Devi Prasad Singh and S.C. Chaurasia, JJ.- Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri H.P. Sri-vastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and perused record. The short question involved in this writ petition is, as to whether the Divisional Forest Officer, has got power to impose damage on ac­count of loss caused to the forest land? 2. On receipt of allegation with re­gard to the alleged damage caused to forest land, an F.I.R. was lodged and according to petitioners' Counsel, charge-sheet has been submitted pending for trial before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri. Relying upon the con­tents of F.I.R., the Divisional Forest Officer has sent a reference to the District Magis­trate to recover the damages from 150 per­sons including the petitioners. However, in the F.I.R., name of all the persons have not been mentioned. The order of recovery has been challenged on the ground that the Divisional Forest Officer has got no juris­diction to impose damages. 3. It is also stated that without hold­ing a proceeding in accordance with law with due compliance of principles of natu­ral justice, the damages cannot be imposed. The amount of damages imposed on the villagers including the petitioners as ap­pears from the contents of F.I.R., are the same. 4. It has been stated that the matter is pending before the Chief Judicial Magis­trate concerned, Lakhimpur Kheri, who has yet to decide whether the petitioners have damaged the forest land or not. Dur­ing pendency of the case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri, the Divisional Forest Officer, vide order dated 25.3.2009, observed that the petitioners have caused damages to the forest land, in consequence thereof, by the subsequent order dated 1.4.2009, the District Magis­trate has issued order of recovery of amount as damages from the petitioners. 5. Attention has been invited to sec­tion 26 of the Forest Act, which is repro­duced as under:- "26. 5. Attention has been invited to sec­tion 26 of the Forest Act, which is repro­duced as under:- "26. Acts prohibited in such forests.-(1) Any person who- (a) makes any fresh clearing prohib­ited by section 5, or (b) sets fire to a reserved forest, or, in contravention of any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, kindles any fire, or leaves any fire burning, in such manner as to endanger such a forest; or who, in a reserved forest- (c) kindles, keeps or carries any fire except at such seasons as the For­est-officer may notify in this behalf, (d) trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass; (e) causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree or cutting or dragging any timber; (f) fells, girdles, lops, or bums any tree or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, the same; (g) quarries stone, bums lime or char­coal, or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or re­moves, any forest-produce; (h) clears or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose; (1) in contravention of any rules made in this behalf by the State Govern­ment hunts, shoots, fishes, poisons water or sets traps or snares; or (j) in any area in which the Elephants' Preservation Act, 1879 (6 of 1879), is not in force, kills or catches ele­phants in contravention of any rules so made, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit- (a) any act done by permission in writing of the Forest-officer, or un­der any rule made by the State Government; or (b) the exercise of any right continued under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 15, or created by grant or contract in writing made by or on behalf of the Government under section 23. (3) Whenever fire is caused wilfully or by gross negligence in a reserved forest, the State Government may (notwithstanding that any penalty has been inflicted under this sec­tion) direct that in such forest or any portion thereof the exercise of all rights of pasture or to forest produce shall be suspended for such period as it thinks fit." 6. A plain reading of aforesaid provi­sion shows that power has been conferred on the Magistrate concerned to impose penalty or award punishment or damages with regard to offence committed under the Forest Act. 7. Sri Balram Yadav, learned Counsel for the petitioners while assailing the im­pugned orders stated that the Divisional Forest Officer lacks jurisdiction to impose penalty. Section 26 of the Forest Act em­powers the Magistrate to impose penalty award punishment or damage to the of­fenders involved in usurpation of forest land in accordance with law after due op­portunity of hearing. 8. It has been stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that charge-sheet has been filed and the matter is pend­ing before the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned. 9. On a query made by this Court as to how the Divisional Forest Officer has got power to impose damage in the manner it has been done, Sri H. P. Srivastava learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on the basis of pleading on record, submits that the power conferred by section 82 of the Indian Forest Act has been exercised by the Divisional Forest Officer. The provisions of section 82 of the Indian Forest Act is repro­duced as under:- "82. Recovery of money due to Govern­ment.-All money payable to the Government under this Act, or un­der any rule made under this Act, or on account of the price of any forest produce, or of expenses in­curred in the execution of this Act in respect of such produce, may, if not paid when due, be recovered under the law for the time being in force as if it were an arrear of land-revenue." 