Judgment : Common Judgment INTRODUCTION These two appeals arise out of the same Judgment of the trial Court. A.S.No.150 of 1991 is filed by defendant No.10 and the other transferred appeal is filed by defendants 12 and 13, the legal representatives of defendant No.8, who died during pendency of suit. The appeal filed before the Court of the District Judge, Kadapa stands transferred to this Court. The dispute in these cases is in respect of land admeasuring 0.67 cents in survey No.455 (suit schedule property) in Proddatur town. The persons who were allegedly members of Sundaracharlu Club (the club, for brevity) on the one hand and the first and second generation legal heirs of late Curram Sundaracharlu (CSC) are fighting this three decades long drawn Court battle for the property. In this Judgment, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. PLEADINGS C.S.Narasimhacharlu (CSN), C.S.Krishnamacharlu (CSK) and C.N.Srinivasacharlu (CNS) are sons of CSC. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are sons of CSK and third plaintiff is son of CSN. They instituted the suit registered as O.S.No.69 of 1980 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Proddatur, which was transferred as O.S.No.68 of 1985 to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Kadapa. It was instituted for declaration of plaintiffs right to the suit schedule property together with open site, constructions, structures and improvements made thereon, to declare the right of the plaintiffs and first defendant to the portion of the suit schedule in occupation of defendant No.8 and for a direction to defendants 12 to 18 to deliver possession of the property. Their case in the plaint is as below. The suit schedule property was originally owned by CSC. He died in 1922, leaving behind his three sons. On 13.05.1938, CSN and CSK executed a registered document in favour of M/s.V.Shankara Rao, B.Bala Narayana Reddy and Ananda Rao, for the purpose of conducting the club in the memory of CSC, i.e., Sundaracharlu Club. The registered deed under which the property was demised was subject to the condition that the property shall be used for the purpose of playing tennis and taking up recreational activities. It was stipulated therein that if for any reason, the club activities are stopped, the property will revert to the donors or their legal heirs. The donees shall have no right of alienation. It was stipulated therein that if for any reason, the club activities are stopped, the property will revert to the donors or their legal heirs. The donees shall have no right of alienation. The property shall be used to run the club in the memory of their father CSC with a view to promote sports, games and goodwill among the public of the town. Four members of legal profession, namely, D.Krishna Rao, V.Shankara Rao, K.Bala Narayana Reddy and Ananda Rao constituted a trust. All of them were tennis players and were running tennis club in the local cotton press compound. As it was not conducive and convenient, they started ‘Sundaracharlu Club’. The trust Board took delivery of the possession and started running the club, which enjoyed good reputation. All respectable elite of the town were its members. In 1945, necessary rules, regulations and bye-laws were framed. Elections were to be held annually for choosing office bearers and members of Managing Committee to look after the administration of the club. After the demise of the members of the trust Board, the club was being managed by elected body till 1974. Thereafter, the dignified character of the club started fading away. The club fell into disrepute and ignominy. The administration fell into the hands of group of persons and thereafter there was no general body meeting to elect the office bearers. No list of persons is maintained and the respective members of the club became helpless to raise their voice. The club went into the hands of people with shady character. It became den for bad characters with criminal conduct. It became a private affair and was not running for the purpose for which the land was donated. The respectable and elite of the town frequently complained to the plaintiffs 1 to 3 as well as law enforcement authorities about the imminent danger which the club in the hands of shady characters was posing to general public and law and order situation in the town. There has been chain of events for over a decade of grave character like murders, attempt to murder and disturbance originated from the club premises as per the police record. Some of the offenders were arrested in the club premises as it became a joint for anti social activities like gambling, drinking, debauchery and it earned very bad name. There has been chain of events for over a decade of grave character like murders, attempt to murder and disturbance originated from the club premises as per the police record. Some of the offenders were arrested in the club premises as it became a joint for anti social activities like gambling, drinking, debauchery and it earned very bad name. Defendant 8 encroached upon a portion of suit schedule property on the northern side without any manner of right. The persons in management did not protest. Some members made efforts to remove the encroachments. A collusive settlement between the defendant 8 and persons in management was brought into effect after reference to first defendant as arbitrator. Defendant 8 agreed to leave the encroached portion except an extent of Acs.0.1½ cents as shown in the plaint plan. The said settlement is not binding on the plaintiffs and defendant 8 is liable to be evicted. As the purpose for which plaintiffs’ predecessors gave the land does not exist, the land must revert back to the donor’s family. Notices were issued on 14.07.1976 requiring the defendants to deliver possession of club premises. Defendant 10 sent reply on his behalf and on behalf of unnamed President and Secretary of the club. From 1973 till 1977, various groups began laying claims to the control and management of the club without any legitimate membership. There were violent incidents. Therefore, Inspector of Police, I-Town P.S., Proddatur instituted proceedings under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) being M.C.No.35 of 1978 before Sub Divisional Magistrate cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Jammalamadugu (RDO, for brevity). RDO passed interim orders on 19.09.1978 attaching the club under Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C. till the rights of the parties are decided by competent Court. All persons were restrained from claiming or entering the club. The Sub Inspector of Police attached the club on 21.09.1978 under Panchanama. A detailed enquiry was conducted by RDO in which plaintiffs stated that there are gross and grave violations of terms of the gift deed. The RDO passed final orders on 24.03.1979 confirming the interim order dated 19.09.1978 ordering that the attachment shall continue till the dispute is resolved by a competent civil Court. The Sub Inspector of Police was directed to hand over the club premises to successful parties after final adjudication. The club is therefore in custodia legis. The RDO passed final orders on 24.03.1979 confirming the interim order dated 19.09.1978 ordering that the attachment shall continue till the dispute is resolved by a competent civil Court. The Sub Inspector of Police was directed to hand over the club premises to successful parties after final adjudication. The club is therefore in custodia legis. Defendants 2 to 7 claimed and proclaimed to be the persons in charge of the club and therefore, they are impleaded. The plaintiffs reserved the right to implead other persons if necessary. Defendant 10 is influential and popular person who is making hectic efforts to take possession of the suit schedule property without any right. Therefore, he is impleaded as party to the suit. Defendant 11 is running elementary school in a portion of the suit schedule property unauthorisedly. He has no right to do so. As the Sub Inspector of Police is in possession of the suit schedule club, he is impleaded as defendant 9. Defendants 8, 10 and 11 filed written statements. Second defendant adopted the statement of defendant 11 and defendant 1 and defendants 2 to 7 remained ex parte. Be it also noted that during the pendency of the suit, plaintiffs 10 to 18 are added as legal representatives (LRs) of first plaintiff and defendants 4 to 9 are added as LRs of second plaintiff. Defendant 8 also died during the pendency and his LRs are on record as defendants 12 to 16. In the written statement, defendant 8 did not dispute about CSN and CSK executing a deed to perpetuate the memory of their father. He also does not dispute Sundaracharlu Club being run for the purpose for which the property was gifted. He alleges that the condition was onerous and being a clog, the same does not make the transfer a conditional one. He put up a cattle shed and hayricks and enjoyed site since 1934, by enclosing the same with a mud wall on the southern site. On the date of purchase, there is no compound wall on the southern site abutting the area known as Sundaracharlu thota. Defendant 8 is in possession continuously, uninterruptedly and knowledge of all the concerned and therefore, he perfected title by adverse possession as against the owners of Sundaracharlu thota. He denied allegation that he encroached upon the land of the club site. Defendant 8 is in possession continuously, uninterruptedly and knowledge of all the concerned and therefore, he perfected title by adverse possession as against the owners of Sundaracharlu thota. He denied allegation that he encroached upon the land of the club site. He, however, does not dispute the alleged resolution by the executive committee of the Club for settlement and ultimately, settlement between defendant 8 and the Club. As per the settlement, he was asked to shift the mud wall a little further towards north upto the line of electric and telephone poles adjacent to the south of the mud wall. Accordingly, he demolished wall and constructed pucca wall. The first defendant submitted a report that which was approved by the Club. The legal heirs of CSC, therefore, cannot raise any dispute. They are estopped from questioning the action of the club in settling the boundary dispute with defendant 8 who has not encroached upon any club land. In the written statement of defendant 10, who is a member of the Club, the following averments