JUDGMENT 1. THE writ petitioner is an aspirant for the post of Manager (I.T.) in Allahabad Bank, which is a nationalized bank. 2. THE petitioner had responded to an advertisement issued in the "Employment News" inviting applications for the said post. THE petitioner fulfilled the eligibility criteria as stipulated in the advertisement. THE advertisement carried particulars of vacancies for several posts in the bank, including the post of Manager-IT. THE advertisement, a copy of which has been made Annexure "PI" specified in detail the eligibility criteria for these posts and the procedure for selection. Column 10 of this advertisement contained "general instructions" for the candidates, and sub-clause (9) of this column specified: "THE Bank would be free to reject any application, at any stage of the recruitment process if the candidate is found ineligible for the post for which he/she has applied. Decision of the Bank in all matters regarding eligibility of the candidate, the stages at which such scrutiny of eligibility is to be undertaken, the documents to be produced for the purpose of the conduct of examination, interview, selection and any other matter relating to recruitment will be final and binding on the candidate. No correspondence or personal enquiries shall be entertained by the bank in this behalf." The petitioner was successful in both written test and oral interview held for the said post. On 4th June, 2009, the writ petitioner had received a communication through e-mail from the bank to the following effect: "Congratulation! We are pleased to inform that you have been selected as Manager (IT) in our Bank. Appointment Letter has been issued and your date of joining is 22.06.2009 at the under mentioned address:" 3. THE actual letter of appointment was, however, issued on 2, June 2009 but this letter appears to have had been received by the petitioner at a later date. I shall henceforth refer to this letter as the appointment letter. This letter is captioned: "Your appointment in Bank's Service as Manager (IT), MMG SCALE-II." THE opening sentence of this letter stipulates:- "This has reference to your selection for appointment in the Bank on the basis of Written Test and Interview". 4. CLAUSE 7 of this letter further provides:- "7. I shall henceforth refer to this letter as the appointment letter. This letter is captioned: "Your appointment in Bank's Service as Manager (IT), MMG SCALE-II." THE opening sentence of this letter stipulates:- "This has reference to your selection for appointment in the Bank on the basis of Written Test and Interview". 4. CLAUSE 7 of this letter further provides:- "7. That your appointment is conditional upon your submitting, in original, the following documents for verification of the Bank and subject to those being found to entire requirements and satisfaction of the Bank. 7.1 School Final/High School/Higher Secondary/Matriculation pass certificate showing your date of birth. 7.2 Graduation/Post-Graduation Degree Certificate, if Degree Certificate is not obtained, provisional Certificate must be submitted. 7.3 Certificate regarding passing of Computer Course and/or professional qualification, if any. 7.4 2 character certificates out of which one must be from the Head of the Educational Institution last attended by you and other from a Gazetted Officer or Bank Officer (not related to you). 7.5 Caste Certificate in case you belong to SC/ST or OBC. 7.6 Unqualified/satisfactory discharge/release certificate from your present employer, if you are already employed, positively before joining the Bank's service and in absence of the said certificate you will not be allowed to join the service". "7. That your appointment is conditional upon your submitting, in original, the following documents for verification of the Bank and subject to those being found to entire requirements and satisfaction of the Bank. 7.1 School Final/High School/Higher Secondary/Matriculation pass certificate showing your date of birth. 7.2 Graduation/Post-Graduation Degree Certificate, if Degree Certificate is not obtained, provisional Certificate must be submitted. 7.3 Certificate regarding passing of Computer Course and/or professional qualification, if any. 7.4 2 character certificates out of which one must be from the Head of the Educational Institution last attended by you and other from a Gazetted Officer or Bank Officer (not related to you). 7.5 Caste Certificate in case you belong to SC/ST or OBC. 7.6 Unqualified/satisfactory discharge/release certificate from your present employer, if you are already employed, positively before joining the Bank's service and in absence of the said certificate you will not be allowed to join the service". As per the terms specified in this letter, the petitioner was to remain on probation for one year. Thereafter the petitioner's appointment in the bank could have continued on confirmation. As per the terms specified in this letter, the petitioner was to remain on probation for one year. Thereafter the petitioner's appointment in the bank could have continued on confirmation. Clause 5 of the appointment letter deals with the aspect of confirmation of the petitioner's service in the bank, and this clause inter alia provides:- "That your confirmation in the services of the Bank may be considered provided: 5.1 Your work and conduct are found to be satisfactory; 5.2 Satisfactory police report regarding your character and antecedents received from the Police Authority. In case, the police report found to be adverse, your service will be terminated forthwith without assigning any reason." 