Judgment :- (This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India praying to quash the order dated 31-08-2009, produced at Ann-D, passed by the R2, in No.ADM8CR-82/09-10. Direct the R1 & R2 to continue the committee of the petitioners till a new committee is appointed to the Manjunatheshwara Temple.) All these petitions are disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners are questioning the order passed by the Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments appointing an Administrator exercising his power under Section 29 of the Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the Act’). 3. The matter arises in the following manner: The petitioners in all these writ petitions are the trustees of various temples in Dakshina Kannada District. According to them, all the temples are ancient and are being managed by an elected body of trustees by the devotees of the temple for a period of five years under Section 39 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act which was in force at that point of time. The case of the petitioners is that the said committees were also accorded approval by the Department of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments of Dakshina Kannada District. A new enactment was placed on the statute to bring about a uniform code to administer and take control of various temples in the State. Hence, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997 came into force. The Constitutional validity of the said enactment was challenged by various temples in the State. Initially, learned single Judge of this Court upheld the validity of the Act. On appeal, the said Act was struck down by this Court in W.A.No.3440/05 and connected cases holding that the said enactment is in violation of several provisions of the Constitution including Articles 14 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The said order of the Division bench is carried in appeal to the Apex Court. Initially the Apex Court granted an order of Stay, staying the operation of the order passed by the Division Bench. Thus for all practical purposes, the repeated enactment stood revived. 4. During this interregnum, the State proposed to constitute new committee under Section 25 of the Act. Initially the Apex Court granted an order of Stay, staying the operation of the order passed by the Division Bench. Thus for all practical purposes, the repeated enactment stood revived. 4. During this interregnum, the State proposed to constitute new committee under Section 25 of the Act. Some of the petitioners in these writ petitions made an application before the Apex Court, questioning the appointment of a fresh committee under Section 25 of the Act on various grounds. The State files objections inter alia contending that the tenure of the committee having expired, it was expedient that new committees are constituted. Hence justifies its action. The Apex Court, however, vacated the interim order insofar as Section 25 of the Act is concerned and the interim order insofar as the other provisions of the Act continued. The Commissioner for Endowments, having regard to the situation, inasmuch as, the term of the committees having expired, was of the view that an Administrator is required to be appointed under Section 29 of the Act, inasmuch as, there was pilferage of the income by the existing committees and hence its members cannot be permitted to administer the temple after the expiry of the term. Hence an Administrator is appointed. The same is questioned in all these writ petitions. 5. Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in one of the writ petitions led the argument, inter alia, contending that Section 29 of the Act is not at all applicable in the present circumstances, inasmuch as, none of the conditions envisaged under Section 29 are attracted. He further submits that once it is held that Section 29 is not applicable to the instant case for appointment of an Administrator, the natural corollary would be that the appointment of the Administrator is required to be set aside. 6. Mr. Shashikiran Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioners in some of the writ petitions submits that indeed after the interim order was granted by the Apex Court, the committees were sought to be constituted under Section 25 of the Act, which according to the petitioners was impermissible. He further submits that the Apex Court has vacated the interim order on an application made notwithstanding the serious objection of the State, inasmuch as, the Apex Court was of the view that appointing a new committee under Section 25 of the Act is impermissible. He further submits that the Apex Court has vacated the interim order on an application made notwithstanding the serious objection of the State, inasmuch as, the Apex Court was of the view that appointing a new committee under Section 25 of the Act is impermissible. Thus, he submits that the impugned order appointing an Administrator cannot be traced to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act. 7. Mr. Nataraj, learned Additional Advocate General for the State submits that even assuming that Section 29 of the Act is not applicable, the power of the State can be traced to Section 3 and Section 49 of the Act wherein in furtherance of the enactment any just decision can be taken by the Commissioner in respect of the Administration of the temple. Hence, he justifies the appointment of Administrator. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. Before adverting to the contentions urged, it is necessary for us to look into certain provisions of the Act. Indeed, the impugned order is passed by the Commissioner exercising the powers under Section 29 of the Act. Section 29 of the Act would read as under: “29. Appointment of Administrator – The prescribed authority shall appoint an officer of the State Government as Administrator in place of the committee of management dissolved or suspended under sub-section (1) or (3) of Section 28 or after the expiry of the term of office of the Committee under Section 26 and till a new Committee of Management is constituted or for a period of six months whichever is earlier.” Section 26 of the Act speaks about the term of the office of the Committee of Management and Election of Chairman. Section 28 would speak about the power to dissolve the Committee of Management. Indeed, if a Commissioner proposes to exercise his powers under Section 29 of the Act to appoint an Administrator, only two contingencies are contemplated-one is that the Management is dissolved or suspended under Sub-Sections (1) or (3) of Section 28 or after the expiry of the term under Section 26 of the Act. Indeed, Section 28 and 26 will not come to the aid of the Commissioner in exercising his powers under Section 29 of the Act. Indeed, Section 28 and 26 will not come to the aid of the Commissioner in exercising his powers under Section 29 of the Act. Indeed, the appointment of an Administrator as envisaged under Section 29 of the Act is altogether different than the one contemplated under Section 26 and Section 28 of the Act. Indeed, Section 26 of the Act contemplates that wherever the committee of Management is constituted under Section 25 of the Act, the members are required to elect a Chairman and the State Government is required to nominate its Executive Officer as ex-officio Secretary and so on and so forth. 