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2010 DIGILAW 1302 (PNJ)

State Of Punjab v. Rajinder Jain And Another

2010-03-26

S.D.ANAND

body2010
Judgment S.D.Anand, J. 1. The petitioners (State of Punjab and Director, Food and Supplies Department, Punjab) are in revision against the concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts i.e. learned Rent Controller and also the learned Appellate Authority upholding the plea raised by the respondents-landlords that they require the tenanted premises for their own use and occupation. 2. A conjunctive reading of both the judgments under challenge would indicate that the following pleadings/evidence related facts can safely be culled out therefrom. The averments made by the respondents-landlords in the first instance. 3. Mst. Om Wati Jain wife of Nand Lal Jain (mother of respondent-landlord Ravinder Jain and mother-in-law of respondent No. 2 Ravi Jain) is owner (to the extent of 25% share) of SCO No. 4-5, Sector 17, Chandigarh). She had acquired the title thereto vide registered sale deed dated 28.2.2003. Her other sons are owners of that SCO to the extent of balance of 75% share which they had acquired, vide registered sale deed dated 1.10.2003. Prior to the purchase of SCO aforementioned by them, petitioner No. 2 was in possession of tenanted portion thereof, as a tenant under their vendors. The rent, agreed to be payable at that point of time, was at the rate of Rs. 6174/-, excluding water and electricity charges. The tenanted premises had been let out by the predecessorin-interest of the respondents-landlords, for use thereof as an office. The tenanted premises, housed the office of Additional Director-cum-Controller of Food Accounts, Chandigarh. 4. On the acquisition of the title of the building including tenanted prernises by Mst. Om Wati (Jain and her five sons, they terminated the tenancy in favour of petitioners on 21.1.2004. They filed a cause to obtain possession thereof but it was withdrawn on 19.3.2007as the relevant notification was invalidated by the Apex Court on 7.11.2006. 5. The family of Mst. Om Wati Jain and her husband "is a known business family which is carrying on the business of sale of readymade garments and textiles in different markets of Chandigarh". All their five sons are married and have grown up children. In order to meet the needs of growing family, Nand Lal Jain aforementioned documented a family settlement on 27.4.2007 and got it registered as well. In terms of the family arrangement aforementioned, the SCO in question, which also includes the tenanted premises, fell to the share of the respondents/landlords. All their five sons are married and have grown up children. In order to meet the needs of growing family, Nand Lal Jain aforementioned documented a family settlement on 27.4.2007 and got it registered as well. In terms of the family arrangement aforementioned, the SCO in question, which also includes the tenanted premises, fell to the share of the respondents/landlords. The respondents do not have any commercial premises at their disposal from where any commercial/business activity could be persued. The respondent No. 2 has been a partner in the family concern, M/s Jain sons, SCO No.24, Sector-17, Chandigarh wherein she held 25% share. She presently has enough time at her disposal as her children having grown up, she has enough time to engage herself in business with her husband and they expect their son, who is a student of Bachelor of Commerce Part I, to join them in the business aforementioned. Apart from possessing relevant experience in the field they also have enough resources to fund the ready-made garments business. 6. The respondents initiated the eviction action with a declaration that they are not in possession of any other commercial premises in the urban area at Chandigarh and that they have also not vacated any commercial premises after commencement of the Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in that urban area. They own one industrial shed No. 33, Industrial Area, Phase-1, Chandigarh, but that shed cannot be used for readymade garments business as it is not located in a shopping centre and is not fit for the purpose aforementioned. 7. The petitioners-tenants averred that the respondents are neither landlord nor sole owners of the tenanted premises under the occupation of the petitioners-tenants. The averments made by the respondents-landlords qua their personal bonafide need to obtain the occupation of the tenanted premises was also denied. 8. As already indicated in an earlier part of this judgment, the learned Rent Controller and also the learned Appellate Authority upheld respondents plea and negatived the resistance offered by the petitioners herein. 9. It was argued by the learned State Counsel, with a certain amount of vehemence, that the need projected by the respondents-landlords is not bonafide inasmuch as they are already in possession of the entire second and third floor of the building where they can easily start their business. The desire of respondents to start the averred business was described to be fanciful and farcical. The desire of respondents to start the averred business was described to be fanciful and farcical. The family arrangement, which is averred to have fetched the tenanted premises to the kitty of the respondents, was described to be a made up affair which was aimed at just enabling the respondents to obtain ejectment of the petitioners herein from the premises aforementioned. 10. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents-landlords, resisted the plea by arguing that there is no want of bonafides on the part of the respondents-landlords in projecting their need inasmuch as the tenanted portion has fallen to their share who are inclined to be run a business therein in their own right and they would be joined in business by their son who is presently undergoing college education. 