5. THE conditions contained in the appointment letter were required to be accepted by the petitioner, which he did. THE petitioner was also required, as per conditions specified in the appointment letter, to submit certain other documents, the format of which were enclosed to the appointment letter itself. In a form entitled "Application for Appointment to the Bank's Service", the petitioner was to give details of his past employment, educational qualification, family particulars. THE petitioner filled in this form, and enclosed to the same his medical fitness certificate, educational certificates, and also report from two referees which were in the nature of character certificates. Another form which the petitioner was required to fill in and submit carried the caption "Attestation Form for Verification of Antecedents." This form again required disclosure of certain personal details of the petitioner, including information pertaining to the following effect:- "Have you ever been arrested, or kept under detention or bound down/fined/convicted by a Court of Law for any offence, or debarred/disqualified by the Public Service Commission from appearing at its examination/selections or debarred from taking any examination or restricted by authority/institution? 6. IN the proforma of report in the nature of character certificates, similar information was required to be given against the following questions: "Whether to the best of your knowledge and information: -he was ever arrested/prosecuted/kept under detention or connected by a Court of Law? -Has any members of the candidate's family ever been arrested/kept under detention or convicted by a Court of Law?" The petitioner admittedly has a criminal case pending against him. He has been charged under section 498A/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the case has been committed for trial to the Court of Sessions. -Has any members of the candidate's family ever been arrested/kept under detention or convicted by a Court of Law?" The petitioner admittedly has a criminal case pending against him. He has been charged under section 498A/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the case has been committed for trial to the Court of Sessions. He was arrested in connection with this proceeding and detained in custody for some days. Thereafter he has been enlarged on bail. Such detention took place in the year 2005. The petitioner's response to the first part of the question contained in the Attestation Form for Verification of Antecedents was ""Yes". The particulars disclosed by him as regards the case in this form was:- "I was arrested and detained in custody for some days in a matrimonial case and subsequently enlarged on bail in connection with North Bidhan Nagar PS case No. 87 dated 6.5.2005 under section 498A-306 IPC and said matter is still pending subjudiced". 7. SIMILAR information was given by the two referees in their reports. 8. THE writ petitioner, in spite of being selected for the post in question has not been permitted to join the post in view of pendency of the criminal case in which he is an accused. In this writ petition, prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondents to permit the petitioner to join the post in terms of the appointment letter. The respondents have contested this writ petition by filing affidavit-in-opposition. In this affidavit, the said stand of the bank for refusing the petitioner to join the said post and justification for such refusal has been reflected. 9. MR. Mukhopadhyay, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in this matter has argued that the ground of refusal indicated in the affidavit-in-opposition is not sustainable in law. His submission is that after the appointment letter has been issued, it is no more open to the bank to refuse appointment to the petitioner. In substance, it has been contended that the fact of issuance of the letter of appointment and acceptance thereof by the petitioner assumes the character of a concluded contract as far as the petitioner and the bank are concerned. He stressed on the fact that there has been no suppression of material fact on the part of the petitioner about pendency of the criminal case. He stressed on the fact that there has been no suppression of material fact on the part of the petitioner about pendency of the criminal case. He relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secy., Deptt. of Home Secy., A. P. vs. B. Chinnam Naidu, 2005(2) SCC 746 , to contend that employment to the petitioner could not be refused as he had not suppressed the pendency of the criminal case and his detention and he could not be deprived from employment for this reason alone. In the facts of the present case, however, I do not think the ratio of this judgment is applicable, as it is the admitted position that there is no allegation against the petitioner of suppression of facts. 10. THIS argument is based on two limbs. First, Mr. Mukhopadhyay has submitted that the advertisement did not specify that if an applicant was an accused in a criminal case, he would be disqualified from joining the post in question. Second, it is a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence of this country that a person, even if accused of an offence is innocent till found guilty. Thus, in the absence of any specific statutory provision or stipulation in an employment contract to the effect that involvement of an applicant in a criminal case would constitute disqualification for appointment to the post in question, such a ground could not be introduced alter conclusion of the selection process to refuse appointment to a selected candidate. He has stressed on the fact that the advertisement also did not specify that such a factor would render a candidate ineligible for the subject post. Mr. Mukhopadhyay has relied on a decision of an Hon'ble Single Bench of this Court in the case of Basudev Malik vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in 2004(1) CHN 32 , in support of his submission that there could be no presumption of guilt so far as employment in a public sector organisation is concerned in relation to an accused person during pendency of the trial. 