10. Apparently, Section 26 of the Act will not come to the aid of the State in appointing an Administrator under Section 29 of the Act once it is held that Section 29 of the Act is not applicable in the present set of circumstances, having regard to the vacation of the interim order. Insofar as appointing an administrator is concerned, one will have to see whether the powers to appoint and manage the temple can be traced to Section 3 or Section 49 of the Act, inasmuch as, it is not in dispute that in all these cases, the term of Committees has come to an end between 26.10.2003 and 26.12.2006. To that extent, learned counsel for the petitioners are right in submitting that the state could not have invoked the provisions of Section 29 of the Act in appointing an Administrator. 11. This takes us to the other relevant provisions of the Act to see if the 2nd respondent can trace his powers to Section 3 and Section 49 of the Act to appoint an Administrator. Section 3 would deal with the appointment of a Commissioner who hails from the cadre of Indian Administrative Services to be appointed as a Commissioner for Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments for the State of Karnataka. Indeed a Commissioner is defined under Section 2(8) of the Act. The definition of Commissioner is who is appointed under Section 3 of the Act. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the impugned order is passed by the Commissioner as defined under Section 2(8) and also Section 3(1) of the Act. One will have to see whether the powers of the Commissioner to appoint an Administrator can be traced to Section 3(3) of the Act. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the impugned order is passed by the Commissioner as defined under Section 2(8) and also Section 3(1) of the Act. One will have to see whether the powers of the Commissioner to appoint an Administrator can be traced to Section 3(3) of the Act. Section 3(3) of the Act would deal as under: “The Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as are conferred by or under the provisions of this Act and shall subject to such general or special orders as the State Government may make, have powers of general superintendence and control for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act in respect of all Hindu religious institutions and charitable endowments in the State, and such superintendence and control shall include the power to pass any order which may be deemed necessary to ensure that such institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purpose they were found or exists.” 12. Indeed the power to appoint an Administrator would certainly not stem from Section 29 of the Act in the present circumstances. But however Sub-Section 3 of the Act in the circumstances is required to be pressed into service inasmuch as it contemplates that the Commissioner in such supervision and control has ample power to pass such other order, which are necessary and to ensure that such Institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated, which would necessarily mean that the administration of the temple in question is required to be administered properly and further that the income derived is properly accounted for. 13. Even Section 77 of the Act would come to the aid of the respondents inasmuch as Section 77 of the Act would deal with the power to remove the difficulties and the Government pursuant to a notification, make such provisions as appear to be necessary to remove the said difficulty. Even under this provision, the power of the government can be traced. 14. Insofar as the two petitions of Mr. Shashikiran Shetty, learned counsel are concerned, it is submitted that the orders of appointing an Administrator is passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Indeed in the preceding paragraph, the power of appointing Administrator is traced to Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. 14. Insofar as the two petitions of Mr. Shashikiran Shetty, learned counsel are concerned, it is submitted that the orders of appointing an Administrator is passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Indeed in the preceding paragraph, the power of appointing Administrator is traced to Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. Indeed insofar as the power of the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner is concerned, that is required to be seen under Section 4 of the Act, if the temple in question is a notified temple and is classified as Group-B, then the Deputy Commissioner does have the power of general superintendence and control for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act in respect of all Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments in his jurisdiction. It is also brought to my notice that Rule 3 of the Rules of 2002 contemplates three categories of notified Institutions having regard to their annual income. Indeed insofar as the petition of Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the annual gross income of the temple is Rs.10 lakhs and hence, the order is passed by the Commissioner. Insofar as Mr. Shashikiran Shetty’s petitions are concerned, the orders are passed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the temple, whose income is less than Rs.10 lakhs. Hence, to the extent, I am of the view that the orders impugned also cannot be disturbed. 