JUDGMENT 1. - This civil second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 19.01.1995 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mount Abu camp Abu Road affirming the judgment and decree dated 11.12.1989 as passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Abu Road in Civil Suit No. 99/1976. 2. By the judgment and decree dated 11.12.1989, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent by the defendants-tenants and on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. The appeal preferred by the defendants against the judgment and decree so passed by the learned Trial Court came to be dismissed by the learned Appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 19.01.1995. 3. This second appeal was admitted for consideration on 07.04.1995 by this Court while formulating the following substantial questions of law for determination in the case:- "1. Whether the owner of a building can became a landlord when his predecessor-in-title was never a landlord ? 2. Whether the plaintiff who filed a suit for residential and commercial accommodation can maintain this ground of bonafide necessity when he has acquired the possession of the shop and house and parted the same?" 4. It has been submitted in this appeal on behalf of the defendants-appellants that when the plaintiff claimed having derived title from Mohini Devi and there has not been any proof on record that Mohini Devi ever became the landlord, the learned subordinate Courts have erred in assuming that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. In has further been submitted that the finding on reasonable and bona fide requirement remains perverse and the fact of the plaintiff having other accommodation has not been appreciated. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has raised the objection that no substantial question of law is involved in this case. The learned counsel submits that as a matter of fact, the impugned decree had already been executed before passing of the interim order in this appeal; and the suit premises were delivered in the possession of the plaintiff who continues to occupy the same. The learned counsel submits that as a matter of fact, the impugned decree had already been executed before passing of the interim order in this appeal; and the suit premises were delivered in the possession of the plaintiff who continues to occupy the same. The learned counsel contends that the question relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant does not even arise in this matter where the defendants themselves alleged having tendered rent to the plaintiff respondent. The learned counsel further submits that the defendants having failed to comply with the requirements of the order making provisional determination of rent, their defence against eviction was struck off and the learned subordinate Courts have specifically found the defendants to be the defaulters in payment of rent. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the decree for eviction deserves to be maintained on this count itself. The learned counsel yet further submits that nothing of parting with any part of the premises has been proved on record. 6. Having examined the record of the case with reference to the law applicable, this Court finds force in the submissions made on behalf of the respondent. 7. The defence against eviction was struck off in this matter and thereafter, the subordinate Courts have concurrently found the defendants to be the defaulters in payment of rent. The finding remains essentially a finding of fact and does not appear suffering from any perversity. Once this finding becomes final and for the defendants being not entitled to the protection of Section 13 (6) of the Act, the decree for eviction follows as a necessary consequence. No substantial question has been formulated on questions relating to default and striking out of defence nor appears arising either. In this views of the matter, the submission on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement appear rather redundant. Even in relation to reasonable and bona fide requirement, the learned subordinate Courts have examined the record and have recorded the findings in accordance with law which do not call for interference being essentially the findings on facts. 8. So far the feeble attempt as made on behalf of the defendants in questioning the status of the plaintiff as landlord is concerned, suffice is to point out that according to the defendants themselves, they did tender rent to the plaintiff. 8. So far the feeble attempt as made on behalf of the defendants in questioning the status of the plaintiff as landlord is concerned, suffice is to point out that according to the defendants themselves, they did tender rent to the plaintiff. This is coupled with the fact that the plaintiff is said to have derived title from one Mohini Devi who in turn derived title from Bhoormal-Ram Prasad who was admittedly the owner of the property and who inducted the defendants as tenants. 9. In a comprehensive view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there existed the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to the suit. In view of the above, there appears no reason or basis to consider any interference in the findings of the subordinate Courts. 10. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal dismissed. *******