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2010 DIGILAW 1341 (CAL)

Nripen Roy v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2010-11-23

ASHIM KUMAR ROY, J.N.PATEL

body2010
Judgment : J. N. Patel, C.J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Third Court, Krishnagore, Nadia in Sessions Trial No. II (March), 2007 arising out of Sessions Case No. 22(11) of 2006, wherein the appellants were found guilty of having committed offences under Section 498A/304B/306 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants-accused Nripen Roy, father-in-law Nirod Roy, mother-in-law, Gouri Roy have been convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each in default to suffer S.I. for one year for committing offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC; to suffer R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each in default to suffer S.I. for one year for committing offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC and to suffer Imprisonment for life for committing offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. It was further directed that the fine, if realized, the entire amount be paid to father of deceased Aparna as compensation under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. However, all the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently under Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. The facts are as follows: Smt. Aparna Sarkar aged 19 years, daughter of Sri Rabindranath Nath Sarkar was married to Sri Nripen Roy aged 28 years, son of Sri Nirod Roy on 14.3.2006 (i.e. on 29th Falgun of 1408). Due to mental and physical torture by the appellants/accused i.e. her parents-in-law and husband, on 19.6.2006 at about 3.30 P.M., within three months of her marriage, she committed suicide by hanging herself from the rafter of her father-in-laws room by using a nylon rope. On being informed, her parents, relatives and neighbours came to her in-laws house and saw her hanging with a rope from the rafter in her father-in-laws house. The matter was reported to the local Police Station, when N. C. Sarkar, a Sub-Inspector of police, attached to the Krishnagange Police Station visited the scene of occurrence in village Swarnakhali, Majher Para, Nadia. As it was about 18.50 hours, a decision was taken by Sri Sarkar to conduct the Inquest on the next day in the morning and accordingly he deployed police security at the scene of occurrence. On 20.6.2006, the Inquest was held. Sri Dilip Kr. As it was about 18.50 hours, a decision was taken by Sri Sarkar to conduct the Inquest on the next day in the morning and accordingly he deployed police security at the scene of occurrence. On 20.6.2006, the Inquest was held. Sri Dilip Kr. Ghosh, P.W. 1, the Block Development Officer of Krishnagange held the Magisterial Enquiry-cum-inquest under Section 174 and 176 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the dead body was referred for postmortem examination. Sri Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, uncle of deceased Aparna Roy lodged a written complaint (F.I.R.) at Krishnagange Police Station which was scribed by one Jharu Sarkar. In the Report lodged by Subhas Sarkar, it was stated that deceased Aparna Roy was physically and mentally tortured by her husband and parents-in-law in order to coerce her to bring money from her parents. Thereafter, she was forced to commit suicide. On lodging the report, the Police registered case No. 89 of 2006 against the appellants/accused under Section 498A/306 of IPC and subsequently Section 304B of I.P.C. was added. In course of investigation the Police arrested the appellant-accused Nripen Roy, husband of the deceased and his parents, recorded the statements of the witnesses and on completion of investigation filed charge sheet against the accused-appellant. In the Trial the accused persons were charged for having committed offences under Section 498A/304B and 306 of I.P.C., they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. On the conclusion of the Trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge found the appellants-accused guilty on all counts and that is how they came to be convicted. Hence, this appeal. The fact that the deceased Aparna Roy was married to appellant-accused, Nripen Roy on 14.3.2006 and that within three months of her marriage i.e. on 19.6.2006 she committed suicide is not disputed. Dr. Pranab Roy, P. W. 6 conducted the postmortem examination of the dead body of deceased Aparna Roy. The said witness in his deposition stated before the Court that “during post mortem examination I found ligature mark, one nylon rope approx 1/3 c.m. in its thickness over the neck and I found one non-continuous ligature mark, oblique the knot over the left side of neck below left ear. In my opinion, death was caused due to asphyxia due to antemortem suicidal hanging. This postmortem report was prepared by me under carbon process. It bears my signature and official seal marked Ext. In my opinion, death was caused due to asphyxia due to antemortem suicidal hanging. This postmortem report was prepared by me under carbon process. It bears my signature and official seal marked Ext. 3.” In his cross examination he has made it clear that beside one non-continuous ligature mark, he did not find any other injury on her neck. Therefore, it can be simply concluded that the deceased Aparna Roy committed suicide. