever, and includes both property in which she has absolute estate (Stridhan) and property in which she has only a limited interest. On application of concerned provision of the said Act as referred to, Hindu Womens estate means the property with limited or qualified interest which postulates the scope of reversion of the property to the reversionary, the heirs of the last male owners after death of the widow. The characteristic of women’s estate and its feature has been dealt with exhaustively in the Maine’s Hindu Law. The characteristic feature of Women’s estate is enjoinment of the property absolutely without any right of transferring the title save and except under certain contingencies. Under the said Act, Mrinalini in the instant case acquired life interest over the half share of the non-agricultural land namely the concerned “beel”, non-agricultural land. Such legal position is accepted by the State respondent and the Learned Tribunal below in the impugned order also viewed such. Under the said Act, Mrinalini in the instant case acquired life interest over the half share of the non-agricultural land namely the concerned “beel”, non-agricultural land. Such legal position is accepted by the State respondent and the Learned Tribunal below in the impugned order also viewed such. When Mrinalini was in possession of the said property, West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act came into force and her properties vested to the State of West Bengal free from any encumbrances and Mrinalini got the right to retain the property permissible under ceiling limit of said Act. The nature of right of life interest holder has been considered by the Calcutta High Court in the case Sambhu Nath Pal vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1983(2) CLJ 58 where the Court held that life estate holder is raiyat till the date of death and after death vested- remainder will be raiyat, as such under Section 14M of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, land of life estate holder could not be taken into account in family ceiling of vested remainder. Relevant paragraph No.22 of said report reads such:- “In calculating the ceiling area of land of the petitioner, the Revenue Officer committed jurisdictional error in taking into consideration the lands which were held by Lichu Bala as a life estate holder. Sub section (1) of section 14S of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has, inter alia, provided that any land owned by a raiyat in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him shall vest in the State. Sub-section (1) of Section 14T fo the Act uses the expression “every raiyat owning land in excess of the ceiling area shall furnish to the Revenue Officer ……..a return”. A raiyat is the owner of his holding according to section 4(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The expression “own” and “ownership” do not only mean absolute of full ownership having right to possess, right to alienate and indetermine in duration and residuary in character (vide Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Chapter VIII). But these expression “own” and “ownership” also refer to fragmentation of ownership by way of co-ownership and also ownership which is split between several persons on the temporal plain. But these expression “own” and “ownership” also refer to fragmentation of ownership by way of co-ownership and also ownership which is split between several persons on the temporal plain. When a lifeestate is carved out of full ownership, then in the wider sence the person having the life-estate who is vested in possession and the remainder man vested not in possession but in interest, both may be considered as owners of the land in question. The West Bengal Land Reforms Act in relation to the ownership puts greater emphasis on possession than on deminium, i.e., the absolute right to a thing. Therefore, for the purpose of calculating the ceiling area person who has life-estate at the date of the commencement of the said Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act ought to be considered as owning the land and the other person who has vested remainder not having any present possession cannot be treated as the owner of the land which is being enjoyed by a person having lifeinterest therein. During his life-time person having life-estate has a right to exclude from possession others including the person upon whom the property may ultimately devolve on the termination of the life estate. When the holder of the life-estate would die, the vested remainder man would acquire full ownership vested in both possession and interest, then all the provisions of Chapter-IIB of the Act relating to ceiling on holding shall apply to such land. Any other view would cause serious hardship and anomaly. In a given case the life-tenant may own land less than the ceiling area whereas the person who has vested remainder may own lands in excess of the ceiling area. If the land which is subject to a life estate is treated as the land of such a vested remainder man, then the latter might surrender the land and thereby the interest of the life tenant would also vest. If the land which is subject to a life estate is treated as the land of such a vested remainder man, then the latter might surrender the land and thereby the interest of the life tenant would also vest. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that so long as Lichu Bala remains alive and continues to be a life-tenant of the lands gifted to her the said lands cannot be lawfully taken into account for calculating the ceiling area applicable to the petitioner.” So far as succession/inheritance is concerned it is a settled legal position of law that right of inheritance and succession is a statutory right and such right cannot be taken away except in terms of any provision of other statute which would have overriding effect by specific provision if is made and such special statute should be a complete code. This issue whether succession right could be negatived was considered by the Apex Court in the case N. Padamma & Ors. Vs. S. Rama Krishna Reddy & Ors. reported in (2008) 15 SCC 517 . Paras 18 and 19 of the said report read such: “18. Right of inheritance and succession is a statutory right. A right in a property which is vestedin terms of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be taken away, except in terms of provisions of another statute, which would have an overriding effect. Such special statute should be a complete code. It shall ordinarily be a later statute. Ordinarily again it must contain a non obstante clause. 19. Law of primogeniture is no longer applicable in India. Such a provision may be held to be unconstitutional being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. ( See Bhe v. Magistrate.)” Hence, on application of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, Mrinalini on death of her husband became the life interest holder of nonagricultural land to the extent of half share of the property left by her husband. There is no confusion of said legal position. The learned Advocate for the State also has admitted said legal position. There is no confusion of said legal position. The learned Advocate for the State also has admitted said legal position. The next question would be when Mrinalini accrued right by application of a statutory provision of inheritance under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, even if such right is a limited right to the extent of Hindu widow’s estate as prescribed in the statute, whether such right was extinguished by application of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1956. The West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act under Section 4 vested all the properties to the State free from encumbrances. Under Section 6(5) read with Section 10(2) of the said act, any raiyat is entitled to exercise his/her choice of retention within specified period mentioned thereto from the date of service of notice. In the instant case, it is admitted position that no such notice under Section 6(5) read with Section 10(2) has been issued asking Mrinalini or her legal heirs to hand over the possession of the land. On the other hand it is an admitted position that the legal heirs of Mrinalini are in possession. Under such a situation what would be the effect of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act relating to the property inherited by Mrinalini on application of statutory provision of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 which revolves round the answer on “right to property”. It is a settled legal position of law that right to property is not only human right but a constitutional right and such right cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of Constitution of India reserves such right. Hence, succession right as accrued by Mrinalini was not possible to be taken away by the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act keeping in view the provision of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is settled law that property right is within human right concept as well as constitutional right, as discussed in the case M. Padamma (supra) and in the case Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimhaiya & Ors. reported in (2008) 5 SCC 176 , relevant portion of paragraph 40 of the said report reads such: “40. Right to property, although no longer a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right. It is also human right. reported in (2008) 5 SCC 176 , relevant portion of paragraph 40 of the said report reads such: “40. Right to property, although no longer a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right. It is also human right. In absence of any provision either expressly or by necessary implication, depriving a person therefrom, the Court shall not construe a provision leaning in favour of such deprivation. Karnataka State financial Corpn v. N. Narasimahaiah (Sinha, J.) 193 Recently, this Court in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma dealing with adverse possession opined: (SCC p. 77, Para 43) “43. Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment, etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgement of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer13 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom14. The Court herein tried to read the human rights position in the context of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights.” Since the right to property is part of human right as well as constitutional right, succession right of Mrinalini never extinguished in view of introduction of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. Since admittedly no notice under Section 10 (2) was served, Mrinalini had the right to retain by exercising option as and when such notice would have been served. The conceptual jurisprudence of Section 4, 5, 6 & 10 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act was discussed in the case State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Suburban Agricultural Diary & Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported in (1993) 4 SCC 674. Exercise of the choice of retention and the limitation of such exercise of choice of retention also was dealt with by dealing with Rule 7 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules in the case Gaur Gopal Mitra vs. State of West Bengal reported in 67 CWN 12. The relevant paragraph reads such: “This is a right of retention. In other words it is a right of keeping the possession. The relevant paragraph reads such: “This is a right of retention. In other words it is a right of keeping the possession. While section 6 lays down the right of the intermediary to retain and state what can be retained, it also prescribes a procedure of achieving and exercising this right to retain. That is provided in section 6(5) of the Act which is material for determining the question before me. It reads as follows:- “An intermediary shall exercise his choice for retention of land under sub-section (1) within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. If no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period, the Revenue Officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c ), (d) and (j) of the sub-section; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall require an intermediary to exercise the choice if he has already done so before the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1957.” A perusal of this sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act makes the following points clear. In the first place it casts an obligation on the intermediary to exercise his choice of retention. The words used are “An intermediary shall exercise his choice.” This statutory obligation to exercise the choice has to be exercised within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. The manner and time prescribed appear in Rule 4A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. the time limit within which to exercise this choice is expressly stated in Rule 4A to be the 30th day of April, 1958. The petitioners here did not exercise the choice within that express time limit of the 30th