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2010 DIGILAW 1309 (ALL)

S. P. Sonkar v. Usha Singh

2010-04-22

PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon'ble Prakash Krishna,J. The above revision has been filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and is directed against the order dated 12-1-2010 passed in original suit no. 42 of 2006 whereby the court below has struck off defence of the defendant tenant who is applicant herein under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. The facts of the case may be noticed in brief. 2. Smt. Usha Singh instituted the afore stated suit no. 42 of 2006 against the present applicant for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages in respect of house no. A-126, Mehdauri Colony, Awas Vikas Colony, Teliyarganj, Allahabad, on the allegations that the defendant applicant was tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 4,000/- and has defaulted in payment of rent. The rent being more than Rs. 2,000/-, the building in question is exempted from the operation of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The tenancy has been determined by means of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. The said suit is still pending. An application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, giving rise to the present revision, was filed on 6-11-2008, on the pleas inter alia that the defendant tenant has failed to deposit the rent, as required under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. In reply thereof, the defendant tenant filed a representation dated 21-11-2009, stating that he could not pay the rent for the period November 2008 to October, 2009 due to financial crisis and illness of the children in the family. It was further stated that he has given a sum of Rs. 25,528/- as advance to the plaintiff landlady for her personal use which shows his bonafide. Through the said representation/application, the defendant tenant expressed his desire and sought permission to deposit a sum of Rs. 23,000/- including tax and 9% interest through tender. 3. The court below, by the order under revision, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff landlady opposite party and ordered for striking off defence, on the finding that admittedly, the defendant tenant has not deposited the rent for the period November 2008 to October 2009. It was further found that the plea as set out by the defendant tenant in reply to the said application is untenable. 4. It was further found that the plea as set out by the defendant tenant in reply to the said application is untenable. 4. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant tenant, in support of the present revision, submits that the order, under revision, is bad as the court below has failed to consider the material on record. Elaborating the arguments, it was submitted that the court below has not considered the plea regarding the financial difficulty and illness of children raised by the applicant in reply. Secondly, the order striking off defence should not have been passed in the present case and discretion should have been exercised in favour of the defendant tenant in much as the defendant tenant has paid the rent in advance to the landlady from time to time as is evident from various cheques issued by the tenant. The learned counsel for the defendant tenant submits that the property in dispute was let out to the defendant tenant under rent agreement dated 4-9-2002 for a period of 11 months on monthly rent of Rs. 3,465/-. After expiry of the aforesaid period , the defendant tenant vacated major portion and rate of rent was reduced to Rs. 1,800/- per month. The defendant tenant used to pay the rent in advance. 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff landlady submits that the accommodation in question was let out on monthly rent of Rs. 3,465/- under rent agreement dated 4-9-1992. In the said rent agreement, it is provided that there would be a periodical increase in the rent and at the time of filing of the suit, the monthly rent of the accommodation in question was Rs. 4,000/-. The defendant tenant has been paying the enhanced rent but became dishonest subsequently. The plea that the monthly rent was reduced to Rs. 1,800/- is a bogus and absurd plea and is against the admitted fact on the record. Attention was drawn towards various cheques given by the defendant tenant to show that the rent was much more than Rs. 1,800/- per month. Elaborating the arguments, it was submitted that the defendant tenant also filed suit no. 954 of 2007, a copy whereof has been filed along with counter affidavit. In paras 1 and 2 of the plaint of suit no. 954 of 2007 it is clearly stated by the defendant tenant that rate of rent is Rs. 1,800/- per month. Elaborating the arguments, it was submitted that the defendant tenant also filed suit no. 954 of 2007, a copy whereof has been filed along with counter affidavit. In paras 1 and 2 of the plaint of suit no. 954 of 2007 it is clearly stated by the defendant tenant that rate of rent is Rs. 4,000/- per month. In view of the above admission, coupled with the other facts, the plea of the defendant tenant that the admitted rate of rent is Rs. 1,800/- per month is nothing but a bogus plea. It has been set out with an oblique motive to grab the property at a throw away price and to harass the landlady who is an old aged, weak and infirm widow, submits the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party. 6. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 7. At this stage it is necessary to have a glance at the relevant statutory provision i.e. Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, which has been added by way of amendment in the State of U.P., reads as follows: "5-. Striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc. - (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1. - The expression " first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2. Explanation 1. - The expression " first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2. - The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account [ and the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him] and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3.--(1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same." ---UP. Act (57 of 1976) (1-1-1977) and (w.e.f. 3-10-1981)." 8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that the aforesaid provision can be divided into two compartments. Act (57 of 1976) (1-1-1977) and (w.e.f. 3-10-1981)." 8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that the aforesaid provision can be divided into two compartments. The defendant tenant, in a suit by a lessor for his eviction after determination of his lease and for recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation shall ; (1) at or before the first date of hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per cent per annum; (2) and the tenant shall throughout the continuance of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. It has been further provided that in the event of any default of either of the deposits stipulated above, the court may, after giving an opportunity of hearing and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. 9. The Explanation - II to Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. defines the expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due". 10. A plain reading of Explanation - II makes it clear that while calculating the gross amount to be deposited under Order 15 Rule 5 (1), a tenant is entitled to make the following deductions only:- (1) The taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of building on a lessor's account, and (2) the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him. The object of the aforesaid explanation is loud and crystal clear. It puts beyond pale of any doubt permissible deductions, which can be made by a lessee while making a deposit under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C.. The expression " no other deduction" makes the position clear beyond doubt that except those amounts which are specified to be deducted, tenant cannot claim any other deduction. To put it differently, the Explanation - II has been enacted with a view to make the things clear that except the aforesaid specified deductions, no other deduction/set of/ or adjustment is admissible for the purposes of deposits under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. 11. To put it differently, the Explanation - II has been enacted with a view to make the things clear that except the aforesaid specified deductions, no other deduction/set of/ or adjustment is admissible for the purposes of deposits under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. 11. Having noticed the above statutory provision, it may be noted that in the present revision, the case of the plaintiff landlady for striking off defence of the defendant tenant is that after filing of the written statement, the defendant tenant has not deposited even a single penny in the court. To this effect, an application for striking off defence was filed on 6-11-2008 wherein it has been stated that the suit is pending since 2006 and after filing of the written statement the defendant tenant has not deposited the admitted rent, as required under law. Since the defendant tenant has not deposited month to month rent and has not made compliance of law, the defence is liable to be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. A copy of the said application was served on the defendant tenant on the same day, but even then he did not choose to deposit any rent for the period subsequent to filing of the written statement. For the first time, after expiry of the period of one year, an application, being paper no. 47C was filed, on the pleas inter alia that due to financial crisis and illness of the children in the family, he is filing the application for permission to deposit the rent for the period November 2008 to October 2009 including taxes with interest. It has been further stated that he had advanced a sum of Rs. 25,528/- to the plaintiff landlady for her personal work which proves his bonafide. 