JUDGMENT Manjula Chellur, J : The appellant herein approached this Court in writ petition to quash the notice dated 4.1.2010 issued by respondent No.2/the Chief Officer of the Town Municipal Council, Manvi, Raichur. The same came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed. 2. In brief the facts that lead to the filing of the appeal are as under : The Town Municipal Council of Manvi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Council’) has 18 councillors and the appellant herein is the erstwhile President of the said Council. 16 out of 18 members gave a memorandum dated 23.11.2009 to the President of the Council to call for a meeting to discuss ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the appellant. The appellant sent letters to the Deputy Commissioner, Raichur; Chief Officer of the Council and Assistant Commissioner, Raichur intimating them that signatures of the 16 members who are said to have signed ‘No Confidence Motion’ seems to be not the signatures of the said members. On 14.12.2009, meeting to discuss ‘No Confidence Motion’ under the Chairmanship of the appellant was convened. This was by a notice dated 5.12.2009. However no meeting was held on 14.12.2009 as there were quarrels among the members and the ‘No Confidence Motion' meeting was postponed. Again a notice came to be issued on 4.1.2010 by the Chief Officer of the Council calling for the meeting to discuss No Confidence Motion' to be held on 16.1.2010. This meeting was proposed to be held under the chairmanship of Vice President: This notice dated 4.1.2010 was the subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge. 3. No statement of objections came to be filed by the respondents in the writ petition. However writ petition came to be dismissed. 4. Impugning the orders of the learned Single Judge, this appeal is filed contending that inspite of citing the decision in the case of Shivamma Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur [2003(2) KLJ 71], the said judgment was not considered and therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed; that the order of the learned Single Judge indirectly over rules the judgment; that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the procedure under Section 42(9) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) relied upon by the learned Single Judge would come into play only after the compliance of Sections 47(2) and 47(3) of the Act. Therefore in the absence of compliance of Section 47(3) of the Act, the notice ought to have been quashed. 5. According to the appellant, he had time till 8.12.2009 therefore calling of the first meeting by the 2nd respondent on 5.12.2009 fixing the date of meeting as 14.12.2009 was without jurisdiction. Only when the appellant failed to call for a meeting within 15 days from 23.11.2009 as contemplated under Section 47(2) of the Act and until and unless another representation is made either by the Vice President or 1/3rd of the total number of Councillors, 2nd respondent had no power to call for the meeting for consideration of motion of No Confidence. Hence the order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be dismissed. 6. As the meeting on 14.12.2009 was adjourned sine-die and subsequent meeting is fixed on 16.1.2010 from the date of request of the Councillors. The date of the fixing of the special meeting on 16.1.2010 is beyond the period of 30 days. Therefore, it is in violation of Section 47(3) of the Act is the contention. 7. Since Section 50 of the Act provides adjournment of the meeting only for want of quorum and apparently the meeting on 14.12.2009 was not adjourned for want of quorum, therefore, it has to be deemed as a failure of the ‘No Confidence Motion’. In such circumstances, no meeting could have been called for the second time. The Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to direct the Chief Officer to act. Therefore, the entire procedure adopted is wrong and hence the order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be dismissed. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision, reported in the case of Shivamma Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur [2003(2) KLJ 71] wherein the provisions of the Act especially Sections 42(9),47(2) and (3) have been discussed. In this case, the President of the Councillors of Sira Town questioned the notice of the CEO on the ground that the notice was illegal and contrary to the provisions of Sections 47(2) and (3) of the Act. Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur [2003(2) KLJ 71] wherein the provisions of the Act especially Sections 42(9),47(2) and (3) have been discussed. In this case, the President of the Councillors of Sira Town questioned the notice of the CEO on the ground that the notice was illegal and contrary to the provisions of Sections 47(2) and (3) of the Act. The learned Single Judge held that a conjoint reading of Sections 42(9) and 47 of the Act would make it clear that the majority of the members of the Council intend to express their ‘No Confidence' in the President or Vice President, they should make a request for the President of the Town Municipal Council to convene a special meeting. If for any reason the President fails to call for such meeting, then only the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act comes into operation. In this case, at no point of time majority of the Council had made any request to the President to call for a special meeting as envisaged under sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act. Therefore, it was held, the relief sought by the petitioner/President deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the special meeting issued by the Chief Executive Officer was quashed. 