11. HIS further submission on this count is that even if the bank had discretion in selection of an employee with a criminal case pending against him, the nature of the offence alleged would be a material factor and that factor would guide exercise of such discretion. 11. HIS further submission on this count is that even if the bank had discretion in selection of an employee with a criminal case pending against him, the nature of the offence alleged would be a material factor and that factor would guide exercise of such discretion. According to him if the offence alleged against a candidate is wholly unconnected with the nature of employment, then pendency of a case in connection with such offence should have no bearing on the decision of the bank on the question of selection of the candidate. He emphasized on the point that implication in a criminal case under the aforesaid provisions of the Indian Penal Code has no bearing on petitioner's credibility so far as employment in a bank is concerned, and if the bank declines to engage him for this reason alone after he is otherwise found suitable, that would amount to exercise of discretion by the bank in an arbitrary and irrational manner. 12. THE other authority relied on by Mr. Mukhopadhyay in support of the petitioner's case is a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D. K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in 1993(3) SCC 259 . Referring to this judgment, he has argued that employment for an individual forms part of his livelihood, and deprivation of such right on irrational ground would violate his Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the light of these facts, his submission is that onus would be on the employer to justify their action. In the instant case, Mr. Mukhopadhyay contended that the stand of the bank is unreasonable and they have failed to discharge such onus. The case of the bank has been argued by Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel. His stand is that as an employer, the bank has absolute discretion on the aspect of engaging their own employee, and in terms of the advertisement itself, the bank retained absolute discretion in appointing an incumbent. The clause relied on this regard is clause 10.9 of this advertisement. This clause has been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. He has also referred to regulation 12(1) of Allahabad Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 which stipulates:- "12. The clause relied on this regard is clause 10.9 of this advertisement. This clause has been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. He has also referred to regulation 12(1) of Allahabad Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 which stipulates:- "12. Suspension (1) An officer employee may be placed under suspension by the competent authority- (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial". 13. REFERRING to this clause it has been submitted on behalf of the bank that even if the petitioner was given appointment, immediately thereafter he would have been exposed to a proceeding which might have had resulted in his suspension. It would not make commercial sense if the bank was to engage someone who would be exposed to a possible disciplinary proceeding and suspension immediately on being appointed. He has also drawn my attention to the appointment letter to contend that this appointment letter did not confer on the petitioner any vested legal right to be appointed, as it was specified in this letter that appointment was conditional upon submitting in original the documents stipulated in clause 7 thereof, and if those documents were found, on verification, to meet the requirements of the bank and their satisfaction then only appointment could be given. Mr. Gupta's main submission is that the relationship the petitioner is seeking to enforce in this proceeding in substance is a relationship between an employer and an employee and this is a contractual relationship. In the absence of a concluded contract, the bank would have absolute discretion in rejecting the petitioner's employment. 14. MR. Mukhopadhyay has not specifically argue that there was a concluded contract between the parties in this case. His submission is that the right of the petitioner to be appointed in bank's service had become absolute after his selection and issuance of the appointment letter. The electronic communication received by the petitioner specifies the date of joining. The communication also refers to the appointment letter. 15. THE appointment letter, however, does not contemplate immediate engagement of the petitioner to the post in question in absolute terms. The electronic communication received by the petitioner specifies the date of joining. The communication also refers to the appointment letter. 15. THE appointment letter, however, does not contemplate immediate engagement of the petitioner to the post in question in absolute terms. THEre are specific stipulations as regards condition of appointment in clause 7 of the appointment letter, whereas confirmation in the bank's service has been made conditional upon fulfillment of the requirements specified in clause 5 of the same letter. 