JUDGEMENT S.K.Katriar, J. 1. The two appeals at the instance of the State of Bihar and its functionaries have been preferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. 1.1. The appellants of L.P.A. No.540 of 2006 raise a grievance with respect to the order dated 23.9.2005, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2187 of 2004 (Rameshwar Singh & Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Others), whereby the writ petition has been allowed, and the writ petitioners have been given the benefit of continuous officiation as Sub-Inspector of Police, and direction has been issued to reckon their seniority for the purpose of their promotion as Inspector accordingly. 1.2. In the analogous L.P.A. No. 504 of 2008, the appellants raise a grievance with respect to the order dated 29.8.2007, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006 (Gyaneshwar Jha V/s. State of Bihar & Ors.), whereby the writ petition has been allowed, and identical relief has been granted. 1.3. Both the appeals raise common issues of facts and law and are, therefore, being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of the appeals may be indicated. We shall draw the basic facts from the proceedings of L.P.A. No.540 of 2006, and the connected C.W.J.C.No. 2187 of 2004, except by specific ref- erence to any other proceeding. We shall go by the description of the parties occurring in the writ proceeding. The writ petitioners were appointed in the Bihar Constabulary as constables and joined the Crime Investigation Department (C.I.D. for short), on various dates between 1.8.1971 to 12.9.1971. They were confirmed as such. They were promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (A.S.I. in short). On the basis of a selection process conducted by the C.I.D., the writ petitioners were promoted to the posts of Sub-Inspector of Police (S.I1 in short), on purely ad hoc/officiating basis on various dates between 1976 to 1981. They were confirmed as such. They were promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (A.S.I. in short). On the basis of a selection process conducted by the C.I.D., the writ petitioners were promoted to the posts of Sub-Inspector of Police (S.I1 in short), on purely ad hoc/officiating basis on various dates between 1976 to 1981. The Central Selection Board conducted a centralized selection process in terms of Rule 659 of the Bihar Police Manual (hereinafter referred to as the Manual) dealing with the cases of all the members of the cadre of A.S.I. of police throughout the State of Bihar and promoted the writ petitioners & others to the posts of S.I., by order dated 5.3.2002. They were denied the benefit of ad hod officiating promotion to the post of S.I. Some of the writ petitioners, therefore, preferred C.W.J.C. No. 3222 of 1991, and the analogous writ petitions by similarly circumstanced persons, which were allowed by a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 8.5.1996, inter alia, on the following terms: "........Accordingly the respondents are directed to compute the petitioners seniority in the rank of S.I. from the date of their initial officiation in the said rank." 3. The State of Bihar challenged the same before the Supreme Court in S.L.P. Nos. 7288-7292 of 1997 (State of Bihar V/s. Anant Tiwary and Others), whereby the same were dismissed In Limine on the ground of delay. The order dated 17.9.1997 of the Supreme Court is reproduced hereinbelow: "The inordinate delay of 364 days in filing the special leave petitions has not been explained satisfactorily or reasonably. The application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the special leave petitions are dismissed, as barred by time." 4. The State Government thereafter issued order dated 28.8.1997, whereby the writ petitioners were promoted to the post of S.I. after giving them the benefit of continuous officiation as per the direction in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991 and its analogous cases. The order stated that the same was subject to the result of the appeal preferred by the State of Bihar before the Supreme Court. As stated herein above, the appeals of the State Government before the Supreme Court were dismissed on the ground of delay by order dated 17.9.1997. The order stated that the same was subject to the result of the appeal preferred by the State of Bihar before the Supreme Court. As stated herein above, the appeals of the State Government before the Supreme Court were dismissed on the ground of delay by order dated 17.9.1997. The State Government thereafter issued provisional gradation list on 25.4.2000 followed by the final gradation list on 3.12.2001, with some modifications in the provisional gradation list which did not concern the writ petitioners. The State Govt.afforded to the writ petitioners the benefit of continuous officiating promotion as S.I. in the provisional list as well as the final list. This was followed by the promotion order dated 20.1.2004, whereby persons junior to the writ petitioners were promoted as Inspector, the writ petitioners were ignored and were denied promotion. The writ petitioners were left with the impression that the order of promotion dated 20.1.2004 has been issued after ignoring the period spent by them on ad hoc/officiating basis as S.I., providing them with the cause of action for the present C.W.J.C. No. 2187 of 2004. As stated hereinabove, the writ petitions have been allowed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order. The State Government has been directed to give benefit of continuous ad hoc/officiating promotion as S.I., inter alia, on the ground that the aforesaid judgment of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991 has attained finality. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh, which was allowed by the order dated 27.4.2000 [2000 (3) PLJR (SC)81] (State of Bihar and Others V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another), is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present C.W.J.C.No. 2187 of 2004. 