day of April 1958. The manner under Rule 4A of making this choice is in Form B appended to Schedule B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. The petitioners observed neither the manner nor the procedure under such Rule to exercise their choice of retention. The manner under Rule 4A of making this choice is in Form B appended to Schedule B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. The petitioners observed neither the manner nor the procedure under such Rule to exercise their choice of retention. The next part of sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act makes it clear that if no choice is exercised by the intermediary during the prescribed period even then the Revenue Officer shall allow him the retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the statutory limits after giving him an opportunity of being heard. It seems to me clear from this language that even after the time for exercising the choice has expired the statute gives the intermediary both opportunity and occasion to claim retention permitted by the Act and there is an obligation and statutory duty cast upon the Revenue Officer to give the intermediary the opportunity of being heard and allow him to retain. No Rules have been framed, however, as to how an intermediary is to proceed when the prescribed time limit of the 30th April 1958 has expired. But whether rules are made or not, effect must have to be given to the statutory provision under section 6(5) of the Act which expressly provides for the case where no choice is exercised by the intermediary during the prescribed period. Certainly if rights such as are there in sections 44, 45 and 45A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act are still open to the intermediary, the intermediary may avail of them. But even then the entry in the record-of rights raises at best a presumption which can always be rebutted on proper and cogent facts. It is enough for the purposes of this application to say that under section 6(5) of the Act, the intermediary has still a right and an opportunity even after the prescribed time limit has passed, to make a claim for retention of lands under section 6(1) (c ), (d) and (j) thereof, so long as he has not parted with the possession of his lands and the prima facie authority to which the intermediary can make such claim is the revenue Officer.” The said issue has been considered by Apex Court in the case West Bengal Government Employees (Food and Supplies) Cooperative Housing Society Limited & Ors v. Smt. Sulekha Pal (Dey) & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 2328 . Relevant paragraph reads such: “On a careful reading of the above referred to decisions portions of which have been brought to our notice and extracted above with emphasis laid in support of the respective stand taken for the parties on either side, we are also of the view that the right of the intermediaries to retain certain lands and properties under section 6 does not come to an end once and for all or said to become extinct, irretrievable after the prescribed date as envisaged in Section 6(5) read with Rule 4-A of the Rules. Without leaving anything for anyone to surmise as an aftermath of such omission or lapse, the legislature itself stipulated as to what should happen thereafter also in the latter part of sub-section (5) of section 6 that if no choice is exercised under Section 6(1) by the intermediary during the prescribed period also obligating the Revenue Officer to give the intermediary an opportunity of being heard allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act.” The right of the Collector to take charge of the estate and rights therein of intermediaries, which vest in the State under Section 5 have been dealt with under Section 10 of the said Act. While sub-section (2) of Section 10 lays down the procedure to be followed and stipulates the manner and method in which the possession has to be taken, sub-section (5) declares in clear and unmistakable terms that nothing in the said Section shall authorize the collector to take khas possession of any estate or of any right of an intermediary therein which ‘may’ be retained under Section 6 and the embargo is not merely with reference to those properties already chosen to be retained as envisaged under sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 6. Before taking possession, Sub-section (2) of Section 10 mandates the Collector to serve a written order in the prescribed manner requiring the intermediary or any other person in khas or symbolic possession, by the date to be specified in the order, which shall not be earlier than sixty days from the date of its service, to give up such possession and all documents, registers, records and papers connected with the management of such estate/ interest. Rule 7 of the Rule prescribes the statutory form (No.3) of order / notice and provides that the order of the Collector and the statement shall be in the said form or in a form substantially similar thereto. The collector has to by his order essentially call upon the intermediary / person concerned, among other things, to furnish a statement in the format prescribed, as part of Form No. 3 itself and particularly in clause 5 (iii) (c) of the statement to retain under the provision of the Act. This, in our view, inevitably postulates and leads only to the inescapable conclusion that even before the Collector actually takes khas possession of the estate and rights of an intermediary therein, the intermediary will have not only an opportunity but a right to choose the lands which he could retain as provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. That such understanding and construction of the relevant provision alone would be proper and necessary to be adopted gets reinforced from sub-section 6 of Section 10 which stipulates that if after vesting takes place under S. 5 and the intermediary or any other person possesses any land which was in the khas possession of the intermediary before vesting, but which the intermediary has not retained or cannot retain under Section 6, then whether possession of such land has been taken by the Collector in pursuance of sub-section (2) or not the intermediary or such other person shall be liable for the period for which he is in possession of such land to make payments determined in the manner enumerated therein.” In the case State of West Bengal Bengal & Ors. v. Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2009) 4 SCC 453 . Para 10, Apex Court again discussed the said issue. v. Ratnagiri Engineering Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2009) 4 SCC 453 . Para 10, Apex Court again discussed the said issue. Relevant paragraph of report reads such: “A perusal of Section 6 of 1953 Act discloses that there is a difference between clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6(1) on the one hand, and clause (f) and (g) of Section 6(1) on the other. While in the case of lands which can be retained under clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6(1) the retention is automatic from the date of vesting and no order of any authority need be passed for that purpose, in the case of clauses (f) and (g) of Section 6(1) the retention after the date of vesting is not automatic, but it is only when the State Government passes an order under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. In other words, after the date of vesting the lands mentioned in clauses (f) and (g) of Section 6(1) cannot be retained by the intermediary unless and until an order is passed by the State Government under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. Also, unlike lands mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6(1) which can be retained after the date of vesting irrespective of the area, in the case of lands mentioned in clauses (f) and (g) only so much of the said land can be retained which in the opinion of the State Government is required for the tea garden, mill, factory or workshop.” It is admitted position from the record of rights that Mrinali’s son Harendra retained the possession of same lands where he was a co-sharer which under law could be considered as possession of Mrinalini also as it was un-partitioned property. The principle of law as settled is that possession of one co-sharer should be considered in law as possession of all co-sharers. Reliance is placed to the case P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in AIR 1957 SC 314 , Kochkunju Nair v. Koshy Alexander & Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 482 . The principle of law as settled is that possession of one co-sharer should be considered in law as possession of all co-sharers. Reliance is placed to the case P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in AIR 1957 SC 314 , Kochkunju Nair v. Koshy Alexander & Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 482 . Since the possession as yet has not been taken, even after death of Mrinalini by issuing a notice under Section 10(2), the legal heirs of Mrinalini have a choice to retain the land as and when such notice to be issued by the State Government under Sections 6(5) and 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act read with concerned relevant rule as discussed above. Sections 6(5) and 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and the Rule 7 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules read such: Section 6(5) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953: “An intermediary shall exercise his choice for retention of land under subsection (1) within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. If no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period, the Revenue Officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses ©, (d) and (j) of that sub-section: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall require an intermediary to exercise the choice if he has already done so before the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition(Second Amendment) Act, 1957 (West Bengal Act.XXV of 1957)” Rule 10 of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act: “S. 10. Collector to take charge of Estates and rights of intermediaries vested in the Estate.-(1) Upon the publication of any notification under section 4, the Collector shall take charge of estates and interests of intermediaries which vest in the State under section 5. Collector to take charge of Estates and rights of intermediaries vested in the Estate.-(1) Upon the publication of any notification under section 4, the Collector shall take charge of estates and interests of intermediaries which vest in the State under section 5. (2) For the purpose as aforesaid, the Collector may, by a written order served in the prescribed manner, require any intermediary or any person in possession (khas or symbolical) of any such estate or of any such interest, to give up such possession by a date to be specified in the order which shall not be earlier than sixty days from the date of service of the order) and to deliver by that date any documents, registers, records and collection papers connection with the management of such estate or of such interest which are in his custody and furnish a statement in the prescribed form in respect of such estate or such interest. Rule 7 as referred to : 7. Service of the order of the Collector under section 10(2) and form of statement referred to therein- (1) The order of the collector and the statement referred to in subsection (2) of section 10 shall be in Form No. 3 appended to these rules or in a form substantially similar thereto. (2) The order may be served- by delivering the same to the intermediary or to the person to whom it is directed or to the authorized agent of such intermediary or person, or on failure of such service by delivering a copy of the order to an adult member of the family of such intermediary or such person or by affixing such copy on some conspicuous part of the premises in which such intermediary or person resides or is known to have last resided; or by affixing a copy of the order on a conspicuous part of any Kutchari of the intermediary: or by sending by registered post to such intermediary or person at his ordinary place of residence or at the place where he may be known to reside.” On a bare reading of those provisions, it appears on the reflection of the judgement as referred to above that legal heirs are still entitled to retain the possession exercising choice of retention. Considering the aforesaid discussion now this point is clear that Mrinalini accrued a right over the non-agricultural land by inheritance under a specific statutory provision namely Women’s Right to Property Act. This right was a limited right as Hindu Widow’s Estate but subsequently on coming into effect of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 such right was converted to an absolute right of ownership by application of Section 14 of the said Act. Section 14 reads such: “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.