JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. 1. THIS Mandamus-Appeal is at the instance of a third party in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is directed against the order dated September 8, 2009 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by which His Lordship disposed of a writ-application by directing the West Bengal Fisheries Corporation Ltd., one of the Respondents in the writ application, (hereinafter called Corporation) to ensure that the writ-petitioner no. 1, the Local Panchayat, was permitted to exercise its rights in the next and the following fishing seasons to recommend the names of the labourers to be engaged by the Corporation for lifting ice from the ice plant in question. 2. ALTHOUGH neither the writ-petitioners nor the Corporation has preferred any appeal against such order, the appellants, a labour contractor and his 12 labourers, who were at the relevant point of time engaged in lifting ice from the plant of the Corporation, have come up with this appeal with an application to grant leave to prefer an appeal. The writ petitioners, the Local Panchayat, represented by its Pradhan, filed the writ application, out of which the present appeal arises, thereby challenging the resolution dated November 10, 2009 adopted in the 44th meeting of the Advisory Board of the Corporation and praying for setting aside the consequent letter dated July 2, 2009, issued by the Corporation. 3. THE case made out by the writ-petitioners in the writ-application may be summed up thus:- a) THE Corporation is a Government Enterprise and Shankarpur Fishing Harbour is one of the units of the Corporation. THE Advisory Committee of Shankarpur Fisheries consisted of 15 members, as detailed in the writ application, including the writ-petitioner No. 2, and all the members of the Advisory Committee were made parties to the writ-application. THE Advisory Committee of Shankarpur Fisheries consisted of 15 members, as detailed in the writ application, including the writ-petitioner No. 2, and all the members of the Advisory Committee were made parties to the writ-application. b) THE function of the Advisory Committee was to maintain the Ice Plant in question for lifting of ice and for selling the same and the Advisory Committee adopted a resolution about 10 years prior to moving the writ application, thereby resolving that for lifting of ice from the Ice Plant, the contractor and the labourers under the said contractor should be recommended by the concerned Panchayat and on that recommendation, the contractor and labourers would be appointed for the purpose of lifting of ice from the Ice Plant for 9 months in a year as those 9 months are the season for catching of fishes. c) THE Advisory Committee by virtue of that resolution had delegated the power upon the Panchayat to recommend the names of the contractor and also 12 labourers under the contractor for the purpose of appointment with the understanding that the contractor and labourers would be appointed on casual basis. d) In the year 2007, the selfsame list of the appointed contractor and labourers was sent by the concerned Panchayat to the Special Officer of the Shankarpur Fishing Harbour and the person, who was appointed as contractor, namely, Amarendranath Bhanja and his 12 labourers subsequently took shelter before the Labour Commissioner for the purpose of regularisation of their appointment. e) In the 44th meeting of the Advisory Committee, a resolution was adopted by the members resolving that since the claim of the earlier contractor and labourers was sub-judice before the Assistant Labour Commissioner for the purpose of regularisation, till any decision was taken by the Labour Commissioner, the said Gram Panchayat was requested to recommend those names who were earlier appointed. f) Subsequently, however, the Pradhan of the Panchayat recommended the names of a different contractor, namely, Alok Baran Maity and 12 different labourers to the concerned Special Officer. However, by a letter, the Pradhan of the Panchayat was informed that in view of the 44th resolution of the Advisory Committee, such request could not be acceded to. f) Subsequently, however, the Pradhan of the Panchayat recommended the names of a different contractor, namely, Alok Baran Maity and 12 different labourers to the concerned Special Officer. However, by a letter, the Pradhan of the Panchayat was informed that in view of the 44th resolution of the Advisory Committee, such request could not be acceded to. g) THE aforesaid 44th resolution of the Advisory Committee was illegal and was, thus, liable to be set aside and a direction should be given upon the respondent-Corporation to accept the list sent by the writ-petitioner, being Annexure-P-7 to the writ-application, and to appoint the persons mentioned therein as the contractor and labourers. 4. NO affidavit-in-opposition to the said writ-application was given by any of the respondents but at the time of hearing, on behalf of the Corporation, it was submitted that it was not disputing the prerogative of the Panchayat to select the contractor or recommend the names of the labourers and that the Corporation had no desire to engage labourers on its own or to continue with, or give any preference to any person who had been previously engaged for the purpose of lifting ice from the Ice Plant. It was further argued on behalf of the Corporation that after the present fishing season was over, the labourers, then engaged for lifting ice, would not be continued and the petitioning Panchayat should follow the procedure and recommend the names of labourers for the following season. In view of such stance taken by the Corporation, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ-application by directing the Corporation to ensure that the Panchayat was permitted to exercise its right in the next and following fishing seasons to recommend the names of labourers to be engaged by Corporation for lifting ice from the relevant Ice Plant. As indicated earlier, neither the writ-petitioners nor any of the respondents preferred any appeal against such order but the contractor earlier engaged by the Panchayat and the 12 labourers, who were retained by virtue of the resolution of the 44th meeting of the Advisory Committee, have come up with the present appeal on the ground that by the order of the learned Single Judge, their appointments have been set aside and by virtue of a fresh resolution, the Panchayat-Authority has recommended the names of different persons, as contractor and labourer respectively. 5. 5. IT may not be out of place to mention here that the present appellants had already filed a separate writ-application challenging the order of termination of the appellants passed by the Corporation. 6. MR. Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, strenuously contended before us that the writ-application, filed by the Panchayat through its Pradhan, was not maintainable and for passing direction pursuant to the order impugned for appointment of fresh contractor and labourers at the whim of the present Panchayat, his clients rights to be reemployed have been prejudicially affected and, therefore, we should set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. In support of his contention, MR. Bhattacharya has placed reliance upon the following decisions:- a) Employees State Insurance Corporation vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors. [ 2002(4) CHN 74 ]. b) Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. vs. V. R. Rudani and Ors. [ AIR 1989 S.C. 1607 ]. c) Secretary, ONGC Ltd. and Anr. vs. V.U. Warrier [ (2005) 5 SCC 245 ]. d) Union of India and Anr. vs. S.B. Vohra and Ors. [ (2004) 2 SCC 150 ]. e) Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar [ (2001) 7 SCC 318 ]. f) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sanghatana [ (2009) 8 SCC 556 ]. The learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the writ-petitioners and the Corporation have, however, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya and have contended that the appellants having already filed a separate writ-application challenging the decision of their termination, this appeal should not be entertained, as the appellants can get their appropriate remedy in the separate writ-application filed by them. It is further contended that the writ-application was quite maintainable without making the appellants as parties. 7. THEREFORE, the only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether we should set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge at the instance of the appellants notwithstanding the fact that the parties to the writ application have not challenged the legality of the same. 8. IT is now a settled law that a person, not party to a legal proceeding, may be permitted to prefer appeal against an order passed therein if it appears that such third party would be prejudicially affected by the order impugned. 8. IT is now a settled law that a person, not party to a legal proceeding, may be permitted to prefer appeal against an order passed therein if it appears that such third party would be prejudicially affected by the order impugned. The law is equally settled that a person not party to a judicial proceeding is not bound by the order passed in such proceedings unless by operation of the doctrine of Res Judicata, such order is binding upon him. 9. ACCORDING to the principle of Res Judicata, no court should proceed to decide an issue of fact or mixed question of law and fact which has already been decided by a competent court having jurisdiction to decide such issue in a judicial proceedings between the same parties or claiming through one of such parties and litigating under the same title, and that the previous decision on such issue was necessary in order to give relief to the plaintiff in the judicial proceeding earlier disposed of. 10. IN other words, if the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, a third party to the proceeding should be given leave to challenge an order on the ground that unless he is permitted to challenge such order, the same would be legally binding on him. Therefore, in order to grant leave to challenge an order at the instance of a third party, the appellate court must be satisfied that such third party is claiming through one of the parties to the original proceedings and litigating under the same title and further, the order sought to be challenged is a decision on an issue of fact or mixed question of law and fact and is binding upon such third party for compliance of all the necessary conditions of application of the doctrine of Res Judicata. 11. IN the case before us, it appears that the Corporation did not dispute the alleged right of the Panchayat to nominate the contractor or the labourers for lifting of ice and agreed to be abided by the decision of the Panchayat from the next or subsequent fishing seasons and the learned Single Judge, on the basis of the admission of the Corporation, disposed of the writ-application by passing direction upon the Corporation to be guided by the nomination of the Panchayat from the next fishing season. 12. 12. THEREFORE, before the learned Single Judge, there was no issue as to whether the appellants have acquired any right to be absorbed as labourers for lifting of ice in Corporation by virtue of rendering their existing service and the learned Single Judge had no occasion to decide whether such independent right has accrued in favour of the appellants. THEREFORE, by the decision impugned in this appeal, the independent right of the appellants, allegedly accrued in favour of the appellants, cannot be affected. It further appears that the appellants have already filed a writ-application for establishing their alleged independent right. Therefore, the order impugned in this appeal will not operate as Res Judicata in the pending writ-application filed by the appellant and thus, we find no reason to entertain this appeal at the instance of the appellants. It appears that the question of maintainability of this appeal was kept open by the Division Bench presided over by the then Chief Justice while disposing of the stay application in connection with this appeal. We now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Bhattacharya. 13. IN the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation (supra), a Single Judge of this Court (one of us) held that a person who has merely entered into an agreement for purchase of a land cannot be interested in getting compensation for acquisition of the land and thus, had no locus standi to move a writ application in that behalf. By relying upon such decision, Mr. Bhattacharya tried to impress upon us that the writ-application filed by the Panchayat through its Pradhan was not maintainable and, therefore, we should set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge. We have already held that the appellants being not affected by the said decision we do not wish to enter into the legality of the order impugned including the question of maintainability of the writ-application. Therefore, the said decision is of no avail to Mr. Bhattacharyas clients. 14. THE other five decisions, mentioned earlier, are all cited either for the purpose of showing extent of the power of the writ-court or in support of the claim of the appellants about their alleged right to work as labourers. Therefore, the said decision is of no avail to Mr. Bhattacharyas clients. 14. THE other five decisions, mentioned earlier, are all cited either for the purpose of showing extent of the power of the writ-court or in support of the claim of the appellants about their alleged right to work as labourers. Since we have kept that question open for decision in the writ-application filed by the appellants which is pending, we do not find any necessity to deal with those decisions in detail. We have already held that the order impugned does not affect any of the alleged rights of the appellants and thus, we do not find any reason to grant leave to the appellant to challenge the order impugned, which is unnecessary. We, therefore, do not intend to enter into the merit of the order impugned. This appeal is thus disposed of as not maintainable at the instance of the appellants for the reasons disclosed above. Interim order earlier granted stands vacated. No costs.