5. The facts and the issues of the analogous L.P.A. No. 504 of 2008, arising out of C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006, are identical, except some minor difference of dates which are not significant for disposal of the two appeals. Therefore, we do not feel the necessity of separately recapitulating the facts and circumstances of L.P.A. No. 504 of 2008. C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006 has been allowed on identical grounds. 6. Therefore, we do not feel the necessity of separately recapitulating the facts and circumstances of L.P.A. No. 504 of 2008. C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006 has been allowed on identical grounds. 6. While assailing the validity of the orders on the two writ petitions, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the promotions to the writ petitioners were in violation of the relevant provisions of the Manual. It is next submitted that the judgment of this Court in C.W.J.C. No.2686 of 1991, has seemingly attained finality, but has really not attained finality and has, therefore, to be viewed in the right perspective. It is next contended that the learned Writ Court has not viewed the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of State of Bihar & Others V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (supra) in its true letter and spirit. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order of the learned writ court. It is submitted that the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, has attained finality, and the appeals of the State of Bihar before the Supreme Court had been dismissed In Limine. He next submits that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (supra), have been considered by the learned writ court and have rightly been held to be inapplicable to the present case. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) A.I.R. 1990 SC 1607 [:1990 (2) PLJR (SC)23] (Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association and others V/s. State of Maharashtra and Others). (ii) Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Suryadeo Tiwary V/s. State of Bihar & Others) reported in 2007 (2) PLJR. 547 . (iii) Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Bihar V/s. Ram Lakhan Shukla, reported in 2007(2) PLJR 694 . (iv) State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh reported in 2000 (3) PLJR (SC)81. (v) Ashok Kumar Khare V/s. State of Bihar, 2010(2) PLJR 215 . 8. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. (iv) State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh reported in 2000 (3) PLJR (SC)81. (v) Ashok Kumar Khare V/s. State of Bihar, 2010(2) PLJR 215 . 8. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is undoubtedly correct to state that the writ petitioners by various orders between 1976 to 1981 were given ad hoc/officiating promotion as S.I. in the C.I.D. The cadre of S.I. is State cadre, and those posted in the C.I.D. are only part of the cadre. The remaining S.ls. are spread over different departments of the Bihar Police Force all over the State of Bihar. It is of utmost importance in the present context that all the writ petitioners were posted in the C.I.D. and were given the ad hoc/officiating promotion to S.I. on the basis of consideration of the A.S.Is. posted in the C.I.D. In other words, it was done at the local level, without taking into account cases of similarly circumstanced A.S.Is. in the rest of the cadre. It is equally correct to state that the State Government had on the earlier occasion denied to the writ petitioners the benefit of continuous officiation, giving rise to C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, which was allowed in full, and the authorities were directed to give to them the benefit of continuous officiation. It is equally correct to state that the appeals preferred by the State of Bihar before the Supreme Court, challenging the judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, was dismissed In Limine and on the sole ground of limitation. 9. It is of considerable importance in the present case to consider Rule 659 of the Manual which prescribes the procedure for promotion of A.S.I. to the next higher post of S.I. The same is reproduced here in below: "659. Promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspectors. (a) 50 per cent of the vacancies in the rank of Sub-Inspector shall be filled by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector who have at least done a minimum of five years service [Rule 653(b)]. Only selected officers who have shown exceptional merit while serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector will be promoted. (b) On receipt of information vide Rule 653(a), the Deputy Inspector General will intimate the number of vacancies allotted to each district and call for nominations, to reach him on a date to be fixed. Only selected officers who have shown exceptional merit while serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector will be promoted. (b) On receipt of information vide Rule 653(a), the Deputy Inspector General will intimate the number of vacancies allotted to each district and call for nominations, to reach him on a date to be fixed. (c) At least 14 days before nominations are sent to the Deputy Inspector-General the names of the nominees shall be published by district order so that those who are not nominated may have an opportunity of representing their cases before the nominations are actually submitted. Officers having such representation to make should be given interviews and their cases examined with them. In forwarding the nomination a certificate must be given of the date on which the lists were published and intimations sent to those not nominated. Those not nominated, may submit representation within 14 days to the Deputy Inspector-General which shall be considered by him as early as possible so that in case of necessity, additional nominations may be sent. In selecting Assistant Sub-Inspectors