-(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, “Property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.” The effect of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act with reference to limited right under the Hindu Widow’s Estate or limited right of a property possessed by a female Hindu was considered in the case Mangal Singh & Ors. vs. Smt. Rattno(dead) by her legal representative & Anr. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1786 . Paragraph 6 & 11 of the said report reads such:- “(6) Section 14(1) of the Act is as follows:- “14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1786 . Paragraph 6 & 11 of the said report reads such:- “(6) Section 14(1) of the Act is as follows:- “14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation- In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage , or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.” The dispute in the case has arisen, because this section confers the right of full ownership on a Hindu female only in respect of property possessed by her, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act; and, in the present case, admittedly, the plaintiff had been dispossessed in the year 1954 and was not able to recover possession from the defendants-appellants until her death in the year 1958. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that, in order to attract the provisions of S. 14(1) of the Act, it must be shown that the female Hindu was either in actual physical possession, or constructive possession of the disputed property. On the other side, it was urged that even if a female Hindu be, in fact, out of actual possession, the property must be held to be possessed by her, if her ownership rights in that property still exist and, in exercise of those ownership rights, she is capable of obtaining actual possession of it. It appears to us that, on the language used in S. 14 (1) of the Act, the latter interpretation must be accepted. The third case of this Court brought to our notice is that of S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 418: ( AIR 1962 SC 1493 ). In that case, a Digamber Jain of the Porwal sect died in 1934 leaving behind his widow, his son and three grand-sons. His son died in 1939. The third case of this Court brought to our notice is that of S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 418: ( AIR 1962 SC 1493 ). In that case, a Digamber Jain of the Porwal sect died in 1934 leaving behind his widow, his son and three grand-sons. His son died in 1939. In 1952, a son of one of the grandsons filed a suit for partition of the joint family properties, while the widow was still alive. While the suit was still pending, the widow died. Amongst other questions arising in the partition suit, one question that arose was whether the 1/4th share of the widow declared in the preliminary decree was possessed by her and whether, on her death, it descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act. Dealing with this question, this Court explained the scope of S. 14 (1) by stating that, by S. 14(1), the Legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which, under the Sastric Hindu law, would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest. It was held that, by S. 14(1), manifestly, it was intended to covert the interest, which a Hindu female has in property, however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be, into absolute estate. under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance, and she was not entitled to claim partition. under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance, and she was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature, by enacting the Hindu Women’s Right to property Act, 1937, made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband head at the time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned, she became owner in severalty of her share, subject, of course, to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual or civil." Applying these principles to the facts of that case, it was remarked: “In the light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose, it would be difficult, without doing violence to the language used in the enactment, to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property. If, under a preliminary decree, the right in favour of a Hindu male be regarded as property, the right declared in favour of a Hindu female must also be regarded as property. The High Court was, therefore, in our judgment, in error in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai was not possessed by her, nor are we able to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of S. 14 was not property within the meaning of S. 14 of the Act. In that case, it will be noticed that the widow died, while the suit for partition was still pending, and she was not in actual, physical or constructive possession of the property which was held to be possessed by her at the time of her death. Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed. That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force. Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed. That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force. On these facts, the Court came to the finding that the disputed property was possessed by the widow; and this finding was given despite the circumstance that she was not in actual possession or constructive possession of the property, but had merely obtained the right to the property under the preliminary decree . the principle laid down in that case, thus, supports the broader meaning given to the expression “possessed by” indicated by us earlier. ” This point was also dealt with earlier in the case Munnalal v. Rajkumar reported in AIR 1962 SC 1493 . Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said report read such: “This Court in G.T.M. Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 968: ( AIR 1959 SC 577 ), held that “The word “Possessed” in S. 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one’s power”. The preliminary decree declard that Khilonabai was entitled to to a share in the family estate and the estate being with the family of which she was a member and in joint enjoyment, would be possessed by her. But counsel for Rajkumar submitted that under the preliminary decree passed in the suit for partition the interest of Khlionabai in the estate was merely inchoate, for she had a mere right to be maintained out of the estate and that her right continued to retain that character till actual division was made and the share declared by the preliminary decree was separated and delivered to her on her death before actual division the inchoate interest again reverted to the estate out of which it was carved. Counsel relied upon the judgement of the Judicial Committee in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanbati Bibi, 63 Ind App 33: (AIR 1936 PC 20) in support of his plea that under the Mitakshara law, when the family estate is divided a wife or mother is entitled to a share, but is not recognised as the owner of such share until the division of the property is actually made, as she has no pre-existing right in the estate except a right of maintenance. Counsel submitted that this rule of Hindu Law was not affected by anything contained in S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. By S. 14(1) the Legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest and by the explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The expression includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By S. 14(1) manifestly it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull’s case, 63 Ind App 33: (AIR 1936 PC 20) undoubtedly laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognized as owner, but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which ere regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu Law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu Law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Women’s Right to property Act 1937 made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her Husband had at the time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in severalty of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual or civil. It cannot be assumed having regard to this development that in enacting S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the Legislature merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in Pratapmull’s case, 63 Ind App 33: (AIR 1936 PC 20 ). Section 4 of the Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act. It enacts: “Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,- (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act: (b) ……………………………..” Manifestly, the Legislature intended to supersede the rules of Hindu law on all matters in respect of which there was an express provision made in the Act. Normally a right declared in an estate by a preliminary decree would be regarded as property, and there is nothing in the context in which S. 14 occurs or in the phraseology used by the Legislature to warrant the view that such a right declared in relation to the estate of a joint family in favour of a Hindu widow is not property within the meaning of S. 14. In the light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose it would be difficult without doing violence to the language used in the enactment to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property. In the light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose it would be difficult without doing violence to the language used in the enactment to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property. If under a preliminary decree the right in favour of a Hindu male be regarded as property the right declared in favour of a Hindu female must also be regarded as property. The High Court was therefore, in our judgment, in error in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai was not possessed by her, nor are we able to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of S. 14 of the Act.” Hence, having regard to the provision of law under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, Mrinalini’s limited right over the non-agricultural land became an absolute right of ownership with all its consequences. When Mrinalini’s such right crystallized by statutory provision of law while she was in possession of the property due to reason that State did not serve any notice under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act irrespective of the fact that portion of the land was vested to the estate measuring 10.68 acres whether Mrinalini was legally entitled to exercise such choice and on her death by the legal heirs and if such right subsists the next question would be whether on the ground of delay in exercise of such right would defeat the succession right of Mrinalini and her legal heirs with reference to a property which is within the canopy of human right as well as constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India as discussed above. The respondent has urged vehemently on delay point and has referred a judgement applying the doctrine “delay defeats equity”, passed in the case Municipal Council, Ahmedanagar & Anr. Vs. Shanti Hembram Beg & Ors. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 248. On reading of the said judgement it appears that the same is distinguishable from the present facts and circumstances of this case. The fact of that case is completely different from this one. In that case the principle of approbate and reprobate was the guiding principle to deal with the case. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 248. On reading of the said judgement it appears that the same is distinguishable from the present facts and circumstances of this case. The fact of that case is completely different from this one. In that case the principle of approbate and reprobate was the guiding principle to deal with the case. In the instant case as already discussed that the right over the nonagricultural land by Mrinalini is a right cropped up by application of law of inheritance and succession which cannot be negatived in absence of any positive statutory provision to that effect permitting said effect. Besides such, since Mrinalini and her legal heirs thereafter was/are in possession of the property and by application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as Mrinalini became the absolute owner when the said act was introduced in the year 1956, Mrinalini’s right cannot be said to have been extinguished on application of delay point as taken by the State. So far as the property right is concerned when it relates to the question of illegal vesting and question of deprivation of somebody from the property right, a positive statutory provision should be there to oust the holder of the property from such property right as already discussed. Under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act as yet no possession has been taken, hence though the State earlier had taken a symbolic possession by application of Section 4 of the said Act namely the vesting of the property to the State, but that has not ousted the possessory right as held by the legal heirs of the Mrinalini with a right to retain the land on application of statutory provision of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. It appears that Mrinalini’s legal heirs sought for revise of record of right and prayed correction of record of rights. The revision of records of right under Section 44(2a) of said Act is permissible. Section 44(2a) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 read such: “44(2a) An officer specially empowered by the State Government may, on application within nine months, or of his own motion within fifty years, from the date of final publication of the record-of-rights or from the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (West Bengal Ord. X of 1957), whichever is later, revise an entry in the record finally published in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefor: Provided that nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be deemed to empower such officer to modify or cancel any order passed under Section 5A, while revising any entry: Provided further that no such officer shall entertain any application under this subsection or shall of his own motion take steps to revise any entry, if an appeal against an order passed by a Revenue Officer on any objection made under sub-section (1), has been filed before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 before a tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section, and, notwithstanding anything in this section, any such appeal may continue and be heard and disposed of as if the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957, had not been promulgated.” The said word revision/revised has been considered by the Apex Court in the case State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Suburban Agriculture Dairy & Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 674, a judgement of three Judges Bench. Relevant paragraph 12 read such: “12. Under Section 39 in Chapter V, the State Government has to carry out the purpose of the Act. It shall prepare the Records of Rights in respect of the lands in an estate in any district or a part of a district in the manner prescribed therein. Section 44 provides the procedure for publication of the draft and final Record of Rights prepared or ‘revised’. Sub-section (1) thereof postulates that when a Record of Rights has been prepared or ‘revised’ the Revenue Officer was enjoined to have it published in the prescribed manner. On receipt of objection, if any,made regarding any entry therein or any omission thereof, he shall consider the same and is enjoined to pass an order under Section 5-A of the Act. By operation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 44 the order so passed under Section 5-A shall be final, subject to the order of the appellate tribunal under Section 44(3) and during the continuance of that order it is not liable to be reopened. By operation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 44 the order so passed under Section 5-A shall be final, subject to the order of the appellate tribunal under Section 44(3) and during the continuance of that order it is not liable to be reopened. The respondent is not right in its contention, as found favour with the High Court, that entries once made shall be final and can never be revised. The word ‘revised’ under sub-section (1) of section 44 indicates that the State Government or its officer shall be entitled to revise from time to time the Record of Rights and to make necessary entries or corrections in the relevant columns of Record of Rights in its settlement operations or as per exigency envisaged under the Act and the rules made therein. The order under Section 44(3) becomes final so long as there is no revision effected. The question of res judicata, therefore, does not arise and the previous appellate order does not preclude the authorities from revising the Record of Rights. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, is not right in its conclusion that the order passed by the appellate authority under Section 44(3) is final and the authorities have no jurisdiction to revise the Record of Rights. After the act was amended by Act 33 of 1973, Section 57-B was brought on statute which had barred the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Revenue authorities to deal with the matter arising under Act. So the dismissal of the suit as having been abated is of little consequence.” Having regard to the said view of the Apex Court, it is now settled law that the record of right could be revised any time and there is no embargo. The issue was considered by the Calcutta High Court earlier in the case Must. Hasnear Khatun v. Revenue Officer, Midnapore & Ors. reported in 74 CWN 1020 at page 1026. Relevant portion read such: “ Mr. Panda further contended that in the suo motu proceeding the power under Section 44(2a) is given to the same officer who might have prepared the records-of-rights under section 44(1) (2). It is contended by Mr. Panda that the revisional power can only be given to a superior authority. in my opinion, however, this is also without substance. Panda further contended that in the suo motu proceeding the power under Section 44(2a) is given to the same officer who might have prepared the records-of-rights under section 44(1) (2). It is contended by Mr. Panda that the revisional power can only be given to a superior authority. in my opinion, however, this is also without substance. The word ‘revise’ is used in an ordinary sense and means to ‘re-examine’ the finally published record-of-rights or ‘review’ or ‘amend’ any entry in the finally published record-of-rights and, as such, there cannot be any objection, if an especially empowered officer re-examine an entry in the record-of-rights finally published. Mr. Panda further contended that the suo motu proceeding must contain some reasons for invoking the power under Section 44(2a) and relied on a case reported in (1) 1968 SC 843. In the said case, it has been held that while exercising the suo motu power there should be some ground for invoking the revisional power and the actual interference must be based on sufficient grounds. It appears in the present case that the officer concerned issued notice under section 44(2a), because he was of the opinion that the record-of-rights finally published was incorrectly made and he was prima facie satisfied and issued the notice. I think that these are sufficient grounds for invoking of the power and for the issue of the notice under Section 57 read with section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and no grievances can be made at this stage of the proceeding and I hold that the initiation of the proceeding under section 44(2a) is not without jurisdiction.” Having regard to said judgement, the finding of Learned Tribunal that there is no scope to revise, has no legal basis. Beside such this point cannot be raised by the State having regard to the order of remand passed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by P.C. Ghosh, J. The application filed seeking such revision since was not disposed of, the legal heirs of Mrinalini initiated a proceeding before the Learned Tribunal and thereafter to the High Court at Calcutta in earlier writ petition by taking all the points thereof which stood disposed of by quashing the order of the Learned Tribunal below under challenge. The order dated 8.8.2006 of the Division Bench in WPLRT No.468 of 2006, presided over by Pinaki Chandra Ghosh, J as discussed above reads such: “The only question arises in this application with regard to the right of intermediary to retain certain lands. It has been submitted before us by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners that non-agricultural land which was tried to be vested by an order passed by the authority would itself show that 10.68 acres of non-agricultural land which directed to be vested in the State free from all encumbrances as on 15.04.1955 would show that the authority ordered that plot No.95 classified as “Bell” stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances with share and area 10.68 acres in terms of the order so passed by the authority. It has been urged before us that “Bell” cannot come under the vested land by way of non-agricultural land which has been specifically mentioned in Section 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal. Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and thereby the order passed by the authority with regard thereto has to be declared as void and nullity since the order so passed is hit under Section 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and the authority has not any right to declare such “Bell” as a vested land in terms of the said Section. Hence, it would be proper for us, after hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties, to set aside the order already passed by the Tribunal on 7th June, 2006 and direct the B.L.L.R.O., Sonarpur, being the respondent No. 4 herein, to take necessary steps in the matter after giving a chance of being heard to the writ petitioners as well as the private respondents and shall pass a reasoned order in the matter within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order in respect of such declaration as declared by the concerned authority in the said impugned order dated 22nd October, 1986 in B.R. case No. 523 of 1986. Until the matter is decided by the said authority, status-quo as of today shall continue since it has been submitted before us and it is not in dispute that the petitioners are in possession in the property in question. Until the matter is decided by the said authority, status-quo as of today shall continue since it has been submitted before us and it is not in dispute that the petitioners are in possession in the property in question. With the above observations, the application is, thus, disposed of.” On a reading of the said order it appears that the Division Bench though in the body of the order has referred about beel but once the order of the Tribunal was set aside and quashed, all points were kept open for decision by the Revenue Officer. The order of the Tribunal in O.A. No.2729 of 2005(LRTT) under challenge before the said Division Bench reads such: “P. Bandyopadhyay, Administrative Member. The applicants have filed this application being O.A. No. 2729 of 2005 (LRTT) alleging inaction on the part of District Land and Land Reforms Officer, Alipore, district- Sought 24 Parganas in the matter of disposal of representation dated 15-7-2005 which is annexure ‘E’ to this application in which review of B.R. case No. 523 of 1986 under section 6(5) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (For short E.A. Act) has been letter has been prayed for. Ld. Advocate for the applicants has submitted that Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar was a C.S. recorded raiyat holding 47.50 acres of land in police station, Kasba, district- 24 Parganas and now Sought 24 Parganas. Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar died in the year 1949 leaving behind his widow Mrinalini Dey Sarkar, son Hirendranath Dey Sarkar and three daughters. In R.S. Only Birendra Nath Dey Sarkar, his son was treated to have inherited the entire land and 42.45 acres of land were recorded in his name on the reference date under E.A. Act that is 15.4.5 Ld. Advocate for the applicants has argued that there is no reason why the balance land being 5.15 acres were not recorded though Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar had never transferred such land in any form during his life time. Ld. Advocate has further submitted that the Revenue officer initiated and disposed of a big raiyat case No. 323 of 1986 under section 6(5) of E.A. Act and disposed of the same by an exparte order dated 22.10.1986 alleging Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar only 15 acres of non-agricultural land and other categories of land as opted in ‘B’ form and directed to vest 10.08 acres of non-agricultural land. During the preparation of L.R. Record a considerable quantum of land was recorded in the name of others reportedly on the ground that such lands were transferred by Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar (since deceased) through Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar had never transferred any land. On the basis of recording during preparation of L.R. ROR the Revenue officer disposed of a proceeding under section 14T(3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act. All the plots of land allegedly transferred by Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar wore including in his schedule of retained land and in consequence thereof Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar was practically left with no land. Ld. Advocate for the applicants submitted that against such illegal recording and arbitrary vesting and retention an application was filled before this Tribunal being O.A. 2519/2000 which was disposed of by an order dated 25.01.2002 in which applicants were given liberty to file application before Block land and Land Reforms officer, Sonarpur under section 50 of WBLR Act for correction of ROR. The Revenue officer was directed to disposed of the application appropriately and if the result of the disposal so