Judgment : ASHIM KUMAR ROY, J.: In this appeal the accused/appellant challenged the Judgement and order of conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 5,000/- with default clause, passed against him in a sessions trial held before the Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Tract, First Court, Kalyani, Nadia. 2. The prosecution case against the appellant is as follows: Sometime in April 2004, the accused/appellant married deceased Bandana according to Hindu Rites and Customs. However, their married life was not happy as the accused/appellant was very much addicted to alcohol and used to consume liquor everyday and torture her under the influence of liquor. On August 22, 2005 at dead night around 2 a.m. the accused/appellant returned home in a heavily drunken condition and demanded money from his wife and as she refused to give him any money he started quarrel with her and then set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her person. The incident took place inside their bedroom. However, Bandana managed to come out from their bedroom, which was bolted from inside and being attracted by her cry the other inmates of the house rushed there and extinguished the fire and removed her to Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Hospital, Kalyani, where she was admitted. In the meantime, her father having received information about such incident met her at the Hospital, when she disclosed everything as to how she was set on fire by the accused/appellant. When her father having come to know all about the incident on August 26, 2005 lodged a FIR to the local police station and on the self-same day her statement was recorded by the attending doctor in presence of a staff nurse, on a requisition made by the police. After recording her statement the deceased put her signature as well as L.T.I. and the same was also signed by the recording doctor as well as the staff nurse as the attesting witness. In her such statement she complained against the accused/appellant for setting her on fire. Thereafter on August 28, 2005 she succumbed to her burn injuries. 3. There was no eyewitness to the occurrence and the prosecution rests its case entirely on circumstantial evidence, and her dying declaration recorded by the doctor and the dying declaration made by her to her father and others. Thereafter on August 28, 2005 she succumbed to her burn injuries. 3. There was no eyewitness to the occurrence and the prosecution rests its case entirely on circumstantial evidence, and her dying declaration recorded by the doctor and the dying declaration made by her to her father and others. During the trial total 12 witnesses were examined, however, defence examined none and it was the case of the defence that Bandana caught fire accidentally while she was boiling milk on a stove. 4. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant assailed the order of conviction and sentence, urging as follows; (a) A dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of conviction in absence of any other evidence. (b) The dying declaration ought to be excluded from consideration as the same was not recorded in the vernacular of the deceased. Admittedly while she made her statement in Bengali but the same was recorded in English. (c) The signature/L.T.I. of the deceased in the dying declaration was never proved. (d) In the admission sheet history of the case was noted as a case of “stove burst”. (e) Since the dying declaration recorded by the doctor at two stages varied the accused/appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. (f) During inquest her both palms were found burnt but the Autopsy Surgeon found no burn injury there and accordingly the finding of the post mortem doctor cannot be relied upon. (g) Since the ocular account of injuries found during inquest was in conflict with the evidence of Autopsy Surgeon the post mortem report lost its value. (h) The post mortem report not being a substantive evidence in absence of examination of the Autopsy Surgeon is of no probative value. (i) The deceased was removed to the Hospital in a rickshaw van but the rickshaw van puller was not examined. (j) There is inordinate and unusual delay in lodging the FIR. The Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused/appellant relied on as many as 25 case laws. Having gone through the same we found either the same has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case or the ratio of such decisions goes against the defence case. The decisions relied upon by the learned advocate of accused/appellant are as follows; (i) Nazrul Sk. @ Nazrul Mondal Vs. Having gone through the same we found either the same has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case or the ratio of such decisions goes against the defence case. The decisions relied upon by the learned advocate of accused/appellant are as follows; (i) Nazrul Sk. @ Nazrul Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2005 (3) CHN 557 , (ii) Munshi Prasad & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3031 , (iii) June @ Arjun Mandi Vs. The State, reported in 1986 C Cr LR (Cal) 138, (iv) Rashid Sk. Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2005 (1) CHN 414 , (v) Pranab Kumar Chakraborty Vs. Kumkum Chakraborty, reported in 2005 (4) CHN146, (vi) State Vs. Sudhangshu Ghakat, reported in 1975 (1) CLJ 144, (vii) Sheikh Meheboob @ Hetak & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2005 (2) Supreme 458 , (viii) Samadhan Dhudaka Koli Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2008 (8) Supreme 719 , (ix) Panneerselvam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2008 (3) Supreme 596 , (x) Amol Singh Vs. State of M.P., reported in 2008 (3) Supreme 679 , (xi) Kanti Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2009 (3) Supreme 360 , (xi) Dandu Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of A.P., reported in 1999 (7) Supreme 354 , (xii) Balbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 2 C Cr LR (SC) 633, (xiii) P. Mani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 1 C Cr LR (SC) 574, (xiv) Gajula Surya Prakasarao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2009 (7) Supreme 299 , (xv) Balwan Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2005 (3) Supreme 711 , (xvi) Eknath Ganpat Aher & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2010 (3) Supreme 726 , (xvii) State of Punjab Vs. Kulwant Singh @ Kanta, reported in 2008 (5) Supreme 168 , (xviii) Kapildeo Mandal & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2007 (8) Supreme 705 , (xix) Kazem Ali Mondal & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2006) 2 C Cr LR (Cal) 452, (xx) Roop Singh @ Rupa Vs. The State of Punjab, reported in 2008 (4) Supreme 548, (xxi) Manjunath Chennabasapa Madalli Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 2 C Cr LR (SC) 308, (xxii) Sri Gopalji Bhagat Vs. Vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2006) 2 C Cr LR (Cal) 452, (xx) Roop Singh @ Rupa Vs. The State of Punjab, reported in 2008 (4) Supreme 548, (xxi) Manjunath Chennabasapa Madalli Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 2 C Cr LR (SC) 308, (xxii) Sri Gopalji Bhagat Vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2007) 2 C Cr LR (Cal) 585 (xxiii) Sunil Chowdhury Vs. Arup Kumar Ghosh, reported in 2006 (2) CHN 347 , (xxiv) Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1957 SC 857 , (xxv) Shri Baru Ram Vs. Smt. Prasanni & Ors., reported in AIR 1959 SC 93 . On the other hand, the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State vehemently contended that the order of conviction and sentence is well founded and the dying declaration on which the same is based cannot be doubted for any reason whatsoever. The dying declaration was recorded by a doctor, who is an independent person and had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the commission of the offence. 5. We have heard the Learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. Considered their respective submissions and the case laws relied upon by them and perused the materials on record, more particularly the deposition of the witnesses as well as the dying declaration (Exbt.– 4). 6. So far as the first contention of the learned advocate of the accused/appellant is concerned, it is no more res integra that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction once the court is satisfied that the version about the incident is truthful as well as the involvement of the accused and there is no rule of law or any rule of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated. But it is equally true where the prosecution case entirely rests on a dying declaration the Court must be very careful before acting upon the same and unless recording of such declaration is fully established, it would not be safe at all to convict an accused only on that basis without any further corroboration. In this connection it would be quite relevant to refer what Hon’ble Apex Court observed in the case of Khushal Rao Vs. In this connection it would be quite relevant to refer what Hon’ble Apex Court observed in the case of Khushal Rao Vs. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 22 , in Paragraph 17, which is quoted below; “In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities.” Similarly, in the case of Munnu Raja & Anr. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1976 SCC (Cri) 376, at paragraph 6, the Apex Court held as follows; “Though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross-examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has harden into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated.” The line of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court on this point are still uniform. 7. Now, in view of the position of law as aforesaid this Court is to see whether the version of the deceased and role attributed to the appellant in the commission of the offence is reliable or not. This is a case where the dying declaration was recorded by the attending doctor in presence of the staff nurse. The dying declaration recorded by a doctor, who being an independent person, is of great value. This is a case where the dying declaration was recorded by the attending doctor in presence of the staff nurse. The dying declaration recorded by a doctor, who being an independent person, is of great value. There is nothing on record nor it was the case of the appellant that the doctor and the staff nurse in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded had any particular animus against the appellant. The defence except suggesting the doctor that