JUDGEMENT Ajay Kr.Tripathi, J. 1. All the writ applications have been heard together because they had been admitted and clubbed together for hearing as common bundle of facts and questions of law have emerged or were pressed by various counsel representing the petitioners at the relevant time. It is in this background all these matters have been heard together and are also being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. All these petitioners are claimants and desired appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) in the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar. They all claimed that they have the requisite experience by virtue of training they had undergone as apprentice in various recognized institutions. Their right for appointment to the post irrespective of the terms and conditions laid down in Advertisement No. 128 of 1996 flows from a decision which was rendered in the case of U.P State Road Construction & Another V/s. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh & Others, (1995)2 SCC 1 . 3. In the above decision of the Honble Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of Apprenticeship Act, the Apex Court was of the opinion that all such apprentices who had undergone training acquired skill as well as consumed public time and money ought to be engaged by the State authority on the basis of certain parameters laid down in paragraph-12 of the said decision. The decision of the Apex Court was rendered in a case originating from the State of Uttar Pradesh and in relation to a Public Sector Undertaking, namely, the Road Transport Corporation Uttar Pradesh. 4. Taking queue from the said decision the advertisement issued by the Bihar Public Service Commission, namely, Advertisement No. 128 of 1996 was sought to be challenged in all these writ applications filed in the years 1998 and 99. According to the petitioners the advertisement did not provide for any kind of concession for the apprentice engineers and they were clubbed with the rest, for appointment, which would be in breach of the decision of the Apex Court. They desires that a fresh advertisement be issued making provision for them or corrigendum be issued accommodating the interest of these petitioners in the said recruitment drive. It is also recorded that majority of these petitioners did not even apply pursuant to the Advertisement No. 128 of 1996. 5. They desires that a fresh advertisement be issued making provision for them or corrigendum be issued accommodating the interest of these petitioners in the said recruitment drive. It is also recorded that majority of these petitioners did not even apply pursuant to the Advertisement No. 128 of 1996. 5. The primary submission made on behalf of most of these petitioners that the law having been settled with regard to the right of these apprentices by virtue of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court, the State of Bihar had an obligation to accommodate these petitioners. The advertisement which was issued for recruitment, being contrary to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court, ought to be quashed straightway. As it was not done the petitioners were compelled to move the High Court by filing several writ applications. 6. Another aspect which has been pointed out to Court is that after 1996 advertisement yet another advertisement which is Advertisement No. 25 of 1999 was issued and even that became a subject matter in some other writ applications. On the basis of the intervention of this Court the respondent authority issued a corrigendum indicating that the apprentices would be given preference and if age comes in their way a kind of waiver too will be extended. 7. The current position is that the. appointments have already been made both with regard to 1996 advertisement as well as 1999 advertisement. These appointments have come to be made, as I am informed, sometime in the year 2002 and 2004 on the intervention of the Court. 8. But the question which is required to be answered in these writ applications is whether any kind of right subsists in favour of the petitioners at such a belated stage after more than 14 years when the advertisement was issued. 9. The stand of the respondent State authority is that no direction can be issued by the Court at this stage for making appointment since recruitments have already been carried out on the basis of the advertisement issued in the year 1996 and 1999. Giving any direction now to the respondent to quash the said advertisements, undo the appointments already made on the basis of the said advertisements would not only unsettle settled things where large number of persons have been appointed and have acquired a right. Giving any direction now to the respondent to quash the said advertisements, undo the appointments already made on the basis of the said advertisements would not only unsettle settled things where large number of persons have been appointed and have acquired a right. It would also amount to putting the clock back and turn the pages of history back by a decade and a half. 10. Yet another aspect which has been pointed out by learned Additional Advocate General-2 is that the appointments to the post came to be made in terms of the notification dated 31.7.2004 issued by the State Government which is Annexure-D to the counter affidavit filed in CWJC No. 4942 of 1999. This notification was based on a direction of the Division Bench which is Annexure-C to the said counter affidavit. The people have already filled up the posts and are working for many years. Now it will not be in the interest of things to even remotely consider their cases on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court for the advertisement of 1996. 11. It is also pointed out that most of these petitioners want direction for appointment on the basis of relaxation given in the 1999 advertisement which was based on a judicial decision. Even otherwise all of them are more near the age of superannuation rather than fit for consideration for appointment. 12. In the totality therefore the facts being what they are, this Court is unable to grant any relief to these petitioners in the above stated circumstances, as the relief can accrue to a litigant only provided it does not unsettle the settled position. There has to be some co-relation between the time frame when a relief was prayed and it could be given or ought to be given. These writ applications are now more academic in nature and no substantive relief can accrue to them when the whole exercise was completed and issue put to rest. 13. These writ applications have not merit and they are dismissed but without any costs.