warranted, records should be corrected under section 51A(4) and the Revenue Officer was given liberty to initiate fresh proceeding under section 14T(3) if so required. Ld. Advocate has further submitted that being aggrieved by the decision of Revenue Officer under section 50, an appeal has been preferred before District Land and Land Reform officer, Sought 24 Parganas under section 50 of L.R. Act which has been registered as appeal case No. 49 of 2002. Against order of t he Revenue Officer in the proceeding under section 14T (3) which has been disposed of on the basis of finding under section 50 of L.R. Act, an appeal has been filed before the same appellate authority that is district Land and Land Reforms Officer, Sought 24 Parganas under section 54 which has been registered as L.R. appeal case No. 55 of 2005. Both the appeals are lying pending before the appellate authority Ld. Advocate has then submitted that the applicants herein have submitted a representation before the District Land and Land Reforms Officer, district-South 24 Parganas which is annexure ‘E’ to this application in which a review of the big raiyat proceeding No. 523 of 1986 under section 6(5) of E.A. Act has been prayed for. Such representation has not yet been disposed of, Ld. Such representation has not yet been disposed of, Ld. Advocate for the applicants has adverted that since Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar died in 1949, his property would not only devolve upon his son Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar but his widow Mrinalini Dey Sarkar was entitled to “inherit 1/3rd share of non-agricultural land” (averment in para 6.10 of the application in terms of provision in Hindu Women’s Right to property Act 1937 as was applicable prior to enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Ld. Advocate has referred to a decision of Federal Court reported in AIR 1941 Federal Court page 72 in this regard. He has also cited a case law being Vaijanath and ors-vs- Guramma and anr. in civil Appeal No. 4379 of 1996 reported in 1999 WBLR (SC) 90 in support of this contention. Ld. Advocate for the applicants further argued that if the representation is disposed of in accordance with direction contained in the judgement of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court then 1/3rd of the property held by Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar will devolve upon Mrinalini Debi from 19.12.1949, the date of death of Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar and Mrinalini Debi having inherited such property had had become tenant directly under the state in terms of provisions of E.A. Act. In such eventuality, argued Ld. Advocate, the land holding of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar on 15.4.55 or 14.4.56 as the case may be would be different thereby necessitating the review of B.R. proceeding No. 523 of 1981 in the name of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar. Consequent upon such changes in R.S. RCR and review of B.R. proceeding, appeal against proceeding under section 50 and appeal against order under section 14T(3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act will lose their perspective and appeals may be rendered unnecessary. In view of such series of legal consequences which are most likely to ensure the authority should be directed to deal with and decide the representation being annexure ‘E’ first giving notice and reasonable opportunity of hearing to the applicants within a stipulated period. Ld. Advocate for the applicants has thus concluded his argument. 2. Ld. Government Representatives have argued that since Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar died intestate in 1949, the entire land held by him was recorded in the name of his son Hidrendra Nath Dey Sarkar in R.S. ROR prepared under the provisions of E.A. Act, 1953. Ld. Advocate for the applicants has thus concluded his argument. 2. Ld. Government Representatives have argued that since Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar died intestate in 1949, the entire land held by him was recorded in the name of his son Hidrendra Nath Dey Sarkar in R.S. ROR prepared under the provisions of E.A. Act, 1953. Mrinalini Debi the widow of Debendra Nath Dey Sarkar and mother of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar did not file any objection under section 44(1) of E.A. Act stating claims of 1/3rd share of the property. Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar also did not file any objection under this sub-section for correction of R.S. ROR either in regard to total land or in regard to the title of her mother Mrinalini Debi in the property left behind by his father. Even after final publication of R.S. ROR, no application was filed at all for either of the aforesaid reasons under subsection (2a) of section 44 of the said Act. On the other hand, Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar submitted ‘B’ option form seeking retention of various categories of land including 25.68 acres of non-agricultural land on the basis of such ‘B’ from return which was submitted long after 30.4.58, the Revenue officer initiated the big raiyat case No. 323 of 1986 under section 6(5) of E.A. Act and allowed him to retain 15 acres of non-agricultural land as is permissible under section 6(1)(c) of the Act and other categories of land as was held and permissible. The Ld. Government Representative have referred to the big raiyat case which is annexure ‘B’ to this application and read out the portion recording the fact of issue of notice and receipt of the same by Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar, the intermediary on the date of vesting. Despite receipt of notice the intermediary did not appear before the Revenue officer and hence the Revenue officer passed order exparte allow him to retain land as per his choice and as permissible under the law. All these years till his death on 25.10.2002, intermediary had no objection to such proceeding. Rather he filed application misc. application etc. before this Tribunal against recording in L.R. ROR with plea that most of the transfers alleged to have be made by him have actually not been made by him and such transfer are forged. Ld. All these years till his death on 25.10.2002, intermediary had no objection to such proceeding. Rather he filed application misc. application etc. before this Tribunal against recording in L.R. ROR with plea that most of the transfers alleged to have be made by him have actually not been made by him and such transfer are forged. Ld. Government representatives argued that pursuant to the order of this Tribunal, the Block Land and Land Reforms officer heard the matter afresh under section 50 and disposed of fresh proceeding under section 14T(3) against which appeals were filed and those appeals are still pending. All on a sudden the son and daughers of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar since deceased have filed a representation before District Land and Land Reforms officer in 2005 for review of big raiyat proceeding disposed of 1986. In terms of section 57B of E.A. Act against an order under sub-section (2) of section 57B, a reference may be filed before sub-Divisional Land and Land Reforms Officer and Assistant Settlement officer concerned within the period of limitation as prescribed in the Act. A more representation filed 19 years after disposal of the big raiyat proceeding is not tenable. Ld. Government Representatives finally argued that this present application is vexatious in nature and a ploy to forestall vesting for indefinite period of time. 3.1. Tribunal has considered the arguments of both the side and perused the documents. The applicants have sought for review of the big raiyat proceeding by a representation which is annexure ‘E’ to this application. On examination of big raiyart proceeding being 323 of 1986 it appears that final order was passed on 22.10 1986 after serving notice upon the intermediary and on the basis of ‘B’ form submitted by him. The intermediary was afforded opportunity of being heard though he did not avail himself of the opportunity. Therefore, though the order was exparte but it was intermediary who was responsible for such exparte order. The procedure cannot be attacked on the ground of being exparte. Besides the land has vested in the state by operation of E.A. Act for which no notice is required to be served. The big raiyat proceeding was initiated and disposed of for allowing retention. The argument of Ld. Advocate that no notice was served for vesting has no substance. 3.2. Besides the land has vested in the state by operation of E.A. Act for which no notice is required to be served. The big raiyat proceeding was initiated and disposed of for allowing retention. The argument of Ld. Advocate that no notice was served for vesting has no substance. 3.2. The applicants have filed a representation for review of order in big raiyat case No. 323 of 1986 passed on 22.10.86. the E.A. Act does not provide any scope for review of an order passed in a proceeding under section 6(5) of the said Act. Section 57(3) provides that any dispute referred to in clause (b) of subsection (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant settlement officer, specially empowered by the state Government in this behalf; who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed. Provide that in deciding a dispute under this subsection, the Revenue officer shall not reopen any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. The big raiyat proceeding as aforesaid has been disposed of by a Revenue officer authorized under sub-section (5) of section 6 of E.A. Act 1953 on the basis of choice exercised by the into mediary as required under this sub-section read with Rule 4A of WBEA Rules 1965. Thus, there is no scope for reopening of the prayer of the applicants for review of the big raiyat case No. 323 of 1986 is not legally tenable. 3.3 Since the applicants have raised the pointing regarding inheritance of 1/3rd share of non-agricultrual land by Mrinalini Debi widow of the Debandra Nath Dey Sarkar who died in 1949, in terms of provision of Hindu Woman’s Rights to property Act, 1937 it is proper that Tribunal should address this issue even though this issue has never been raised before the Revenue officer at the time of preparation / revision of R.S. ROR or before the Revenue Officer under section 6(5) of E.A. Act. This Federal Court in the case law reported in (28) AIR Federal Court 72 has held that- “The Court is therefore of opinion that the answers to the questions comprised in the special reference are as follows:- (1) The Hindu Women’s Rights to property (Amendment) Act 1937 (a) do not operate to regulate succession to agriculture land in the Governors’ provinces and (b) do operate to regulate devolution by survivorship of property other than agricultural land; (2) The subject of devolution by survivorship of proper other than agricultural land is included in entry of list 8, the concurrent list.” The Hon’ ble Supreme Court in vaijanath-vs-Guramma (Supra has held as below:- “In the entire Hindu Women’s right to property Act, 1937 there is noting which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural Land. The property is a general term, which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to the original Hindu Women’s to property Act, 1937 enacted by the Central Legislature entirely because of the legislative entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act 1935. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women’s Right to property Act, 1937 as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgement therefore, would not apply.” Ld. Advocate could not produce anything showing that Bengal Legislature enacted law in the line of Hyderabad. So what applied in Bengal and then West Bengal is the ratio of judgement of Federal Court. Viewed by the ratio, Mrinalini Debi inherited a share of nonagricultural land in 1949, when her husband died, for the period of her a survivor-ship and if she retains the land then by virtue of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she becomes a perpetual under the state. However, in the meantime a silent revolution has taken place in the state in the matter of land holding. The E.A. Act 1953 has come into force in February 1954. By declaration under section 4 and by effect of declaration under section 5 or by notification under section 49 read with section 4 and by effect of notification under section 52 read with section 5 land inherited by Mrinalini Debi which became an estate, vested in the State from encumbrances on 15.4.55 of 14.4.56 as the case may be. By declaration under section 4 and by effect of declaration under section 5 or by notification under section 49 read with section 4 and by effect of notification under section 52 read with section 5 land inherited by Mrinalini Debi which became an estate, vested in the State from encumbrances on 15.4.55 of 14.4.56 as the case may be. What is saved is the possession under section 6(1)(c ) of the Act on submission of statement in Form-I and return in Form ‘B’. In the instant case the R.S. ROR was not draft published in her name and she or anybody on her behalf did not submit any objection under sub-section (1) of section 44. Even after final publication, she or any person on her behalf did not prefer any application under sub-section (2a) of section 44 for correction of ROR. She did not file any ‘B’ form exercising option for retention. On the other hand her son Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar submitted ‘B’ from for retention of the entire land. Therefore, if she has inherited any no agricultural land which is classified as ‘Beel’ such land has vested in the state free from encumbrances. This conforms to the law laid down by Hon, ble Supreme Court in Ardhendu Bhusan Halde-vs-Gangamoni Mondal ( AIR 1990 SC 2240 ), in the state of West Bengal and ors-Vs-subarban Agricultural Dairy pvt. Ltd. and ( AIR 1993 SC 2103 ) as also in the case of state of West Bengal vs-Arun Kumar Basu ( AIR 1997 SC 2645 ). Calcutta High Court in Gour Gopal-vs-state of West Bengal (67CWN 12) has held that the Revenue officer cannot also any retention suo motu nor it is obligatory on the part of the collector to issue notice calling the intermediary to retain. Thus in Gour Gopal (Supra) their Lordships on the interpretation of proviso to section 6(5) have observed that in order to invoke section 6(5) an intermediary is required to make a claim for revision section 6(5) only provides for giving to the intermediary an opportunity of being heard on such option being exercised. Thus in Gour Gopal (Supra) their Lordships on the interpretation of proviso to section 6(5) have observed that in order to invoke section 6(5) an intermediary is required to make a claim for revision section 6(5) only provides for giving to the intermediary an opportunity of being heard on such option being exercised. In the instant case, the intermediary did not appear before Revenue officer during preparation of ROR and as such no record has been prepared in her name necessarily implying that she was not in possession of the land nor did she exercise option for retention and in terms of proviso to sub-section (3) of section 57B the big raiyat proceeding which has been decided by appropriate Revenue Officer is not reviewable. Such representative filed in 2005 also attracts the question of limitation as enjoined in section 55A of E.A. ACt. The plea of lack of knowledge about the existence of Hindu Women’s Right to proper Act 1937 taken by the applicants who are grand –son and grand-daughters of Mrinalini Debi (since deceased) cannot form ground for condoning delay since ignorance of law is no excuse in deciding legal issues. 4. For the reasons stated herein above the application being O.A. No. 2729 of 2005 (LRTT) is dismissed. Interim order, if there be any, is vacated. Let a plain copy of this order duly countersigned by principal officer of this Tribunal be handed over to Ld. Government representative for communication to district Land and Land Reforms officer, South 24 Parganas and Block Land and Land Reforms officer Sonarpur and Xerox certified copy to the parties to the proceeding on payment of requisite Court fees. I agree Chairman (P. Bandyopadhyay) Administrative Member ” On considering the order under challenge in earlier writ proceeding earlier and the order of the writ Court passed, there is no doubt that the Division Bench practically remanded the matter back for consideration of all issues afresh. In terms of said order however, the Revenue Officer did not approach the issue by dealing with the question involved therein. The order of the Revenue Officer as passed on 18.10.2006 read such: “Learned Advocate Sri Nibaran Kumar Das is present and filed attendance. Learned Advocate Pradip Kumar Panja is also present. The Revenue Officer initiated a Big Rayat proceeding in 6(5) of W.B.E.A Act, 1853in the name of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar, on intermediary vide case No.523/1986. The order of the Revenue Officer as passed on 18.10.2006 read such: “Learned Advocate Sri Nibaran Kumar Das is present and filed attendance. Learned Advocate Pradip Kumar Panja is also present. The Revenue Officer initiated a Big Rayat proceeding in 6(5) of W.B.E.A Act, 1853in the name of Hirendra Nath Dey Sarkar, on intermediary vide case No.523/1986. Notices were send upon the intermediary but none appeared. So ex-parte decision was taken. Sri Dey Sarkar held that total non-agricultural land of 25.68 acres. He was allowed to retain 15.00 acres of land and the remaining 10.68 acres were declared vested to State. The lands were in mouza Atghara (J.L.5) P.S. Sonarpur within East Calcutta Wetland as Reclaine Zone Plot No.95 measuring 10.68 acres having classification “bill” was vested to State. Learned Advocate Sri Nibaran Kumar Das agitated upon the issue that widow of Debendranath Mrinalini’s frght held properties were with the properties of Sri Hirendranath Dey Sarkar and demarcated last this is unfair, Sri Dey also cited some hasitation of federal copy by which the such properties shall be claimed with. The Revenue Officer acted in strict conformity with the basic tenants of premises land, dozen under W.B.E.A. Act 1953, allowed the B/R to retain 15.00 acres of land. Subsequently possession of vested lands were also taken. Thus there is having such scope for taking relief to the appearances. Thus, the direction of Honble High Court is complied with. Sd/- B.L.L.R.O Sonarpur.” Learned Tribunal below in original application No.281 of 2007(LRTT), the order of which is under challenge before us in this present writ application, committed gross mistake in the decision making process whereby and whereunder ultimate decision was reached dismissing the original application which resulted confirmation of the order of the Revenue Officer aforesaid impugned before the Learned Tribunal in a subsequent proceeding for the sole reason that the Revenue Officer did not follow the order dated 8.8.2006 of the Division Bench passed in earlier writ application WPLRT No.468 of 2006 wherein the Bench presided over by Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J on setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal directed to consider the issue about declaration made to vest the property, denovo. The Revenue Officer whose order was under challenge before the Learned Tribunal below neither considered the point about acquiring of title over the property by the legal heirs of Mrinalini subject to retention in terms of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and the rules made thereunder aforesaid and subject to limitation of ceiling limit under the said Act relating to retention of non-agricultural land, nor has considered the point as to whether any land admittedly recorded as beel, a nonagricultural land could be the subject matter of vesting under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. By the impugned order of the Learned Tribunal below in this writ application, Tribunal simply opined that the claim of the legal heirs could not be accepted after lapse of 50 years for the sole reason that Mrinalini at the time of hearing of the Big raiyat case No.523 of 1986 initiated against Hirendranath even if she was not noticed could have claimed her right on the basis of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 to retain non-agricultural land in her possession and during her lifetime also did not file any application seeking review of the said decision vesting 10.48 acres of non-agricultural land out of total land of the beel alleging that Revenue Officer wrongly considered the property of Mrinalini as of Hirendranath. Beside that point Learned Tribunal below reached to the decision to dismiss the tribunal application on other ground that after finality of record of rights as prepared under Section 44(4) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, there was no scope to re-open the issue. The aforesaid finding of the Learned Tribunal is under attack in the writ application before us for the purpose of judicial review of the issue under the anvil of judicial review of decision making process. The aforesaid finding of the Learned Tribunal is under attack in the writ application before us for the purpose of judicial review of the issue under the anvil of judicial review of decision making process. As already discussed above regarding acquiring of title over the half portion of the non-agricultural land along with Hirendranath by the Mrinalini on application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 though Mrinalini was life interest holder at the material time and possession was a joint possession with Hirendranath, but subsequently Mrinalini got absolute right, title and interest over the property under her possession by application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and Mrinalini during her lifetime continued to remain in possession exercising her right to sale the property and at the present moment the legal heirs of Mrinalini are in possession which is admitted fact and not disputed by the State respondent. The State respondent also cannot deny the possessory right of legal heirs of Mrinalini in view of application of Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act read with Rule 7 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rule which provides inter alia, that at the time of taking possession of the vested land, if any, not retained by any big raiyat, notice to be served so that the raiyat may exercise choice of retention even at that moment and order of vesting could be modified to that extent. On that score decision of the Court of law settled the legal position with reference to following proposition (I) that so long the possession is not being taken over by the collector by serving a notice under Section 10 (2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act read with Rule 7 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rule, the intermediary/raiyat has the right to file choice of retention of the land and on adjudicating that choice, if is made, possession could be taken. (ii) That the legal heirs of the intermediary/raiyat also may exercise such choice of option under the aforesaid contingencies where notice for taking over possession under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act would be served. (ii) That the legal heirs of the intermediary/raiyat also may exercise such choice of option under the aforesaid contingencies where notice for taking over possession under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act would be served. As already discussed earlier that the right to property is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and is also within human rights concept and such right cannot be negatived and it cannot be extinguished without any procedures of law and application of statute. The right to succession/inheritance of a property cannot be negatived without any law to that effect by categorically providing a statutory provision for such extinction of succession right. Right to property is a basic right which could be considered as emanated fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, if we extend the meaning of the word “life” so far as land property is concerned of any raiyat due to reason that livelihood of majority persons living in rural India are maintained from the income of land property. In the instant case Mrinalini a widow having regard to the Women’s Right to Property Act got life interest over the property to enjoy the usufruct thereof for her maintenance of livelihood, which otherwise could be considered as for her maintenance of livelihood in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India at the present moment at the post constitution era. The conceptual idea of statutory codification of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 by providing the provision of “women’s estate” is a departure and/or a serious positive turn in social angle as well as in socio-economic field, in favour of women’s which earlier was not so recognised by any statutory codification save and except the “sastrik” provision of Hindu law in the nature of “Stridhan”. The Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 accordingly provided a positive stipulation under Section 2 to this effect “notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary, the provision of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate”. The Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 accordingly provided a positive stipulation under Section 2 to this effect “notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary, the provision of Section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate”. In view of that, a new vista was opened or new window was opened, providing right to the property to a limited extent, as envisaged under Section 3 of the said Act by bringing it out from the shakle of Sastrik law and/or the custom and as such by non-obstante clause under Section 2, the legislatures by their wisdom allowed women to enjoy the property in the same share as of a son, subject to limitation under sub Section 3 of Section 3 as prescribed thereto, but with a provision of right to claim partition as a male owner. This is a historical