for promotion, preference should be given to those who have received special commendation for integrity of character and good detective work. (d) The Range Deputy-Inspector-Generals Board [Appendix-72(3)) shall make selection from those nominated from districts and shall send names for consideration to Central Selection Board [Appendix-72(2)]. This list shall be drawn according to seniority but if any Assistant Sub-Inspectors is placed serially above his seniority on the basis of his ability, reasons for such special nomination shall be given. Necessary papers and all papers concerning selection shall be presented before the Central Selection Board [Appendix-72(2)] by the date fixed. (e) The Central Selection Board [Appendix-72(2)] shall, if necessary, interview the candidates nominated by the Range Deputy Inspector-Generals Board and prepare a list of selected candidate for promotion. Names of this list should ordinarily be in order of seniority. If an officer is placed higher in the list than his seniority warrants the reasons for such special nomination shall be recorded. Promotions shall be confined to the selected list framed by the Central Selection Board [Appendix-72(2)] but vacancies shall be filled up range wise according to seniority in the list by the Range Deputy Inspector-General. If an officer is placed higher in the list than his seniority warrants the reasons for such special nomination shall be recorded. Promotions shall be confined to the selected list framed by the Central Selection Board [Appendix-72(2)] but vacancies shall be filled up range wise according to seniority in the list by the Range Deputy Inspector-General. A copy of the proceedings shall be forwarded to Inspector General for information who shall endeavour to see that wide disparities do not occur in matter of promotion and confirmation in different ranges and adjustment may be made by suitable transfers of Assistant Sub-Inspectors. (f) The Central Selection Board shall make 25 per cent more selections of Assistant Sub-Inspectors than the number of vacancies so that there is no difficulty in filing casual vacancies. Names beyond 25 per cent may also be kept in this list after getting order of Inspector-General. If any one in the list does not get promoted in one year, his case shall be reviewed again for Inclusion in the next years list and he shall be placed above them. (g) Assistant Sub-Inspector shall be on probation for a period of 12 months from the date of the order promoting them to the rank of Sub-Inspector." 10. This rule on the very face of it contemplates, that it has to be done on Centralised basis, and after taking into account cases of all the eligible A.S.Is of the cadre. It is, therefore, difficult to countenance a situation where A.S.I. of one section or one department would be given ad hoc/officiating promotion to S.I. followed by its recognition by giving to them the benefit of Continuous Officiation, ignoring the remaining members of the cadre posted elsewhere. Such a benefit can be granted only after the procedure prescribed by Rule 659 has been followed. Rule 659 of the Manual was not brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench disposing of C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991. 11. The judgment handed down by a Division Bench would normally bind another Division Bench. We are, however, of the view that had the provision of Rule 659 been brought to the notice of the Division Bench dealing with the C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, it may have reached a different conclusion. It appears to us thats same does not bind us in view of the doctrine of Per Incurium. We are, however, of the view that had the provision of Rule 659 been brought to the notice of the Division Bench dealing with the C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, it may have reached a different conclusion. It appears to us thats same does not bind us in view of the doctrine of Per Incurium. This principle has been applied in a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court and followed by the High Courts. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community V/s. State of Maharastra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 , has expounded the law as follows in paragraph-7: "7. The Constitution Bench in the case of Chandra Prakash V/s. State of UP., took into consideration the law laid down in Parija case and also referred to the decision in Union of India V/s. Reghubir Singh relied on by Ms. Indira Jaising, the learned Senior Counsel and then reiterated the view taken in Parija case Per incuriam means a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision such as a decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law. A ruling making a specific reference to an earlier binding precedent may or may not be correct but cannot be said to be per incuriam. It is true that Raghubir Singh case was not referred to in any case other than Chandra Prakash case but in Chandra Prakash case, Raghubir Singh case and Parija case both have been referred to and considered and then Parija case followed. So the view of the law taken in a series of cases to which Parija case belongs cannot be said to be per incuriam." (emphasis added) 11.1. In Halsburys Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. So the view of the law taken in a series of cases to which Parija case belongs cannot be said to be per incuriam." (emphasis added) 11.1. In Halsburys Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: PP 297-298, para 5781, the doctrine of Per Incuriam has been stated as follows: "A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow; or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. A decision should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of parties, or because the court had not the benefit of the best argument, and, as a general rule, the only cases in which decisions should be held to be given per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority. Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake". (emphasis added) 11.2 Lord Godard, C.J. in Hudders field Police Authority V/s. Watson, 1947 K.B. 842, case observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the courts attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered in per incuriam. 11.3. In a decision of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. and Another V/s. B. Satyanarayana Rao, reported in (2000) 4 Supreme Court Cases 262, it has been held as follows: ( SCC pp. 264-65, para 8) "The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue. ... ... We, therefore, find that the rule of per incuriam cannot be invoked in the present case. Moreover, a case cannot be referred to a Larger Bench on mere asking of a party. A decision by two Judges has a binding effect on another coordinate Bench of two Judges unless it demonstrated that the said decision by any subsequent change in law or decision ceases to laying down a correct law." (emphasis added) 11.4. In State of U.P. V/s. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 , Supreme Court observed: (SCC pp. 162-63, para 40) "40. Incuha literally means carelessness in practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. (Young V/s. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.) Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law." 11.5. In Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. V/s. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356 , Supreme Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 367 & 368, paras 19 & 23) "A prior decision of the Supreme Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a later case. In exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment per incuriam. It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam." (emphasis added) 11.6. In that view of the foregoing, we are of the view that the judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991 is Per Incurium, having been rendered in complete ignorance of Rule 659, and, therefore, does not bind us. 12. Just the same is the position with respect to the two judgments of the Division Bench in Suryadeo Tiwari (supra), and Ram Lakhan Shukla (supra), relied upon by the respondents. 12. Just the same is the position with respect to the two judgments of the Division Bench in Suryadeo Tiwari (supra), and Ram Lakhan Shukla (supra), relied upon by the respondents. In other words, Rule 659 was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents brought to our notice the order of the Supreme Court whereby the appeals challenging the judgment of Division Bench in C.W.J.C. No. 2686 of 1991, have been dismissed In Limine, on the ground of delay. In other words, learned counsel submits that the judgment of this Court has been upheld by the Supreme Court and, therefore, the judgment of this court has attained finality. In his submission, had the judgments of this court not been challenged in the Supreme Court, the doctrine of Per Incuriam could have been applied, but not in a situation like the present one where the order/judgment of this Court has merged into that of the Supreme Court. The contention on first flush appears to be attractive, but on deeper scrutiny and on consideration of the relevant authorities compels us to reject the contention. 14. Law is well settled that dismissal of an appeal In Limine does not in law mean that the impugned judgment has been upheld on merits. An appeal may be dismissed In Limine on various grounds other than merits, for example, on the ground of limitation, locus standi of the petitioner, the conduct of the petitioner disentitling him to any indulgence by the Superior Court, non-compliance of peremptory orders of the Bench, non-payment of court fee, failure to remove defects etc. It is an equally possible situation that, in view of facts and circumstances of the case, the superior court may not be inclined to adjudicate the issue raised in the appeal before it, and may wait for an appropriate case. Neither the doctrine of merger nor Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted to such an order. Reference may be made to the judgment of House of Lords in England in the case of Wilson V/s. Colchester Justices, (1985)2 All. E.R. 97=(1985) 2 W.L.R. 1. The following portion of the judgment illumines the legal position: "My Lords, before I do so there is, however, a matter of some general importance to which your Lordships would wish to advert. E.R. 97=(1985) 2 W.L.R. 1. The following portion of the judgment illumines the legal position: "My Lords, before I do so there is, however, a matter of some general importance to which your Lordships would wish to advert. In one passage in his judgment Stephen Brown LJ., appears to have thought that one reason for following the judgment of Woolf, J., and for accepting his reasons for not fully applying the principles enunciated by Lord Fraser in his speech in Forrest V/s Brighton Justices was that an Appeal Committee of this House (which as it happens on that occasion included Lord Scarman and Lord Bridge) had refused leave to appeal in the Chichester case (See [1982]1 AII.E.R. 1000 at 1004, [1982] 1 WLR 334 at 340). Seemingly the Divisional Court felt that this refusal indicated at least implied approval of the decision which it had been unsuccessfully sought to impugn. Counsel surprised your Lordships by saying that this impression was widespread in the profession. My Lords, if that were so, as my noble and learned friend Lord/Diplock remarked during the argument, the sooner this erroneous impression is emphatically corrected by your Lordships the better. There are a multitude of reasons why, in a particular case, leave to appeal may be refused by an Appeal Committee. I shall not attempt to embark on an exhaustive list for it would be impossible to do so. One reason may be that the particular case raises no question of general principle but turns on its own facts. Another may be that the facts of the particular case are not suitable as a foundation