9. As against this, the learned Advocate for the respondent relies upon the following decisions: a) Srimanthi Vs. Chief Officer, ILR 1986 Kar 3399: In this case failure to call for Special General Meeting within the time allowed under sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act was held to be refusal to call for meeting and further held that express refusal in writing was not necessary as it could be inferred from the conduct evidenced by failure to call for meeting. Section 48 of the Act was also referred to as it refers to ordinary or special general meeting by notice of even shorter period of less than 3 days in case of emergency. b) Galappa Vs. Bellary City Municipality [1987 (2) Short Note Cases]. In this case Special General Body Meeting of the Council convened for passing resolution relating to want of confidence against the President. The meeting was adjourned despite available quorum on the ground of resignation of President which is to take effect ten days thereafter. b) Galappa Vs. Bellary City Municipality [1987 (2) Short Note Cases]. In this case Special General Body Meeting of the Council convened for passing resolution relating to want of confidence against the President. The meeting was adjourned despite available quorum on the ground of resignation of President which is to take effect ten days thereafter. In that context, it was held that if there is refusal or failure to call for a meeting under Section 47(2) of the Act, Section 47(3) comes into play providing for calling of a Special General Meeting within 30 days from the date of presentation of the request when the President fails to call for a meeting and Special General Body Meeting was called on 3.2.1986 within 30 days from the date of request on 8.i.1986. Section 47(4) applies to both Ordinary and General Meeting of ' the Council. As Section 47 of the Act refers to both Ordinary and Special General Meeting. Section 56 of the Act does not provide adjournment of Special General Meeting and on this basis it was held that it was not possible to hold that the Act prohibits adjournment of the Special General Meeting. As nowhere such prohibition is contemplated under the Act, Section 47 of the Act applies. Section 56 of the Act refers to adjournment of Ordinary General Meeting with the consent of majority of the Councillors. Under this provision, there cannot be transaction of any business other than left or undisposed of at the meeting when Special General Meeting was convened only for a specific purpose. Therefore, there is no need to specifically provide as to what business shall be transacted. Therefore, if that meeting is adjourned, it is adjourned to consider that specific purpose only and Section 56 of the Act has no application. c) Revanna Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur (1979(2) KLJ 81]. In this case it was held that when the President fails to call for a meeting within the time prescribed, he could not have called for a meeting beyond time limit. Hence, there was no bar to the councillors to meet to consider the resolution within the- time prescribed. Section 56 of the Act comes into play only with the consent of the majority of the councillors. The requisition could be either in person or by hand in the office. d) M. Krishnappa Vs. Chief Officer [1993(1) KLJ 583]. Hence, there was no bar to the councillors to meet to consider the resolution within the- time prescribed. Section 56 of the Act comes into play only with the consent of the majority of the councillors. The requisition could be either in person or by hand in the office. d) M. Krishnappa Vs. Chief Officer [1993(1) KLJ 583]. In this case, the learned Single Judge has held that President is empowered to call for a special general meeting and CEO could convene a meeting on the direction of the President. The CEO cannot convene such meeting on his own. The written request is required under Section 47(2) of the Act to the President so as to bind him to call such a meeting. Section 47(3) comes to play only when the President fails to call for a meeting. e) Chandrakant Khaire Vs. Shantaram Kale [ AIR 1988 SC 1665 ]. This case pertains to Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act. The meeting should not be said to be ‘adjourned for the day’ or ‘adjourned sine die’. When in the first meeting there was total confusion and bedlam inside the meeting hall and the entire atmosphere was surcharged with commotion and no business could be transacted, then Municipal Commissioner merely suspended the proceedings till the business was restored and accordingly, he announced on the mike that proceedings would he taken up after 45 minutes for transacting the business for the day. Under that circumstance, it cannot be said that the first meeting of the Councillor was adjourned or adjourned sine die. It had only put off the meeting to a later hour as the proceedings were only suspended. f) Sub hash Tukaram Sangaokar Vs. State [1998(2) KLJ 26] In this case it is held that in a case where ten days notice of intention to move a resolution of no confidence against the President or Vice President and when the Councillor received less than ten days clear notice, the resolution passed in the meeting would not by itself invalid if it is passed with the support of more than two thirds of the strength of the councillors. 