12. During the course of the argument, pointedly a query was put by the Court to Sri Arvind Srivastava, Advocate as to whether any amount was deposited by the defendant tenant in the suit before or after filing of the written statement. He stated in clear terms that the defendant tenant has not deposited any amount in the suit so far and for the first time, through his application (paper no. 47C), he expressed his willingness to deposit the amount. He stated in clear terms that the defendant tenant has not deposited any amount in the suit so far and for the first time, through his application (paper no. 47C), he expressed his willingness to deposit the amount. On these facts, the trial court held that admittedly the defendant tenant has not deposited any amount and default being admitted, the defence is liable to be struck off. Order 15 Rule 5 CPC., as already reproduced above, is in two parts. Its second part mandates a tenant to deposit the monthly rent due throughout the continuance of a suit within a week from the date of its accrual. As noticed hereinabove, it is rather admitted case of the defendant tenant that he has not deposited any amount towards the rent and, therefore, the defence is liable to be struck off on this ground alone. 13. At this stage, the learned counsel for the defendant tenant submits that the representation filed by the tenant through application (47-C) should have been taken into account and even if there is non-compliance of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, the discretion still vests in the court not to strike off defence. In this connection, a reference was made by him to a celebrated judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Sri Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981 SC 1657 =1981 ARC 463 wherein it has been held that sub-rule (2) of Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code obliges the court before making an order for striking off defence, to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, a defendant is vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being strike off. If a representation is made, the court must consider it on its merit and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is a good reason for it. 14. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is a good reason for it. 14. Applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, the written statement was filed on 21-11-2006 and from that date till the date of filing of application (47-C) i.e. 21-11-2009, the defendant tenant admittedly did not deposit any amount which he was required to deposit monthly within a period of seven days of its accrual. 15. The other aspect of the case is that there is no material on record in support of the plea sought to be put forward by the defendant tenant that he could not deposit the amount either due to financial crisis or illness of the children. What was the financial crisis and how it had cropped up, has not been disclosed. Except making bald allegations in the application, no material was placed either before the trial court or before this Court in this regard. So far as the illness of the children is concerned, the said allegation is as vague as it could be. Nature of illness, date of illness, treatment if any provided to the children, names of children etc. deliberately do not find place in the said application. On these facts, if the trial court has rejected the said pleas raised in the application, I find no good ground to disagree with it. 16. Learned counsel for the defendant tenant referred certain decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that financial crisis is a good ground for condoning default under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. Each case depends on its own facts and in the case on hand, as noticed hereinabove, the plea of financial crisis is totally baseless and has been put forward by way of lame excuse. The conduct of the defendant tenant in this regard is also relevant. The said conduct as noticed in the latter part of the judgement go to show that he is a hardened litigant and a person taking shifting stand. 17. A further dispute was raised by the learned counsel for the parties with regard to 'admitted rate of rent'. The conduct of the defendant tenant in this regard is also relevant. The said conduct as noticed in the latter part of the judgement go to show that he is a hardened litigant and a person taking shifting stand. 17. A further dispute was raised by the learned counsel for the parties with regard to 'admitted rate of rent'. The contention of the defendant tenant is that it is the rate of rent admitted by him in the written statement which is relevant for the purposes of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. He submitted that initially the tenanted accommodation was undoubtedly let out under a rent agreement dated 4-9-2002 for a period of 11 months at Rs. 3,465/- per month. After expiry of the lease term, he was not interested to continue the tenancy being unable to pay the rent, expressed his desire to leave the accommodation, but on persuasion of the landlady on 15-8-2003, he vacated the other portion and kept only a small portion consisting of one big residential room, lobby, kitchen and box room. It was further agreed that monthly rent would be Rs. 1,800/- per month inclusive of electricity charges and everything. The said agreement was arrived at in the presence of some respectable persons, vide para-20 of the written statement. The tenant used to make ad hoc payments in advance as well as the electricity charges. In para-26 of the written statement it has been stated that arrears of rent commencing from the month of August 2007 to April 2008 at the rate of Rs. 1,800/- comes to Rs. 16,200/- and after adjustment of the said amount against the advance payment amounting to Rs. 25,528/-, a sum of Rs. 9,328/- still remains balance towards the landlady and as such the defendant tenant is not liable to pay any rent nor he is a defaulter in any manner. 18. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that in view of the averments made in the written statement, the defendant tenant has admitted the rate of rent at Rs. 1,800/- per month and as such at the most, he could be directed to deposit or pay the said amount and not Rs. 4,000/- per month, as pleaded in the plaint by the landlady. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kunwar Baldevji and etc. Vs. 1,800/- per month and as such at the most, he could be directed to deposit or pay the said amount and not Rs. 4,000/- per month, as pleaded in the plaint by the landlady. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kunwar Baldevji and etc. Vs. The XI Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 2004 Allahabad Law Journal 945 wherein the expression 'admitted rent due' has been interpreted by this Court. In contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party submits that in the present written statement, the rate of rent has been disputed for the purposes of the case and for the sake of dispute. He submitted that under the original agreement which is no longer in dispute, the accommodation was let out on monthly rent of Rs. 3,465/-. The said rent agreement contains a clause of periodical enhancement and the rent was enhanced lastly to Rs. 4,000/- per month when the suit was instituted. He submits that expression 'admitted rent due' used in Order 15 Rule 5 CPC should be interpreted in a manner so that an unscrupulous tenant may not continue to enjoy the property without paying any rent. In other words, if an inference of 'admitted rent' can be drawn from the material on record, the said inference will amount the 'admitted rent due' as held by the Apex Court in the case of Manik Lal Majumdar and others Vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey and others, (2005) 2 SCC 400 . 19. The above argument has two facets. Firstly, whether there is material on record to show that the inference of 'admitted rent due' can be drawn on the basis of material on record and secondly, what would be the true import and meaning of expression 'admitted rent due'. 20. Taking the first point first, it is undisputed that the defendant tenant took the accommodation on monthly rent of Rs. 3,465/- under a rent note dated 4-9-2002 for a period of 11 months. The said rent note has been admitted in para-20 of the written statement. In the said rent note, the following description of the tenanted accommodation has been mentioned:- "Three rooms, one lobby, one kitchen room and a bath room on the ground floor from front side of the building and garage from the back side of the building." 21. The said rent note has been admitted in para-20 of the written statement. In the said rent note, the following description of the tenanted accommodation has been mentioned:- "Three rooms, one lobby, one kitchen room and a bath room on the ground floor from front side of the building and garage from the back side of the building." 21. Attention of the Court was drawn towards the plaint of suit no. 954 of 2007 which has been filed by the present defendant tenant against the landlady for permanent injunction not to interfere in his peaceful possession over the property in dispute. The factum of filing of the said suit is not being disputed by the defendant tenant.. Paras 1 and 2 of the plaint are extracted below:- "1- That the plaintiff is a tenant in the ground floor of house no. A-126, Mehdauri Colony, Awas Vikas Yojana, Teliarganj, Allahabad. On payment of Rs. 4000/- per month as rent, more fully described at the foot of the plaint. 2- That the plaintiff is living with his family members i.e. old father mother and his wife & children's in three rooms, one lobby, one kitchen and a bathroom on the ground floor of House no. A-126, Mehdauri Colony, Awas Vikas Yojana, Teliarganj, Allahabad." 22. Further, at the foot of the plaint, the description of the disputed tenanted portion has been mentioned which reads as follows:- "Ground floor of House no. A-126, Mehdauri Colony, Teliarganj, Allahabad (Three rooms, one lobby, one kitchen, one bathroom)." 23. A close reading of the said plaint would show that there is not a whisper therein that the defendant tenant has made any advance payment of rent to the landlady. In para-7 thereof it has been stated that in August 2007 when the plaintiff (present tenant) went to the plaintiff's house in August 2007 to give the rent for the month of August, she refused to accept the rent and now he has to pay Rs. 6,000/- per month. The said plaint has been verified on 12-9-2007 by the present defendant tenant. A bare reading of the said plaint would show that he himself has stated that rate of rent is Rs. 4,000/- per month. Further, the description of the tenanted property is identically the same which has been given in the rent note and in the plaint as well. A bare reading of the said plaint would show that he himself has stated that rate of rent is Rs. 4,000/- per month. Further, the description of the tenanted property is identically the same which has been given in the rent note and in the plaint as well. There is no averment in the entire plaint regarding payment of any advance rent. On the contrary, the defendant tenant has stated that he has paid the electricity dues. Reading of the plaint clearly shows the following things:- 1. Rate of rent is Rs. 4,000/- per month. 