the said dying declaration was recorded being influenced by the father of the deceased, which of course was denied by the witness, there is nothing to disbelieve the same. Nothing has been brought on record as to how the doctor was influenced by the father of the deceased except making a bald suggestion. We have no material with us to accept the contention of the defence that the father of the deceased by exerting his influence managed the doctor to falsely record the dying declaration in question Exhibit – 4. The doctor, who recorded the dying declaration was examined by the prosecution as P.W. 11 and he stated as follows; “I recorded the statement of the patient in presence of Sarmila Dasgupta on duty nurse. The patient was fully conscious oriented, i.e. possessed of full faculty and coherent. She did not state anything incoherent. The witness further stated that he had attached a certificate regarding the mental health and the condition of the patient. Prior to the recording of such statement he made a request in writing to the S.D.O. asking him to record the dying declaration. But the witness was asked to get such declaration recorded through the Ward Master. The said dying declaration was signed both by him and by the staff nurse. The declarant made the statement in Bengali and the same was recorded in English and read over and explained to her.” According to the staff nurse Sarmila Dasgupta, who was examined as P.W. 3, she was present at the time of recording of such dying declaration and also signed on such recorded statement as a witness. In her presence the declarant put her signature and L.T.I. Both the witnesses were cross-examined at length but nothing have been brought out from their evidence which might casts doubt as to their reliability. In her presence the declarant put her signature and L.T.I. Both the witnesses were cross-examined at length but nothing have been brought out from their evidence which might casts doubt as to their reliability. Therefore, we are of the opinion here in this case can very well be taken into consideration without any further corroboration. 8. One of the major argument of the learned defence counsel in support of his contention that the dying declaration is not reliable is this, that the same was not recorded in the vernacular of the deceased. It was submitted although the declarant made his statement in Bengali but the doctor recorded the same in English. It is true admittedly the deceased made her statement in Bengali but such statement was recorded by the doctor in English, but in our opinion same is no ground either to reject the dying declaration or to doubt the authenticity of the same. In a similar circumstance where dying declaration narrated in Punjabi and was recorded in Urdu, a 3 Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bakhshish Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1957 SC 904 , found no reason to reject such declaration on the ground that such dying declaration was recorded in a language different from that of the declarant. It was also not the case of the defence that the statement of the deceased was not correctly reproduced. It was also argued since the dying declaration was at variance the same should not be acted upon. We do not find any force in such submission. The question of varied declaration, if at all may arise where the dying declaration is more than one. In the case at hand, the prosecution relied only on the dying declaration Exhibit – 4. In any event endorsement on the admission sheet to the effect “stove burst” without anything more cannot be accepted to be the statement of the victim as to the cause of fire. There is nothing further to show on whose statement such an endorsement was made. There is no mention such endorsement was made on the statement of the deceased. The author of such statement was never examined, nor the doctor who recorded the Exhibit–4 was confronted with the same. The defence also never moved the trial Court for examination of the doctor who made such statement. There is no mention such endorsement was made on the statement of the deceased. The author of such statement was never examined, nor the doctor who recorded the Exhibit–4 was confronted with the same. The defence also never moved the trial Court for examination of the doctor who made such statement. In such circumstances we find no reason to anyway act thereupon. It was vehemently urged since the signature of the declarant or her L.T.I. was not proved the dying declaration is of no value. In this regard the Learned Counsel of the accused/appellant relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1957 SC 857 . We find the ratio of such decision goes against the defence case. In the aforesaid case at Paragraph 11 the Apex Court held as follows; “…The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in Sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.” Therefore, the authorship of the document can very well be proved by a person in whose presence such a document was written or the signature or the L.T.I. was affixed. In this case it is the categorical evidence of the doctor as well as the staff nurse that after her statement was recorded she put her signature and L.T.I. thereon. Except suggesting to the doctor that she did not put her L.T.I. defence has not been