10. Section 82 of the Act has been amended and amended portion has been referred in the impugned order dated 25.3.2009 a copy of which is contained in Annexure No. CA-2 to the counter affidavit filed by the State. The power conferred by section 82 is the enabling provision to re­cover the dues payable to Government on various counts. Section 82 of the Act has been amended and amended portion has been referred in the impugned order dated 25.3.2009 a copy of which is contained in Annexure No. CA-2 to the counter affidavit filed by the State. The power conferred by section 82 is the enabling provision to re­cover the dues payable to Government on various counts. It does not empower the Divisional Forest Officer to impose damage or direct to compensate the Forest Depart­ment for loss caused. The question with regard to recovery of due arises after pass­ing of the basic order in accordance with law imposing damages. A plain reading of section 82 reveals that it regulates the pro­cedure to recover the dues and not to im­pose damages. 11. Section 82 as amended by the U.P. Act No. 1 of 2001, given effect from 16.4.2001, is reproduced as under: "82. Recovery of money due to State Gov­ernment.-All money, other than fines, payable to the State Gov­ernment under this Act or under any rule made thereunder or on account of the price of any forest produce or any agricultural crop grown on land owned by the State Government in a reserved or pro­tected forest or under any contract relating to forest produce or said agricultural crop, including any sum recoverable thereunder for breach thereof, or in consequence of its cancellation, or under the terms of a notice relating to the sale of such agricultural crop or other forest produce by auction or by in­vitation of tenders issued by or under the authority of a Forest Of­ficer and all compensation awarded to the State Government under this Act, may, if not paid when due, be recovered, under the law for the time being in force, as if it were an arrear of land revenue." 12. A plain reading of section 82 does not reveal that the Divisional Forest Officer has been empowered to impose damage in case some persons encroach upon the for­est land or cause some loss to forest land. The power of recovery under section 82 has been conferred to recover dues payable by the persons and it does not empower the Divisional Forest Officer and District Mag­istrate to impose damage. Notice was is­sued to the petitioners but in response thereof, no reply has been submitted. 13. The power of recovery under section 82 has been conferred to recover dues payable by the persons and it does not empower the Divisional Forest Officer and District Mag­istrate to impose damage. Notice was is­sued to the petitioners but in response thereof, no reply has been submitted. 13. Nothing has been brought on re­cord by the State Government while filing counter-affidavit indicating as to how the damage has been assessed and what pro­cedure has been adopted. Even if assuming that the petitioners have not submitted any response, the awarding of damages or pen­alty on account of an offence must be con­formed to penal act. 14. By catena of judgments, Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court settled that a thing should be done in the manner pro­vided by the Act and statutes and not oth­erwise. When the Statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. It has been hither to uncontroverted legal posi­tion that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. (Vide Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426 Nazir Ahmed v. King Em­peror, AIR 1936 PC 253 Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and others AIR 1963 SC 1077 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and others, AIR 1964 SC 358 Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 2077 Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare and others, AIR 1975 SC 915 Chet-tiam Veettil Ammad and another v. Taluk Land Board and others, AIR 1979 SC 1573 State of Bihar and others v. J.A.C. Saldanna and others, AIR 1980 SC 326 . 10. AIR 1986 SC 2160 A.K. Roy and an­other v. State of Punjab and others, State of Mizoram v. Biakchhawna, (1995) 1 SCC 156 J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality Morvi, AIR 1996 SC 2520 Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others, AIR 1999 SC 1281 and Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1998) 8 SCC 266. 15. AIR 1986 SC 2160 A.K. Roy and an­other v. State of Punjab and others, State of Mizoram v. Biakchhawna, (1995) 1 SCC 156 J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality Morvi, AIR 1996 SC 2520 Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others, AIR 1999 SC 1281 and Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1998) 8 SCC 266. 15. The aforesaid settled legal proposi­tion is based on a legal maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following other course is not permissible. This maxim has consistently been followed, as is evident from the cases referred to above. A similar view has been reiterated in Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Ma­harashtra and others, (2000) 6 SCC 179 Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, (2000) 7 SCC 296 Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka etc. etc., (2001) 4 SCC 9 Com­missioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Annim M.H. Ghaswala and others, (2002) 1 SCC 633 Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 486 and Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657 . 16. No statutory provisions could be pointed out by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel except section 82 under which the Divisional Forest Officer has exercised power to impose damages. