JUDGEMENT Ramesh Kr.Datta, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner-Bank, learned counsel for Union of India and learned counsel for respondent no. 3-workman. 2. The writ application has been filed for quashing the award dated 21.9.2000 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No. 14(C) of 1998 by which it has been held that the termination from service of respondent no. 3 with effect from 14.8.1989 without any domestic enquiry and without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, is illegal and he is entitled to reinstatement with 50% of the back wages with effect from 14.8.1989 with a further direction to implement the award within a period of two months from the date of publication of the award. 3. The brief facts of this case are that the respondent no. 3 was empanelled as Budlee Sepoy-cum-Tea/Water Boy after obtaining the names from the Employment Exchange in the year 1986. The admitted position is that the respondent no. 3 worked for 247 days in different Branches as such in the year 1987. Thereafter he has worked in the other years. A complaint dated 4.3.1989 was received from Sarvoday Nav Yuvak Vikas Parishad on 9.3.1989 alleging that the respondent no. 3 had suppressed his real age in order to get selected in the panel of Budlee Sepoy in which complaint the matriculation Admit Card, marks sheet of matriculation and false certificate of non-matric was enclosed. On an investigation being made, it was prima facie, found that the date of birth in the original matriculation certificate was mentioned as 4.5.1969 which was subsequently cut and changed to 10.3.1966. However, even before the report of investigation could be submitted on 18.11.1989 by the Investigating Officer, by order dated 14.8.1989, the respondent no. 3 was disengaged from the panel of Budlee Sepoy. The respondent no. 3 for the first time raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Patna by sending his demand notice dated 18/20.1.1997 to the management. Upon failure of the conciliation, the Government of India by notification dated 23.7.1998 referred the following question for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna: "Whether the action of the management of Bank of India in terminating the services of Shri Prithvi Raj Singh w.e.f. 14.8.1989 without following the provisions of Section 25F of I.D. Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the said workman is entitled." 4. The Industrial Tribunal entered into the reference case being registered as 14(C) of 1998. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal found that the workman had worked for 247 days in the year 1987. In the year prior to 14.8.1989 the respondent no. 3 had taken the plea that although he had worked for more than 240 days but no certificate was issued and the same would be established from the records of the Bank such as vouchers, P.L. Analysis Book and Wage Payment Register which he asked for from the management by his petition dated 24.4.2000 but despite direction of the Tribunal the management did not produce the same. For the said reasons the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Bank having not produced the said documents to show that the workman did not work for 240 days as has been claimed by him, hence in the facts and circumstances, there would be no hesitation to find that he has worked for 240 days as required under Section 25(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Regarding submission of false date of birth, the Tribunal has recorded that the investigation had been conducted behind the back of the workman without disclosing the allegations to him and asking him to explain and the report of investigation was submitted on 8.11.1989, whereas the workman had been terminated three months prior to 14.8.1989 and hence no support can be derived by the management from the same. The Tribunal also relied upon the fact that subsequently the Bihar School Examination Board had also corrected the date of birth and the certificate issued by it has not been challenged by the management. For the said reasons, the Tribunal held that there was non-compliance of the requirement of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and directed reinstatement of respondent no. 3 with 50% of the back wages. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the award on several grounds. Firstly, it is submitted that there was a delay of nearly 10 years in making the reference and thus on the said ground alone the reference and the award ought to be quashed. In support of the same he relies upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the award on several grounds. Firstly, it is submitted that there was a delay of nearly 10 years in making the reference and thus on the said ground alone the reference and the award ought to be quashed. In support of the same he relies upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision relied upon is the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. V/s. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others: (2000)2 SCC 455 , in para 6 of which it has been held as follows: "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. in fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent." It is submitted that reference in the said case was quashed on the ground of seven years delay. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent." It is submitted that reference in the said case was quashed on the ground of seven years delay. 6 The other decision relied upon is that of The Workmen of M/s Shalimar Works Ltd. V/s. M/s Shalimar Works Ltd. and Another: AIR 1959 SC 1217 , in which in a case of wholesale discharging of nearly 250 workmen, it was held that a reference not made within a reasonable time as it was sent to the Industrial Tribunal more than four years after such discharge was not in accordance with law although there was no period of limitation prescribed. Learned counsel also relies upon a similar decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.M.Nilajkar and Others V/s. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka: (2003)4 SCC 27 and the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Secretary, Barauni Tel Sodhak Mazdoor Union, Begusarai V/s. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad and Others: 1992(2) PLJR 163. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 counters the said submission by, submitting that the plea regarding delay was not taken before the Tribunal nor the petitioner approached this Court against the reference made by the Government of India and thus the said plea is not available to him at this belated stage. It is urged that the petitioner participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal and having lost before it, he cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the award on that ground. In support of the same he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board V/s. Rajesh Kumar: (2005) SCC (L&S) 183, in paras 4 and 5 of which it has been held as follows: "4. The Labour Court, on the basis of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding of fact that the respondent workmen did work for 240 days. This conclusion is based on the evidence of the workmen and the list of 82 employees, which included the names of the respondent workmen. The Labour Court, on the basis of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding of fact that the respondent workmen did work for 240 days. This conclusion is based on the evidence of the workmen and the list of 82 employees, which included the names of the respondent workmen. It is also on record that the correctness of this list was not challenged before the Labour Court and the management did not produce any contra-evidence or the original records which it possessed to deny the claim or contention of the workmen. Non-consideration of the evidence of the Executive Engineer who was examined on behalf of the appellant, in our view, did not affect the case in any way for the simple reason that he was not in service on the relevant dates i.e. the dates on which the services of the respondent workmen were terminated. It is also clear from the impugned judgment that the point with regard to the stale claim of the workmen was not aisod before the Labour Court. For the 1st time it was sought to be urged before the High Court. We may also add that if the appellant was really aggrieved and serious as to the stale claim of the respondent workmen, it was open to the appellant management to question the very reference made by the State Government in the year 1997 itself. The validity of the reference was not questioned. Thereafter, the management participated in the proceedings before the Labour Court and suffered the award. The management further, unsuccessfully, challenged the award of the Labour Court before the High Court. From the award of the Labour Court it is clear that the relief granted to the workmen was only with regard to the reinstatement with continuity of service. The back wages were- awarded only from the date of reference and not from the dates of termination of their services. This is how the Court has moulded the relief. We are told that when the proceedings were pending in the High Court, the respondent workmen are already reinstated. 5. It is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that there is no period of limitation as is prescribed for the parties in making the reference. The facts and circumstances of each case are to be considered in dealing with the stale claims and appropriate reliefs are to be granted. 5. It is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that there is no period of limitation as is prescribed for the parties in making the reference. The facts and circumstances of each case are to be considered in dealing with the stale claims and appropriate reliefs are to be granted. We do not think it is necessary for us to examine the question of stale claims made by the learned counsel for the appellant in these cases, in the light of the facts narrated above and particularly, when the appellant did not challenge the order of reference made in the year 1997, at this stage. Thus, looking from all angles, substantial justice is done in the matter. In this view, we decline to interfere with the impugned judgment. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed. No costs." He also relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum- Processing Service Society Limited and Another: (1999)6 SCC 82 , in para-10 of which it has been held as follows: "10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to. be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya V/s. State of Haryana: (1999)1 SCT 141 (P&H): ILR (1999)1 P&H 93 (FB) is also of no help to him. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya V/s. State of Haryana: (1999)1 SCT 141 (P&H): ILR (1999)1 P&H 93 (FB) is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases". However, it went on further to say that "reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay." We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 33-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding over the Court cannot be stretched to authorize them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/ boards and tribunal under the Act." He further relies upon a decision in the case of Shahaji V/s. Executive Engineer, PWD: 2006 SCC (L&S) 644, in para-6 of which it has been held as follows: "6. We have heard counsel for the parties and we have also been taken through the judgments of this Court reported in Ajaib Singh V/s. Sirhind Coop. We have heard counsel for the parties and we have also been taken through the judgments of this Court reported in Ajaib Singh V/s. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society: (1999)6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054, Nedungadi Bank Ltd. V/s. K.P. Madhavankutty: (2000)2 SCC 455 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 283 and Sapan Kumar Pandit V/s. U.P. SEB: (2001)6 SCC 222 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 946. Having gone through the judgments we have no doubt that the judgment of this Court in Ajaib Singh case lays down the law correctly. In the instant case there was no ground of delay urged by the management. Moreover, even if there was delay in making the reference to the Labour Court, if it came to the conclusion that the termination was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the relief to be granted to the workman in view of the delay. In such cases the award of back wages may either be not permitted or curtailed. In Nedungadi Bank case what was challenged before the High Court was the order making the reference. That was not a case where the Labour Court refused to entertain the dispute on the ground of delay. Having regard to the clear position in law we are left with no option but to allow this appeal and set asid.e the judgment and order of the High Court." 8. It is evident from the consideration of the aforesaid decisions that there is no limitation prescribed in the Industrial Disputes Act for making a reference under Section 10 of the Act but the same ought to be made within a reasonable time. However, it has also been held that merely raising the plea of delay is not sufficient. The employer must also show prejudice caused on account of the delay. The most important aspect however, is that if the employer is aggrieved by the making of delay in reference, then he ought to challenge the reference itself in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution or at the very least raise the issue before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. If the employer has not raised any such plea and goes on to participate in the proceedings before the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal and if the award is given against him, he cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the same before the High Court. If the employer has not raised any such plea and goes on to participate in the proceedings before the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal and if the award is given against him, he cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the same before the High Court. That being the position of law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court does not find any force in the plea of learned counsel regarding the delay in making the reference. 9. The next plea of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the onus is on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days before he can claim application of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act in his favour and the Industrial Tibanal instead of laying the onus upon the workman has rather laid it at the door of the management for failure to prove contrary by producing necessary documents. It is urged by learned counsel that the respondent no. 3 had not worked for 240 days prior to 14.10.1989 and he had not raised any plea in this regard and there is no question of evidence on the said point and thus the Tribunal has wrongly shifted the onus on the management to disprove the same. In support of the same learned counsel relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Range Forest Officer V/s. State of Karnataka and Another. 2002(2) PLJR (SC)212: (2002)2 SCC 25 in paras 2 and 3 of which it has been held as follows: "2. In the instant case, dispute was referred to the Labour Court that the respondent had worked for 240 days and his service had been terminated without paying him any retrenchment compensation. The appellant herein did not accept this and contended that the respondent had not worked for 240 days. The Tribunal vide its award dated 10.8.1998 came to the conclusion that the service had been terminated without giving retrenchment compensation. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days, the Tribunal stated that the burden was on the management to show that there was justification in termination of the service and that the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a year. 3. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days, the Tribunal stated that the burden was on the management to show that there was justification in termination of the service and that the affidavit of the workman was sufficient to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a year. 3. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, though reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat V/s. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar: (2001)9 SCC 713 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 269: JT (2001)3 SC 326. In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. However, Mr. Hegde appearing for the Department states that the State is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two months from today." He also relies upon the decision in Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Sowaran Singh: (2005)8 SCC 481 which has been relied upon in State of M.P. and Others V/s. Arjunlal Rajak : (2006)2 SCC 711 . 10. Learned counsel for the respondent no. Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Sowaran Singh: (2005)8 SCC 481 which has been relied upon in State of M.P. and Others V/s. Arjunlal Rajak : (2006)2 SCC 711 . 10. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, on the other hand, submits that while initial onus may be upon the workman in the matter but since the records in such matters are generally with the management and if the workman has produced whatever evidence he had and produced the witnesses in Court in support of the same, and also sought the production of the relevant documents by the management which the management failed to produce, then in such circumstances, the onus would shift upon the management. It is urged by learned counsel that the respondent no. 3 filed a petition dated 24.4.2000 seeking production by the management of all the papers which were most relevant for proving the point that the respondent-workman had worked for more than 240 days in the 12 preceding calendar months before the termination but despite the direction of the Tribunal, the management did not produce the same and thus it must be presumed that producing the same would have gone against the contention of management that the workman had not worked for more than 240 days during the said period, in support of the said stand learned counsel relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division V/s. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda : 2010-I-LLJ-3(SC), in para-15 of which it has been held as follows: "15. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this Court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this Court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. It is the contention of the appellant that the services of the respondent were terminated in 1988. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. It is the contention of the appellant that the services of the respondent were terminated in 1988. The witness produced by the appellant stated that the respondent stopped coming to work from February, 1988. The documentary evidence produced by the appellant is contradictory to this fact as it shows that the respondent was working during February, 1989 also. It has also been observed by the High Court that the muster roll for 1986-87 was not completely produced. The appellants have inexplicably failed to produce the complete records and muster rolls from 1985 to 1991, in spite of the direction issued by the Labour Court to produce the same, in fact there has been practically no challenge to the deposition of the respondent during cross-examination. In this regard, it would be pertinent to mention the observations of three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad V/s. Siri Niwas, (2004)8 SCC 195 : 2004-III-LLJ-760, where it is observed at p. 763 of LLJ: "14. A Court of Law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against this contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a Court the evidence is withheld." 11. He also submits that if the workman is purposely terminated before 240 days of continuous employment in a calendar year by the action of the employer, then it must be held that the same is in violation of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act and reinstatement is the.only consequence of the same. In support of the same, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others V/s. Ramchander and Another: (2007)1 SCC (L&S) 439, in para 4 of which the said proposition has been laid down. 12. In support of the same, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others V/s. Ramchander and Another: (2007)1 SCC (L&S) 439, in para 4 of which the said proposition has been laid down. 12. From a consideration of the decisions cited, it is clear that the initial onus is upon the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding the date of retrenchment. But it has also been held that where the workman has led evidence on the point and prayed for production of documents by the management which are in the custody of the management for proving his case and the said relevant documents are not produced by the management on directions by the Industrial Tribunal, then in such circumstances, the Court can presume that the evidence if produced by the management would have been adverse to it and presumption can be raised that the workman has completed 240 days of service. In the present case the respondent no. 3 did file a petition on 24.4.2000 before the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal directed the petitioner to produce those documents but despite such direction the petitioner failed to produce the same without any proper cause. In the said circumstances, the finding by the Tribunal that respondent no. 3 has completed 240 days of service in the 12 calendar months preceding 14.8.1989 is not fit to be interfered with. 13. Another submission has been made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the termination of daily rated employees does not come within the retrenchment and as such they are not entitled to any benefit under the Industrial Disputes Act. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent-workman however relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Superintending Engineer, Rastriya Uchh Path Artchal, Muzaffarpur V/s. P.W.D. Workers Union and Others: 1995(1) PLJR 303 for the proposition that a daily wager is as much a workman as any other employee receiving monthly salary in a time scale of pay. In para 7 of the said decision it has been held as follows: "7. In para 7 of the said decision it has been held as follows: "7. It is to be noted that like any other Act the Industrial Disputes Act also provides a conceptual framework within which entitles are created and their mutual rights and obligations are determined in order to achieve the legislative object. Thus, the Industrial Disputes Act also has its own concept of employer and workman as defined in Sections 2(g) and 2(s) respectively and determines their inter se rights and obligations. One of the obligations imposed upon the employer in terms of Section 25F is that he must part company with such of his workmen who have been in service for not less than one year only on the fulfillment of certain conditions failing which the relationship of employer and workman would be deemed not to have been severed and the workman would in the eye of law continue to be in service and would consequently be entitled to his wages etc. All that is required by the Act is that a person should qualify as workman within the meaning of the Act and should satisfy the conditions to attract, the protection of Section 25F of the Act. Any consideration regarding regular or irregular, legal or illegal appointments or appointments made following the procedures under the rules is wholly foreign to the definition of workman in Section 2(s) of the Act. Now that the definition of workman has been so enlarged by the decision of the Supreme Court, in Hussaini Bhais case ( AIR 1978 SC 1410 ) in our opinion it is futile to urge that an employee engaged on daily wages is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. This question has come before the Courts on countless occasions and it is now established beyond dispute that for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act a daily wage earner is as much a workman as an employee receiving his wages on a monthly basis in a time scale of pay." The said finding of the Division Bench is sufficient to answer the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. 