Judgment Jasbir Singh, J. 1. This order will dispose of Civil Writ Petitions bearing Nos. 5349 of 1986, 4816,6954,6955,6956, 17720, 17721, 17722 of 1996, 3722, 5417, 14673, 15244 of 1997,3166 of 1998,1220,1911,6428 of 2004, 17930 and 18909 of 2005, 11002, 14110, 15770,15771 and 17915 of 2008, 6777, 7702, 7846 of 2009, COCP No. 190 of 2002 and LPA No. 64 of 2006, as common question of law and facts are involved in these cases. For facility of reference, facts are being mentioned from CWP No. 4816 of 1996. 2. The petitioner Gram Panchayat has filed this writ petition with a prayer to quash notification No. 8-LEG/95 dated 8.5.1995 (P9), vide which, Punjab Act No. 8 of 1995 (in short, Amendment Act of 1995), amending the provisions of Section 2 and 3 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 was notified. 3. The petitioner Gram Panchayat has asserted that in the year 1957, mutation of land measuring 242 kanals 11 marlas was sanctioned in its favour being shamilat deh land. In subsequent jamabandis, the Gram Panchayat continued to be shown as owner of the aforesaid land and the land was being leased out every year to the lessees. Respondent No. 12, on 5.4.1976 allotted 230 kanals 10 marlas of shamilat deh land to respondent No. 7. Thereafter, an attempt was made by respondent No. 8, alleged attorney of respondent No. 7 to take possession of the shamilat deh land on 8.7.1976. The petitioner filed CWP No. 3560 of 1976 to lay challenge to the allotment of shamilat deh land in favour of respondent No. 7. The said writ petition was allowed, allotment in favour of respondent No. 7 was set aside by this Court on 23.8.1985 in terms of the ratio of the judgment dated 9.7.1985 of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh and others, 1985 R.R.R. 249 : (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1394). 4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (in short, the 1961 Act) read with Section 5/7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 for ejectment of respondent No. 7 from the land, in dispute. 4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (in short, the 1961 Act) read with Section 5/7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 for ejectment of respondent No. 7 from the land, in dispute. During pendency of those proceedings, respondent No. 1 passed the impugned Act No. 8 of 1995, which was notified vide notification dated 8.5.1995, effecting amendment in Section 2 and Section 3 of the 1961 Act. Hence, this writ petition. 5. It is apparent from the records that on 24.5.2000, a Division Bench of this Court, by taking note of the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1995, dismissed this writ petition, upholding the allotment made in favour of respondent No. 7 in the year 1976. 6. Perusal of the order mentioned above indicates that no finding was given regarding validity or otherwise of the impugned notification. The petitioner went to the Hon,ble preme Court by filing Civil Appeal No. 4145 of 2001, impugning order passed by this Court on 24.5.2000. The Honble Supreme Court allowed the appeal on 11.2.2008 on the ground that practically, no reason was indicated in the order, with reference to challenge to the Amendment Act of 1995 and the writ petition was dismissed in a summary manner, without adverting to the relief claimed by the petitioner. The order passed by this Court, mentioned above, was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh disposal in accordance with law by passing a reasoned order, particularly with reference to the challenge made in the writ petition to the Amendment Act of 1995. 7. This is how this matter has been put up before this Court. 8. Before proceeding further, to deal with the issue in dispute, it is necessary to refer to the dispute which was under consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra). 7. This is how this matter has been put up before this Court. 8. Before proceeding further, to deal with the issue in dispute, it is necessary to refer to the dispute which was under consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra). In the aforesaid case, the Honble Supreme Court was dealing with a controversy regarding rights of the Gram Panchayat in the shamilat deh land in a village under its jurisdiction and on the other hand right of the Rehabilitation Department of the Central Government to allot land of that description, to the extent of evacuee interest therein, to the person(s) who had migrated from Pakistan to India after the partition of the Country in the year 1947. Before the Honble Supreme Court, it was the contention of the Central Government and the allottees, that the interest in shamilat deh land of Mulsims, who migrated to Pakistan, is evacuee property and the Central Government has a right to allot it under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (in short, 1954 Act). On the other hand, it was the contention of the State of Punjab and the Gram Panchayats within the States of Punjab/Haryana, that by reasons of the Punjab Act, 1953, the interest of all persons whether Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims in shamilat deh land stood extinguished and those lands were placed by the said law under the control and power of respective Gram Panchayats. The Hon,ble Supreme Court held that the Punjab Act of 1953 would prevail in the State of Punjab over the Central Act of 1954, even so far as shamilat deh lands are concerned. It was also held that the State Legislature being a measure of agrarian reform, is conducive to the welfare of the community and there is no reason why that law should not have effect in its full amplitude. 9. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra), the petitioner Gram Panchayat started asserting its rights over the land, which was allotted to respondent No. 7 in the year 1976. It also so happened in the case of other Gram Panchayats, where dispute was raised regarding allotment of land, by the Rehabilitation Department to the migratories from Pakistan, out of the shamilat deh land in the respective villages. It also so happened in the case of other Gram Panchayats, where dispute was raised regarding allotment of land, by the Rehabilitation Department to the migratories from Pakistan, out of the shamilat deh land in the respective villages. Dispute also arose regarding land sold by the Rehabilitation Department as per the provisions of 1954 Act to various persons and also regarding shamilat deh land, which was allowed to be retained by the unauthorized occupants under various policies framed by the State. 10. At that stage, the State of Punjab passed the impugned Act i.e. Amendment Act of 1995. 11. Before looking into validity of the Act, mentioned above, it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions of the 1961 Act. Section 2 contains the definitions. Clause (g) defines shamilat deh land as under :- "(g) "Shamilat deh" includes - (1) lands described in the revenue records as shamilat deh excluding abadi deh; (2) shamilat tikkas, (3) lands described in the revenue records as shamilat, Tarafs, Pattis, Pannas and Tholas and used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; (4) lands used or reserved for the benefit of the village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, school, drinking wells, or ponds within abadi deh or gorah deh; and (5) lands in any village described as banjar qadim and used for common purposes of the village, according to revenue records; but does not includes land which - (i) omitted (ii) has been allotted on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person; (ii-a) was shamilat deh, but, has been allotted on quasipermanent basis to a displaced person, or, has been otherwise transferred to any person by sale or by any other manner whatsoever after the commencement of this Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985. (emphasis supplied) (iii) has been partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual landholders before the 26th January, 1950; (iv) having been acquired before the 26th January, 1950, by a person by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the shamilat deh and is so recorded in the Jamabandi or is supported by a valid deed and is not in excess of the share of the co-sharer in the shamilat deh. (v) is described in the revenue records as Shamilat, Taraf, Pattis, Pannas, and Thola and not used; according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; (vi) lies outside the abadi deh and was being used as gitwar, bara, manure pit, house or . for cottage industry, immediately before the commencement of this Act. (vii) omitted (viii) was shamilat deh, was assessed to land revenue and has been in the individual cultivating possession of co-sharers not being in excess of their respective sharers in such shamilat deh on or before the 26th January, 1950; or (ix) was being used as a place of worship of for purposes, subservient thereto, immediately before the commencement of this Act; Clause (h) defines shamilat law as under :- (h) "shamilat law" means (i) in relation to land situated in the territory which immediately before the 1st November, 1956, was comprised in State of Punjab, the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953; or (ii) in relation to land situated in territory which immediately before the 1st November, 1956 was comprised in State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union; the Pepsu Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954" Section 3 defines the Lands to which provisions of the 1961 Act shall be applicable. Section 3 of the 1961 Act mandates that the Act shall apply to all lands which are shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of Section 2. Provisions of Section 3 read as under :- "3. Lands to which this Act applies.- (l) This act shall apply and before the commencement of this Act the Shamilat Law shall be deemed always to have applied to all lands which are shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of section 2. 2. Provisions of Section 3 read as under :- "3. Lands to which this Act applies.- (l) This act shall apply and before the commencement of this Act the Shamilat Law shall be deemed always to have applied to all lands which are shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of section 2. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 4.