2. There is no case of any advance payment of rent to the landlady. 3. The tenanted accommodation, which was let out to the defendant initially, continues to remain the same. 24. Noticeably, when the learned counsel for the applicant was confronted with the copy of the said plaint during the course of the arguments, he took a stand that it is a case of typographical error and the plaint has been got amended by filing an amendment application. When he was cornered, Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant tenant took a somersault that he was not properly instructed earlier and, according to his instructions, an amendment application has been filed, but no order has been passed so far. Even otherwise also the defendant tenant had been paying the rent not at Rs. 1,800/- per month, as alleged by him but as per enhanced rent, for the subsequent period. The various cheques such as dated 25-10-2004, 18-11-2004 and 12-12-2004 issued by the defendant tenant in favour of the landlady Smt. Usha Singh drawn on Uco Bank towards payment of monthly rent at Rs. 3,820/- as it then was completely belies the case of the tenant that the rent was reduced to Rs. 1,800/- per month. These cheques were admittedly issued by the defendant tenant and they do show that the defendant tenant was paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 3,820/- in the year 2004. It is not necessary at this stage to consider the other documents referred in the counter affidavit of the plaintiff landlady, for the time being. From the documents, referred to above (copy of the plaint and the copies of the cheques), an inference can easily be drawn that the defendant tenant was paying rent at the rate of Rs. It is not necessary at this stage to consider the other documents referred in the counter affidavit of the plaintiff landlady, for the time being. From the documents, referred to above (copy of the plaint and the copies of the cheques), an inference can easily be drawn that the defendant tenant was paying rent at the rate of Rs. 3,465/- in the year 2002, at the rate of Rs. 3,820/- in the year 2004 and at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month immediately before filing of the suit. 25. Now I take up the second point. The Apex Court faced the identical controversy in the case of Manik Lal Majumdar and others (supra) with reference to Section 13(1) of Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 which is pari materia to Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. It was called upon to interpret the words 'admitted by the tenant to be due'. It has been interpreted that if the material on record prima facie discloses the admission of relationship of landlord and tenant and the rate of monthly rent payable, the tenant would be required to pay or deposit arrears of rent and continue payment of current rent during pendency of the litigation, as enjoined under Section 13 of the Act. Agreeing with the view of Division Bench of the High Court it has been held therein that by giving a literal meaning to the expression in question may defeat the very object of enacting Section 13 of the Act (which is pari materia to Order 15 Rule 5 here) and an unscrupulous tenant may continue to enjoy the premises without payment of any rent to the landlord by protracting the litigation. Relevant portion is extracted below:- ".......... The expression 'all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due', if interpreted literally, would mean that unless the tenant specifically admits any arrears of rent to be due to the landlord, the condition to make the payment of arrears of rent in order to contest the original proceedings before the Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal as provided under Section 13 of the Act would not arise. The High Court in Binapani Roy case has held that giving literal meaning to the words 'admitted by the tenant to be due' would frustrate the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and make the same nugatory or otiose. The object of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act is to avoid litigation for realisation of arrears of rent which is likely to accumulate during the course of litigation, which may be a long period and also to deter the tenant from resorting to an unfair practice to use and occupy the tenanted premises without payment of any rent so long as the litigation continues. The High Court was of the opinion that the reasonable meaning of the words 'admitted by the tenant to be due' is the inference of admission from the material on record. If the material on record prima facie discloses the admission of relationship of landlord and tenant and the rate of monthly rent payable, the tenant would be required to pay or deposit arrears of rent and continue payment of current rent during the pendency of the litigation, as enjoined under Section 13 of the Act. Dharmadhikari, J. has expressed his concurrence with the aforesaid view taken by the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Binapani Roy. We are also of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on this point is perfectly sound as giving a literal meaning to the expression 'all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due' may defeat the very object of enacting Section 13 of the Act and an unscrupulous tenant may continue to enjoy the premises without payment of any rent to the landlord by protracting the litigation and the landlord may have to wait till the final decision of the case to recover his dues by taking execution proceedings." 