Judgment :- 1. The accused in CC No.298/1996 on the file of the learned, CJM, Bellary (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court” for short) has challenged in this revision the legality and correctness of the Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence dated 19.09.1998 passed in the said case convicting him for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month for the offence under Section 279 of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months for the offence under Section 304A of IPC. He has further challenged in this revision the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2006 passed in Crl.A.No.48/1998 by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-II, Bellary (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Court” for short) confirming the said Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. 2. Heard the arguments of Smt.Anuradha Deshpande for the revision petitioner-accused and Sri.P.H.Gotkhindi, learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent and perused the impugned Judgments and Orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate court and also perused the entire records obtained from the Trial Court. 3. The accusation against the revision petitioner-accused was that on 04.07.1996 at about 9.15 a.m. in front of Government High School at Koralagundi Village within the limits of Bellary Rural Police Station, drove the KSRTC bus bearing registration No.KA-25/F-420 in a rash and negligent manner from Bellary side towards Gudaduru Road so as to endanger the human life and dashed against one Shankargowda S/o Eranna Gowda who was standing by the side of the road and thereby caused his death and thus committed the offences under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC. 4. In order to substantiate the above accusation, the prosecution got examined for it PWs 1 to 8 and got marked the documents at Exs.P1 to p7. The defence of the accused is one of total denial. Therefore, he has not chosen to get any witness examined for him nor as he chosen to produce any documents. 5. 4. In order to substantiate the above accusation, the prosecution got examined for it PWs 1 to 8 and got marked the documents at Exs.P1 to p7. The defence of the accused is one of total denial. Therefore, he has not chosen to get any witness examined for him nor as he chosen to produce any documents. 5. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by the prosecution, the trial Court held the accused guilty for the said offences and convicted and sentenced him accordingly by its impugned judgment and order. Aggrieved by the same, the revision petitioner-accused filed Crl.A.No.48/1998 and the Appellate court dismissed the said appeal and thereby confirmed the Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. 6. Of the 8 witnesses examined for the prosecution, PWs 2 and 6 are the eyewitnesses to the said accident. Both the said witnesses have consistently stated in their examination-in-chief that on the said date, time and place while they were near the said school, they saw the said KSRTC bus coming from Bellary side at high speed and also in a rash and negligent manner and dashing against the deceased Shankara Gowda. They have further stated consistently that right side front and rear wheels of the said bus ran over on the deceased and the driver could stop the said bus after it went ahead for about 15 feet. It is suggested to PW2 Srinivasa, the eye witness to the accident, that on the said date, time and place of the accident, the accused blew horn while driving the said vehicle. Further, it is suggested to PW6 Thirumala Reddy, another eye witness to the said accident, that the deceased went to catch hold of another boy at the place of accident and by doing so, himself dashed against the said bus. These suggestions to PWs2 and 6, the eye witnesses, clearly go to show that the factum of accident that occurred on the said date, time and place and also the fact that the accused was driving the said bus involved in the said accident are not in dispute. 7. These suggestions to PWs2 and 6, the eye witnesses, clearly go to show that the factum of accident that occurred on the said date, time and place and also the fact that the accused was driving the said bus involved in the said accident are not in dispute. 7. On careful reading of the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., it could be seen that though he has denied the incriminating evidence of all the prosecution witnesses including PWs2 and 6, the eye witnesses, he has not stated anything as to how the said accident occurred. How exactly the accident occurred is a fact which was especially within the knowledge of the accused. Therefore, though the accused had right to remain silent, by virtue of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, he, being the driver of the said vehicle at the relevant time of accident, had a duty to explain as to how the accident occurred. 8. In the case of Ramgulam choudary Vs State of Bihar reported in AIR 2001 SC 2842 where the accused were alleged to have kidnapped the deceased and the prosecution was able to prove that deceased was kidnapped by the accused, but the dead body of the deceased could not be traced, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that what had happened to the deceased after the deceased was kidnapped by the accused, was especially within the knowledge of the accused, since the accused gave no explanation as to what they did after they took away the deceased, there was every justification for drawing inference that the accused had murdered the victim. 9. In another decision in the case of Sucha Singh Vs State of Punjab reported in AIR 2001 SC 1436 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed at para Nos.15, 19 and 20 as under: “15. The abductors alone could tell the Court tell the Court as to what happened to the deceased after they were abducted. When the abductors withheld that information from the Court there is every justification for drawing the inference, in the light of all the preceding and succeeding circumstances adverted to above, that the abductors are the murderers of the deceased. 19. When the abductors withheld that information from the Court there is every justification for drawing the inference, in the light of all the preceding and succeeding circumstances adverted to above, that the abductors are the murderers of the deceased. 19. We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases where prosecution has succeeded in proving facts for which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts failed to offer any explanation which might drive the Court to draw a different inference. 