- (i) where any land has vested in a Panchayat under the shamilat law, but such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under clause (g) of section 2 other than the land so excluded under sub-clause (ii-a) of that clause, all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land as from the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995, shall cease and all such rights, title and interest shall vest in the person or persons in whom they were vested, immediately before the commencement of the shamilat law; (ii) where any land has vested in a Panchayat under this act, but such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under sub-clause (ii-a) of clause(g) of section 2, all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land, as from the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995, shall, cease, and all such rights, title and interest shall o n or before the 9th day of July, 1985, revest in the person or persons to whom the land so excluded has been allotted or otherwise transferred by sale or by any other manner whatsoever, subject to the condition that- (a) any sum of money realised by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab gs a result of allotment or transfer of such land shall alongwith interest at the rate of three per cent payable from the date of such allotment or transfer, or (b) where no money was realizable by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab as a result of allotment or transfer of such land, the amount of compensation in respect of such land as determined by the Collector of the District in which such a land is situated along with interest at the rate of three per cent payable from the date of allotment or transfer, as the case may be; shall be paid by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab to the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats for onward disbursement to the Panchayat to which such shamilat deh belonged. (emphasis supplied) (3) As soon as may be, on the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995 the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats shall make a reference to the Collector of the District to determine the amount of compensation under sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) of sub-section (2) and the Collector of the District shall, keeping in view the market value of the shamilat deh at the time it was allotted or transferred determine the amount of compensation." Note : Underlined provisions were added vide the Amendment Act of 1995 12. Section 4 of the 1961 Act deals with rights of the Panchayats and non- proprietors with regard to the lands described under that provision. Section 5 lays down the norms regarding regulation of use and occupation of land vested or deemed to have been vested in the Gram Panchayat. Section 7 deals with power of the Gram Panchayat to take possession of the shamilat deh land. Section 10-A deals with power of the Collector to cancel or vary leases etc. of the land vested in the Gram Panchayats. Section 11 of the 1961 Act lays down the procedure regarding decision on claims, right, title or interest in shamilat deh land. 13. It appears that the State of Punjab, with a view to curtail litigation, which would have arisen on account of cancellation of the allotments of shamilat deh land made to the migratories and sale of that land under various policies of the State Government, enacted the Amendment Act of 1995 and added clause (ii-a) in clause (g) of Section 2 of the 1961Act defining shamilat deh land and also substituted sub-section 2 in Section 3 of the Act wherein it was provided that the land which has been excluded from operation of clause (g) of Section (2) of the 1961 Act, other than so excluded under sub clause (ii-a) of that clause, all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land from the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1995, shall cease and all such rights, title and interest shall vest in the person or persons in whom they were vested immediately before commencement of the shamilat law. 14. It was further provided that shamilat deh land excluded from the ownership of the Gram Panchayat under sub clause (ii-a) of clause (g) of Section 2, rights etc. 14. It was further provided that shamilat deh land excluded from the ownership of the Gram Panchayat under sub clause (ii-a) of clause (g) of Section 2, rights etc. of the Gram Panchayat shall come to an end from the date of commencement of Amendment Act of 1995 and shall re-vest in the person or persons to whom the land, so excluded, was allotted or otherwise transferred by sale or any other manner whatsoever on or before 9th of July 1985 i.e. the date when judgment was pronounced by the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra). Exclusion was subject to some conditions contained therein. 15. Mr. Sharma, learned senior Advocate, counsel for the petitioner has laid challenge to the Amendment Act of 1995 primarily on the following grounds :- (a) that the Amendment Act of 1995 was bad for want of consent of the President, (b) that the State Legislature was not competent to nullify effect of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) by passing Act No. 8 of 1995, (c) that to give retrospective effect to Act No. 8 of 1995 was not within the legislative competence of the State Legislature and (d) that Act No. 8 of 1995 being repugnant to the provisions of Section 8 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (in short 1950 Act) cannot be sustained. 16. So far as point (a) is concerned, the same was not raised in the writ petition, however, we allowed Mr. Sharma to raise the same at the time of arguments. 