JUDGMENT :- (Per GM, J) This writ petition is filed assailing the legality and validity of the order dated 15.09.2004 passed in O.A. No.1150 of 2004 by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) whereby the O.A. filed by the petitioner/applicant was dismissed, upholding the punishment of postponement of increments for two years with effect on future increments and pension and treating the suspension period from 22.07.1999 to 25.08.1999 as ‘not on duty’, imposed upon him by the disciplinary authority, the third respondent, which was affirmed in appeal and review, by the second and first respondents respectively. 2. The petitioner was initially recruited as a Police Constable in Adilabad District in the year 1981, subsequently promoted as a Head Constable in the year 1994 and has been working as such. While so, the third respondent issued charge memo bearing C.No.PR/37/99 dated 16.07.1999 to the petitioner which is to the following effect: “On 10.06.1999 Sri T.Srinivasa Rao, H.C.1306 in charge of the P.S. front guard Madaram left P.S. without permission of S.H.O. and went to Madaram centre along with P.C.2288 on his own Hero Honda Motor Cycle, beat one Devi Ravinder regarding his due amount of Rs.200/- and thereby exhibited high handed behavior towards Devi Ravinder by bringing him to P.S. in an Auto and putting him in lock up without permission of the S.I. or without any case against him.” Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Nirmal, was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry into the allegations made in the charge sheet dated 16.07.1999 against the petitioner. During the enquiry, 8 witnesses were examined and 11 documents were marked on behalf of the prosecution/department. However, the petitioner did not choose to examine any witnesses nor exhibit any document on his behalf despite sufficient opportunity being afforded to him. Thereupon, the enquiry was completed following the due procedure and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 30.04.2001 stating that the charge levelled against the charged officer is held proved. After receipt of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority furnished a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner vide Memo C.No.39/PR/A5.1/ 99 dated 01.06.2001 inviting his reply to the same. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his representation on 27.08.2001 stating that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are completely based on presumptions and seeking total exoneration from the charge levelled against him. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his representation on 27.08.2001 stating that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are completely based on presumptions and seeking total exoneration from the charge levelled against him. Not being satisfied with the same, the disciplinary authority inflicted upon the petitioner the punishment of postponement of increments for two years with effect on future increments and pension and treating the suspension period from 22.07.1999 to 25.08.1999 as ‘not on duty’ vide proceedings No.39/PR/99 (DO.3504/02) dated 07.10.2002. 3. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Warangal Range, Warangal, the second respondent, which was rejected vide proceedings No.C.No.127/APP/A/02 (RO No.75/2003) dated 26.03.2003. The review petition filed by the petitioner before the Additional Director General of Police (Admn.), Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the first respondent, too met with the same fate. Challenging the same, the petitioner filed the subject O.A. before the Tribunal. 4. The Tribunal, after perusing the material on record and upon hearing the arguments put forth by the learned counsel on either side, considered the matter in the right perspective and came to the conclusion that there was no illegality in the orders impugned before it and upheld the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority. Holding so, the Tribunal dismissed the O.A. Questioning the same, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 5. Heard Sri D.Linga Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Services-I. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Tribunal had neither adverted to the material on record nor considered the contentions put forth before it and therefore the order of the Tribunal suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. He pointed out that the complainant, P.W.2, namely Devi Ravinder, stated inter alia in his evidence during the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer that the charged officer, Srinivas Rao neither asked mamool (bribe) nor abused and beat him for the amount of Rs.200/-. The learned counsel argued that when this statement, which is crucial evidence, is taken into consideration, there is nothing left on record to support the allegation made in the charge memo dated 16.07.1999. The learned counsel argued that when this statement, which is crucial evidence, is taken into consideration, there is nothing left on record to support the allegation made in the charge memo dated 16.07.1999. He submitted that the earlier statement of P.W.2 recorded by the Circle Inspector of Police, P.W.1, during the preliminary enquiry is false as it was obtained under duress and that the Enquiry Officer without considering the material on record, mechanically came to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner was held proved with a view to safeguard 7. P.W.1 and the Sub-Inspector of Police, Madaram P.S., P.W.7. He finally pointed out that the disciplinary authority, without application of mind, merely followed the report of the Enquiry Officer and imposed punishment upon the petitioner and that the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority, without considering the material on record, mechanically rejected the appeal and review petition respectively. He therefore prayed that the writ petition may be allowed. