JUDGMENT (Per N.V. Ramana, J.) This C.M.A. is directed against the order dated 15-12-2009, passed by the II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad, dismissing the application in I.A.No.4018 of 2008 in O.S. No.665 of 2008 filed by the appellants-plaintiffs praying to grant temporary injunction restraining the respondents-defendants, their agents, servants, nominees assigns etc., from alienating/transferring the suit schedule property being Flat Nos. 101, 203, 204, 401, 405, 601 and 602, admeasuring 8684 Sft in Shaheen Heights, constructed on premises bearing Nos. 11-3-848, 11-3-848/1, 11-3-848/2, 11-3-848/3, 11/3/848/4 and 11/3/848/5, totally admeasuring 811 Sq. yds. situated at Mallepally, Hyderabad, in favour of third parties, pending disposal of the suit. 2. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that as per the Development rimes Reports Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 26-11-2005, the appellants and respondent No.1, are entitled to built up area in the ratio of 40:60 i.e., 15 and 10 flats respectively. He further submitted that respondent No.1, as Developer, is entitled to 60% of the built up area i.e. flats, and only in respect of those flats, he is empowered to enter into sale agreements, sell and execute sale deeds, and receive sale consideration from the intending purchasers. 3. He submitted that as respondent No.1 after selling his share of 60% of the built up area, was trying to sell the 40% share of built up area of the appellants, they cancelled the unregistered Power of Attorney executed by them in favour of respondent No.1, by issuing public notice dated 20-01-2007, which fact is not denied by respondent No.1 in the written statement filed by him. He submitted that the Power of Attorney having been cancelled, the only document that still remains in force is the Development Agreement dated 25-11-2005. 4. Since the appellants cancelled the Power of Attorney, respondent No.1 had no power to execute sale deed on their behalf in favour of third parties, and therefore, the Sub Registrar refused to register the sale deed presented by respondent No.1 in favour of third parties. To show that respondent No.1 had unauthorizedly executed sale deeds in respect of their 40% of built up area i.e. 10 flats after canceling the Power of Attorney, the appellants filed documents, namely ten copies of sale deeds, affidavit dated 25-08-2008executed by respondent No.1, obtained by him from the Sub Registrar, Golkonda, under the Right to information Act. To show that respondent No.1 had unauthorizedly executed sale deeds in respect of their 40% of built up area i.e. 10 flats after canceling the Power of Attorney, the appellants filed documents, namely ten copies of sale deeds, affidavit dated 25-08-2008executed by respondent No.1, obtained by him from the Sub Registrar, Golkonda, under the Right to information Act. In view of this, he submitted that the Court below ought to have granted interim temporary injunction as prayed for. 5. He further submitted that the Court below committed a grave error in not looking into the fact that the General Power of Attorney, and holding that even though the sale deeds executed by respondent No.1 are not registered, but since respondent No.1, as GPA of the appellants had alienated the suit flats in favour of third parties by receiving the sale consideration and also executed sale deeds, the relief of temporary injunction claimed in the present application has become infructuous. He submitted that since the appeal filed by respondent No.1 against the order passed by the Sub Registrar, refusing to register the documents is pending before the District Registrar, there is no valid conveyance or transfer of property made in favour of the purchasers, much less as provided in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and since the sale is not concluded, it is neither open to respondent No.1 nor the Court below to hold that third party rights have crept in. 6. He further submitted that even if the appeal filed by respondent No.1 is allowed, having regard to the provisions of Section 72(2) of the Registration Act, the documents do not automatically stand registered, because respondent No.1 has to appear before the Sub Registrar and represent the documents for registration, and thereupon, the Sub Registrar, shall follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and 60. Unless the said procedure is followed by the Sub Registrar, the registration of the document will not become complete. Unless the said procedure is followed by the Sub Registrar, the registration of the document will not become complete. He submitted that the Court below failed to look into the fact that another application in L.A.No. 4019 of 2008 for grant of temporary injunction is pending and also visualize that if no temporary injunction is granted, there is every likelihood of respondent No.1 unlawfully alienating their 40% share of the built up area i.e. 10 flats, and in which case, the very purpose of the appellants filing the suit would be frustrated. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that respondent No.1 contributed 80% while the appellants contributed 20% towards the sale consideration for the premises, on which the building has been constructed, as per the Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 26-11-2005. He submitted that as per the Development Agreement-cum-Power of Attorney, respondent No.1 being the Developer, along with the appellants, is the joint owner and possessor of the suit schedule property, for the appellants have delivered their 20% of physical possession of their share of the schedule property to respondent No.1 for development along with his 80% share. He submitted that respondent No.1, as Developer, agreed to develop 20% property of the appellants, and share the built up area in the ratio of 40:60, which comes to 8% of the total built up area. He submitted that appellants are entitled to only 40% in their 20% of the total property, and therefore, the appellants cannot contend that they alone are the owners of the suit schedule property, and that they are entitled to 40% share in the entire total joint built up area. 8. He submitted that since respondent No1., as joint owner of the property, sold all the 25 flats by executing documents in favour of third parties, much before cancellation of the General Power of Attorney, the same would not come• in the way of respondent No.1 getting the documents executed by him in favour of third parties registered. He submitted that respondent No.1 having sold the 25 flats, realized a total amount of Rs.2,68,55,000/-, out of which 8% share of the appellants comes to Rs.21,48,400/-. However, respondent No.1 had paid an amount of Rs.l,68,00,000/-, with an understanding that the excess amount of Rs.l,46,51,600/- paid shall be treated as loan, and which amount respondent No1. He submitted that respondent No.1 having sold the 25 flats, realized a total amount of Rs.2,68,55,000/-, out of which 8% share of the appellants comes to Rs.21,48,400/-. However, respondent No.1 had paid an amount of Rs.l,68,00,000/-, with an understanding that the excess amount of Rs.l,46,51,600/- paid shall be treated as loan, and which amount respondent No1. is entitled to recover with interest from the appellants as counter claim. 9. He submitted that since respondent No.1 had already sold the flats, the appellants are not entitled to seek temporary injunction against a second party, purportedly to protect the interest of third parties. At any rate, he submitted that the suit filed by the appellants for declaration and temporary injunction, without claiming the relief of cancellation of sale deeds and recovery of possession and without making the purchasers and the statutory authorities (registration authorities) as party-respondents, is not maintainable. 10. He submitted that the documents filed by the appellants to show that respondent No.1 had agreed to share 40% built up area in the total built up area, cannot be relied upon, and respondent No.1 is entitled to explain it as not true and as to under what circumstances, he had executed them, by leading oral evidence. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in Basant Singh v. Janki Singh (1) AIR 1967SC 341 and General Court Martial v. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal (2) 1998 (1) ALT (Crl.) 185 (SC) = (1998) 1 SCC 756 . 11. He submitted that as per the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, the document shall operate from the time of its execution and not from the time of its registration. In the event, the appeal filed by respondent No.1 under Section 72(2) of the Registration Act, is allowed by the District Registrar, the only consequential act, which the Sub Registrar, has to perform is number the document and release it in favour of respondent No.1 or his agent, and there is no necessity for respondent No.1 to once again appear before the Sub Registrar, for there remains, nothing for respondent No.1 to perform before the Sub Registrar. 12. 12. He submitted that even if temporary injunction is granted, there is nothing which respondent No.1 or his agents can be restrained from doing, for respondent No.1, having executed the sale deeds in favour of third parties upon receiving the sale consideration had already put the purchasers in possession, and the only formality, which respondent No.1 is required to perform is to take delivery of the document, once it is registered by the Sub Registrar. Hence, he submitted that the Court below has rightly refused to grant the relief of temporary injunction on the ground that the prayer has become infructuous, and no interference is called for therewith. However, he submitted that he is willing to give an undertaking to that effect that respondent No.1 will not resort to any further alienations. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs and the learned counsel for respondent No.1-defendant No.1 and perused the order under appeal. 14. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective parties, the following question arises for consideration: Whether the Court below was justified in refusing to grant temporary injunction, as prayed for by the appellants against respondent No.1 and his agents? 