approach of the legislature to provide the women’s right to property which naturally is nothing but a provision having an objective purpose to provide maintenance to the women and social and financial security under the said Act. To make a concrete stability of women’s right to property at par with the male member of the family guided by the Hindu law, the law was developed further by enacting Hindu Succession Act, 1956 whereby and whereunder a provision under Section 14 was made providing absolute ownership right without any embargo as made in earlier Hindu Right to Property Act, 1937 about life interest of the property and thereby absolute ownership right with right title and interest and possession was given in respect of properties “possessed” by the Hindu Women. The Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 accordingly stood repealed by Section 31 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 prior to repeal of the said section by repealing and amendment Act 1960 being Act 58 of 1960. The effect of such repeal under Section 31 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by reason of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 did not in any way affect the right already acquired by the widows under Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and repealing of Section 31 subsequently by repealing and amending Act, 1960, shall not be understood as reviving the two acts namely the Hindu Law of inheritance amendment Act, 1929 and Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. On interpretation of the word “property possessed by a female Hindu” stipulated in section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, it was opined by Court of law that even joint possession or symbolic possession through some other else would satisfy possession of Hindu women. The explanation of sub Section 1 and Section 14 defined the word property on considering the object and scope of Section 14 conferring greater right of women and objective purpose of the present section was two fold namely to remove disability of a female to acquire and hold property as an absolute owner and secondly to convert any estate already held by women on the date of commencement of the act as a limited owner, into a basic estate. As a natural corollary of that in case of her death intestate she becomes the fresh stalk of the deceased and the property devolves by succession on her own heirs. Section 14 otherwise is a section introduced as a step of practical recognition satisfying, Article 14 of the Constitution of India and to lift the women from a subservent position in the economic field to a higher pedastal, so that they could exercise full power of enjoyment and disposal of the proerty held by them as owners overcoming the revival limitation about their right of ownership and the male dominancy as was prevailing earlier. This issue was dealt with and considered by the Apex Court in details in a case Bai Vijaya v. Thakuri Bai Chalabhai reported in (1979) 3 SCC 300 , by holding that enacting Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 legislatures removed the traditional limitation on the power of disposition of property by female Hindu. Reliance is also placed to the judgement passed in the case Munnalal v. Raj Kumar reported in AIR 1962 SC 1493 . The provision, Section 14, was given retrospective effect in view of very nature of right vested to the female Hindu converting limited right of women’s estate to absolute ownership. Reliance is also placed to the judgement passed in the case Munnalal v. Raj Kumar reported in AIR 1962 SC 1493 . The provision, Section 14, was given retrospective effect in view of very nature of right vested to the female Hindu converting limited right of women’s estate to absolute ownership. The conflict of opinion in between different High Courts on the question of prospectivity or retrospectivity of the statute has been finally settled by the Supreme Court in the case Kotturi Swami v. Veeravva reported in 1959 Suppl 1 SCR 968 corresponding to AIR 1959 SC 577 by holding, inter alia, that where a woman is in possession of property whether actual or constructive and she has acquired the property before the act came into effect, she becomes absolute owner and if the alienation of such property is made subsequent to commencement of the Act, the revertioners cannot question it though the alienation is not for any religious purpose or for any legal necessity of female. The Supreme Court further has considered the effect of Section 14 by holding that this salutary provision should not be ignored on technicalities about vesting or absolute ownership of the property to the Hindu women, in the case Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v. Raj Kumari Sharma reported in AIR 1996 SC 869 . The word “possession” of Section 14, has been judicially interpreted by the Apex Court to this effect that it should be considered in the broad sense and the property need not be in actual possession of the female. It is held further that it is sufficient if she has a right to recover possession according to law. This view expressed in the case Kothuruswami v. Veeravva reported in AIR 1959 SC 577 by holding that a property is said to be possessed by a person if she is a owner even though she may for the time being put out of actual possession or even though she is in constructive possession. The Apex Court considered this principle by holding, inter alia, that “possessed of ” word of the section is intended to gather all cases of possession in law in the case Mangal Singh v. Rattno (Smt.) reported in 1967 SC 1786. The constructive possession would be sufficient, also is the view expressed in the case Dindayal v. Raja Ram reported in (1970) 1 SCC 786 . The constructive possession would be sufficient, also is the view expressed in the case Dindayal v. Raja Ram reported in (1970) 1 SCC 786 . Having regard to the conceptual idea of enacting Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it is abundantly clear that the legislatures at their wisdom practically had given the right to the women at par with the right with the male members of the female and that right was initially under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, prescribing limited right as women’s estate, which was nothing but a right in the angle of providing maintenance and/or subsistence allowance and as a sequence same could be considered alike provision of livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India being an emanated fundamental right at post constitution era. The word “life” of Article 21 of Constitution of India also engulf the maintenance/subsistence issue, to maintain the livelihood in that angle. The concept of Article 21 of Constitution of India could be applied in the instant case while adjudicating the right of Mrinalini as existing prior to omission of Article 19(1) (f) by Constitution (44th )Amendment Act, 1978 w.e.f 20.6.1979 over the nonagricultural land under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and this right cannot be said to have been time barred for its effect and/or cannot be extinguished without any fair procedures of law by any other statutory enactment, overriding said right. A fundamental right or emanated fundamental right, is not barred by limitation, for its enforciability. There is also no question of waiver of any fundamental right or emanated fundamental right and also constitutional right under Article 300A. Since the right to livelihood was the objective purpose of enactment of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, providing limited life interest over the non-agricultural land and in some states it was for agricultural land also, the issue goes to the root of the point of constitutional right of property under Article 300A as well as the right under Article 21 by its extended meaning of the word “life” which encompass ‘livelihood’. This right in my view cannot be curtailed/restricted and cannot automatically be evaporated/extinguished by technicalities of limitation point as has been held by the Learned Tribunal below. This right in my view cannot be curtailed/restricted and cannot automatically be evaporated/extinguished by technicalities of limitation point as has been held by the Learned Tribunal below. Right of inheritance and succession over a property, cannot be the subject matter of limitation to allow the State who is a “model authority” to deprive women from exercising her right and/or to deprive the legal heirs of such women from the said right. Having regard to aforesaid findings and observation, the decision making process of the Learned Tribunal by holding that after long 50 years this point cannot be agitated, has no legal substance and such decision making process to reach the decision nullifying right of legal heirs of Mrinalini, is absolutely illegal and on breach of constitutional provision as discussed above. So far as finality of record of rights under Section 44(4) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act as held by the Learned Tribunal below also has no legal basis having regard to the judgement State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) and Must. Hasnear Khatun (supra) interpreting the word “revise” as appearing under Section 44 sub section 2 of the said Act. The Apex Court in that case has interpreted the word revise to this extent that it can be done on sufficient reasoning by the Revenue Officer and the finality clause will not be an embargo. Having regard to such legal position the decision making process of tribunal applying Section 44(4) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, is also not legally sustainable. Learned Advocate for the State respondent has strongly urged on principle of res judicata so far as the issue about Mrinalinis right, over the property under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, to limited extent and absolute ownership thereafter on application of Hindu Succession Act as well as right of the legal heirs to exercise the choice of option for retaining the non-agricultural land following the succession line from Mrinalini, to have modification of order of vesting for the purpose of correction of revisional settlement record of rights, on the ground that this issue was thrashed before the Learned Tribunal below in earlier proceeding unsuccessfully leading to application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as disposed of by the Bench presided over by P. C. Ghose, J without explicitly considering that point which tantamounts to rejection of point raised. To have an answer of this point, the order of the Learned Tribunal below passed earlier which became the subject matter of challenge before the Division Bench of the High Court in writ jurisdiction wherein writ application was allowed by the Bench presided over by Honble Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose, is required to be considered. It appears that the Learned Tribunal below by its earlier order which was the subject matter of earlier writ application, as already discussed, rejected the contention raised on the factual and legal premises of acquiring right by Mrinalini on application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Succession Act in respect of proportionate portion of non-agricultural land and on challenge of the same the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in earlier writ application WPLRT No.468 of 2006 quashed the order impugned in the writ application i.e. the order of the Learned Tribunal below and directed the Revenue Officer concerned to cre-onsider the issue of declaration of vesting as made, denovo on considering the point afresh. The order of the Learned Tribunal passed in original application No.2729 of 2005 and the order of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the writ application WPLRT No.468 of 2006 passed on 8.8.2006 are already quoted in earlier paragraph. On a bare analysis and scanning of the order passed by the Honble Division Bench earlier, it appears that the order of the Learned Tribunal was set aside and quashed not on the limited point of a fresh decision regarding the “beel”, but in its entirety. Though in earlier writ application the High Court made an observation and finding relating to the concerned beel and its applicability for vesting, but when the entire order of the Learned Tribunal below was set aside and quashed, in the eye of law, it will be deemed that all finding and observation as well as decision reached by the Learned Tribunal below on different points involving the issues were set aside and quashed. As a resultant effect of such, point of acquiring right by Mrinalini on application of aforesaid statutory provisions of succession Act and right of the legal heirs after death of the Mrinalini while remaining in possession of the land to exercise their choice of retention of the lands as are vested under Section 4 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act by considering the entire land recorded in the revisional settlement record of rights as of the land under ownership of Hirendranath the son of Mrinalini, also was made open for fresh adjudication. On scanning the