10. Having regard to the various decisions referred to above, one has to analyse the facts of the case with reference to the provisions of the Act. 10. Having regard to the various decisions referred to above, one has to analyse the facts of the case with reference to the provisions of the Act. sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act provides that after receipt of the request of the 1/3 members of the total number of Councillors, the President has to call for a Special General Meeting for a date not more than 15 days from the date of such request. 11. In the present case, admittedly the first date of notice is 23.11.2009 but the appellant has not called for the meeting and he had sent letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Raichur and others informing that there is some anomalies with the signatures of the 16 members out of the 18 Councillors in the so called request to move ‘No Confidence Motion’. The time to convene the meeting as per sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act was till 8.12.2009. Now the 2nd respondent calls for a meeting by notice dated 5.12.2009 fixing the date of meeting as 14.12.2009 and the said meeting did not transact any business as there was commotion. According to the appellant, the meeting called be the CEO by notice dated 5.12.2009 is without jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act contemplates that such exercise of jurisdiction could be by the President alone. 12. If no meeting is called for on or before 8.12.2009, the exercise of authority as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Sections 47 of the Act comes into play i.e., either the Vice President or 1/3rd of the whole number of Councillors may call for such meeting to move ‘No Confidence Motion’ and such request has to be made within 30 days from the date of original request i.e.. 23.11.2009 to the Chief Officer of the Municipal Commissioner to give notice to the Councillors and take such action as may be necessary to convene a meeting. Sub-section (4) of Section 47 of the Act says any meeting may be adjourned until the next date or any subsequent date. 13. In the instant case there was no business transaction on 14.12.2009 and the meeting was postponed without fixing any date to call for a meeting. Sub-section (4) of Section 47 of the Act says any meeting may be adjourned until the next date or any subsequent date. 13. In the instant case there was no business transaction on 14.12.2009 and the meeting was postponed without fixing any date to call for a meeting. As the meeting in question dated 14.12.2009 was a Special General Meeting, therefore when the second meeting notice dated 4.1.2010 was sent, it was only to transact the said special subject of ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the President. The notice dated 4.1.2010 is beyond 15 days to consider it as a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act. If it has to be considered as a notice under sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act, it ought to have been given within 30 days from the date of request i.e., 23.11.2009. Apparently such meeting was called for beyond 30 days from 23.11.2009. The Chief Officer could not have called for such meeting on his own in the absence of Vice President or 1/3rd members of the total number of Councillors calling such meeting for a day not more than 30 days after presentation of such request. 14. Therefore, the notice dated 4.1.2010 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If once the notice dated 4.1.2010 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, question of compliance of sub-section (9) of Section 42 of the Act does not arise because the very meeting dated 16.1.2010 was not in pursuance of a notice as mandated under the Act. Then it would be immaterial whether the meeting on 16.1.2010 had validly passed a resolution passing ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the President. The learned Single Judge without referring to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 47 of the Act with reference to the facts and the relevant dates proceeded to consider only the notice dated 4.1.2010 and the meeting dated 16.1.2010. Even if the Councillors had ten clear days notice as contemplated under the provisions of sub-section (9) of Section 42 of the Act when the very call given is not in accordance with law, the consequences are also not legal and valid. Therefore the appeal deserves to be allowed. 15. Even if the Councillors had ten clear days notice as contemplated under the provisions of sub-section (9) of Section 42 of the Act when the very call given is not in accordance with law, the consequences are also not legal and valid. Therefore the appeal deserves to be allowed. 15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8.2.2010 passed in W.P.No. 80133/2010 and the notice dated 4.1.2010 issued by the 2’ respondent in file No. TMC/NO-CONFIDENCE/2009-10 vide Annexure-G is quashed.