are made. The Club had been functioning properly and is being managed on sound lines. Suit schedule land was transferred on 13.5.1938 for running the Club in the name of Sundaracharlu, the father of the donors, for the purpose of outdoor games like tennis and indoor games, as a recreation for the elite of Proddatur town. There is nothing prohibiting taking up other activities. The first defendant is a member of the Club and he is aware that all the activities are being carried on as per the deed and the Club enjoys good reputation. The defeasance clause in the gift deed was never intended to enable the donors to resume possession and claim ownership for themselves. If some culprits entered the premises after the closure of the Club and use as a place of refuse, the Club members cannot be held responsible. When defendant 10 and others tried to change the office doors, rumours were spread and taking advantage of the same, plaintiffs pressed the matter for obvious reasons with a view to get the Club closed and reclaim the property which is worth Rs.6,00,000/-even by the date of filing the suit besides the building valued at Rs.1,00,000/-. The defendant 10 further pleaded that the Club is registered body with rules and regulations. The defendant 10 further pleaded that the Club is registered body with rules and regulations. Any allegations of mismanagement, maladministration, misapplication and misappropriation of funds are internal matters of the Club, which can be questioned by the members of the body and plaintiffs cannot have any say in the same. While admitting the proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being M.C.No.35 of 1978, he stated that in spite of the same the Club is not defunct and the tennis court is being used every day from the date of resumption of possession by defendant 10 and other members. The plaintiffs have knowledge of the occupation of Club portion by defendant 8 and the efforts of first defendant to arbitrate the matter. The defendant 10 is taking all necessary steps for revival of the Club. The defendant 11 filed written statement alleging that he is not at all necessary party to the suit. He denied having taken possession of the Club property for running a school. ISSUES FOR TRIAL AND FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT Based on the rival claims, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property A B E F as shown in the plaint plan together with the super structure shown as G H I J? 2. Whether the plaintiffs and D1 are the owners of the portion marked as B C D E in plaint plan which is now in the occupation of the 8th defendant? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession as prayed for? 4. To what relief? During the trial, the third plaintiff, Krishnamacharyulu, deposed as P.W.1 besides examining two members; a retired Deputy Tahsildar as P.W.2 and a retired teacher and former Secretary of the Club as P.W.3. Exs.A1 to A12 were also marked. Defendants examined D.W.1 to D.W.7, who include one former President of the Club, one former Secretary of the Club, one former Secretary of the Tennis Club and a tennis ball picker of Tennis Court. The defendants also marked Exs.B1 to B4. Whether the plaintiffs are owners of suit schedule property with the super structure thereon? Defendants examined D.W.1 to D.W.7, who include one former President of the Club, one former Secretary of the Club, one former Secretary of the Tennis Club and a tennis ball picker of Tennis Court. The defendants also marked Exs.B1 to B4. Whether the plaintiffs are owners of suit schedule property with the super structure thereon? On this issue, the trial Court found in favour of the plaintiffs and held that in view of the defeasance clause the suit schedule property shall revert back to the legal heirs of CSN and CSK. On issues 2 and 3 also the findings were recorded in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial Court also found that Sundaracharlu Club which was under attachment till the date of the trial Court judgment, had no responsible person to hold elections and that nobody was interested in running the Club. ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS In these appeals, the Counsel for the appellant/defendant 10 in A.S.No.150 of 1991 and the Counsel for appellants/legal heirs of defendant 8, made the following submissions. Sundaracharlu Club is a registered society with byelaws and regulations. Therefore the suit against the members of the Club would not lie. A suit has to be instituted in the name of the Society represented by its Secretary and, therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable. The defeasance clause cannot be interpreted in such a manner as conferring any right on the legal heirs of CSC to take back possession as long as some activity – outdoor and indoor games, reading room etc., are carried on by the Club members. Alternatively they submit that the Club cannot be said to have been closed down. The Club was closed temporarily during the period of attachment by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Such temporary stoppage of activities does not amount to closure under Section 13 of the Societies Act, 1860, and in the entire administration and management of the Club no acts of malfeasance or misfeasance were reported nor proved and, therefore, the trial Court was in error. The Senior Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs points out that the defendants never raised objection regarding maintainability of the suit and, therefore, it cannot be permitted now. He would urge that the society nowhere existed and the defendants alone contested the possession of the Club. They were made parties in the suit for declaration and possession. The Senior Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs points out that the defendants never raised objection regarding maintainability of the suit and, therefore, it cannot be permitted now. He would urge that the society nowhere existed and the defendants alone contested the possession of the Club. They were made parties in the suit for declaration and possession. He further adds that unlike a company the society is not a juristic person and, therefore, it cannot hold property in perpetuity and cannot be sued in a declaratory suit. He placed reliance on Illachi Devi v Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India (2003) 8 SCC 413 : AIR 2003 SC 3397 . Nextly he submits that the declaratory decree with consequential relief of possession is not liable to be set aside in appeal at the instance of defendant 10 and legal heirs of defendant 8. Their case has to be adjudicated only with reference to their stand in their respective written statements. As other defendants did not choose to file appeals against the declaratory decree such a plea is beyond the scope of appeal. In support of the submission he relies on Rafique Bibi v Sayed Waliuddin (2004) 1 SCC 287 : AIR 2003 SC 3789 . He would urge that defendant 8 cannot be permitted to raise plea of adverse possession as he claims under an arbitration settlement. For this purpose, he relies on Karnataka Board of Wakf v Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 . According to the Senior Counsel, Ex.A1 makes it a conditional transfer and in the event of failure to carry on the activities for which the land was donated, the legal heirs of Sundaracharlu are entitled to get back the possession. He would urge that the plaintiffs amply proved the plea and if the land is taken possession neither the Society nor members would suffer any legal injury. According to him as per Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963, when the property is held in trust, the limitation would not apply. He contends that under Ex.A1 title of the property was never transferred and, therefore, it is always open to reclaim the land especially when defendants 8 and 10 do not have any personal right much less legally enforceable right in the suit schedule property. He contends that under Ex.A1 title of the property was never transferred and, therefore, it is always open to reclaim the land especially when defendants 8 and 10 do not have any personal right much less legally enforceable right in the suit schedule property. The background pleadings and the rival submissions made before this Court give rise to four issues for consideration, which are taken up one after the other. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE SUIT Defendants 8 and 10 contested the suit by filing written statements. Defendants 2 and 11 pleaded misjoinder and defendants 1 and 3 to 7 remained ex parte. The contesting defendants in one voice pleaded that Sundaracharlu Club is a registered association/society with rules, regulations and procedures. No evidence was let in although as many as seven witnesses were examined on their behalf. Presumably for this reason, defendants 8 and 10 did not take a specific plea of maintainability of the suit before the trial Court. They did not allege that the suit against the members is not maintainable. Therefore it is futile for the appellants now to raise such a plea after lapse of about 30 years from the date of the institution of the suit. A society is an association organized for some recognized purpose, be it for charity, business, recreation or social welfare. The Societies Registration Act is an Act (hereafter, Central Act) for the registration of literary, scientific and charitable activities. An association or group of similar minded people with a memorandum of association with (objects therefor) the rules and regulations is registerable. All the property of the society, if not vested in the trustees; shall vest in the governing body of the society (Section 5) and every society registered under the Central Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society. The proviso to Section 6 of the Central Act enables to sue the President or Chairman or Principal Secretary or trustees of the society if no other person is nominated for the purpose. Therefore, though a society can sue and be sued in the name of its President/Chairman/Secretary, the law does not bar suing its members, who as trustees have control over the property. Therefore, though a society can sue and be sued in the name of its President/Chairman/Secretary, the law does not bar suing its members, who as trustees have control over the property. Before 2001, the Central Act applied to Andhra Area of the State and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act, 