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders seem to have been passed without jurisdiction. A faint argument has been advanced by the learned Standing Counsel that damages could have been imposed on the persons for the loss caused by them to the forest land in view of the provisions contained in Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 17. However, reading of the Preven­tion of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, does not seem to cover the present controversy. The Forest Act is a complete code in itself and while assessing damages, the authorities have to act in the manner provided in the Act itself. Once a special law has been enacted by the Legislature to deal with the subject, then that should be done under the special law and not under the general law. It is a very settled proposi­tion of law. 18. Once a special law has been enacted by the Legislature to deal with the subject, then that should be done under the special law and not under the general law. It is a very settled proposi­tion of law. 18. Moreover as observed herein-above, section 26 of the Forest Act specifi­cally deals with the controversy in ques­tion. Once specific provision has been pro­vided under the said law to deal a subject then, the matter should be dealt with under the same provision and not otherwise. The action taken by the respondents in absence of any statutory provisions conferring power on to the Divisional Forest Officer to award damages and in consequence thereof, to proceed with the recovery thereof, seems to be arbitrary exercise of power. 19. It appears that the First Informa­tion Report has been lodged on account of alleged damage caused by as many as 150 persons. In the First Information Report, the amount has been mentioned. No sepa­rate notice has been attached with the counter affidavit which may reveal that they were served for the alleged loss call­ing upon them to submit response indicat­ing the damages caused by them. 20. Factual controversy mentioned in the First Information Report, relates to criminal offence. The averments made in the First Information Report, cannot be treated as substantial evidence and to make it the basis for recovery of damages from the petitioners. The principles of law gov­erning the criminal and civil rights, are dif­ferent and the contents of First Information Report, are meant only to prosecute the offenders for criminal offence. It cannot be treated as the ground to proceed with re­covery proceeding against the petitioners for the alleged damage in question. In case the authorities feel that some damage has been caused by the petitioners, then for that, they are expected to proceed and should have proceeded in accordance with law. Otherwise also, it is a settled proposi­tion of law that the First Information Re­port, is not a substantive piece of evidence unless the allegation mentioned therein, is proved by cogent and material evidence. 21. So far as the criminal case is con­cerned, that aspect should be dealt with by the Trial Court concerned. Otherwise also, it is a settled proposi­tion of law that the First Information Re­port, is not a substantive piece of evidence unless the allegation mentioned therein, is proved by cogent and material evidence. 21. So far as the criminal case is con­cerned, that aspect should be dealt with by the Trial Court concerned. During the pendency of trial except the First Informa­tion Report, or the report in question, noth­ing has been brought on record to establish that the proceeding was initiated by the State or the Forest authorities in accordance with the provisions contained in the Forest Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Non-compliance of statutory provisions or pro­ceedings initiated in arbitrary manner whimsically against the citizen de hors the Rule, is anti-thesis of the Rule of law in a democratic polity. The gravity of offence does not empower the State or its authori­ties to proceed in its own way arbitrarily. 22. One of the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is that an identical writ petition being Writ Petition No. 5306 (M/B) of 2009, has been decided by the Division Bench by the judgment and order dated 9.6.2009 to avail the alternative remedy. 23. A perusal of the judgment and or­der dated 9.6.2009 reveals that their lord­ships have not considered the jurisdictional error in passing the order. In case an au­thority lacks jurisdiction to impose penalty, then such order is amenable to writ juris­diction under Article 226 of the Constitu­tion of India, vide judgment of Hon'ble Su­preme Court in (Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others), AIR 1987 SC 2186 . 24. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tewari), AIR 1970 SC 786 held that alternative remedy is the rule of discretion and not an exclusion of jurisdiction under Article 226. It has been further held in the case reported in (Cen­tury Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ullas Nagar Municipal Council and others), AIR 1971 SC 1021 that in case the petition may be decided on the basis of material on record, then alternative remedy shall be no bar. 25. It has been further held in the case reported in (Cen­tury Spg. And Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ullas Nagar Municipal Council and others), AIR 1971 SC 1021 that in case the petition may be decided on the basis of material on record, then alternative remedy shall be no bar. 25. In the case reported in (Rasid Ahmad v. Municipal Board Kairana) AIR 1950 SC 163 , Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 and (Himmat lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1954 SC 403 it has been further held that it is self-imposed limitation and does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India even if an al­ternative remedy is available to an ag­grieved person. 26. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Su­preme Court in the case in (State of Bombay v. United Motors), AIR 1953 SC 252 held that alternative remedy shall not come into the way where party come to Court with an allegation that his fundamental right has been violated and sought the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. It has been settled by Hon'ble Su­preme Court in the case reported in (Cal­cutta Discount Company v. I.T.O. AIR 1961 SC 372 and (Bho-pal Sugar Industry v. STO), AIR 1967 SC 549 that where mandatory provision of law has not been complied with and petitioners suffer from no fault on his or her part, the alternative remedy shall not be a bar to exercise juris­diction under Article 226 of the Constitu­tion of India. 28. It has also been settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court that where important ques­tion of law is involved it shall be open to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction of Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution of India to settle a controversy. It has further been held that where public authority is acting contrary to provision of law or taking undue advan­tage of its own then alternative remedy shall not be a bar, vide, judgments in Union of India v. State of Haryana, 2000 (10) SCC 482 and Maharash­tra State Judicial Services Association v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2002 (3) SCC 244 Salonah T. Company v. Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1990 SC 772 T.N. Transport Corporation v. Neethivalangan, 2001 (9) SCC 99 Shiv Shankar Dal Mill v. State of Haryana 1980 (2) SCC 437 . 29. 29. In a case in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC 1 Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that alternative remedy shall not be a bar and dismissal of writ pe­tition by High Court held to be not proper. The order passed by the authorities arbi­trarily by abusing the power or in violation of principle of natural justice, may always be subjected to judicial review under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. In the present case, substantial question of law has been raised by the peti­tioner's Counsel with regard to jurisdiction of Divisional Forest Officer, which may be adjudicated without entering into the fac­tual controversy. Hence, it is a fit case where, this Court should exercise extraor­dinary jurisdiction power conferred by Ar­ticle 226 of the Constitution of India. The relegation of matter to Civil Court, is not effective and efficacious alternative remedy to deal with the substantial question of law. 31. In a case reported in (Godreg Sara Lee Ltd. v. Commr.) (2009) 14 SCC 338 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed held that if the order of statutory authority is questioned on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, Court may interfere and the alternative remedy is no bar. Their lordships held that where issue relating to jurisdictional fact is raised, it should have been determined by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 32. In the case in (Babubhai Jamunadas Patel v. State of Gujarat), (2009) 9 SCC 610 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Courts and Supreme Court are sentinels of justice. They have been vested with extraordinary powers of judicial review and supervision to ensure that rights of citizens are duly protected. Courts have to maintain a constant vigil against inaction of authorities in discharg­ing their duties and obligations in the in­terest of citizens for whom they exist. Di­rections may be issued to authorities to perform their duties as required under various statutes. 33. The catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, were not considered by the Division Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 9.6.2009.The judgment is per incurrium to law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 34. Di­rections may be issued to authorities to perform their duties as required under various statutes. 33. The catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, were not considered by the Division Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 9.6.2009.The judgment is per incurrium to law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 34. Per incurrium means in ignorance of or without taking note of some statutory provisions or the judgment of Hon'ble Su­preme Court or the larger Bench, vide; State of Bihar v. Kalika Singh and others, 2003 (5) SCC 448 State of U.P and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another, (1991) 4 SCC 139 Mamleshwar Prasad and others v. Kanhaiya lal, AIR 1975 SC 907 Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar, 2005 (1) SCC 608 Ram Gopal Baheti v. Giridharilal Soni and others, 1999 (3) SCC 112 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1988 SC 1531 Sarnam Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, 1999 (5) SCC 638 State v. Ratan lal Arora, 2004 (4) SCC 590 . 35. The concept of "per incurrium" in all those decisions given is ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, i.e., previous deci­sions of the Court i.e. its own Court or by a Court of co-ordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of a term of a statute or by a rule having the force of law. "Incuria", literally means "carelessness". In practice, per incurrium is taken to mean per ig-noratium. (Vide Mamleshwar Prasad and an­other v. Kanhaiya lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232 A.R. Antule v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 State of U.P. and others v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondichery, AIR 1967 SC 1480 Municipal Corpora­tion of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 Ram Gopal Baheti v. Girdharilal Soni and others, (1999) 3 SCC 112 Sarnam Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, (1999) 5 SCC 638 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, (dead) by LRs. Director of Consolidation and others, (1999) 5 SCC 638 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, (dead) by LRs. and oth­ers, AIR 2000 SC 1729 M/s. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. findal Exports Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 2293 Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jag-deeshan, AIR 2002 SC 681 State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer, 2003 (7) AIC 188 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 2443 Direc­tor of Settlements, A.P. and others v. M.R. Apparao and another, (2002) 4 SCC 638 Manda Jaganath v. K.S. Rathnam and others, (2004) 7 SCC 492 Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and others, 2004 AIR SCW 7116 Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Ma­harashtra and another, (2005) 2 SCC 673 K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala and others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 and Union of In­dia and another v. Manik lal Banerjee. AIR 2006 SC 2844 36. State v. Ratan lal Arora, 2004 (49) ACC 469 (SC) = 2004 (19) AIC 822 = (2004) 4 SCC 590 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where in a case the decision has been rendered without reference to statutory bars, the same cannot have any precedent value and shall have to be treated as having been rendered per incurrium. 37. In N. Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala, 2004 (49) ACC 610 (SC) = 2004 (20) AIC 642 = AIR 2004 SC 2317 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in view of the specific statutory bar, the view, if any, expressed without analys­ing the statutory provision cannot, in our view, be treated as a binding precedent, and at the most is to be considered as hav­ing been rendered per incurrium. 38. A similar view has been reiterated in Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. CBI, AIR 2006 SC 2449 = 2006 (43) AIC 15 (SC) wherein the Apex Court has ob­served as under:- "Incuria" literally means "careless­ness". In practice per incurrium is taken to mean per ignoratium. Eng­lish Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law", as held in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 2 All ER 293 is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, "in ig­noratium of a statute or other bind­ing authority". In practice per incurrium is taken to mean per ignoratium. Eng­lish Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law", as held in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 2 All ER 293 is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, "in ig­noratium of a statute or other bind­ing authority". Same has been ac­cepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Arti­cle 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short "the Constitution") which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. The above position was highlighted in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd, (1991) 4 SCC 139 . To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial con­signs. The - position was high­lighted in Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. 2004 (23) AIC 708 (SC) = (2004) 7 SCC 558 . 39. In view of the above, the writ peti­tion seems to be maintainable in this Court. The earlier judgment lacks binding effect being per incurrium to law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 40. There is another aspect of the mat­ter. The recovery proceeding was stayed by this Court by a Division Bench of this Court, prima facie being satisfied on the ground raised by the petitioners. Since the question raised by the petitioners is of gen­eral public importance, with regard to ju­risdiction of Divisional Forest Officer, to impose damage, it is a fit case where juris-dictional power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should be exer­cised relying upon various pronounce­ments of Hon'ble Supreme Court. 41. As observed hereinabove, in case State Government feels that some damage has been caused by the petitioners or other villagers, then it should have proceeded in accordance with the statutory provisions and not otherwise. In view of the above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 42. Accordingly, the writ petition is al­lowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 25.3.2009 and subsequent order dated 1.4.2009 contained in Annexure No. 1 and 2 to the writ petition. However, liberty is given to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law and the petitioners shall cooperate with the proceedings. 43. Accordingly, the writ petition is al­lowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 25.3.2009 and subsequent order dated 1.4.2009 contained in Annexure No. 1 and 2 to the writ petition. However, liberty is given to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law and the petitioners shall cooperate with the proceedings. 43. It has been brought to notice of this Court that chargesheet has been filed in the criminal cases pending before the trial Court, since long. The District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri is directed to look into the matter and may proceed with the criminal cases with regard to present con­troversy expeditiously and conclude the same to its logical end preferably, within one year from the date of receipt of a certi­fied copy of this judgment. 44. Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned Addi­tional Chief Standing Counsel shall com­municate this judgment to the learned Dis­trict Judge, Lakhimpur Khefi forthwith. The Registry of this Court shall also com­municate the judgment to the learned Dis­trict Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri forthwith. Petition Allowed.