able to make out any case that it was neither her signature or L.T.I. In view of aforesaid evidence on record we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned advocate of the appellant that the signature and L.T.I. has not been proved. In this connection it was also argued by the learned advocate of the accused/appellant referring to the inquest report that both her palms were completely burnt. In this connection it was also argued by the learned advocate of the accused/appellant referring to the inquest report that both her palms were completely burnt. But while the doctor who recorded the dying declaration he was cross-examined, the signature and the L.T.I. on the same was challenged on the ground due to the burn she sustained she was not in a position to either sign or put her signature. It may be noted that according to the Autopsy Surgeon both of her palms received no burn. It was also argued that there is a conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence. While in inquest her both palms were found burnt but in post mortem no burn injuries were found there. In our opinion, this discrepancy cannot be categorized as a conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence. The submission of the learned advocate of the accused/appellant is out and out misconceived and merits no consideration. It was also argued that non-examination of the rickshaw van puller is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case. We do not find any force in such submission because of the fact under the provisions of the Evidence Act, no particular number of witness is required to be examined by a party to prove its case. In this case the defence has sufficient opportunity to examine the said rickshaw van puller as a defence witness, but no such attempt has ever been made. So far as the contention of the learned advocate of the accused/appellant there is an inordinate and unusual delay in lodging the First Information Report, we also do not find any force in such contention. The delay in lodging FIR is only fatal when prosecution did not explain the same. However, in this case, we find according to the defacto-complainant since he was busy with the treatment of his daughter, he could not inform the police earlier. Therefore, the delay, if any, has been sufficiently explained and there is no ground to disbelieve the prosecution case on the ground of delay in lodging FIR. 9. Last but not the least, besides the dying declaration recorded by the doctor there is an oral dying declaration made by the victim to her father P.W. 1, the defactocomplainant of the case. 9. Last but not the least, besides the dying declaration recorded by the doctor there is an oral dying declaration made by the victim to her father P.W. 1, the defactocomplainant of the case. According to the said witness when he met the victim at the Hospital she disclosed to her as to how she was set on fire by her husband. This witness was cross-examined at length but except suggesting to him that the victim did not disclose to him as to how she was set on fire by the appellant is not true, nothing has been brought out from his cross-examination. It is to be noted that such suggestion was denied by the witness. It is pertinent to note the prosecution case that the incident took place at the dead hours of night inside the bedroom and the only person present were the deceased and the appellant and none else, has never been disputed by the defence. It is the defence case that the deceased caught fire while boiling milk inside the bedroom. However, in support of his plea nothing has been brought on record to establish the same. It is true that the accused is no longer liable to prove his innocence but where a specific plea is taken by the defence and the facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the accused, then in that case onus is on the defence to prove the same and its failure would be an additional circumstance against the accused. Apart from the fact no material has been brought on record to support the plea of the defence, we are not ready to accept such a defence plea, due to the simple reason when the house consist of a separate kitchen room there cannot be any question of cooking anything inside the bedroom. The plea of defence thus appears to be false. Further it is nobody’s case that stove was found inside the bedroom. 10. Thus, by carefully scrutinizing the dying declaration of the victim, Exhibit –4 along with the other attending circumstances, we are of the opinion, it can safely be concluded that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances which led to the death of the deceased Bandana and appellant is the assailant of the victim/wife. Thus, there is no need of further corroboration. The dying declaration is absolutely reliable. Thus, there is no need of further corroboration. The dying declaration is absolutely reliable. The Trial Court has very rightly convicted the accused/appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine. In the result the impugned Judgment and order is sustained and this appeal stands dismissed. Let the Lower Court Records be sent down to the Court below forthwith. Criminal Section is directed to deliver urgent Photostat certified copy of this Judgment to the parties, if applied for, as early as possible. I agree.