1350 Fasli (Act 1 of 1350 F) applied to erstwhile Hyderabad State. The Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 – a consolidating and amending law – repealed Central Act in its application to Andhra area as well as Act 1 of 1350 F. Under the new legal regime, Sections 3 to 9 deal with registration of Societies with memorandum of association and byelaws which are to be filed with the Registrar of Societies. In addition Section 9 of the A.P. Act requires the furnishing of the list of members of the general body every year. Even when an amendment is carried out to byelaws it comes into effect only when they are filed with and are certified by the Registrar of Societies. Section 11 of A.P. Act requires a register of members to be maintained besides keeping the accounts and records of the society. In this case, D.W.1, D.W.2, D.W.3 and D.W.6 were examined. Admittedly they were at some point of time involved in the affairs of the Club. Except D.W.2, the former Secretary of tennis Club, nobody even whispered about the maintaining of the books of accounts or registers. As already pointed out, no evidence was let in like certificate of incorporation, copy of the memorandum of association, copy of the byelaws, the register of members, account books, resolutions passed by the governing body and general body from time to time etc. In the absence of any of these, the defendants 8 and 10 cannot contend at this stage that the suit was not properly instituted. There is yet another reason to reject the submission. The society is not a juristic person unlike a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is not capable of ownership of any property. It cannot be sued in its name like a company. This is well settled. In Illachi Devi, the Supreme Court, while observing that a society is endowed with an “existence” separate from its members for certain purposes, laid down as below. It is not capable of ownership of any property. It cannot be sued in its name like a company. This is well settled. In Illachi Devi, the Supreme Court, while observing that a society is endowed with an “existence” separate from its members for certain purposes, laid down as below. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. The law for the purpose of grant of a probate or Letter of Administration recognises only a juristic person and not a mere conglomeration of persons or a body which does not have any statutory recognition as a juristic person. … … It is well known that there exist certain salient differences between a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, on the one hand, and a company corporate, on the other, principal amongst which is that a company is a juristic person by virtue of being a body corporate, whereas the society, even when it is registered, is not possessed of these characteristics. Moreover, a society whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in a criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (emphasis supplied) In view of the settled position, the plaintiffs could not have sued the so-called society, Sundaracharlu Club, for declaration and possession. The possession was with the defendants, who claimed to be either members or former office bearers. Therefore the plea of the appellants before this Court is wholly misconceived and unsustainable. The point is answered accordingly. MAINTAINABILITY OF APPEALS BY DEFENDANTS 8 AND 10 In a suit for declaration and possession all the persons claiming title, right, interest, ownership as well as possession are necessary and proper parties. Each category of all these can never have the same line of defence to oppose the suit. For instance, rival titleholders may put up a case as to how he alone should be treated as rightful owners whereas a person in possession like tenant may claim statutory right or common law right to protect his possession. Each category of all these can never have the same line of defence to oppose the suit. For instance, rival titleholders may put up a case as to how he alone should be treated as rightful owners whereas a person in possession like tenant may claim statutory right or common law right to protect his possession. Yet another instance is the right of a person who has only a limited right over the property in a declaratory suit like a mortgagee or a licensee or a contractor in respect of usufruct on the land. In a case of mining lease, the line of defence is altogether different. Therefore any type of rival claim has to be considered by the Court with reference to the category of defendants. If the Court grants declaratory decree to the plaintiff as against those defendants, who have set up rival title in themselves, they only can assail such title in the appellate Court. If there is also a decree for possession, such category of persons can assail the decree only to defend their possession and cannot ordinarily be permitted to impeach the title based on declaratory decree. Thus, an appeal to the declaratory decree can be adjudicated at the instance of a right person. In case of an appeal by other category of defendants, who did not claim title in themselves but claim some other right or interest in the property, such an appeal has to be adjudicated based upon the written statement filed by those defendants before the trial Court. In other words, the locus standi to prefer an appeal is to be decided from the pleadings in written statement of the defendant. He may or may not himself claim adverse title. A reference need to be made to Rafique Bibi wherein it was held. Two things must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, “the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be ‘a nullity’ and ‘void’ but these terms have no absolute sense: their meaning is relative, depending upon the court’s willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. Firstly, “the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be ‘a nullity’ and ‘void’ but these terms have no absolute sense: their meaning is relative, depending upon the court’s willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results.” (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p.308.) Secondly, there is a distinction between mere administrative orders and the decrees of courts, especially a superior court. “The order of a superior court such as the High Court, must always be obeyed no matter what flaws it may be thought to contain. Thus a party who disobeys a High Court injunction is punishable for contempt of court even though it was granted in proceedings deemed to have been irrevocably abandoned owing to the expiry of a time-limit.” (ibid., p.312) Defendant 8 has nothing to do with Sundaracharlu Club. His case is that he purchased a small piece of land on the north of the Club in 1934 and that it is not an encroachment on the Club’s property. He claimed to have been in possession of Acs.0.01½ cents (72.6 Sq.yards) of land whereas the total extent of the land donated by CSK and CSN is admittedly Acs.0.67 (3,042.8 Sq.yards). At the best defendant 8 can only claim Acs.0.01½ situated on the northern side of the Club’s property. The trial Court has held that the same forms part of the Club’s property donated by the plaintiffs’ predecessors. Whether defendant 8 could succeed in respect of entire suit schedule property? The answer must be in the negative. Defendant 8 claims to have perfected the title by adverse possession by reason of his long occupation as well as arbitral settlement, which defendants claim. It is a different question altogether, which is considered infra. So far as this point is concerned, the defendant 8 – it must be held; cannot be conferred locus standi to question the entire decree in this appeal. Insofar as the defendant 10 is concerned, he is a member of the Club. It is a different question altogether, which is considered infra. So far as this point is concerned, the defendant 8 – it must be held; cannot be conferred locus standi to question the entire decree in this appeal. Insofar as the defendant 10 is concerned, he is a member of the Club. His right is only limited to claim the privileges as are conferred as a member of the Club and cannot claim ownership rights to the suit schedule property nor he claims to represent the Club. As pleaded by the plaintiffs, defendant 8 along with others was impleaded as party respondent in M.C.No.35 of 1978 (Ex.A2) before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jammalamadugu. Therefore, he or his legal heirs cannot impeach the declaratory decree by the trial Court. The point is decided against the appellants accordingly. Adverse possession The plaintiffs alleged that A B C D E site shown in the plaint plan was encroached upon by the defendant 8. He demurred taking two pleas. First, that he purchased A B C D E site on 25.5.1934 and constructed a mud wall on the northern side of the suit schedule property where he put up cattle shed and hayricks. Secondly, he claimed to be in possession of the said portion from 1934 onwards and, therefore, perfected title by adverse possession. As indicated supra, even if the defendant 8 succeeds on any of these two pleas, he would have locus standi only to the extent of Acs.0.01½ of land and he cannot be treated as adverse titleholder in respect of entire extent of suit schedule property claimed by the plaintiffs. By the date of commencement of trial, defendant 8, M.Krishnaiah, died. Defendants 12 to 16 came on record as his legal heirs. Not only that defendant 8 did not give his evidence but also none of his legal representatives deposed his case. No document of title evidencing the alleged purchase of portion of land on 25.5.1934 was produced as evidence. Absolutely there was no evidence at all. Therefore, his plea of having purchased portion of land fails. Coming to the question of adverse possession, when defendant 8 claims to have purchased the property and settled the boundary dispute in arbitral proceedings, one fails to understand as to how he can take such a plea of adverse possession. Absolutely there was no evidence at all. Therefore, his plea of having purchased portion of land fails. Coming to the question of adverse possession, when defendant 8 claims to have purchased the property and settled the boundary dispute in arbitral proceedings, one fails to understand as to how he can take such a plea of adverse possession. If a person claims to have come into possession as a consequence to execution of a document, he cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession. In Karnataka Board of Wakf, the Supreme Court dealt with similar question and observed as under. A plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. (See S.M. Karim v Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ) In P.Periasami v P. Periathambi, (1995) 6 SCC 523 , this Court ruled that: (SCC p.527, para 5) “Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.” The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639 , that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held (SCC pp.640-41,para 4) “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” Adverse possession – as is well known; is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” Adverse possession – as is well known; is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. A party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is peaceful, open and continuous – nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in public and in extent to show that possession is adverse to the true owner. It must always start with a wrongful possession and be actually, peaceably, exclusively hostile and continued over a statutory period of twelve (12) years. (see D.N. Venkatarayappa v State of Karnataka (1997) 7 SCC 567 : AIR 1997 SC 2930 ). Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession must show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, and (c) his possession was open and undisturbed (see Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v Raj Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128 : AIR 1996 SC 869 ). All these aspects have to be pleaded and proved. No effort whatsoever is made either to prove any of these aspects nor were they pleaded properly. In this appeal, the plea of adverse possession remains not proved. This point is decided accordingly against the appellants in Tr.A.S. No.1474 of 2001 holding that they failed to prove the tile over the suit site. WHETHER SUNDARACHARLU CLUB CEASED TO EXIST This point needs to be considered in two parts. In first part, the focus has to be on interpreting the so called gift deed, Ex.A1. The plaintiffs argue that if the activities of the Club are not carried on or stopped, the property demised there under shall revert to the donors or their legal heirs. The contesting defendants 8, 10 and 11 opposed the plaintiffs contending that Ex.A1 does not confer the right on the plaintiffs to take back the Club property. Alternatively they contend that the activities of the Club never ceased or stopped and were carried on regularly disentitling the plaintiffs to seek declaration and possession. Defendant 10 also raised a plea that the defeasance clause in Ex.A1 was never intended to enable the donors to resume possession and claim ownership, merely because some anti-social elements entered the premises of the Club after its closure. Defendant 10 also raised a plea that the defeasance clause in Ex.A1 was never intended to enable the donors to resume possession and claim ownership, merely because some anti-social elements entered the premises of the Club after its closure. On the question of maintainability of appeals by defendants 8 and 10, this Court has already held supra, that their appeals are limited to the rights claimed by defendants 8 and 10 and, therefore, they may not seriously impeach the defeasance clause. Nevertheless the question whether the Club ceased its activities (which is Part-2 of the point under consideration), is inseparably connected with the interpretation of Ex.A1, it is necessary to consider the purport of Ex.A1. Law of Interpretation of Documents General Principles There is no law specially dealing with interpretation of documents. Although the Central General Clauses Act, 1897, or the A.P. General Clauses Acts, to a limited extent, deal with interpretation of statutes, the principles of interpretation of statutes are mostly well settled by reason of the precedent law. Similarly the subject ‘the principles of interpretation of documents’, is part of voluminous legal prose mostly because of the precedent law. In spite of spending considerable time on research, this Court is not able to lay hands on any one particular judgment, which comprehensively considers various rules of interpretation of deeds and documents, be they fall in the category of Will, Gift deed, Trust deed, Power of Attorney etc., which are subject to somewhat different rules of interpretation. Therefore, hereunder are considered; albeit in brief – the rules of interpretation of deeds and documents. Before doing so, it is beneficial to notice the definitions/concepts of ‘deed’, ‘document’ and ‘instrument’. ‘Deed’ in English Common Law is an instrument written in parchment or paper, whereunto ten things are necessarily incident, viz., First, writing. Secondly, in parchment or paper. Thirdly, a person able to contract. Fourthly, by a sufficient name. Fifthly, a person able to be contracted with. Sixthly, by a sufficient name. Seventhly, a thing to be contracted for. Eighthly, apt words (if any) required by law. Ninthly, sealing, and Tenthly, delivery. A deed cannot be written upon wood, leather, cloth, or the like, but only upon parchment or paper, for the writing upon them can be least vitiated, altered or corrupted. Sixthly, by a sufficient name. Seventhly, a thing to be contracted for. Eighthly, apt words (if any) required by law. Ninthly, sealing, and Tenthly, delivery. A deed cannot be written upon wood, leather, cloth, or the like, but only upon parchment or paper, for the writing upon them can be least vitiated, altered or corrupted. ‘Document’ as per Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 29 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. ‘Instrument’ as per Section 2(14) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899, includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. ODGERS’ ‘Construction of Deeds and Statutes’ (1967 5th edn., by Gerald Dworkin – 1st Indian Reprint 1996) enumerates crystallized body of rules of interpretation of deeds deduced from various common law decisions as follows. TABLE - I Rule No. Remarks I The intention of the parties must be discovered, if possible, from the expressions they have used. The meaning of the document or of a particular part of it is therefore to be sought for in the document itself. II Clear and unambiguous words prevail over any intention, but if the words used are not clear and unambiguous, the intention will prevail. The intention may prevail over the words used. III The plain, ordinary meaning of the words used is to be adopted in construing a document. Words are to be taken in their literal meaning. IV Whatever the instrument, it must receive a construction according to the plain meaning of the words and sentences therein contained. Literal meaning depends on the circumstances of the parties. V Extrinsic evidence does not mean evidence of the writer’s intention but evidence to enable the court to interpret the language used. When is extrinsic evidence admissible to translate the language? VI Technical legal terms, or words of well-known legal import used by lawyers, especially conveyancers, will have their technical legal import, “though the testator uses inconsistent terms or gives repugnant or impossible directions.” Technical legal terms will have their legal meaning. When is extrinsic evidence admissible to translate the language? VI Technical legal terms, or words of well-known legal import used by lawyers, especially conveyancers, will have their technical legal import, “though the testator uses inconsistent terms or gives repugnant or impossible directions.” Technical legal terms will have their legal meaning. VII Collecting the general intention from the instrument as a whole and inferring that intention from the general frame of the deed. Therefore the deed is to be construed as a whole. Herbert Broom’s Legal Maxims, (1939, 10th edn by R.H.Kersley) in Chapter 8 gives “a general view of … maxims as are of most practical utility in construing statutes, deeds and other written instruments including Wills”. There are 17 rules of interpretation applicable to deeds and other written instruments. Some of these are also applicable to interpretation of statutes. So as to keep the length of this judgment to the minimum and also bring all the rules of interpretation of documents to one place the 17 principles/legal maxims with the translation and the decision of Supreme Court making reference to these maxims are given in the following table. TABLE – II Rule No. Latin Maxim English Meaning Decisions of Supreme Court Benign ae faciend ae sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem laicorum ut res magis I valeat quam pereat It means a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. TABLE – II Rule No. Latin Maxim English Meaning Decisions of Supreme Court Benign ae faciend ae sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem laicorum ut res magis I valeat quam pereat It means a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. H.S.Vankani v SoGujarat (2010) 4 SCC 301 (paras 43; 48); Jyoti Harshad Mehta v Custodian (2009) 10 SCC 564 (paras 33; 35); K.P Mohammed Salim v CIT (2008) 11 SCC 573 (para 14); CIT v Lakshmi Machine Works (2007) 11 SCC 126 (paras 12 and 13); M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v SoKerala (2005) 11 SCC 45 ((paras 55 and 56); Standard Chartered Bank v Director of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 530 (paras 63 and 72); Pratap Singh v SoJharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 (paras 77, 81 and 103; ANZ Grindlay Bank v Director of Enforcement (2004) 6 SCC 531 II Argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet in lege An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 and Swantnraj v State of Maharashtra, (1975) 3 SCC 322 III Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio A passage is best interpreted by reference to what precedes and what follows it Puram Singh Sahni v Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalani (1991) 2 SCC 180 and Provash Chandra Dalvi v Bishwanath Banerjee 1989 Supp (1) SCC 487 : AIR 1989 SC 1834 IV Noscitur a sociis The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it State of UP v Jai Bir Singh (2005) 5 SCC 1 Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland) Inc. v Indian MRI Diagnostic & Research Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 227 (paras 14, 15 and 16); Deepak