15. In the present writ petitions it is not in dispute that the tenure of the Trustees or the Management has since long expired. Indeed the petitioners cannot be heard to say that they propose to continue for all time to come until the appeals filed before the Apex Court are heard and disposed of. The petitioners also cannot take advantage of the vacuum created by vacation of the interim order insofar as Section 25 of the Act is concerned. Indeed Section 25 of the Act would deal with the Constitution of the Committee of Management. Section 25 of the Act would speak about that the State Government, pursuant to any general or special order shall constitute a Committee of Management consisting of nine members in respect of one or more notified Institutions. The procedure for appointing or constituting a Committee is enumerated in Sub-Sections 2 to 7 of Section 25 of the Act. 16. Section 25 of the Act would speak about that the State Government, pursuant to any general or special order shall constitute a Committee of Management consisting of nine members in respect of one or more notified Institutions. The procedure for appointing or constituting a Committee is enumerated in Sub-Sections 2 to 7 of Section 25 of the Act. 16. In the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the State, in the circumstances is precluded from constituting a Committee of Management. The tenure of the existing Committee of Management has since expired. This would envisage a catch 22 situation inasmuch as the vacuum is created. It may be that there are no serious allegations as against the existing Committee members though the same is disputed seriously by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, but nevertheless once their term has come to an end, they are expected to gracefully quit and go. They cannot cling on to the management of the temple when their term has come to an end. In these circumstances, Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act would come into play inasmuch as there should be someone at the helm of affairs to take care of the administration and the income, which is derived from the temple. Section 49 of the Act is in aid of Section 3 more so Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. Indeed it is within the power of the Commissioner to issue such directions, if he is of the view that any property of the Institution is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully sold, removed or disposed off. Indeed such a situation may not have arisen, but nevertheless the power of the Commissioner to issue such directions as deemed fit for proper maintenance, administration and keeping the accounts of the temple is essential. Indeed a similar if not identical question fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of B.I. Tarali V/s. Kenya Ravindranath Shetty and others reported in 1990 (1) Kar.L.J. 367 . Indeed Section 20 of the Mysore Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short ‘the 1951 Act’) fell for consideration. Section 20 of the 1951 Act is almost a paramateria with Section 3 of the present enactment, more so Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. Indeed Section 20 of the Mysore Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short ‘the 1951 Act’) fell for consideration. Section 20 of the 1951 Act is almost a paramateria with Section 3 of the present enactment, more so Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. This Court was of the view that having regard to the circumstances narrated therein, it is open for the Commissioner to exercise powers under Section 20 of the 1951 Act and appoint an Administrator to manage the temporal affairs of the Institution. It is useful to extract the observations made by this Court in the said decision which would read as under: “As already pointed out, the Board of Trustees has not yet been constituted. As per the scheme, the petitioner is only a manager appointed by the previous Board of Trustees. He is a servant of the temple appointed on a salary. Section 20 of the 1951 Act specifically provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Administration of a Religious Endowments shall be subject to the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner and such ‘superintendence and control’ shall include the power to pass an order which he may deem necessary for the purposes for which a Hindu Religious Endowments is founded or existed. Thus we are of the view that Section 20 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to appoint an Administrator to manage the temporal affairs of the religious institution and also to ensure that the religious part of the temple are performed as per the traditions of the temple in a case where the term of the Board of Trustees has expired and the Board of Trustees cannot be permitted to continue keeping in view the interest of the religious institution until the new Board of Trustees is constituted.” (Emphasis supplied). 17. The case on hand is identical. It is to be noticed that the term of the petitioners having expired, they cannot take shelter under the fact that since Section 25 of the Act is no longer a statute, the question of appointing an Administrator in the circumstances does not arise. Indeed it is to be noticed that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court holding the Act is ultravires is stayed by the Apex Court. Indeed it is to be noticed that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court holding the Act is ultravires is stayed by the Apex Court. It is no doubt true that it does not have the effect of wiping out the judgment of this Court but certainly it has the effect on operation of the order of the Division Bench. Once it is held that the order of the Division Bench is stayed, the Act is in force. 18. It is no doubt true a contention was raised before me by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitting that since the interim order insofar as Section 25 of the Act is vacated, the matter is required to be reverted to the old enactment at least insofar as appointing a Committee. Indeed there is a fallacy in this contention. Apparently, the interim order is vacated insofar as only one provision i.e., Section 25 of the Act is concerned. Insofar as other provisions of the Act are concerned, indeed the same would hold the field. Indeed Section 78 of the Act deals with the Repeal and Savings pursuant to which several enactments relating to the Religious Institution and Religious and Charitable Institutions has been repealed, which would mean that Section 78 would still continue on statue. Thus, to that extent, the provisions of the repealed enactment are not available to the petitioners to contend that at least certain provisions of the repealed enactment can be relied or pressed into service for the purpose of constituting a Committee. 19. Indeed the question would be whether an Administrator is required to be appointed in all cases. Certainly, it is not so. If a validly constituted committee is in place, the same cannot be displaced by appointing an Administrator. The necessity to appoint an Administrator would come only if the term of the existing Committee has come to an end and not otherwise. 20. Having given my anxious consideration, I am of the view that the impugned order appointing an Administrator cannot be faulted, though the Commissioner was not justified in invoking the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, which has no relevance in the present circumstances. All the petitions stand dismissed.