20. We have seriously bestowed our consideration to the arguments addressed by the learned Senior Counsel. We only reiterate the legal principle adumbrated in State of West Bengal v Mir Mohammad Omar, 2000 AIR SCW 3230: AIR 2000 SC 2988 : (2000 Cri LJ 4047) (supra), that when more persons than one have abducted the victim, who was later murdered, it is within the legal province of the Court to justifiably draw a presumption depending on the factual situation, that all the abductors are responsible for the murder. Section 34 of the IPC could be invoked for the aid to the end, unless any particular abductor satisfies the Court with his explanation as to what else he did with the victim subsequently, i.e. whether he left his associates en-route or whether he dissuaded others from doing the extreme act etc.” 10. Thus it is clear that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases where prosecution has succeeded in proving facts on which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, unless the accused offers any explanation which might drive the Court to draw a different inference. 11. 11. Following the above observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case, I am of the considered opinion that how exactly the accident occurred was especially within the knowledge of the accused but he has not given any explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The suggestions put to PW2 and 6, the eye witnesses to the accident, as observed by me supra, clearly go to show that it is not disputed by the accused that he drove the said bus on the said date, time and place and thereby caused the accident resulting in the death of the deceased, but nothing is brought on record to show that the evidence of PW2 and 6 in their examination-in-chief as to the rash and negligent driving of the said bus by the accused stood rebutted by him. Under these circumstances, I hold that the Trial Court, as well as the Appellate court, did not commit any error or irregularity in recording their findings that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. 12. As to the sentence imposed on the revision petitioner-accused, Smt. Anuradha Deshpande, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner-accused strongly contended that since there is no material on record to show that this accused had caused any accident in his service as a driver of the KSRTC bus, the Trial Court was not justified in imposing rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence under Section 304A of IPC and therefore, the same deserves to be modified. 13. Per Contra, learned High Court Government Pleader, placing reliance on three decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in, i) State of Karnataka Vs Krishna @ Raju reported in (1987) 1 SCC page 538; ii) Dalbir Singh Vs State of Haryana reported in (2000) 5 SCC page 82; and iii) B. Nagabhussan Vs State of Karnataka reported in (2008) 3 SCC (Crl) page 61 = (2008) 5 SCC 730 . strongly contended that the rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 304A of IPC is the least possible sentence and therefore, the impugned order insofar as it relates to imposing of the said sentence does not call for any interference in this revision. 14. strongly contended that the rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 304A of IPC is the least possible sentence and therefore, the impugned order insofar as it relates to imposing of the said sentence does not call for any interference in this revision. 14. In first of the above said three decisions, i.e., in the case of State of Karnataka Vs Krishna @ Raju reported in (1987) 1 SCC page 538, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed at para Nos.6 and 7 as under: “6. The utter disregard shown by the Magistrate to the nature of the offences, particularly the one under Section 304A, IPC and the sentences provided for them under the Indian Penal Code and the Motor Vehicles Act, by imposing what may be termed as ‘flea-bite’ sentences on the respondent, should have spurred the High Court to not only pass appropriate strictures against the Magistrate but also to set right matters by enhancing the sentence at least for the conviction under Section 304-A, IPC to a conscionable level in exercise of its powers under Section 377, IPC. 7. ………… “Considerations of undue sympathy in such cases will not only lead to miscarriage of justice but will also undermine the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the criminal judicial system. It need be hardly pointed out that the imposition of a sentence of fine of Rs.250 on the driver of a motor vehicle for an offence under Section 304-A, IPC and that too without any extenuating or mitigating circumstance is bound to shock the conscience of anyone and will unmistakably leave the impression that the trial was mockery of justice.” While so observing, the Hon’ble Supreme Court enhanced sentence of fine of Rs.250/-for the offence under Section 304A IPC imposed by the Trial Court, to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing fine of Rs.1,000/-with default sentence of RI for a further period of two months. 15. In second of the said decisions i.e., in the case of Dalbir Singh Vs State of Haryana reported in 2000 (5) SCC page 82, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has observed at para Nos.1, 12 and 13 as under: “1. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. 12. In State of Karnataka Vs Krishna [ (1987) 1 SCC 538 = 1987 SCC (Cri) 198] this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under Section 304-A IPC to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. …………. “A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.” 16. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.” 16. In the third of the said decisions i.e., in the case of B. Nagabhushan Vs State of Karnataka reported in (2008) 3 SCC (Crl) page 61 = (2008) 5 SCC 730 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed its view taken in the case of Dalbir Singh and observed at para No.14 that six months simple imprisonment and a direction to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-for commission of the offence punishable under Section 304-A and simple imprisonment for one month and to pay fine of Rs.500/-for the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC cannot be said to be shocking. 17. In view of the above principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am of the considered opinion that the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months imposed on the revision petitioner by the Trial Court had affirmed by the Appellate Court for the offence under Section 304A of IPC does not call for any interference in this revision. 18. For the reason aforesaid, the present revision petition is dismissed as being devoid of merits. The Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and also the impugned Judgment and order of the Appellate court are hereby confirmed.