16. FOR this reason, I reject Mr. Mukhopadhyay's submission that the electronic communication conferred on the petitioner absolute right of appointment in the post in question. I also accept the respondents' stand as reflected in their affidavit-in-opposition, that the process of recruitment does not conclude till appointment is made upon fulfillment of the requirements specified in the appointment letter. I hold so because the letter of appointment itself provides certain stipulations which are required to be satisfied as conditions for joining the service. The electronic communication cannot be read independent of the letter of appointment, and this communication cannot be construed to have conferred any vested legal right on the petitioner overriding the provisions of the letter of appointment. Clause 7 of the Letter of Appointment permits the bank to test the antecedents of the petitioner, and to this letter is annexed the format in which disclosure on the petitioner's antecedents is to be made. In clause 6 of the appointment letter, there is a stipulation that the petitioner is to submit the application form duly completed. It is only with respect to the disclosures made against column 12 of the attestation form, and the report of the two referees which are in the nature of character certificates, there is scope on the part of the bank to make subjective assessment of the suitability of the petitioner for the post in question. Other disclosure requirements comprise of evidence of the petitioners academic qualification and past experience, which are routine disclosures to be made at the time of appointment in an organisation as an employee. 17. MR. Gupta's argument is that as per Clause 10.9 of the advertisement, the bank retains absolute discretion in selection of persons as their employees. Other disclosure requirements comprise of evidence of the petitioners academic qualification and past experience, which are routine disclosures to be made at the time of appointment in an organisation as an employee. 17. MR. Gupta's argument is that as per Clause 10.9 of the advertisement, the bank retains absolute discretion in selection of persons as their employees. If any material is disclosed to the bank concerning a candidate which the bank would find undesirable for their employees, it would be within their power and authority to reject appointment to such employees. 18. I would have accepted the submission of Mr. Gupta if his clients were a private commercial bank. But Allahabad Bank is not a private commercial bank. This is a nationalized bank, and hence is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Being an agency or instrumentality of the State, the respondents are bound to exercise their discretion in a reasonable and rational manner. And the jurisdiction of the Writ Court to test the manner of exercise of such power is well entrenched in Constitutional jurisprudence of this country, as explained and confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramana vs. I. A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . Clause 10.9 of the advertisement cannot insulate the bank from a judicial scrutiny founded on Article 14 of the Constitution of India to test their decision on the question of eligibility of a candidate. This being the legal position, I shall test the validity of the grounds on which the respondents found the suitability of the petitioner for appointment to the post unsatisfactory, and rejected his candidature even after selection and fulfillment of disclosed eligibility criteria. 19. THE respondents' justification of their stand is that since chargesheet against the petitioner has been filed and the case of the petitioner has been committed to the Court of Sessions, prima facie case against the petitioner had been established. This stand is reflected in paragraph 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition. THE respondents' contention is that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the petitioner to join the post, as he is likely to be subjected to termination or suspension in terms of the service regulation of the bank. THE fact of petitioner's detention in the past in connection with the same case has also been highlighted. THE respondents' contention is that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the petitioner to join the post, as he is likely to be subjected to termination or suspension in terms of the service regulation of the bank. THE fact of petitioner's detention in the past in connection with the same case has also been highlighted. It has also been pleaded that on disclosure of petitioner's detention and pendency of the criminal case, the bank had decided to forward the attestation form for further verification by the police authorities and no report from the police authorities was received. 20. JUSTIFYING the rejection of the claim of the petitioner for being appointed to the post in question, it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that no legal right of the petitioner has been violated by the action of the bank impugned in the present writ petition. As I have observed earlier, had it been a case of allegations of contractual violation against a private person, the bank's stand could have been justified. But this is not the case here, and the bank is subject to the limitations on arbitrary exercise of power. This is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Ramana (supra), it has been held:- "It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other form of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its own sweet will, and like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant." (at pages 1637-38, para 12 of the report). 21. IN the case of Roshan Lal vs. Union of INdia, AIR 1967 SC 1889 , it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the origin of Government service is contractual, and there is an offer and acceptance in every case. A Government servant acquires his status after his appointment to a post. 22. BUT it does not automatically follow that a public sector bank, after undertaking a selection process can reject the candidature of any applicant on any ground they choose. A Government servant acquires his status after his appointment to a post. 22. BUT it does not automatically follow that a public sector bank, after undertaking a selection process can reject the candidature of any applicant on any ground they choose. It is not open to them to resist judicial scrutiny of such action on the sole argument that the rejected applicant has no vested legal right, as he is yet to be appointed to the post in question. In the case of D. K. Yadav (supra), the requirement on the part of the authorities to discharge the same set of duties and obligations contemplated in the case of Ramana (supra) in employment related matters has been reconfirmed. I shall examine the legality of the bank's action on this limited ground. 