17. It is the contention of Mr. Sharma that the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953, the subsequent amendments made therein and the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, were all notified after getting assent of the President of India, whereas Act No. 8 of 1995 was notified on assent received from the Governor of State of Punjab. To strengthen his argument, he has submitted that custody management and disposal of property, declared by law to be evacuee property, would fall in list III (concurrent list) of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India and as per provisions of Sub-clause 2 of Article 254, it was mandatory for the State of Punjab to reserve Amendment Act of 1995 for consideration of the President. He further argued that the State Legislature is not competent to take away rights of the petitioner, which were conferred upon it by judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) and further that State Legislature was not empowered to give retrospective effect to the Amendment Act of 1995 w.e.f. 9.7.1985, to negate the effect of the aforesaid judgment. He further urged that the Amendment Act of 1995 is repugnant to the provisions of Section 8 of the 1950 Act, which provides that evacuee property, declared under Section 7 of that Act, shall be deemed to have been vested in the custodian for the State. 18. Mr. P.N. Aggarwal, Advocate, who has put in appearance in connected CWP No. 17722 of 1996 has also assailed the impugned notification on similar grounds, as agitated by Mr. Sharma and has supported the arguments raised by Mr. Sharma to lay challenge to the impugned notification by stating that the shamilat deh land, under any circumstances, cannot be alienated and allotted to the migratories from Pakistan and others, further by stating that the amendment under challenge, was a colorable exercise of jurisdiction, which he argued cannot be sustained. He also argued that once the custodian has no interest in the property in dispute, the sale etc. made by the custodian cannot be validated by the provisions of Amendment Act of 1995. 19. It is necessary to mention here that in connected CWP No. 3722 of 1997, Gram Panchayat Chhoti Kohri district Amabla v. State of Haryana, exactly, similar amendment made by the State of Haryana in clause (g) of section 2 and Section 3 of the 1961 Act, i.e. Haryana Act No. 13 of 1996 is under challenge. Vide that amendment the State of Haryana has added sub-clause (ii-a) in clause (g) of Section 2 and has substituted sub-section 2 of Section 3 of the 1961 Act. 20. Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, Advocate and others who have put in appearance in the connected cases have virtually adopted the arguments raised by Mr. Sharma and Mr. Aggarwal to lay challenge to the Haryana amendment. 21. Arguments raised as above, were vehemently controverted by Mr. H.S. Sidhu, Additional Advocate General, Punjab. He argued that once consent has been given to the Principal Act i.e. 1961 Act by the President for sub-sequent amendments, consent of the President is not necessary. Sharma and Mr. Aggarwal to lay challenge to the Haryana amendment. 21. Arguments raised as above, were vehemently controverted by Mr. H.S. Sidhu, Additional Advocate General, Punjab. He argued that once consent has been given to the Principal Act i.e. 1961 Act by the President for sub-sequent amendments, consent of the President is not necessary. He also argued that as per ratio of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra), the evacuee shamilat deh land shall not vest in the custodian, rather it will vest in the Gram Panchayat. If that is so, there was no necessity to get assent of the President to the Amendment Act of 1995 in terms of Article 254 and the Entry No. 41 of List III (concurrent list) of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. He further argued that the State Legislature is competent to enact law retrospectively as well as prospectively and to take away effect of any judgment, by fundamentally amending the law on the basis of which judgment was passed. By making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of the 1950 Act and the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1995, he argued that provisions of Amendment Act of 1995 are not repugnant to the aforesaid provisions. Both operate in different fields. He also brought it to our notice that such discussion will only be an academic one, because in the year 2005, the 1950 Act was repealed by the Central Legislature. He also asserted that the Gram Panchayat is claiming ownership under a Statute and as such, it cannot claim any protection under Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution of India. To support his contention he has placed reliance upon judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2254 and in State of Haryana and others v. The Karnal Co-op Farmers Society Limited, etc., 1993(2) R.R.R. 122 : AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1. He further argued that vide the impugned amendment, only that portion of the shamilat deh land has been taken away from the petitioner, which stood already allotted in the year 1976. He further argued that vide the impugned amendment, only that portion of the shamilat deh land has been taken away from the petitioner, which stood already allotted in the year 1976. It serves the public cause because if allotments were quashed at this stage, the migratories from Pakistan, who came to this part of the country in 1947, will further suffer and under the given circumstances, no land for allotment will be available for them. He further argued that the Amendment Act of 1995 would also decrease litigation. He prayed that the writ petition, having no substance, be dismissed. 