15. The principles that govern the grant of temporary injunction, are prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, which cannot be compensated at a later stage. If a party satisfied any of these principles, he is entitled to grant of temporary injunction. Apart from these three principles, the Court before granting temporary injunction, must also consider and visualize what consequences would follow if temporary injunction is granted and not granted. In the light of these principles that govern the grant of temporary injunction, we may proceed to consider the sustainability or otherwise of the order under appeal. 16. Admittedly, the suit property (Shaheen Heights) comprising of 25 flats, has been constructed by respondent No.1 under the Development Agreement, in the house property admeasuring 811 Sq. yds. situated at Mallepally, Hyderabad. 17. 16. Admittedly, the suit property (Shaheen Heights) comprising of 25 flats, has been constructed by respondent No.1 under the Development Agreement, in the house property admeasuring 811 Sq. yds. situated at Mallepally, Hyderabad. 17. The appellants state that they purchased the said house property under registered sale deed dated 10-01-2005 for a valuable consideration and that they being the absolute owners thereof, entered into Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney with respondent No.1 for construction of the building, agreeing to share the built up area in the ratio of 40:60 and that as respondent No.1 in breach thereof, was attempting to sell the 40% of the built up area that fell to their share, they got cancelled the General Power of Attorney dated 25-11-2005 by issuing public notice dated 20-01-2007, and that after cancellation of the General Power of Attorney, the only document that remains is the Development Agreement dated 25-11-2005. 18. That as per the Development Agreement, they are entitled to 40% of the built up area i.e. out of 25 flats constructed they are entitled to 10 flats. But contrary thereto, and despite cancellation of General Power of Attorney, respondent No.1 had sold the flats that fell to their share, by executing sale deeds in favour of third parties. Since the sale deeds presented by respondent No.1 are not registered by the Sub Registrar, and the appeal filed by respondent No.1 before the District Registrar, is pending, they are entitled to grant of temporary injunction as prayed for. 19. However, this stand taken by the appellants is disputed by respondent No.1, and it is contended by him that he along with the appellants is the joint owner of the land, that he had contributed 80% of the sale consideration, while the appellants had contributed 20% sale consideration towards purchase of the land. 19. However, this stand taken by the appellants is disputed by respondent No.1, and it is contended by him that he along with the appellants is the joint owner of the land, that he had contributed 80% of the sale consideration, while the appellants had contributed 20% sale consideration towards purchase of the land. That along with his land, which constitutes 80% of the total land, he has agreed to develop the land of the appellants, which constitutes 20% of the total land, under the Development Agreement, by sharing the built up area in the 20% land of the appellants in the ratio of 40:60, and that out of the entire total extent of built up area, the appellants are entitled to only 8% of the built up area, that the appellants had given General Power of Attorney, to sell only the 8% of the built up area that fell to their share, and that he having sold 8% of the built up area, comprising three flats, had paid the sale consideration. 20. It is the further case of respondent No.1 that though the sale consideration of the three flats worked out to Rs.21,48,400/-, but he had paid an amount of Rs.1,68,00,000/-, treating the excess amount of Rs.1,46,51,600/-, towards loan, which he is entitled to recover with costs by way of counter claim. That even before cancellation of General Power of Attorney by the appellants, he had sold all the flats in favour of third parties by executing sale deeds and also received the sale consideration. That even if the General Power of attorney executed in his favour by the appellants is cancelled, the same would not come in his way in executing sale deeds, in favour of third parties, because even before the said cancellation of General Power of Attorney, he as GPA holder of the appellants, had already sold the 8% of the built up area i.e. three flats that fell to their share. As he had already executed sale deeds in favour of third parties and also received sale consideration and also put them in possession, except completing the formality of registration, which was not done by the Sub Registrar because of the objection taken by the appellants and as he had already preferred appeal, there was no need to grant any temporary injunction. 21. 21. From the respective stands taken by I the parties, it becomes clear that the appellants are claiming 40% of the built up area out of the total constructed area, while respondent No.1 is contending that the appellants are entitled to only 8% of the total built up area, which constitutes 40% share of development in their 20% land, and that he had already sold the said 8% of the, built up area of the appellants as their GP A and even paid the sale consideration. Though the appellants and respondent No.1 have taken such stands, they have not placed any plan, appended to the Development Agreement, to show as to what portion of the built up area fell to each of their shares, whether it is demarcated or not, and even though, the appellants mentioned the flats in respect of which they sought temporary injunction, had fell (sic. as fallen) to their share, the same is disputed by respondent No.1. 