15 Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to argue that the Tribunal ought not to have granted the reinstatement to the workman considering the fact that he had worked for a very short period of time particularly on account of suppression of real date of birth and producing false certificate in that regard. It is alleged that in respect of work in a Bank, the personal integrity is a very important factor and that ought to have been weighed by the Tribunal while considering the other findings on merits which had been arrived at in favour of the workman. It is urged by learned counsel that in such matters a lump sum is normally paid in lieu of reinstatement. In support of the same he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagbir Singh V/s. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Another: 2009-IV-LLJ- 336(SC), in paras 15 and 16 of which it has been laid down as follows: "15. It would be, thus, seen that by catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages. As a matter of fact, in all the judgments of this Court referred to and relied upon by the High Court while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages, this Court has awarded compensation. 16. While awarding compensation, the host of factors, inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant. As a matter of fact, in all the judgments of this Court referred to and relied upon by the High Court while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages, this Court has awarded compensation. 16. While awarding compensation, the host of factors, inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant. Of course, each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances. In a case such as this where the total length of service rendered by the appellant was short and intermittent from September 1, 1995 to July 18, 1996 and that he was engaged as a daily wager, in our considered view, a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellant by respondent No. 1 shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment should be made within six weeks from today failing which the same will carry interest @ 9% per annum." 16. Learned counsel for the respondent-workman however, submits that in the present matter the petitioner has not only implemented the award unconditionally while reinstating the respondent no. 3 as Budlee Sepoy but subsequently it has even promoted and confirmed the workman as Clerk with effect from 21.3.2008. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had no option but to reinstate the workman and it had also earlier reinstated the workman subject to the result of the writ petition but as there was threat from the authorities of the Government of India to initiate criminal proceedings against the Zonal Manager of the Bank, faced with such situation it had no option but to reinstate the workman without stating the condition of the same being subject to the result of the writ petition in the said order of reinstatement. The same however, according to learned counsel, cannot be taken against the Bank as it would lead to a situation where the Bank would be deprived of pursuing its lawful remedy before this Court. 18. This Court finds some force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner to the extent that even if forced by circumstances and under threat of initiation of prosecution it had reinstated the workman without stating any such condition in the letter of reinstatement, that cannot prevent it to pursue its remedy before this Court. 18. This Court finds some force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner to the extent that even if forced by circumstances and under threat of initiation of prosecution it had reinstated the workman without stating any such condition in the letter of reinstatement, that cannot prevent it to pursue its remedy before this Court. It is evident from the sequence of events mentioned in the writ petition and the pleadings that the petitioner was placed in a helpless position by the Officers of the Central Government. In the opinion of this Court, the Bank had every right to have reinstated the respondent no. 3 subject to the result of the writ petition which it had already filed challenging the award in question. It was only on account of the unreasonable stand taken by the authorities of the Central Government in support of respondent no. 3 that it was forced to issue a letter without the said condition of reinstatement subject to result of the writ petition, that cannot be held against the petitioner so as to deprive it of its right to pursue the writ petition before this Court. 19. However, the main issue is that not only the Bank reinstated the workman in terms of the award but it has gone further ahead and also promoted him as a Clerk in the Bank and thereafter has confirmed him on the said post. There was no pressure or threat upon the petitioner to promote the respondent no. 3 on the higher post of Clerk. Having done that, according to this Court, it is too late in the day for the Bank to claim that the order of reinstatement should be set aside. 20. In the light of the aforesaid discussions this Court does not find it a fit case to interfere with the award of the Tribunal. 21. The writ application is accordingly dismissed.