for determining some question of general principle. Your Lordships House is only able, in any given year, to hear and determine a limited number of cases and it is important for the evolution of the law as a whole that those cases should be carefully chosen. Conversely the fact that leave to appeal is given is not of itself an indication that the judgments below are thought to be wrong. It may well be that leave is given in order that the relevant law may be authoritatively restated in clearer terms. Conversely the fact that leave to appeal is given is not of itself an indication that the judgments below are thought to be wrong. It may well be that leave is given in order that the relevant law may be authoritatively restated in clearer terms. It is not difficult to find in the books examples of cases where, after leave to appeal has been refused in one case, another case will later arise in which leave to appeal has been given as a result of which the decision against which leave to appeal was originally refused is shown to have been wrong. But that of itself does not mean that the initial refusal of leave was wrong." 14.1. The same has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Kunhayammed V/s. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 . Summing up the conclusion in Clause-IV of paragraph 43, it was held as follows: "(iv) An order refusing Special Leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed." 14.2. In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association V/s. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187 : ( AIR 1990 SC 334 ): 1990 Lab.lC 324), and Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury V/s. Union of India, 1996 (7) SCC 1 : (1996 AIR SCW 57): (AIR 1996 SC 57): (1996 Lab.lC 759), both decisions by two-Judges Benches, the Supreme Court has held that a non-speaking order of dismissal of a special leave petition cannot lead to assumption that it had necessarily decided by implication the correctness of the decision under challenge. 14.3. We may refer to a recent decision by a Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court in V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2000) 3 SCALE 240 : ( AIR 2000 SC 1623 ) : (2000 AIR SCW 1702 : (2000 CLC 1181), wherein it has been held as follows: ".......when a special leave petition is dismissed, this Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is sought. What the Court means is that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution That certainly could not be so when appeal is dismissed though by a non-speaking order. Here the doctrine of merger applies. In that case the Supreme Court upholds the decision of the High Court or of the Tribunal. This doctrine of merger does not apply in the case of dismissal of special leave petition under Article 136. When appeal is dismissed, order of the High Court is merged with that of the Supreme Court. We find ourselves in entire agreement with the law so stated. We are clear in our mind that an order dismissing a special leave petition, moreso when it is by a non-speaking order, does not result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the Supreme Court." 14.4. In its decision in the case of Saurashtra Oil Mills Association V/s. State of Gujarat ( AIR 2002 S.C. 1130 ), the Supreme Court has held as follows in paragraph 14 of the judgment: "...Repeatedly it has been held that the dismissal of Special Leave Petition without a speaking order would only mean that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion in granting leave to file the appeal. It does not attract the doctrine of merger and the view expressed in the impugned order does not become the view of this Court. The dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by a non-speaking order would remain a dismissal simplicitor in which the permission to file the appeal to this Court is not granted. This may be because of various reasons. It would not mean to be the declaration of law by this Court......" (emphasis added) 15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Another set of similarly circumstanced employees challenged similar or identical decisions in parallel proceedings before this Court and were similarly allowed. The State Government challenged the same by preferring the aforesaid appeals before the Supreme Court, namely, State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh, which were allowed by a common judgment dated 27.4.2000, reported in [2000 (3) PLJR (SC)81]. The State Government challenged the same by preferring the aforesaid appeals before the Supreme Court, namely, State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh, which were allowed by a common judgment dated 27.4.2000, reported in [2000 (3) PLJR (SC)81]. The Supreme Court has observed that the judgments of the High Court were passed in violation of the provisions of law and rules and is adversely affecting the interest of a large number of officers in the department. Dismissing the appeals under such situation, on technical grounds of delay, would result in failure of justice. 15.1. The Supreme Court examined a large number of judgments including the judgment in the Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association and Others V/s. State of Maharashtra & Others, as well as Rule 649 of the Manual, and came to the conclusion that ignoring such a basic principle of law by the High Court has resulted in separation of a large number of officers in the Police Department. Therefore, no benefit can accrue to the employee who has been considered for ad hoc/officiating promotion on a local level, touching a portion of the cadre, to the exclusion and grave prejudice of the remaining members of the cadre. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, judgments of the High Court were set aside, and it was directed that such candidates are not entitled to the benefit of continuous officiation who had worked on ad hoc/ officiating basis. 