11. I find the plea on behalf of the petitioners herein to be denuded of merit. The reasons therefor are as under :- 12. There is plethora of law on the point that the Courts have to give it to the landlord to decide how exactly he would like to use the tenanted premises. If, however, the landlord obtains ejectment of a tenant from the tenanted premises by making a wrong averment and does not actually occupy the premises (after the vacation by the tenant), the latter is entitled to have restitution in accordance with law. 13. Insofar as the plea raised by the petitioner-tenants qua the validity of the impugned family settlement is concerned, the law would not allow them to as claim locus standi to have a say in the context. It was held by this Court in Roshan Lal v. Ved Parkash 2002 (2) RCR (P&H) 494 that a tenant cannot challenge a family settlement/partition in the course of summary proceedings under the Rent Act. A similar view was obtained in S.C. Leekha v. Air Commodore Mohinderjit Singh, 1998 (2)RCR 304. Even otherwise, PW-1 Rajinder Jain who is a signatory to the family settlement aforementioned also testified at the trial to prove the factum of the impugned family settlement which was also supported by the testimony on oath of PW-2 Shanti Nath Bansal, who is a relative of the respondents. Even otherwise, PW-1 Rajinder Jain who is a signatory to the family settlement aforementioned also testified at the trial to prove the factum of the impugned family settlement which was also supported by the testimony on oath of PW-2 Shanti Nath Bansal, who is a relative of the respondents. The latter witness also categorically told the Court that the tenanted premises had fallen to the share of the respondents who are inclined to set up a retail outletforthe sale oftextiles of varying hues and also other articles including furnishing material/accessories carpets etc. PW-3-Rajesh Gupta, also a close relation of the respondents-landlords, deposed to prove the factum of family settlement aforementioned. 14. The law would authorise the drawal of an inference in favour of an averment made by the landlord on point of personal bonafide necessity. Ofcourse, a tenant is entitled to prove the contrary which could be done by him by adducing evidence to the effect that certain other equi-size commercial accommodation is available with the respondent-landlord and that its locational placement is either equal or better than that of the tenanted premises (in terms of the suitability). In the present case, the respondents themselves averred that they have an industrial shed in the Industrial Area of Chandigarh but that is not suitable for running readymade garments business. By the very nature of things, a business of the averred category cannot be run from an industrial shed, particularly when it is located far away from the Sector-17 shopping hub but also from other business centres located in various sectors of the city. 15. The respondents categorically indicated that they require all the floors for running business and that they would also be having air conditioning and capsule lift in the premises. It shows the bonafide intention of the respondents-landlords, appreciated in the light of the level of business already being run by the family. 16. There is also no force in the plea raised on behalf of the petitioners- tenants that the respondents-landlords do not require the tenanted premises for their personal bonafide need and they are inclined to coax the petitioners-tenants to agree for the enhancement of the rent. In fact, there is complete want of evidence to prove the averment aforementioned. 17. The petitioners are not on a firmer footing in raising that plea. In fact, there is complete want of evidence to prove the averment aforementioned. 17. The petitioners are not on a firmer footing in raising that plea. RW-1 Mangal Dass (Administrative Officer, Department of Food and Supplies Department and Consumer Affairs, Punjab, Chandigarh) had conceded, in the course of cross-examination, that the respondents never increased the rent after the entire building fell to their share in terms of a family settlement. 18. The rent being paid presently is very meager in comparison to that a such like premises would fetch. If the respondents were open to that charge, they would like normally made an endeavour to obtain an enhancement of rent which the petitioners-tenants are paying since the time the vendees of the respondents owned the premises aforementioned. In this context, it may be noticed that it was conceded by none else or other than RW-1 -Mangal Dass himself (in the course of cross-examination directed at him) that the respondents-landlords never increased the rent after they acquired title thereto. This fact, by itself, is sufficient to falsify the apprehension indicated on behalf of the petitioners herein that the respondents-landlords are not acting bonafide. 19. Insofar as the withdrawal of civil suit is concerned, it may notice that the learned Rent Controller found, as a fact, that the respondents had filed a suit (for possession) after having terminated the lease in favour of petitioners herein. However, it transpired thereafter that the building was exempted from the provisions of Rent Restrictions Act on the authority of notification dated 7.11.2002. That notification was invalidated by the Apex Court, vide judgment dated 7.11.2006. The suit having become infructuous was withdrawn on 19.3.2007. The withdrawal of that suit under those circumstances has no legal significance on the present adjudication. 20. It is, thus, apparent that the respondents-landlords have been able to adduce clinching evidence to the effect that they require the tenanted premises for their personal bonafide need. They have also adduced acceptable evidence to the effect that they require the entire premises for utilisation under various heads. On the other hand, the petitioners have not been able to adduce any evidence to persuade this Court to take a view to the contrary. 21. In the light of foregoing discussion, the petition is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed. On the other hand, the petitioners have not been able to adduce any evidence to persuade this Court to take a view to the contrary. 21. In the light of foregoing discussion, the petition is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed. By the very nature of things, the functional facet of the petitioners would be impersonal in character. It is this facet which has been held to entitle the similarly circumstanced little indulgence even in the matter ofconsideration of a plea for condonation of delay. 22. In view, thus, of the facts noticed, the petitioners shall have one year time from today to vacate the premises aforementioned.