23. THE basic flaw in the respondents' reasoning is that they have proceeded on the basis that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner for conviction. THE criminal jurisprudence of this country is based on the basic tenet of anglo-saxon jurisprudence of "presumption of innocence," and this fundamental presumption does not get altered even if an accused is committed to trial. If an individual is innocent in the eye of law, in my opinion, in the absence of any law or any pre-disclosed stipulation in the advertisement or even service regulations, it would be impermissible for a potential employer in the State sector to make a contrary presumption. 24. MR. Gupta has also raised the question of futility of such appointment, as according to him immediately on appointment, the petitioner may be subjected to suspension or termination in terms of the service regulation. But the service regulation, the relevant provision of which has been referred to above does not stipulate mandatory provision for suspension of an employee accused of an offence. The authorities have been conferred with discretionary power, which requires to be exercised in the given facts of a case. It is not possible at this stage to anticipate what would be the decision of the bank authorities after the petitioner is appointed to the post in question. There is possibility that immediately on admission the petitioner may be exposed to disciplinary proceeding and be placed under suspension. There is also possibility that the employer may choose not to proceed against the petitioner at all, pending final judgment in the trial. There is possibility that immediately on admission the petitioner may be exposed to disciplinary proceeding and be placed under suspension. There is also possibility that the employer may choose not to proceed against the petitioner at all, pending final judgment in the trial. In the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is not of such nature which would raise doubt in the mind of the customers of the bank about the integrity of the petitioner in financial matters. It would have been a relevant factor if the petitioner was charged with an offence in the nature of defalcation or breach of trust, which might have caused insecurity in the mind of the employer in entrusting the petitioner with work relating to finance. 25. THE decision of an Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in the case of Basudev Mallik vs. State of West Bengal lays down the course which may be followed in such a situation. This authority, though not squarely applicable in the facts of the present case, in my view lays down a wholesome principle of law. It has been held in this case:- "6. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the provisions contained in Management Rule 28(9) (viia), I find that the Managing Committee of a school has right to suspend a teacher or an employee where such suspension is in the interest of the institution pending drawal of proceedings against the person concerned within 90 days from the date of suspension. In this, case petitioner was arrested for an alleged offence committed beyond the scope of his duty as an assistant teacher and such offence is neither directed against the institution nor the property of the institution. It is true that if in the long run petitioner is found guilty and is consequently convicted, the school authority is at liberty to take appropriate disciplinary action against the petitioner. But, so long the criminal proceeding is not concluded and the petitioner is not found guilty, there is no scope of initiating any disciplinary proceeding at the instance of the school. Thus, the school authority has no right to even suspend the petitioner merely because a criminal case has been initiated against the petitioner. 7. But, so long the criminal proceeding is not concluded and the petitioner is not found guilty, there is no scope of initiating any disciplinary proceeding at the instance of the school. Thus, the school authority has no right to even suspend the petitioner merely because a criminal case has been initiated against the petitioner. 7. However, after incorporation of sub-rule (8b) of Rule 28 of the Management Rule the moment an approved teacher or an employee of the school is arrested in connection with a criminal case and consequently detained in custody beyond 48 hours, he should be deemed to be under suspension during the period of detention and according to the said newly incorporated sub-rule (8b) in such a case the school authority is not even required to pass any formal order of suspension that being "deemed suspension" and the school has no further role to play in the matter. THE moment he will be released from detention by the competent Criminal Court the "deemed suspension" will come to an end and the petitioner should be permitted to join his duty subject to the final decision in the criminal case". 26. I am of the view that mere possibility of suspension after being given appointment would not be a valid and reasonable ground for rejecting appointment altogether in the case of the petitioner. In the light of the ratio laid down in the case of Basudev Malik (supra), I have doubt if such an order of suspension would be legally sustainable or not. To me, such a possibility seems remote. Now comes the question as to whether it would be reasonable exercise of discretion on the part of the respondents to deprive employment to the petitioner on the ground of possibility of his conviction. 