22. However, whether the appellants are entitled to 40% or 8% of the total built up area as contended by the appellants and respondent No.1 respectively, is a question on which the Court below was required to prima facie satisfy for itself before refusing to grant temporary injunction as prayed for by the appellants. Upon satisfying for itself on the above question, the appellants by executing the General Power of Attorney, which they claim to have cancelled subsequently by issuing public notice, gave power to respondent No.1 to alienate his share of built up area or their share of built up area, and if so to what extent. To arrive at prima facie satisfaction on the above issues, the Court below was required to look into the recitals of the documents, which it did not do. 23. To arrive at prima facie satisfaction on the above issues, the Court below was required to look into the recitals of the documents, which it did not do. 23. However, the Court below, without appreciating the above issues in the light of the principles governing the grant of temporary injunction and in right perspective, has refused to grant temporary injunction on the ground that since the document is executed by respondent No.1 as GP A of the appellants and also received sale consideration and alienated the same in favour of third parties, the relief of temporary injunction claimed by the appellants has become infructuous, and as such, they are not entitled to temporary injunction, holding as follows: Admittedly, the 1st defendant alienated away the suit flats in favour of the petitioners in I.A. 1731 of 2009 by receiving the entire sale consideration from them and also executed sale deeds in their favour and when those sale deeds were presented before the Sub Registrar, Golconda, since the plaintiffs raised their objection before the Sub Registrar that they have cancelled the GPA dated 20-01-2007, executed in favour of the 1st defendant those sale deeds were refused to be registered. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendants 1 and 2 and the petitioners in I.A.1731 of 2009 that an appeal is now pending before the District Registrar. These facts clearly go to show that having received the sale consideration from the petitioners in I.A.No.1731 of 2009 by the list defendant being GPA Holder of the plaintiffs he alienated away the suit flats in favour of the said petitioners/ 3rd parties and executed sale deeds in their favour. Since the 5uit flats were already alienated in favour of the petitioners in IA.1731 of 2009 by the 1st defendant, even though sale deeds executed by defendant No.1 in their favour were not registered by the Sub Registrar, Golconda, the relief of interim temporary injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from alienating the suit flats in favour of the 3rd parties become infructuous and as such, no such relief of interim temporary injunction can be granted. I, therefore, hold that the petitioners/ plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of temporary injunction as prayed for. This point is answered accordingly against the petitioners/plaintiffs. 24. The approach made by the Court below is incorrect. I, therefore, hold that the petitioners/ plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of temporary injunction as prayed for. This point is answered accordingly against the petitioners/plaintiffs. 24. The approach made by the Court below is incorrect. Mere execution of document and receipt of sale consideration does not conclude the sale transaction. No doubt, respondent No.1 executed the documents in favour of third parties, the fact remains, the same was refused registration by the Sub Registrar, obviously on the objection taken by the appellants that such documents were executed after cancellation of the General Power of Attorney. Since questioning the refusal of registration by the Sub Registrar, respondent No.1 filed appeal before the District Registrar, and in the event, the said appeal is allowed, having regard to the provisions of Section 72(2) of the Registration Act, respondent No.1 is required to present the documents and thereupon the Sub Registrar, is required to follow the procedure contemplated in Sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof. However, the Court below did not consider as to what would be the effect of the suit proceedings, if the temporary injunction is granted and not granted, in that whether the cause in the suit would survive or stands frustrated. As the Court below without considering the above aspects had dismissed the temporary injunction application on the ground that it has become infructuous, we are of the considered opinion that order under appeal should be set aside the matter remanded to the Court below for considering the application afresh. 25. Accordingly, we set aside the order under appeal, and remit the matter to the Court below, for deciding the application afresh in the light of the observations as made above. 26. Accordingly, the C.M.A. is allowed. No costs.