Agro Solutions Ltd., v Commr. v Indian MRI Diagnostic & Research Ltd. (2008) 10 SCC 227 (paras 14, 15 and 16); Deepak Agro Solutions Ltd., v Commr. of Customs (2008) 8 SCC 358 ; J.Srinivasa Rao v GoAP (2006) 12 SCC 607 (para 14); Godfray Phillips India Ltd v State of UP (2005) 2 SCC 515 (paras 75, 76, 77, 79 & 81) V Verba chartatum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem The words of an instrument shall be taken most strongly against the party employing them Bank of India v K.Mohandas (2009) 5 SCC 313 (paras 28, 31 and 32) VI Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur Latent ambiguity may be explained by evidence; for an ambiguity which arises by proof of an extrinsic fact may be removed in like manner Ss.91 to 95 of Evidence Act 1872 VII Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba fiendaest In the absence of ambiguity, no exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words of the instrument Ss.91 to 95 of Evidence Act 1872 VIII Certum est quod certum reddi potest That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. Vimlesh Kumari Kulshreshta v Sambhaji Rao (2008) 5 SCC 58 (para 24); Juthika Mulick v Mahendra Yashwant Bal (1995) 1 SCC 560 (paras 19, 20 and 31 to 34) IX Utile per inutile non vitiatur Surplusage does not vitiate that which in other respects is good and valid X Falsa demonstratio non nocet Mere false description does not vitiate, if there be sufficient certainty as to the object XI Verba generalia restringunter ad habilitatem rei vel personae General words may be aptly restrained according to the matter or person to which they relate XII Expressio unius est exclusio alterius expressum facit cessare lacitum The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another Union of India v Tulsimram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 ADM, Jabalpur v Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 XIII Expressio eorum qu ae tacite insunt nihil operatur The expression of what is tacitly implied is inoperative XIV Verba relata hoc maxime operantur per referentiam ut in eis inesse videntur Words to which reference is made in an instrument have the same operation as if they were inserted in the clause referring to them XV Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia Relative words refer to the next antecedent, unless by such construction the meaning of the sentence would be impaired XVI Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege The best and surest mode of construing an instrument is to read it in the sense which would have been applied when it was drawn up Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd v Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board (2010) 2 SCC 273 T.N.Electricity Board v Status Spg. Mills Ltd (2008) 7 SCC 353 XVII Quihaeret in litera haeret in cortice He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin-deep into its meaning. The intention and parties of the document is more relevant than words used in the document Ashok Singh v Asst. Controller of Estate Duty (1992) 3 SCC 169 Before further analyzing and synthesizing the above principles, a reference may be made to Ramana Dayaram Shetty v International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 , wherein it was held that, “the rules of interpretation are applicable alike to documents as to statutes …”. Controller of Estate Duty (1992) 3 SCC 169 Before further analyzing and synthesizing the above principles, a reference may be made to Ramana Dayaram Shetty v International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 , wherein it was held that, “the rules of interpretation are applicable alike to documents as to statutes …”. It may be noted that in addition to the general principles, while construing the documents like “Will”, “Gift deed”, “Power of Attorney” and trust deed, abundant caution should be exercised because more often than not these are the documents, which are executed without active participation or with minimal participation of the other party to the documents, such as legatee, donee or trustee. By reason of this, these documents need to be strictly interpreted having regard to the context, the attending circumstances and the subject matter and the purpose of executing each of these documents, a further reference is made to this aspect infra. Some of the principles have come up for consideration before the Supreme Court to which a reference is made above. Keeping in view these, it is proposed to further deduce the following principles, which are considered with reference to decided cases. The first principle is to construe the document as a whole. More often than not, the Court will face a dilemma as to whether a document is (i) a sale deed or an agreement of sale; (ii) a Will or settlement deed; (iii) a trust deed or a gift deed etc. It is also common in Courts that the rights and obligations created under a document are but in issue with regard to the extent of right/ obligation. The limitations in enforcement of rights and discharge of obligations and the scope and extent of the covenants with regard to the subject matter of the document, is frequent question. Unless a document is thoroughly scrutinized and read as a whole, it would not be possible to know the intention of the parties with regard to all the aspects mentioned hereinabove. Quihaeret in litera haeret in cortice and Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege very lucidly explain this principle. In Ashok Singh while interpreting the term ‘levy’ in Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the Supreme Court relied on the maxim Quihaeret in litera haeret in cortice. Quihaeret in litera haeret in cortice and Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege very lucidly explain this principle. In Ashok Singh while interpreting the term ‘levy’ in Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the Supreme Court relied on the maxim Quihaeret in litera haeret in cortice. In T.N. Electricity Board, the Government by notification dated 14.2.1997 withdrew concessions granted earlier to new high tension industries in respect of electricity tariff. An exception was made in favour of industries ‘set up’ before 15.2.1971. This was clarified by a letter dated 01.8.1997 to the effect that ‘set up’ would mean ‘obtained service connection’. Withdrawal of tariff concession and the clarificatory letter were assailed. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions. Appeals were filed to the Division Bench. During the pendency, the Government issued notification dated 07.1.2000 giving further clarification with regard to the meaning of ‘set up’. The Division Bench, however, ignored the pendente lite notification and disposed of the appeals holding that, “if the high tension industry had been erected before 15.2.1997 they would be eligible for concessional electricity tariff.” The Supreme Court relied on the maxim Contemporanea expositio and while holding that, “a word cannot be assigned a meaning in vaccum … … it has to be read in the context in which hit has been used and while doing so considering the executive order is not barred” observed as follows. The clarification issued by the State during pendency of the appeals should have, therefore, been considered by the High Court in its proper perspective. If it is clarificatory in nature, it could be given a retrospective operation. Such a question, however, should have been posed and answered. Furthermore, the letter dated 1.08.1997 was issued as some confusion arose. When a subordinate legislation is made by the State Government, it must be done in terms of the constitutional provision. An executive order is also issued keeping in view the rules and executive business. It may not have the force of law but the same may come within the purview of the well-known principle of contemporaneous exposito. Rules of executive construction are also relevant. An executive order is also issued keeping in view the rules and executive business. It may not have the force of law but the same may come within the purview of the well-known principle of contemporaneous exposito. Rules of executive construction are also relevant. In Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd, the Supreme Court referred to the maxim Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege and observed that even if the person who dealt with the statute understood in a particular manner, that does not prevent the Court giving the true construction and that generally the principle has no application to modern statutes. It may be observed that while interpreting a document nothing prevents the Court to read it in the sense as understood when the document was drawn up. The second principle is to understand the meaning of a document or a part of it from the document itself. The legal maxims relevant to this are Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba fienda est and Verba generalia restringunter ad habilitatem rei vel personae. In addition to these, the legal maxims Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation, Noscitur a sociis, Certum est quod certum reddi potest, Utile per inutile non vitiatur, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius expressum facit cessare lacitumi, Verba relata hoc maxime operantur per referentiam ut in eis inesse videntur and Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia furnish subsidiary rules while discovering the intention of the parties. In Table–II above, the decisions of the Supreme Court applying relevant legal maxim, have been referred to. But herein below a brief reference is made to some of these judgments. In Provash Chandra Dalvi, referring to N.E. Railway v Hastings (1900) A.C. 260 the Supreme Court held that, “every contract is to be construed with reference to its object and the whole of its terms. The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the parties. It is an accepted principle of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may be collected ‘ex antecedentibus et consequentibus’ every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that is possible”. It is an accepted principle of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may be collected ‘ex antecedentibus et consequentibus’ every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that is possible”. It was further held that, “In construing a contract the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject-matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply”. In