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Services-I submitted that the Tribunal had considered the matter in the proper perspective and rightly dismissed the O.A., upholding the orders impugned therein and that the same does not warrant interference from this Court. He drew our attention to the relevant portions of the evidence of P.W.7, Sub-Inspector of Police, Madaram, and P.W.8, Medical Officer, Madaram Dispensary, which read as under: “P.W.7 The said Devi Ravinder further stated that on so many times the said HC threatened him and on 10.06.1999 quarreled with him at the bus stand area over the debt of Rs.200/- where he was brutally beaten up by the said HC and was brought to the police station and was kept in the lock-up and requested to send him to hospital as he was injured. On seeing the condition, he prepared a requisition to the Medical Officer, Madaram Dispensary and sent the injured Devi Ravinder. After collecting the medical report, he submitted a repot to ASP, Bellampalli videLr.No.98/R3/99, dt.10.06.1999 requesting to take necessary action against HC 1306 for his manhandling.” “P.W.8 On 10.06.1999 about 11.45 Hrs. one Devi Ravinder came to him along with a MLC requisition from SI of Police, Madaram and he gave treatment to the said Devi Ravinder and found injuries on left and right hips and swelling of middle finger of left hand. one Devi Ravinder came to him along with a MLC requisition from SI of Police, Madaram and he gave treatment to the said Devi Ravinder and found injuries on left and right hips and swelling of middle finger of left hand. When he enquired about the injuries, he told that one Head Constable beat him. He further stated that the signature found on MLC requisition belongs to him.” He therefore pointed out that the Enquiry Officer, being a quasi- judicial authority, arrived at a finding upon taking into consideration the material brought on record by the respective parties to the effect that the charge levelled against the petitioner is held proved; and that the disciplinary authority, following the due procedure and considering the material before him, rightly imposed punishment upon the petitioner. He lastly contended that the appellate authority and the revisional authority properly considered the matter and rejected the appeal and revision petition respectively. He accordingly prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed in toto. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to a Judgment of the Supreme Court in SHER BAHADUR v. UNION OF INDIA (2002) 7 SCC 142 , in support of his contentions. Therein, the Supreme Court held thus: “7. It may be observed that the expression "sufficiency of evidence" postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however, voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, "in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry", would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence. …… In our view, this is clearly a case of finding the appellant guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the appellant with the alleged misconduct. The High Court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set aside.” 9. The High Court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set aside.” 9. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Services-II drew our attention to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in ROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK (2009) 2 SCC 570 to support his contentions. In the said case, the Supreme Court had considered elaborately the case law relating to departmental enquiry and inter alia held thus: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. ……..” 10. In MONI SHANKAR v. UNION OF INDIA (2008) 3 SCC 484 , it was held thus: “The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles.” 11. In UNION OF INDIA v. H.C. GOEL AIR 1964 SC 364 , the Supreme Court held thus: “In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. ……” 12. Considering the rival contentions put forth by the learned counsel on either side, the point that arises for our consideration is as to whether the Tribunal has committed any jurisdictional error or acted within the aforestated limitations. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that P.W.2, namely, Devi Ravinder, deposed that the charged officer (petitioner) had neither asked for mamool (bribe) nor abused and beaten him and that when the said evidence is taken into consideration, there is no evidence on record to support the finding of the Enquiry Officer that the charge levelled against the petitioner is held proved and that this Court, while exercising power of judicial review, can take note of these things, cannot be accepted in as much as the Enquiry Officer, upon considering the evidence adduced and analyzing the documents exhibited during the enquiry, arrived at a conclusion based on preponderance of probabilities that the charge was proved. 