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants-accused submitted that the learned trial court has placed reliance on evidence which is based on surmises and conjectures and not on any material on record. Therefore, the Court should quash the conviction and set aside the sentence against the appellants-accused. It is submitted that the charge framed against the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and others during trial was erroneous and misleading and, therefore, bad in law and has caused substantial prejudice to the appellant, particularly, with reference to the charge under Section 304B of the IPC and the alternative charge under Section 306 of the IPC. It is submitted that the learned Trial court could not have convicted the appellant accused Nripen Roy and others on all the three counts that is for having committed offences under Section 498A/304B and 306 IPC which was an alternative charge. Therefore, the learned trial court has committed an error in sentencing the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and others on all the three counts. It is further submitted that if the trial court has arrived at a conclusion that the charge under Section 306 of the IPC has been committed by the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and others, their conviction under Section 304B of the IPC cannot be sustained on the ground that it may amount to double jeopardy. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused further contended that except for the interested witnesses, the parents and relatives of the victim, no independent witness was examined to show that Smt. Aparna Sarkar, daughter of Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7 was treated with cruelty by her husband Nripen Roy, father and mother in-law in order to extract dowry. It is submitted that in absence of very essential element of offences that is for want of proof of demand of dowry, this cannot be said to be a case of dowry death. It is submitted that in absence of very essential element of offences that is for want of proof of demand of dowry, this cannot be said to be a case of dowry death. It is submitted that as no cruelty has been proved to extract dowry, the case under Section 498A I.P.C is not made out. It is further contended that there is no evidence on record to show that due to the fact that the victim was treated cruelly she was driven to commit suicide. It is further submitted that none of the prosecution witnesses have in their evidence deposed to the effect as to when the alleged demand of dowry was made and how much money was demanded and from whom and therefore, the entire prosecution evidence on this count remains vague and cast a serious doubt on veracity of the prosecution case. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused that there is no evidence to show that there was any positive act on the part of the appellants-accused Nripen Roy and others which compelled Aparna to commit suicide. It is further submitted that there was substantial delay on the part of the Investigating Officer in recording the statement of the parents of the deceased (P.W. 7 and P.W. 8) though the incident took place on 19.6.2006, their statements came to be recorded on 11.7.2006 for which there is no explanation offered by the prosecution and, therefore, this was nothing but an attempt on the part of the prosecution to frame the appellants-accused Nripen Roy and others in the case merely because deceased Aparna Roy committed suicide. It is submitted that the evidence on record goes to show particularly in the cross-examination of Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, the uncle of the victim girl has admitted that during the course of visit on the occasion of ‘Jamai Shashti’, the appellants-accused Nripen Roy attended his house alongwith deceased Aparna which shows that Aparna had cordial relations with her husband and in-laws. It is submitted that the prosecution witnesses have substantially improved their case in the court and considering the contradictions and omissions, it would be most unsafe to rely on their evidence and therefore, in absence of cogent consistent and reliable evidence the conviction and sentence of the appellants-accused Nripen Roy and others deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that the prosecution witnesses have substantially improved their case in the court and considering the contradictions and omissions, it would be most unsafe to rely on their evidence and therefore, in absence of cogent consistent and reliable evidence the conviction and sentence of the appellants-accused Nripen Roy and others deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that if the prosecution case is believed that the deceased Aparna was treated with cruelty and was mentally and physically tortured, the medical evidence i.e. in postmortem examination no other injury on the dead body of Aparna Roy being noticed, goes to show that the witnesses have falsely implicated the appellant-accused. It is further submitted that the learned trial judge did not record the statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr. P. C. in proper manner and failed to consider defence of the appellants-accused. Therefore, the appellants-accused deserves to be acquitted. On the other hand, the learned A.P.P. submitted that the charge framed by the learned trial court cannot be faulted with as erroneous or misleading as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused. On the other hand, the charge is specific and give sufficient notice of the sum and substance of the case against the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and other. It is further contended that the prosecution has proved the case of the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and other on all counts and it is submitted that at the most, as a matter of fact, and by way of fair procedure, conviction