Prem Lata Sharma v. State Of Bihar Through The Vigilance
2010-06-25
SHEEMA ALI KHAN
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT 1. Criminal Misc. No. 3783 of 2010 has been filed challenging the order dated 12.09.2006 taking cognizance for the offences under Section 7/13(2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Cr. Misc. No. 4016 of 2010 has been filed challenging the order dated 02.07.2009 refusing to discharge the petitioner under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aforesaid orders have been passed in Special Case No. 13 of 2004 (Vigilance Police Station Case No. 10 of 2004) by the Special Judge. Vigilance- I, Patna. 2. Counsel for the Vigilance Department supports the order of sanction by referring to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and submits that what is required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is an order to show that the authority concerned has applied its mind to the offences alleged and has come to a conclusion that the incumbent should be prosecuted for having committed the offences under Sections 7, 10, 11 and 13 or 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to the Counsel for the Vigilance Department, the impugned order indicates that the sanctioning authority was aware that the petitioner was to be prosecuted under Section 7/13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The fact that Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code has been mentioned in the sanctioning order is immaterial as per the submissions made by the Counsel for the Vigilance Department. 3. In my opinion, the very fact that the sanctioning authority i.e. the Secretary of the Law Department has passed an order granting sanction for prosecuting under Section 7/13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code shows complete non-application of mind. It appears that the sanctioning authority is not even aware of the difference between Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the range of offences which covers both the sections. 4.
It appears that the sanctioning authority is not even aware of the difference between Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the range of offences which covers both the sections. 4. Learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department submits that the order dated 13.06.2006 passed by the Secretary of the Law Department indicates firstly that the Commercial Taxes Department has forwarded the file containing all the allegations and materials against the petitioner to the Law Department for consideration for the purposes of granting sction and as such the Law Secretary had gone through the connected materials in this matter before passing the order for prosecuting the petitioner. The second submission is that the language of the order of sanction indicates that the Law Secretary was aware that no order could be passed taking cognizance against the petitioner without sanction from the appointing authority and as such has incorporated this aspect in the order of sanction. 5. Considering all these aspects, it is submitted by counsel appearing on behalf of the Vigilance Department that it is not of importance that Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code should be mentioned in the order of sanction whereas all the materials referred to really connect the order to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In any event, it would always be open to the petitioner to raise these aspects at the time of trial of the case. 6. This court in the case of Nand Kishore Verma passed on 15.12.2009 in Cr. Misc. No. 36723 of 2009 has held that sanction for prosecution under sections 7, 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the order of sanction having been taken under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a valid order of sanction. Similar order was also passed in the case of Dr. Suresh Prasad on 22.12.2009 in Cr.Misc. No. 26345 of 2008. Relying on these decisions, counsel for the petitioner submits that the orders impugned are vitiated on the ground that the order of sanction was not in accordance with law. 7. It may be noted that cognizance in this case was taken on 12.9.2006 and the petitioner has filed the present application challenging the order of sanction on 29.1.2010 after a lapse of more than three years.
7. It may be noted that cognizance in this case was taken on 12.9.2006 and the petitioner has filed the present application challenging the order of sanction on 29.1.2010 after a lapse of more than three years. In the mean time an application was filed for discharging the petitioner which was rejected on 2.7.2009 and has been challenged by filing an application for quashing of the order on 1.2.2010. 8. Objection should have been raised with respect to illegality in the order of sanction at the initial stage of the case. The petitioner has waited for three and half years before challenging the order. In the mean time the case has progressed and charges have been framed in this case. 9. At this stage it would not be proper for this court to interfere with the orders impugned and I tend to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Vigilance Department that the question of sanction can be raised by the petitioner at the stage of the trial. 10. This court finds no merit in these two applications on the ground that the petitioner has approached this court after a delay of three and half years whereas it would have been proper to raise the issues at the very initial stage. These applications are dismissed.