JUDGMENT :- Heard finally as this Court has issued notice for final disposal. 2. Shri Pudke, learned counsel contends that petitioner Sarpanch issued notice on 6th December, 2009 and convened monthly meeting on 14th December, 2009 and in default of quorum on 15th December, 2009. The petitioner remained present on 14th December, 2009 and as there was no quorum the meeting was adjourned to 15th December, 2009. She did not and could not attend the adjourned meeting. Only because of this, she has been disqualified under section 36 of Bombay Village Panchayats Act. According to learned counsel section 36 does not envisage disqualification on account of absence at such meeting. 3. Shri Dhage, learned counsel for respondent No.6 and the learned AGP Shri Fulzele for respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 support the order. They contend that merely issuing notice is not convening but the meeting must be convened by remaining present in the house. On 15th December, 2009 petitioner was absent and the competent authority has found that such absence was not for any just or sufficient reason. They point out that statutorily satisfaction of competent authority on the question whether or not, there was sufficient cause for such absence is made final. 4. Shri Dhage, learned counsel has placed reliance upon judgment of this Court reported in Gunwantrao Yeshwantrao Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 1981 MhLJ. 815. Perusal of said judgment reveals that the meeting was not convened and effort was made to have a Resolution passed through circulation. Facts here clearly show that the Sarpanch had issued notice on 6th December, 2009 and meeting was not only convened on 14th December, 2009 but was also conducted. In that meeting as there was no quorum the meeting was adjourned to 15th December, 2009. Provisions of Meeting Rules 1959 relied upon by Shri Dhage need to be viewed in this background. Rule 9, sub-rule (2) thereof speaks of business to be transacted in such adjourned meeting. The adjourned meeting on 15th December, 2009 could not be conducted and the petitioner was not present in that meeting. 5. The provisions of section 36 speaks of failure to convene the meeting and the absence at a meeting is not relevant for it. Rule 9, sub-rule (2) thereof speaks of business to be transacted in such adjourned meeting. The adjourned meeting on 15th December, 2009 could not be conducted and the petitioner was not present in that meeting. 5. The provisions of section 36 speaks of failure to convene the meeting and the absence at a meeting is not relevant for it. The dispute before the Additional Collector in present matter was regarding the absence of petitioner in the adjourned meeting and not about any omission on her part in convening the meeting. In present facts meeting was convened by her. Section 36 of Bombay Village Panchayats Act does not deal with the position emerging after the meeting is called. If only Sarpanch is not available, obligation to convene meeting shifts to Upsarpanch. If there is failure to convene" without sufficient cause", then disqualification results for not convening the meeting. If in meeting convened, Sarpanch remaining absent, other officer like Upsarpanch can preside over it. 6. Section 36 of Bombay Village Panchayats Act is a penal provision and needs to be interpreted strictly. It operates on failure to convene a meeting. Failure to convene or call a meeting and failure to hold it is not one and same thing. Difference between the two is noticed by Hon'ble Full Bench of Patna High Court. In AIR 1985 Patna 61, Mohd. Zainul Abedine vs. State of Bihar. Same High Court have in AIR 1956 Patna 367, Sukhdev vs. Amah Municipality found that the word "call" and word "hold" are not exactly synonymous. For the purposes of section 36 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, mere absence of person convening it in such meeting is not relevant at all. Section 36 does not envisage his disqualification only for not attending it. Here impugned order is passed only because of absence of petitioner in adjourned meeting on 15th December, 2009. 7. Additional Collector therefore has erroneously taken recourse to provisions of section 36 in the matter. The impugned order dated 29th May 201 0 is therefore clearly unsustainable. Said order is accordingly quashed and set aside. Proceedings for disqualification initiated by respondent No. 6 are dismissed. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.