16. Identical writ petitions came up before a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (S.K. Katriar, J.) was a member. Relying on Rule 649 of the Manual and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-ll Engineering Officers Association and Others V/s. State of Maharashtra & Others (supra), State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and State of Bihar V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (supra), the appeals at the instance of the employees in Ashok Kumar Khare V/s. State of Bihar (supra) were dismissed. The Division Bench did not grant to them the benefit of continuous, officiating promotion because they had been given the benefit without following the prescribed procedure, and at the local level. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is relevant in the present context and is reproduced herein below: "8. The Division Bench did not grant to them the benefit of continuous, officiating promotion because they had been given the benefit without following the prescribed procedure, and at the local level. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is relevant in the present context and is reproduced herein below: "8. We do not find it possible to grant to the writ petitioners the benefit of continuous officiation with effect from 10.7.1981, for various reasons. Clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph 44 of the judgment in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association V/s. State of Maharashtra (Supra) are reproduced hereinbelow. "44. To sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority, (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rule but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted." (Emphasis added) The two portions of the judgment have to be read harmoniously. The underlined portion completely prohibits us from showing such a liberal approach to the petitioner." 9. There is yet another difficulty in following such a course. The writ petition does not state that grant of the benefit of continuous officiation with effect from 10.7.1981 shall not adversely affect persons senior to him in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors. The petitioner has also not impleaded the persons senior to him in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors. The issue is really covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (supra), Paragraphs 25 and 26 of which are reproduced herein below for the facility of quick reference: "25. The petitioner has also not impleaded the persons senior to him in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors. The issue is really covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (supra), Paragraphs 25 and 26 of which are reproduced herein below for the facility of quick reference: "25. It is thus evident that Brij Bihari Prasad Singh having been promoted on officiating basis with a clear stipulation that he will not get seniority in the rank of Inspector till finally selected could not have preferred a claim regarding his seniority on the basis of promotion of Ramjas Singh, though initially junior to him yet substantively promoted in accordance with Rule 660(c) on 8.7.1972 whereas Brij Bihari Prasad Singh was promoted after selection under Rule 649 in 1978. The High Court totally ignored the basic principles governing the service rules and the mandate of law. There was, therefore, no justification of issuing the directions to direct the promotion of Brij Bihari Prasad Singh while deciding the Writ Petition No. 697 of 1995 and dismissing the L.P.A. No. 1018/95 vide the judgment impugned in this appeal filed against Brij Bihari Prasad Singh. 26. It appears that the High Court totally lost sight of the fact that in his petitions filed from time to time Brij Bihari Prasad Singh had not impleaded any of his seniors as party-respondents. In the absence of persons likely to be affected by the relief prayed for, the writ petitions should have normally been dismissed unless there existed specific reasons for non-impleadment of the affected persons. Neither any reason was assigned by the writ petitioner nor did the Court feel it necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter, ignoring such a basic principle of law has resulted in the supersession of 168 Inspectors and 407 Dy.SPs. The writ petition filed Brij Bihari Prasad Singh being totally misconceived, devoid of any legal force and prayers made being in contravention of the rules applicable in the case deserved dismissal, which was unfortunately not done with the result that the interests of many seniors have been threatened, endangered and adversely affected. The appeal of the State has, therefore, to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment"." 17. The appeal of the State has, therefore, to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment"." 17. We are, therefore, of the view that giving the benefit of continuous officiation on the strength of the officiating/ad hoc promotion as S.I. to a portion of the cadre will act to the great detriment of the remaining members of the cadre, and will create an extremely unjust and anomalous situation. Persons senior to the writ petitioners and likely to be adversely affected have not been impleaded as party respondents. 18. In the result, the appeals are allowed. We disagree with the order dated 23.9.2005, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2187 of 2004, and the order dated 29.8.2007, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 446 of 2006, and the writ petitions are dismissed. We wish to emphasise that, in view of the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Prasad and State of Bihar V/s. Brij Bihari Prasad Singh (supra), the writ petitioners shall only be deprived of their claims for seniority on the basis of continuous officiation as S.I., but shall not be deprived of the monetary benefits or such other benefits they have derived from such officiation. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Birendra Prasad Verma, J. 19 I agree.