14. In the process of recording the said conclusion, the Enquiry Officer properly considered the evidence of P.W.1, the Circle Inspector of Police, Tandur, P.W.7, the Sub-Inspector of Police, the superiors of the petitioner, together with P.W.8, Medical Officer, which clearly demonstrated that P.W.2, Devi Ravinder, was beaten up and illegally detained in the lock-up by the petitioner and that injuries were found on the body of P.W.2. It is manifest from the record that during the preliminary enquiry, the Circle Inspector of Police, Tandur, P.W.1, recorded the statements of P.Ws.2 to 6, which were subsequently marked during the departmental enquiry and basing thereupon, he sent his report on 16.06.1999 to the Superintendent of Police, Adilabad, the disciplinary authority, which was the basis for framing charge against the petitioner under the charge memo dated 16.07.1999. The Enquiry Officer observed in his report that except P.Ws.1 and 7, nobody supported the prosecution evidence as the charged officer/petitioner won over witnesses, P.Ws.2 to 6 and 8. The Enquiry Officer observed in his report that except P.Ws.1 and 7, nobody supported the prosecution evidence as the charged officer/petitioner won over witnesses, P.Ws.2 to 6 and 8. However, considering the material on record and placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 7, the Enquiry Officer came to a conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner was proved on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 15. It is true that the victim, P.W.2, whose statement was recorded by P.W.1 in the preliminary enquiry whereby he levelled allegations against the charged officer, turned hostile during the departmental enquiry. When the charged officer is a policeman, P.W.2 would, in all probability, apprehend further mental agony and suffering, which consequence he was not prepared to face, if the petitioner was found guilty of the charge levelled against him. As rightly pointed out by the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner succeeded in his attempt to win over the witnesses except, P.Ws.1 and 7, who were his superiors and whose evidence clinchingly proved the charge levelled against the petitioner. 16. The disciplinary authority, on receipt of the enquiry report, furnished a copy thereof to the petitioner inviting his reply prior to a final decision thereon. Having received the representation from the petitioner and not being satisfied with the same, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment upon the petitioner. The appellate authority and the revisional authority considered the appeal and revision petition with reference to the record and rejected the same respectively. 17. The Tribunal, after carefully perusing and considering the entire material placed before it, held that there was no illegality in the orders impugned in the O.A. warranting interference and the O.A. 18. Departmental proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and though the provisions of the Evidence Act do not strictly apply to the said proceedings, the principles of natural justice should be complied with. No doubt, this Court, while exercising power of judicial review, is entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a charged officer, relevant evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on some evidence which meets the requirements of legal principles. 19. No doubt, this Court, while exercising power of judicial review, is entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a charged officer, relevant evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on some evidence which meets the requirements of legal principles. 19. A perusal of the material on record shows that the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based on ‘no evidence’ and cannot be said to be perverse. The Enquiry Officer gave cogent and convincing reasons for his finding. The disciplinary authority rightly imposed the punishment upon the petitioner on the basis thereof. The charged officer/petitioner, being a member of a disciplined force, we do not find that the punishment imposed upon him is in excess of the charge levelled and proved against him. In view of the discussion hereinabove, the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not deserve consideration. The Judgment in SHER BAHADUR (2002) 7 SCC 142 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the present case. 20. In the light of the law down by the Supreme Court in its decisions referred to hereinabove and having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand as discussed supra, it is manifest that this is not a case of ‘no evidence’ but one where the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer upon the evidence adduced before him are assailed. Such reappraisal cannot be done by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Adequacy of the evidence is a matter which is within the domain and competence of the authority which deals with the question. 21. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error and acted well within its limitations while passing the impugned order dated 15.09.2004 in O.A. No.1150 of 2004. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.