order of the Honble Division Bench passed earlier, the only conclusion could be reached that in the earlier writ application the High Court when quashed the impugned order of the tribunal touching different points, those points revived again for adjudication by the Revenue Officer. It appears that the State respondent did not challenge the said order of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court passed in writ proceeding aforesaid, as such this order is binding to the State respondent and the Revenue Officer. The question of res-judicata accordingly has no applicability on the present facts of the case. On perusal of the order it appears that it is not a limited remand but a remand on all points. Having regard to the order of the Honble High Court passed in earlier writ proceeding, and the submission made in the form of a written submission before the concerned Revenue Officer, it appears that he did not consider any points namely the issue (i) relating to the applicability of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act in respect of property recorded as beel and (ii) succession/legal heirship of Mrinalini by dint of succession statute which is also covered by constitutional right of property under Article 300A read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The judgement as relied upon by the State respondent on point of res-judicata namely Ramchandra Dagdu v. Vithu Hire Mahar reported in (2009) 10 SCC 273 para 42, 43, Forward Construction v. Prabhat Mondal reported in (1986) SCC 100, M/s. Eastern Coalfield v. Abinesh Mondal reported in 2008(1) CLJ 436 , accordingly has no applicability in the instant case, having regard to the factual parameters of the case in hand before us. This issue on resjudicata accordingly stand rejected. This issue on resjudicata accordingly stand rejected. It appears from the records that Learned Tribunal below by the impugned order which is the subject matter of the present writ application has considered the principle of approbate and reprobate on the premises that once Hirendranath submitted ‘B’ form retaining portion of lands and allowed vesting of other portion, in terms of his choice of retention wherein a portion of the beel was included allowing vesting to the extent of 10.48 acres, the legal heirs of Hirendranath and Mrinalini were not entitled to raise that point further claiming the property right of Mrinalini by law of succession/inheritance. It is true that Hirendranath submitted ‘B’ form claiming ownership right over the entire property left by his father without mentioning mother’s proportionate share over nonagricultural land in terms of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. It is also true that Hirendranath submitted ‘B’ form showing ownership over the entire lands left by his father including property under life interest of Mrinalini and thereby was successful to record his name in the revisional settlement. Hence, so far as exercise of further right by the legal heirs of Hirendranath, the principle of reprobate and approbate even if is considered as applicable, but the said principle, to the case of the legal heirs of Mrinalini claiming separate title over the property derived by statutory application of succession law applicable to Mrinalini, is not applicable. Neither Mrinalini nor the legal heirs of Mrinalini at any point of time exercised choice of retention earlier. Beside the aforesaid point, it is a settled legal position of law that the right, title and interest over any landed property which is being carried following the law of succession, cannot be extinguished without proper application of another statutory provision explicitly extinguishing said right. The record of rights is not the proof of title, is also a settled legal proposition, but it is merely a possessory right presumption which is also rebuttable. The record of rights is not the proof of title, is also a settled legal proposition, but it is merely a possessory right presumption which is also rebuttable. Mere recording of properties in the name of Hirendra over which Mrinalini was life interest holder under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and subsequently after coming into effect of Hindu Succession Act became the absolute owner of the property, will not extinguish the title of Mrinalini over the property as owner and as a consequential effect, legal heirs of Mrinalini also cannot be denied/deprived of to exercise such right, on the ground as already discussed that the legal heirs of any raiyat or intermediary even under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act while in possession, is entitled to claim/challenge the order of vesting so long possession is not being taken under Section 10(2) of the said Act by the Collector following the procedure laid down in the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules. The judgements on that point has already been discussed earlier. The judgements on that point has already been discussed earlier. Legal Conclusion:-Considering the aforesaid findings and observation, we accordingly hold (i) Mrinali’s absolute right, title and interest over the half portion of the nonagricultural land left by her husband by application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 read with Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (ii) the reversioners of the said life interest holding namely Hirendranath or male legal heirs thereof, did not accrue any right of reversioners, as prior to death of Mrinali, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into effect declaring under Section 14 of the said act absolute ownership over the said property by Mrinalini as inherited by her as life interest holder under the earlier provision of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hirendranath and after his death his legal heirs did not accrue any right, title and interest over the properties of Mrinalini which she acquired by application of law of inheritance or succession under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and thereafter under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (iii) Mrinalini accrued absolute ownership of the said property under her possession when Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into effect as under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act the possession over property by Mrinalini was not taken over by the State irrespective of the fact that proportionate nonagricultural land of Mrinalini also stood vested under Section 4 of the said Act (iv) Mrinalini and on her death her legal heirs thereafter, got right to exercise choice of retaining the land as permissible under the ceiling limit of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act and such right to retain still survive and existing, as the possession as yet has not been taken over by the State respondents under Section 10(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. Having regard to those findings, observation and conclusion, the legal heirs of Mrinali who are writ petitioners herein, accordingly had right to agitate the point by filing review application seeking correction of record of rights which initially was kept pending for which an original application O.A No.2729 of 2005 was moved unsuccessfully and thereafter on challenge of the same, order of the Division Bench of High Court in WPLRT No.468/2006 directing denovo consideration of the issue. Despite such, as Revenue Officer did not consider those points which was impugned in the original application No. 281/2007 (LRTT) unsuccessfully and now it has come before us for consideration in the present writ application, I am of the view as the property right being a constitutional and human rights both as well as right protected even under Article 21 to the limited extent of maintenance of livelihood of Mrinalini on present factual premises, legal heirs of Mrinalini are legally entitled to retain the lands as permissible to be retained under the statutory provision of West Bengal Estate Acquistion Act. Order: Having regard to the aforesaid findings, observation and legal conclusion, the impugned order dated 25th September, 2008 passed by Learned Tribunal below in O. A. No.281 of 2007 (LRTT) and the impugned order dated 18th October, 2006 passed in B.R. No.523/ 1986 by the Revenue Officer concerned, both stand set aside and quashed. Now, the question whether we will remand the matter back further for consideration by the Revenue Officer in the angle of our findings, observation and legal conclusion. It appears that lis is pending for a very long time and the matter was remanded back once by the High Court exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but Revenue Officer concerned did not act as per tenor of the said order of High Court. Hence, applying the principle of law as settled by the Apex Court in the cases H. L. Trehan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1989) 1 SCC 764 , K.L. Shephard & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1987) 4 SCC 431 , I am of the view that the matter could be decided by this Court as it is purely a question of law relating to property right of widow Mrinalini under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and absolute ownership thereafter under Hindu Succession Act. The relevant portion of the judgement K. L. Shephard(supra) read such: “16. We may now point out that the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court proposed a post-amalgamation hearing to meet the situation but that has been vacated by the Division Bench. For the reasons we have indicated, there is no justification to think of a post-decisional hearing. On the other hand the normal rule should apply. We may now point out that the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court proposed a post-amalgamation hearing to meet the situation but that has been vacated by the Division Bench. For the reasons we have indicated, there is no justification to think of a post-decisional hearing. On the other hand the normal rule should apply. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the excluded employees could now represent and their cases could be examined. We do not think that would meet the ends of justice. They have already been thrown out of employment and having been deprived of livelihood they must be facing serious difficulties. There is no justification to throw them out of employment and then give them an opportunity of representation when the requirement is that they should have the opportunity referred to above as a condition precedent to action. It is common experience that once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose.” The said paragraph was quoted and applied further in the case H. L. Trehan & Ors. (Supra) in para 12 of the said report. Considering the said principle of law, though the writ Court seldom pass the order which is required to be passed by the appropriate authority, but on considering the facts and circumstances of the case this Court is of the view that appropriate direction be passed for rendering justice to the party. Accordingly, I direct the concerned Revenue Officer to correct the revisional settlement record of rights by incorporating the names of Mrinalini’s legal heirs with reference to proportionate portion of non-agricultural land as could have been retained by Mrinalini had she been alived by asking legal heirs of Mrinalini to exercise their choice of retention of said non-agricultural lands as was permissible to be retained under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act by Mrinalini within two weeks from the date of communication of this order and on the basis of choice of retention as to be exercised by the legal heirs of Mrinalini relating to the proportionate portion of non-agricultural lands left by Debendranath, which was acquired by Mrinalini (since deceased) on exercise of the law of succession/inheritance, necessary entry in the revisional settlement record of rights by necessary correction and appropriate noting in said Big Raiyat case, to be made. It is made clear that legal heirs of Mrinalini only would be entitled to retain 15 acres of non-agricultural land out of the land acquired by Mrinalini by application of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 from the property left by her husband Debendranath and rest portion, if any, on the basis of choice of retention as to be exercised by the writ petitioners, who are legal heirs of Mrinalini could be vested to the State of West Bengal and appropriate order to be passed by the Revenue Officer taking note of this direction and order passed in this writ application within four weeks from the date of exercise of option by the legal heirs of Mrinalini. It is made clear that retention of land as ordered would be on considering ceiling limit under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. The question of retention of land under ceiling limit prescribed by West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1956 has not been dealt with by us. Said issue is kept open for decision by Revenue Officer concerned in accordance with law. The writ application accordingly succeeds. I agree.