27. WHILE the ultimate outcome of the criminal case remains in the domain of possibility, to decide on this question I would have to examine comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties to the litigation while testing the justification of the action of the respondents. 28. 27. WHILE the ultimate outcome of the criminal case remains in the domain of possibility, to decide on this question I would have to examine comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties to the litigation while testing the justification of the action of the respondents. 28. I apply this test because in my opinion, when the Writ Court exercises its jurisdiction to test the reasonableness of certain action of an authority which is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the impact of such action on the aggrieved person is also required to be assessed before arriving at a decision on such an issue. What would be the disadvantage faced by the bank if the petitioner is given appointment? It may be that if he is eventually convicted, then the investment incurred on the petitioner in course of on the job training, that may enhance his skill for serving the bank may go waste, as his sentence is likely to result termination from service. While in service of the bank, he may be required to attend the Court on repeated occasions which may disrupt his regular service. If his service is terminated after his appointment, the respondents may have to incur additional expenditure to engage another person to the said post. 29. SO far as the petitioner is concerned, the disadvantage he would be subjected to is that he would be without the means of livelihood till the final judgment is delivered in the pending criminal case. In the case of D. K. Yadav (supra), deprivation of means of livelihood without following a fair and just procedure has been held to be violative of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 30. ONCE I weigh the comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties, I find that the petitioner would be at a far greater disadvantage if he is not given appointment until he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal trial. He would be without his means of livelihood in the interim period, and if he is eventually discharged or acquitted, it would be difficult to quantify his loss and compensate him for these lost years, during which, in the eye of law, he would remain innocent, but in the eye of the bank, "potential guilty". He would be without his means of livelihood in the interim period, and if he is eventually discharged or acquitted, it would be difficult to quantify his loss and compensate him for these lost years, during which, in the eye of law, he would remain innocent, but in the eye of the bank, "potential guilty". On the other hand, if he is convicted, it would be easier for a large organisation like a bank to absorb the loss of a trained and experienced employee. I find from the letter of appointment that such appointment would be initially on probation. If because of the ongoing trial, there is too much disruption the normal discharge of duty by the petitioner, the bank would be empowered to take such step as may be permissible before his confirmation. But the respondents would not be entitled to reject the petitioner's appointment on such apprehension alone. 31. THE other point taken in the affidavit-in-opposition is that the police report has not been received. I do not think this is a valid reason to deny employment to the petitioner. First of all, I do not find any provision of law under which a public sector bank can seek any report on the character of an individual from the police authorities. No such provision has been shown to me in course of hearing by the learned Counsel representing the bank. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he has disclosed that a criminal case is pending against him. Further enquiry from police may reveal whether the petitioner is implicated in any other case or not. But in the absence of any material which may give rise to such an apprehension, I do not think appointment of the petitioner can be held up for an indefinite period till the police report is submitted. Moreover, as per the letter of appointment, the police report is to be considered before confirmation, not at the stage of appointment on probation. THE bank is aware that the case against the petitioner has been committed to trial. THE respondents may want to know the present status of the trial. This they can ascertain from the petitioner himself. Since there is no allegation of suppression of facts against the petitioner, there is no reason as to why reliance shall not be placed on petitioner's own disclosure on this issue at this stage. 32. THE respondents may want to know the present status of the trial. This they can ascertain from the petitioner himself. Since there is no allegation of suppression of facts against the petitioner, there is no reason as to why reliance shall not be placed on petitioner's own disclosure on this issue at this stage. 32. UNDER these circumstances, I hold that the grounds on which the respondents seek to reject appointment of the petitioner in terms of the letter of appointment issued on 2nd June, 2009 are not valid, and the respondents have exercised the discretionary power specified in clause 10(9) of the advertisement in an arbitrary and irrational manner. The action of the respondents does not stand the test of reasonableness contemplated in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. I direct the respondents to engage the petitioner in terms of the appointment letter dated 2 June 2009, a copy of which has been made Annexure "P3" to the writ petition within four weeks from the date of communication of the order. 33. THERE shall, however be, no order as to costs. 34. URGENT photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, as expeditiously as possible.