26. In my considered view, the ratio laid down in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 27. At this stage, it is apt to consider the Division Bench decision of this Court, heavily relied by the learned counsel for the defendant tenant, in the case of Kunwar Baldevji (supra.) 28. In my considered view, the ratio laid down in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 27. At this stage, it is apt to consider the Division Bench decision of this Court, heavily relied by the learned counsel for the defendant tenant, in the case of Kunwar Baldevji (supra.) 28. It may be noticed that the Division Bench had not the advantage of having the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Manik Lal Majumdar and others (supra) which came subsequent in point of time. Secondly, the decision in the case of Baldevji (supra) is distinguishable on facts. The controversy involved therein was slightly different wherein the question referred was whether the defence can be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC for non-deposit of rent which is not admitted to be due despite the express word to the contrary in that statutory provision. Whether the words 'admitted to be due' should be interpreted in strict sense or in a liberal sense to advance the purpose and object of the statute was not in issue therein. In other words, what is true scope and ambit of word 'admitted' was not directly involved therein. The decision of the Apex Court is nearer to the facts of the case on hand. 29. In view of the above discussions, I find sufficient force in the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff landlady that the word 'admitted' should not be interpreted in a strict sense. To put it differently, if an inference of 'admitted rent' can be drawn on the basis of material on record that would amount the 'admitted rent'. 30. Learned counsel for the landlady submitted that in view of clear language of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC read with Explanation II, a tenant is required to deposit the rent without making any deduction, expect the taxes paid to the local authorities. He submits that no other deduction is possible. He further submits that except making bald statements, there is nothing on record to show that any advance payment was made by the defendant tenant to the landlady, otherwise such a plea would have been raised in the suit filed for permanent injunction by the tenant against the landlady. 31. He submits that no other deduction is possible. He further submits that except making bald statements, there is nothing on record to show that any advance payment was made by the defendant tenant to the landlady, otherwise such a plea would have been raised in the suit filed for permanent injunction by the tenant against the landlady. 31. In view of the above discussions and on the admitted facts, the defendant tenant has failed to comply with second part of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and the finding recorded by the trial court in this regard is perfectly justified and based on relevant consideration. No illegality or perversity could be pointed out therein. 32. It will be travesty of justice if relief is granted to a person whose defence is based on falsehood. The Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvarya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 has held that Coutt should not lend its support to a tax evader, property grabber or a persons who has not approached Court with clean hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. 33. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that the defendant tenant is enjoying the property in question without paying any rent/damages to the landlady who happens to be a widow lady of 70 years suffering from diabetes, hypertension, parkinsons disease and also has lost the eye sight in both the eyes due to diabetic retinopathy. She is fighting the litigation for the last about four years and the defendant tenant by legal engineering is not paying any penny and enjoying the accommodation in question. The shifting stand taken by him has been noticed in the earlier part of this judgement. The trial court will do good by hearing and deciding the suit itself preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this judgement. If necessary, day to day hearing may take place and unnecessary adjournments be avoided. Only in exceptional circumstances adjournment on heavy costs not less than Rs. 500/- per adjournment and not for more than three days be granted. 34. No other point was pressed. 35. In view of the above discussions, there is no merit in the revision. 36. If necessary, day to day hearing may take place and unnecessary adjournments be avoided. Only in exceptional circumstances adjournment on heavy costs not less than Rs. 500/- per adjournment and not for more than three days be granted. 34. No other point was pressed. 35. In view of the above discussions, there is no merit in the revision. 36. The revision is dismissed with costs of Rs. 3,000/-.