Puram Singh Sahni, the question was whether the agreement between the parties is ‘lease’ or ‘licence’. The Supreme Court relied on Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio and held that, “the sense and meaning of the parties has to be collected from the context and every part of the agreement has to be brought into action to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense”. Noscitur a sociis is the maxim which postulates that the meaning of doubtful words would be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the words associated with it. In Godfray Phillips India Ltd Constitution Bench relied on the maxim. Referring to Advocate General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) A.C. 436 : (1957) 1 All ER 49 (HL) observed as under. We are aware that the maxim of noscitur a sociis may be a treacherous one unless the “societas” to which the “socii” belong, are known. The risk may be present when there is no other factor except contiguity to suggest the “societas”. But where there is, as here, a term of wide denotation which is not free from ambiguity, the addition of the words such as “including” is sufficiently indicative of the societas. As we have said, the word “includes” in the present context indicates a commonality or shared features or attributes of the including word with the included. But where there is, as here, a term of wide denotation which is not free from ambiguity, the addition of the words such as “including” is sufficiently indicative of the societas. As we have said, the word “includes” in the present context indicates a commonality or shared features or attributes of the including word with the included. The third principle is that the words used in a document are to be given literal meaning. There are five legal maxims relatable to this principle. They are shown as Rules I, V, VI, X and XIII in Table-II supra. The first of these is ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The Supreme Court applied this maxim in many cases and held that, “a statute must be read always in such a manner that it would not lead to absurdity and make the instrument workable.” Some of the tests are referred in Column-4 of Table-II. The subsidiary rules of third principle are those shown as Rules III, IV, V and VI of Table-I and the corresponding legal maxims already referred to in the above paragraph. Literal meaning depends on the circumstances of the parties and technical legal terms will always be given their legal meaning. When the language is very clear, the interpreter is precluded from supplying the words or reading something depending on the oral evidence. It is well settled that when the language is clear, oral evidence is not permissible. But as postulated by the maxim Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur, latent ambiguity may be explained by evidence because the ambiguity often arises by proof of an intrinsic fact, which may be removed in like manner. Sections 91 to 95 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 adumbrate this principle. The fourth principle is that in the event of the intrinsic incongruities and inconsistencies flowing from the words and language used in the document, “the intention would prevail over the words used.” The intention of the parties has to be determined from the attending circumstances leading to the transaction. In a given situation, post-execution conduct of the parties and partial or full discharge of obligations would also determine the intention of the parties. The fourth principle is an exception to the first three principles. In a given situation, post-execution conduct of the parties and partial or full discharge of obligations would also determine the intention of the parties. The fourth principle is an exception to the first three principles. If the language used in the document is very clear, while determining the nature of the document, nature of rights and obligations flowing from the document cannot be inferred by resorting to the fourth principle. An attempt has been made supra to gather all the principles of interpretation of documents in brief with reference to Odger’s and Broom’s treatises as well as the precedents. To reiterate most of the principles of interpretation of documents are also the principles applied while interpreting the statutes. The precedents referred to above mostly deal with interpretation of provisions of the statutes and the case law dealing with interpretation of documents is not much. Therefore an interpreter of the documents, should be cautious in applying the precedent and choose appropriate principle depending on the particular controversy that arises. It is also settled law that every deed or document should be interpreted keeping in view the implied terms. This is important while construing compulsorily registerable documents, namely, exchange deed (Section 119 of Transfer of Property Act), gift deed (Section 127 of Transfer of Property Act), mortgage deed (Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act), relinquishment deed or sale deed (Section 55 of Transfer of Property Act). The following implied terms need be kept in mind: (i) Presumption is against adding to contracts of terms which parties have not expressed; (ii) There are documents where obviously some term is to be implied, if the intention of parties is not to be defeated; and (iii) Term depends on a rule of law (e.g., Section 64-A of Sale of Goods Act) and Contract for legal purpose implies a term not to use the contract for illegal purpose. Having summarized the general principles, this Court would now consider the principles in relation to ‘power of attorney’, ‘gift deed’ and ‘Will’. Interpretation of “Power of attorney” The Power of Attorney Act, 1882 defines a ‘power of attorney’ to include any instruments empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of person executing it. It is an “authority whereby one is said in turn, stead or place of another to act for him (Ram deo v Lalu Natha AIR 1937 Nag 65). It is an “authority whereby one is said in turn, stead or place of another to act for him (Ram deo v Lalu Natha AIR 1937 Nag 65). Section 2(21) of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 describes ‘Power of attorney’ to include any instrument (not chargeable with a fee under the law relating to Court fee for the time being in force) empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. The power of attorney is conferment of authority whereby the person empowered is authorized to do any lawful act instead of another commonly called the principal. The contract of agency which is dealt with in Chapter X of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Sections 182 – 238) is also regulated by creation of execution of ‘power of attorney’. It is common that principal may either execute a general power of attorney or special power of attorney as per the need. In the former, the authority to the donee (person in whose favour power is conferred) is to do all acts for and on behalf of the principal in relation to a tangible or intangible property or right. In the latter the donee is given power only to do a specified act in the manner provided and as mandated by the principal like executing a document to sell and register property, to receive money and/or to incur expenditure as directed etc. The disputes often arise in the Civil Courts with regard to the scope and extent of the authority or power given by the principal to the donee. Such disputes may arise between the donor and donee of the ‘power of attorney’ or between the donee and third parties. The law is well settled with regard to the interpretation of ‘power of attorney’. In P.M.Desappa Nayanim Varu v Ramabhaktula Ramaiah AIR 1952 Mad 559 : (1951) II MLJ 43, Justice Koka Subba Rao (as he then was) quoted with approval the following principles governing the construction of ‘power of attorney’ as stated in Bowstead on ‘Agency’ (6th Edn., at p.73) "Powers of attorney must be strictly pursued, and are construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication. The following are the most important rules of construction: 1. The operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. 2. The following are the most important rules of construction: 1. The operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals. 2. Where authority is given to do particular acts, followed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular acts. 3. General words do not confer general powers, but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given, and are construed as enlarging the special powers when necessary and only when necessary for that purpose. 4. The deed must be construed so as to include all medium powers necessary for its effective execution." In Tmblo Irmaos Ltd v Jorge Anibal Matos Sequeira (1977) 3 SCC 474 : AIR 1977 SC 734 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that purpose for which a ‘power of attorney’ is executed must appear primarily from the terms of the document itself. When there is unresolved problem left by the language of the document, the Court need to consider the manner in which the words used would be related to the facts and circumstances of the case or the nature of the dealings. The nature and object, the provisions and the language in the document are all relevant in construing a ‘power of attorney’. The Supreme Court pointed out the following settled rules applicable in the construction of the ‘power of attorney’. (i) First, that, a word used in a document has to be interpreted as a part of or in the context of the whole; (ii) Secondly, the purpose of the powers conferred by the power of attorney have to be ascertained having regard to the need which gave rise to the execution of the document, the practice of the parties, and the manner in which the parties themselves understood the purpose of the document; and, (iii) Thirdly, that, powers which are absolutely necessary and incidental to the execution of the ascertained objects of the general powers given must be necessarily implied. It was further held that the implied powers under an authority cannot go beyond the scope of the general power of the ‘power of attorney’. The relevant observations are as follows. In this case, the purpose of the general power was subordinated to the specific powers given which determined the object of the power of attorney. It was further held that the implied powers under an