and sentence the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and other for an offence under Section 304B of the IPC was sufficient being a major offence and conviction and sentence for offence under Section 306 of the IPC which was alternative charge was not necessary. But still the prosecution maintains that there is no illegality or irregularity in convicting the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and other on both the counts that is, Section 304B and 306 of the IPC as they constitute distinct offences arising out of the same set of facts and, therefore, they are not prejudiced in any manner. In support of his contention the learned A.P.P. has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti & Anr. vs. State of Haryana [1991 SCC (Cri) 191]. In support of his contention the learned A.P.P. has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti & Anr. vs. State of Haryana [1991 SCC (Cri) 191]. It is further submitted that the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and others were very much aware of the case against them and the evidence of the witnesses cannot be discarded mainly because the appellants-accused could not come out with a good defence. It is submitted by the learned A.P.P. that there is no delay in recording the statement of the parents of the deceased Aparna and that the FIR in the case lodged by Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, at the very first instance discloses the prosecution case. It is further submitted that the court can take note to the effect that due to such a tragic incident and the parents having lost their daughter Aparna, a few days delay in recording statement of the parents is not fatal to the prosecution. It is submitted that there is nothing brought on record to show that the evidence of the witnesses is in any manner tutored and improved by the prosecution. On the other hand, in the crossexamination, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused could not bring on record any substantial contradiction or omission. Therefore, the prosecution having established their case against the appellants-accused Nripen Roy and others, the appeal ought to be dismissed. The points which arise for determination are firstly whether Aparna Sarkar was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband, father and mother in-laws with a view to drive her to commit suicide and that such harassment was to coerce her and her relatives to meet any unlawful demand of any property or valuables. Secondly, soon before her death, Aparna was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband and parents-in-laws in connection with demand for dowry and that death of Aparna was otherwise than under normal circumstances. Thirdly, that Aparna committed suicide having been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellants-accused. Let us first examine the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants-accused that the charges framed against the accused persons during trial was defective and that has caused prejudice to them. Thirdly, that Aparna committed suicide having been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellants-accused. Let us first examine the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants-accused that the charges framed against the accused persons during trial was defective and that has caused prejudice to them. The Charges read as under: “CHARGES WITH THREE HEADS [No. XXVIII (II), Schedule V, Act V, 1898] (Sections 221, 222, 223, Code of Criminal Procedure) (1) Name and Office of Magistrate & C. (2) Name of accused person (3) My cognizance or the cognizance of the Court of Session 1(1) Sri P.K. Bhattacharyya, Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T.C. III, Krishnagar, Nadia hereby charge you (2) as follows- 1. Nripen Roy, 2. Nirodh Roy, 3. Gouri Roy. First – That you, on or about since after 29th day of Falgun, 1412 B.S. at Swarnakhali under P.S. Krishnaganj in the house of Nirodh Roy being husband of Aparna Sarkar and near relation of her husband subjected said Aparna Sarkar such cruelty by willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive her to commit suicide or harassed said Aparna Sarkar with a view to coerce her or any other persons related to her to meet any demand of cash as dowry after marriage. and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, and within(3) the cognizance of this sessions court. Secondly – That you, on or about the 19.6.2006 at about 3.30 P.M. at Swarnakhali under P.S. Krishnaganj in furtherance of common intention committed death by causing death of Aparna Sarkar by hanging on her neck. (underlining is ours) and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, and within(3) the cognizance of this sessions court. Alternatively – That you, on or about the 19.6.2006 in the house of Nirodh Roy at about 15:30 hours at village Swarnakhali under Krishnaganj P.S. Aparna Sarkar committed suicide by hanging and you abetted its commission by inflicting torture both physically and mentally on the demand of more money. and thereby committed an offence punishable under (4) In cases tried by Magistrate, omit “by the said Court”. Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and within(3) the cognizance of this Session Court. and thereby committed an offence punishable under (4) In cases tried by Magistrate, omit “by the said Court”. Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and within(3) the cognizance of this Session Court. And I hereby direct that you be tried(4) by the Said Court on the said charge is read over and explained to them in which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Dated this 1st Day of March, 2007 Sd./- Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T.C. III, Krishnagar, Nadia.” In so far the contention of the appellants-accused that they could not have been convicted for Section 304B IPC so also 306 IPC on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge might have been made under sub-Section (1) or (2) of Section 221 of the Cr.P.C. This is not a case where the accused persons are being tried again in any subsequent proceedings so as to attract Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India or the rule against autre fois acquit to be found in Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. i.e. on the principle against double jeopardy. In the present case the learned trial court proceeded to frame an additional charge under Section 306 of the IPC alternatively, after framing charges under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. When the charges in the alternative are made, the prosecution may rely on the evidence in support of any of the alternative charges, and the accused may be convicted for that offence. The trial court having found the appellants-accused guilty of charge under Sections 304B of the IPC proceeded further to convict and sentence the appellants-accused for having committed offence under Section 306 of the IPC which was an alternative charge, in our opinion, cannot be said to be an error or irregularity due to which failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. In our opinion, in this case the learned Trial Court was cautious enough to frame charges on the three counts, i.e. under Sections 498A, 304B and 306 of the IPC on the basis of facts of the case but was doubtful as to which of the aforesaid offences have been committed on such facts and proceeded to frame cumulative charges under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC but for offence under Section 306 of the IPC, framed an alternative charge. Having done so, at the conclusion of trial when he arrived at a finding that the major charge under Section 304B IPC was proved by the prosecution, there was no necessity of proceeding further and sentencing the appellants-accused having committed offences under Sections 306 IPC which was an alternative charge. One can understand if the prosecution having failed to prove charge under Sections 304B of the IPC then the learned Trial court could have proceeded to examine whether as an alternative on the facts of the case proved by prosecution offence under Section 306 IPC is made out and then sentenced them with the punishment prescribed for the said offence. If the very charges were cumulative then the learned trial court was justified in sentencing the appellants-accused on all the three counts as the offences under Sections 498A, 304B and 306 of the IPC are all distinct offences for which ordinarily cumulative charges could have been framed. In our view, this has not caused any prejudice to the appellants-accused. Therefore, in the peculiar fact and circumstances of the case that the learned trial court having framed an alternative charge under Section 306 IPC and the appellants-accused having been found guilty of having committing offences under Section 304B which is the major charge sentence of the appellants accused under Section 306 of the IPC can be quashed and set aside. On going through the charge we noticed that charge secondly is not framed correctly, particularly the portion underlined by us in order to point out the error. The correct particulars to be incorporated were “caused the dowry death of Aparna, wife of you accused No. 1 and daughter-in-law of you accused No. 2 and 3 on subjecting her to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry”. However, this issue was not raised by the counsel for the accused and rightly so as it has not occasioned failure of justice for the reason that the appellants/accused knew what they were tried for and they were given full and fair chance to defend themselves. Further, the later part of charge secondly, clearly mention Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code as the charging Section. We are required to observe this, having noticed the error and appellants/accused have not suffered any miscarriage of justice due to this casualness of the trial court. Further, the later part of charge secondly, clearly mention Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code as the charging Section. We are required to observe this, having noticed the error and appellants/accused have not suffered any miscarriage of justice due to this casualness of the trial court. In order to prove its case, that deceased Aparna was treated with cruelty and that was in connection with the demand of dowry and that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. The prosecution has examined the parents of deceased Aparna i.e. Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7 and Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8 and the uncle and aunt Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, and Anjali Sarkar, P. W. 5 and other villagers respectively. The FIR came to be lodged by Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, uncle of Aparna. He has specifically stated in his evidence that after Aparna was married to appellant-accused Nripen Roy, son of Nirod Roy of village Swarnakhali, for one month there was no problem but thereafter, she was ill-treated and subjected to misbehaviour and tortured by her husband and parents-in-laws. According to him, they used to demand money from her and told her to bring money from her father otherwise they would have her killed. Aparna during her visit at her father’s house disclosed all these facts to them. He further stated that Arup, brother of deceased Aparna was sent to bring his sister and her husband at their house on the occasion of ‘Jamai Shashti’ and it was the first ‘Jamai Shashti’ after their marriage and at that occasion Aparna and her husband stayed for 3 to 4 days. The appellant-accused Nripen Roy assaulted Aparna at her father’s house on the demand of cash and after assaulting her he left their house without taking Aparna. After two to three days Nripen made further demand for cash over telephone and the said call was made to the telephone booth of Chitta Chakraborty. On telephone he threatened that if the demand of cash is not made, then Aparna will have to suffer a lot for that. Due to this cruel treatment and harassment, Aparna was scared to go back to her husband’s house. Thereafter, he made her understand and took her to the house of Nripen and left her at her in-laws house. On telephone he threatened that if the demand of cash is not made, then Aparna will have to suffer a lot for that. Due to this cruel treatment and harassment, Aparna was scared to go back to her husband’s house. Thereafter, he made her understand and took her to the house of Nripen and left her at her in-laws house. He has also stated in his evidence that while he went to leave Aparna at the house of Nripen, at that time Nripen demanded cash from him but they could not meet the demand and assured him that the demand would be met up as and when they are able to arrange money. Similarly, her Aunt Anjali Sarkar, P. W. 5 has also stated that after her marriage, Aparna started residing at her in-laws house. Her parents-in-laws and husband used to torture her and demand cash and that she was not provided with food and clothing. She has specifically stated that when Aparna visited her house on the occasion of ‘Jamai Shashti’, she was accompanied by her husband and that on one occasion, Nripen under influence of liquor assaulted Aparna at her parents house and abused in filthy language and thereafter left Aparna at their house. Thereafter, Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, uncle of Aparna who made her understand and took her to the house of her husband and left her there. Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7 and Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8, father and mother of deceased Aparna have also deposed to the effect that at the time of marriage, cash of Rs. 7,000/-cot with beddings and gold ornaments like earring were provided as joutuk (dowry) to her husband. One month after marriage of her daughter she was assaulted by her husband and parents-in-law on the demand of more cash and they also threatened her with dire consequences. Aparna while visiting her parent’s house used to disclose everything before them. He further stated that his daughter came to his house for the last occasion on ‘Jamai Shashti’ alongwith Nripen and on the following day, Nripen assaulted Aparna and left their daughter at their house. The appellant-accused Nripen Roy thereafter, gave a call at the residence of Chitta Chakraborty, when he alongwith his wife went to the STD booth of Sri Chakraborty and over phone Nripen told them to send his daughter alongwith money. The appellant-accused Nripen Roy thereafter, gave a call at the residence of Chitta Chakraborty, when he alongwith his wife went to the STD booth of Sri Chakraborty and over phone Nripen told them to send his daughter alongwith money. They could not meet the demand at that time as they were poor and thereafter Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, uncle of Aparna made Aparna understand and she was sent back to her husband’s house alongwith her uncle. He also stated that after 10 to 12 days of ‘Jamai Shashti’, her daughter expired by hanging and they were informed by their son-in-law over telephone and stated that if they are eager to see the dead body of Aparna then they may come. They received the telephone call at 3.30 P.M. and at 5 P.M. they reached the house of Nripen. On reaching their house, they noticed that their daughter was hanging with a nylon rope in the room of Nirod Roy. They noticed that the dead body was tied with a nylon rope on her neck which was also tied in the other end with ara and her hands were upon the bed and legs were in a position touching the floor. Seeing the dead body they became unconscious. Smt. Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8 and mother of deceased Aparna corroborated her husband in her evidence. The other witnesses like villagers who have gone alongwith her father to Nripen’s house at Swarnakhali, in their evidence before the court deposed what they learned from uncle and parents of Aparna which is mostly in the realm of hearsay. In the cross examination of all these witnesses except for making suggestions, nothing has been brought on record to show that these witnesses have falsely implicated the accused persons, the so-called contradictions and omissions put to the witnesses reflect the manner in which the evidence was conducted. The defence counsel failed to confront the witnesses with the FIR or the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, the appellants-accused do not get any benefit or advantage of the same, as contradiction or omission, if any, are not proved. To make it clear we may refer to para 13 of the reported judgment in Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1012] which reads as follows: “13. To make it clear we may refer to para 13 of the reported judgment in Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1012] which reads as follows: “13. The learned counsel’s first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradict him. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1), 1952 SCR 812 : (AIR 1952 Supreme Court 214). Bose J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act thus at p. 819 (of SCR) : (at p. 217 of AIR) : “Resort to section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is necessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts : the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the crossexamination assumes, the shape of contradiction : in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with crossexamination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. it would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate : A says in the witness-box that B stabbed C; before the police he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus : If the witness is asked “did you say before the police-officer that you saw a gas light?” And he answers “yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as contradiction. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus : If the witness is asked “did you say before the police-officer that you saw a gas light?” And he answers “yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies : one is it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examine what the witness stated before the police-officer. If a police-officer did not make a record of a witness’s statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness’s oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness-box, for the witness has yet not made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness-box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually made before him. In such a case the question could not be put at all : only questions to contradict can be put and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” In order to satisfy ourselves, we have gone through the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. particularly, that of Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, Anjali Sarkar, P. W. 5, Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7 and Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8 respectively. We are satisfied that the so-called contradictions and omissions put to the witnesses cannot be considered as contradictions/omissions and on the other hand, the charge stands fully established by the evidence of the witnesses which is cogent, consistent and reliable. The evidence of Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2 stands corroborated by the First Information Report (Ext. We are satisfied that the so-called contradictions and omissions put to the witnesses cannot be considered as contradictions/omissions and on the other hand, the charge stands fully established by the evidence of the witnesses which is cogent, consistent and reliable. The evidence of Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2 stands corroborated by the First Information Report (Ext. 5), so also all these witnesses stand corroborated by P.W. 3 who is having a STD Booth in the village and he also happens to be the priest who performed the marriage of Aparna and Nripen which took place in the house of Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7, father of Aparna and that Nripen used to call his in-laws at the said STD Booth and the last occasion was when Aparna died. The said information of her death was conveyed by Nripen over telephone to mother of Aparna, Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused that the prosecution case is totally based on evidence of parents, relatives of deceased Aparna who have falsely implicated cannot be accepted as the fact that Aparna was treated with cruelty and harassed to force her to bring money from her parents was narrated by her to her parents, uncle and aunt. On the other hand, they are natural witnesses to the cruel treatment meted out to their daughter at the in-laws house by her husband and the parents-in-laws, and the daughter on being treated with cruelty and harassed is bound to reveal the said cruel treatment and harassment to the parents and relatives who were her well-wishers. It is well-settled principle that in cases of dowry death, the evidence of close relatives and friends would be available and normally strangers would not come forward to support the prosecution. The testimony of close relatives and friends, therefore, cannot be disbelieved only on the ground that they are relatives and that on that ground he or she had come forward to depose for the prosecution. Disclosure of cruelty would normally be made only to related persons and hence their testimony cannot be rejected as of interested witnesses. We have already held that it is not in dispute that Aparna’s death was not in normal circumstances that her death took place within three months of her marriage. Disclosure of cruelty would normally be made only to related persons and hence their testimony cannot be rejected as of interested witnesses. We have already held that it is not in dispute that Aparna’s death was not in normal circumstances that her death took place within three months of her marriage. There is no dispute over this fact, none of the witnesses have been cross examined to the effect of disputing the date of marriage and the manner in which she was found dead and the evidence of medical officer that it was a suicidal attempt. Therefore, the prosecution has established beyond doubt that the appellant-accused Nripen Roy and his parents treated Aparna with cruelty in order to coerce her to bring dowry which means more money from her parents. “In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab [ (2000) 5 SCC 207 ] a three Judge Bench of this Court dealt with the presumption available in terms of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) and its effect on finding persons guilty in terms of Section 304B of the IPC. It was noted as follows: 9. The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative for or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be punishable under Section 304B. In order to seek a conviction against a person for the offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove that: (a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; (d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected soon before her death.” Taking into consideration that the death has taken place within a period of three months from marriage also establishes one of the essential ingredient of Section 304B IPC that is dowry death, to the effect that Aparna was subjected to such cruelty or harassment soon before her death and the unfortunate victim could hardly survive for a period of three months due to the cruelty and harassment meted out to her. The evidences of Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, uncle of deceased Aparna, Rabindranath Sarkar, P.W. 7, father of deceased Aparna, Usha Sarkar, P.W. 8, mother of deceased Aparna and Anjali Sarkar, P. W. 5, aunt of deceased Aparna make it crystal clear that the manner in which Aparna was treated at her in-laws house by her husband and parents-in-laws from the time she got married and till she came over to her father’s place on the last occasion of ‘Jamai Shashti’ that after her husband left her at her parent’s place, she was reluctant to join him further and go back to her matrimonial home and it was after much persuasion by her uncle and parents that she was made to go to her in-laws place where she was coerced to commit suicide within a period of 10 to 12 days from ‘Jamai Shashti’. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused tried to take advantage of this conduct on the part of the uncle and parents of Aparna by contending that if Aparna was treated with cruelty and harassed by her husband and in-laws she would not have been sent to her husband’s place by her uncle. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused tried to take advantage of this conduct on the part of the uncle and parents of Aparna by contending that if Aparna was treated with cruelty and harassed by her husband and in-laws she would not have been sent to her husband’s place by her uncle. And as she was sent back to her in-laws place by her uncle, Subhas Sarkar, P.W. 2, after ‘Jamai Shashti’, the same goes to show that she was happy with her husband at her in-laws place. It is stated that as no evidence has come on record to show why Aparna committed suicide, it cannot be assumed to be dowry death. We are unable to accept this contention. On the other hand, it is a specific case of the prosecution that the uncle and parents of deceased Aparna persuaded her to go back to her husband’s place which is very normal and natural conduct of the parents of a girl who is recently married as no one would like to see their daughter’s matrimonial home to be ruined within such a short time of marriage. It is with much hope the parents of Aparna had sent Aparna back to her husband’s place that the things would change and they may be able to satisfy the greed of their son-in-law and his parents in near future. In their defence the appellants-accused except for denial have not come up with any case which will go to show that Aparna committed suicide for reasons other than the cruel treatment meted out to her so as to extract dowry from her parents. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants-accused that learned trial court ignored their defence is meaningless. We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution have proved that the appellants-accused have committed offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC. On the point of sentence, we have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case and we find that this is a case where the husband, father and mother-in-laws of the victim Aparna within a months time of the marriage started harassing her in order to coerce her to bring dowry. On the point of sentence, we have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the case and we find that this is a case where the husband, father and mother-in-laws of the victim Aparna within a months time of the marriage started harassing her in order to coerce her to bring dowry. She was treated with cruelty and her husband left her at her parents place with a clear warning that she should not return without money, not only this, the parents of the victim were also forewarned on telephone, the parents and the uncle of the victim considering that her welfare was in her matrimonial house persuaded her and brought her to the house of her husband where she could hardly survive for 10-12 days. The trial court in its discretion has found that sentence of imprisonment for life would be appropriate by giving its own reasons. We do not wish to interfere in the matter as we find that a lesser sentence will send wrong signal to potential offender considering that such crimes are on rise and lesser sentence will not yield the desired result. We, therefore, uphold the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial court in so far as offences under Section 498A and 304B of the IPC is concerned, but quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each on the count of Section 306 of the IPC being the alternative charge. The appeal is partly allowed. (J. N. Patel, C.J.) I agree. (Ashim Kumar Roy, J.)