authority cannot go beyond the scope of the general power of the ‘power of attorney’. The relevant observations are as follows. In this case, the purpose of the general power was subordinated to the specific powers given which determined the object of the power of attorney. There is no deviation in this case from the general rules of construction set out above by us. We have indicated above that implied powers cannot go beyond the scope of the general object of the power but must necessarily be subordinated to it. In fact, in a case like the one before us, where a general power of representation in various business transactions is mentioned first and then specific instances of it are given, the converse rule, which is often specifically stated in statutory provisions (the rules of construction of statutes and documents being largely common), applies. That rule is that specific instances do not derogate from the width of the general power initially conferred. To such a case the ejusdem generis rule cannot be applied. The mode of construing a document and the rules to be applied to extract its meaning correctly depend not only upon the nature and object but also upon the frame, provisions, and language of the document. In cases of uncertainty, the rule embodied in proviso 2 to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, which is applicable to contracts can be invoked. Thus, the ultimate decision, on such a matter, turns upon the particular and peculiar facts of each case. (emphasis supplied) Interpretation of “Gift deed” In construing a document claimed to be a gift deed, the question that commonly confronts the interpretator is regarding the nature of the document itself. The issues regarding the nature of the disposition would arise with consistent regularity as to whether a document is a gift or settlement or Will or trust deed. In addition to this, the intention of the donor and donee under a gift deed with regard to the property demised and/or the nature of right given to the donee or the extent of the right retained by the donor are also issues which need to be resolved by the Court depending on the facts of each case. In addition to this, the intention of the donor and donee under a gift deed with regard to the property demised and/or the nature of right given to the donee or the extent of the right retained by the donor are also issues which need to be resolved by the Court depending on the facts of each case. As defined in Section 2(24) of the Stamp Act any non testamentary disposition in writing, either of movable or immovable property, made for any religious or charitable purpose, for the purpose of distributing property of the settler or in consideration of marriage is ‘settlement deed’. A ‘settlement deed’ can also a document of declaration of trust in which event there is disposition of property to be held in trust for a named or indicated purposes (see S.N.Mathur v Board of Revenue (1996) 9 SCC 388 : AIR 1996 SC 2220 ). As per the definition of ‘settlement deed’ as in Section 2(24) of Stamp Act, a gift deed is also one method of disposition of property by settlement. Be that as it is, Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defines the ‘gift’ as the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration by one person called the donor to another called donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Whether it is a settlement deed or gift or a Will? The Courts have formulated number of tests. These are (i) the name by which the document is styled; (ii) registration of the document; (iii) reservation of life estate in favour of executant; (iv) express words as to when possession passed; (v) use of the present or future tense in the document; and (vi) reservation of the power of revocation. If the executant imposes self-restriction with reference to the right to sell or create encumbrances though he is in possession of the property after execution of the document, the document is a ‘settlement deed’ and not a ‘Will’. In Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v Alapati Hymavathi (1996) 9 SCC 388 : AIR 1996 SC 2220 , the Supreme Court held that, “nomenclature of the document is not conclusive and that the recitals in the document as a whole and the intention of the executant and acknowledgement thereof by the parties are conclusive. In Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v Alapati Hymavathi (1996) 9 SCC 388 : AIR 1996 SC 2220 , the Supreme Court held that, “nomenclature of the document is not conclusive and that the recitals in the document as a whole and the intention of the executant and acknowledgement thereof by the parties are conclusive. The Court has to find whether the document confers any interest in the property in praesenti so as to take effect intra vivos and whether an irrevocable interest thereby, is created in favour of the recipient under the document, or whether the executant intended to transfer the interest in the property only on the demise of the settler. In the former case it is a gift/settlement and in the latter it is a Will.” In Subbegowda v Thimmegowda (2004) 9 SCC 734 : AIR 2004 SC 2428 , Justice Lahoti (as he then was) considering the question as to the nature of the document styled as ‘settlement deed’ elucidated the principles as follows. For the interpreter of documents it is common knowledge that a transfer of property or a creation of interest therein may be accompanied by conditions, covenants or restraints. Condition may be condition precedent — a condition which must be performed before the grant or alienation takes effect to create an interest in property, or may be condition subsequent — a condition which has an effect of enlarging or defeating the interest already created or vested. In either case the condition will be annexed with the estate and would run with the same. In Philip John Plasket Thomas v CIT, AIR 1964 SC 587 , vide para 14, this Court has dealt with conditions — precedent and subsequent, in the context of gift of shares. A covenant is not annexed with the estate and runs independently of it which may give rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for an action in damages. A restraint or a limitation has the effect of curtailing the quantum of the estate affected thereby. Yet again relying on Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v Thakurain AIR 1953 SC 7 , it was held as under. Though called a settlement deed, what was the intention of the executant behind executing the deed? A restraint or a limitation has the effect of curtailing the quantum of the estate affected thereby. Yet again relying on Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v Thakurain AIR 1953 SC 7 , it was held as under. Though called a settlement deed, what was the intention of the executant behind executing the deed? The question of construction of a document is to be decided by finding out the intention of the executant, firstly, from a comprehensive reading of the terms of the document itself, and then, by looking into — to the extent permissible — the prevailing circumstances which persuaded the author of the document to execute it. If the executant intended to transfer property the court would lean in favour of holding the transferee having been vested with interest in the property. Where an intention to transfer property within the meaning of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be spelled out, the document will be given effect to as it reads and as is explicit from what is set out in the deed itself. In a dispute with regard to the property and right given in a gift deed, in addition to general principles of construction, the court has to look to Sections 122 to 129 of Transfer of Property Act. If there is any conflict or inconsistency in the document itself, there is no bar for constructing such a gift deed keeping in view the oral evidence as is permissible under Proviso (1) to proviso (6) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As the relevant decisions have been referred to supra, the principles governing construction of Will are taken up in the next portion of this judgment. Interpretation of “Will” “Will” means the legal declaration of intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into the effect after his death (Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925). Part VI (Sections 57 to 191) thereof deal with testamentary succession. Sections 74 to 111 contain rules of construction of Wills. To be a valid testamentary disposition, a Will shall have to be signed by the testator which shall be attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the testator sign the Will. Part VI (Sections 57 to 191) thereof deal with testamentary succession. Sections 74 to 111 contain rules of construction of Wills. To be a valid testamentary disposition, a Will shall have to be signed by the testator which shall be attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the testator sign the Will. The principles of constructions of Wills may be summed up as follows: (i) to the extent possible effect should be given to every disposition in the Will; (ii) if there are repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, first interest created is valid; (iii) if the first interest created is not valid, Court as far as possible should give effect to every testamentary intention in the Will; (iv) ascertain the intention of words used; (v) Court to put itself in testators on chair; (vi) the whole Will should be read; (vii) construction leading to intestacy be avoided; (viii) give effect to every disposition (see Navneet v Gokul AIR 1976 SC 794 ). It is necessary to remember that as per Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, if inconsistent bequeath is made to two persons, the gift in favour of other person cannot be ignored. Further if one clause makes absolute gift and other clause curtails the bequeath, the restrictive clause being repugnant to unqualified bequeath should be ignored. The propounder of a Will is required to prove Will in the Court as per Section 68 of Evidence Act and Section 63© of Indian Succession Act, by examining one or more attesting witnesses. When such proof of execution of Will is offered and accepted, more often than not, the last wish of testator has to be respected and disposition in the Will are to be given effect to. Nevertheless if caveator (challenger of Will) alleges and proves fraud, coercion or undue influence in execution of Will, the Court has to reject the Will. In addition to these yet another situation where the Will cannot be treated as last testamentary conscious disposition by testator is, when execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances (see H.Venkatachala Iyengar v B.N. Thimmajamma AIR 1959 SC 443 , Shashi Kumar Banerjee v Subodh Kumar Banerjee AIR 1964 SC 529 and Pinnaka Hanumantha Rao v Garlapati Dhanalakshmi 2007 (2) ALD 435 ). In Ramachandra v Hildra Brite AIR 1964 SC 1323 , the Supreme Court observed that ‘it is one of the cardinal principles of construction of Wills that to the extent that it is legally possible, effect should be given to every disposition contained in the Will unless the law prevents effect being given to it and that if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid, the subsequent interest cannot take effect and in such a case the Court will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the Will. The Supreme Court in the said decision gave the following illustration. It is for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely “on” or “after” or “at” A’s death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B. In Navneet, the Supreme Court referred to earlier judgments in Gnanambal Ammal v T.Raju Ayyar AIR 1951 SC 103 , Ram Gopal v Nand Lal AIR 1951 SC 139 , Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v Bakhtraj Kuer AIR 1953 SC 7 , Pearey Lal v Rameshwar Das AIR 1963 SC 1703 and Ramachandra and laid down the following principles for construction of a Will. i) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed; ii) In construing the language of the will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator’s armchair and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than merely the words used. It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense. It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense. But all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document; iii) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory; iv) The court must accept, if possible, such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. The court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the state of his property, of his family and the like. Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator. Further, where one of the two reasonable constructions would lead to intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which does not create any such hiatus; and v) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. In Bhura v Kashiram AIR 1994 SC 1202 , the Supreme Court reiterated the above principles. Nextly, It is necessary to refer to Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereafter called ‘the Succession Act’), which reads as under. Where two clauses or gifts in a will are irreconcilable so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail. Illustrations. Nextly, It is necessary to refer to Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereafter called ‘the Succession Act’), which reads as under. Where two clauses or gifts in a will are irreconcilable so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail. Illustrations. (i) The testator by the first clause of his will, leaves his estate of Ramnagar to A and by the last clause of his will leaves it to B and not to A. B will have it. (ii) If a man at the commencement of his will gives his house to A, and at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail. Interpreting Section 88 of the Succession Act, in V.Subbareddi v Basivireddi 1966 (1) An.W.R. 272, this Court held that where an absolute gift of property is made under one clause of the Will and by a later clause the mode of enjoyment of that property or the right of management of it is sought to be curtailed, it can be held that restrictions sought to be placed on the enjoyment or management of the property are repugnant to be unqualified and absolute estate given by the previous clause of the Will, but the position will be far different in a case where two gifts, one wholly inconsistent with the other, are made under the Will in favour of two different persons in respect of the same property, the gift in favour of other person cannot be ignored. If the situation presents any difficulty, then only Section 88 of the Succession Act should be resorted to. Interpretation of Ex.A1, executed by CSN and CSK Ex.A1 is in Telugu language. It reads as under. Document No.1127 of 1938 The English translation of the highlighted portion, which is contentious issue in this case, reads as under. During course of time for any reason Club ceases to function schedule property shall revert to us or our successors and you or your successors shall have no right. Before considering the effect and purport of the deed under which the predecessors of the plaintiffs demised the property for running Sundaracharlu Club, it is necessary – as rightly pointed out by the Senior Counsel – to understand the nature of Ex.A1. Before considering the effect and purport of the deed under which the predecessors of the plaintiffs demised the property for running Sundaracharlu Club, it is necessary – as rightly pointed out by the Senior Counsel – to understand the nature of Ex.A1. He does not specifically say it is a gift deed though the plaint allegation is that CSK and CSN gifted the property for the Club. Mere description of the deed is not conclusive. Therefore it is necessary to consider this aspect of the matter. Section 126 of Transfer of Property Act deals with the suspension or revocation of the gift. If the donor and donee agree on the happening of any specified event not depending on the will of the donor, the gift shall be suspended or revoked. This cannot be read in isolation. It is a general section, which is controlled by Section 10 of Transfer of Property Act laying down that a transfer subject to condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee from parting or disposing of the interest in the property is void except in the case of a lease where such condition is for the benefit of the lessor. In Jagdeo Sharma v Nandan Mahto AIR 1982 Pat 32 it was held that, “if Section 126 is read in isolation then the argument of Mr.Singh is correct, but in my view Section 126 cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act which says that any stipulation completely restraining the donee from transferring the gifted property is void. If read together, which must be so read, the only reasonable conclusion that one can arrive at is that Section 126 is the general section which is controlled by Section 10 and if that is done, then it is obvious that the stipulation in Ext.1 completely restraining the donee from alienating the gifted property is void. ” In Philip John Plasket Thomas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta AIR 1964 SC 587 the Supreme Court while construing Section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, held that, “a gift may be made subject to conditions, either precedent or subsequent. ” In Philip John Plasket Thomas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta AIR 1964 SC 587 the Supreme Court while construing Section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, held that, “a gift may be made subject to conditions, either precedent or subsequent. A condition precedent is one to be performed before the gift takes effect; a condition subsequent is one to be performed after the gift had taken effect, and, if the condition is unfulfilled will put an end to the gift.” Ex.A1, on a true construction, is not a gift deed. CSN and CSK executed the document transferring the suit schedule property for running the Club without any right of alienation. The transfer of property is also conditional that as long as Club is run the transferees or their successors can enjoy the property and if the Club activities are not carried on, the property shall revert to the transferors or their legal heirs. It is a licence as rightly pointed out by the plaintiff’s Senior Counsel. There was no transfer of property. This was made clear in positive terms as well as negative terms. The right to resume the land was reserved and retained by the transferors. Applying the principles of interpretation of documents, as discussed supra, this Court is convinced that argument of the defendants that the condition of inalienability in Ex.A1 rendered such condition void, cannot be accepted as Ex.A1 is not a gift deed. Then the question is whether the Club ceased its activities. There is oral evidence on both the sides on this aspect. D.W.1, who was President of the Club during 1975-76, admits that the said Club was abolished during his tenure and that there were disputes between him and Ramana Reddy. Defendant 10 as D.W.12, and tennis picker, D.W.7, only speak about tennis club and not the activities of entire club. Therefore, on probabilities, an inference can be drawn that the Club activities ceased. Merely because there were self-proclaimed members and there were certain activities other than those which were carried on earlier, it cannot be said that the Club was still carrying on activities. Therefore, on probabilities, an inference can be drawn that the Club activities ceased. Merely because there were self-proclaimed members and there were certain activities other than those which were carried on earlier, it cannot be said that the Club was still carrying on activities. The other strong circumstances which improbablise the case of defendant are: (i) In Ex.A2 Sub Divisional Magistrate directed to close the Club and handover the property to those who succeed in the suit; (ii) the Club was closed on the orders of RDO by way of prohibitory order; (iii) defendant 8 occupied Acs.0.01½ for construction of two rooms on the northern side and thus the Club property was alienated by the transferees; and (iv) defendants did not oppose the suit on the ground that the Club activities were being carried on the ground that they have vested interest in the property. This Court already held that Ex.A1 is a licence granted by the predecessors of the plaintiff and that they are entitled to seek resumption of the land especially when they proved that the Club stopped its activities and it became a place for criminal activities and went into disrepute. This point is answered accordingly in favour of plaintiffs against the defendants. In the result, for the above reasons, these appeals are devoid of any merit and are accordingly dismissed with costs.