22. Mr. L.N. Verma, who has put in appearance in CWP No. 5349 of 1986, supported arguments raised by Mr. Sidhu. He has also placed reliance 13 Civil Writ Petition No. 4816 of 1996 upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. and others v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2310 to state that the retrospective effect can be given to an Act by the Legislature. 23. Mr. M.L. Sareen, learned Senior Advocate in CWP No. 3722 of 1997 also argued on the same lines, as urged by Mr. Sidhu. 24. Mr. J.S. Vasu, learned Senior Advocate has controverted the argument raised by Mr. Sharma regarding non-obtaining the consent of the President to the Amendment Act of 1995 on the ground that this plea was not taken in the writ petition. He further argued that object of the amendment was to give relief to those, who had suffered during partition of the country and to whom lands were allotted out of the shamilat deh land decades earlier. He further brought it to the notice of the Court that in the original Act i.e. 1953 Act and in the Principal Act, i.e. 1961 Act, as per subclause (ii) of clause (g) of Section 2, land which stood allotted on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons was excluded from definition of the shamilat deh land. It is his argument that by adding clause (ii-a) only wider effect has been given to the provisions already existing. Once, nothing new has been added in 1961 Act, then there was no necessity for obtaining any assent of the President. To support this plea, he has placed reliance upon judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Syed Ahmed Aga etc. Once, nothing new has been added in 1961 Act, then there was no necessity for obtaining any assent of the President. To support this plea, he has placed reliance upon judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Syed Ahmed Aga etc. v. The State of Mysore and another etc., (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1443) and in Mohammed Abdul Khader v. Govt. OfA.P. and others, (AIR 1985 A.P. 217). He further argued that the State legislature has the powers to enact validation laws and to take away the fundamental basis upon which the judgment has been pronounced by the Court. The same has been done in the present case. Very basis on which the judgment was delivered by the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) was taken away by the Amendment Act of 1995. He prayed that the writ petition, having no substance, be dismissed. 25. Before proceeding further, it is necessary for us to set out the provisions of Article 254 and Entry No. 41 in List III (concurrent list) of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India, which read as under :- 254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States. - (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State : Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Entry No. 41 in List III (concurrent list) of 7th Schedule. "Custody, management and disposal of property (including agricultural land) declared by law to be evacuee property." 26. After hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the view that argument of Mr. Sharma that for want of Presidents assent, the Amendment Act of 1995 is liable to be quashed, can not be upheld. To support his contention Mr. Sharma has made reference to the assent given by the Hon,ble President of the country to the 1953 Act, subsequent amendments added therein and also assent given by the President to the 1961 Act. 27. Perusal of the judgment passed by the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) is indicative of the fact that the assent to those Acts were sought only with a view to overcome the restrictions imposed by Articles 30 and 31-A of the Constitution of India and not for any other purpose. As per established law, once assent by the President has been given to the Principal Act, any amendment thereafter/therein, unless it alters the fundamental basis of the Principal Act, does not need assent of the President. 28. Mr. Wasu has brought it to our notice that as per sub-clause (ii) of clause (g) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act, the part of shamilat deh land allotted on quasi permanent basis to a displaced person was excluded from definition of shamilat deh land. The said provision reads thus :- "(g) "Shamilat deh" includes - (1) to (5) xxx xxx xxx but does not includes land which- (i) xxxx (ii) has been allotted on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person" 29. The said provision reads thus :- "(g) "Shamilat deh" includes - (1) to (5) xxx xxx xxx but does not includes land which- (i) xxxx (ii) has been allotted on quasi-permanent basis to a displaced person" 29. On reading of the said provision, it becomes amply clear that in the 1961 Act, there was a provision to exclude such land out of the purview of the shamilat deh land, which has been allotted to the displaced persons on a quasi permanent basis. Perusal of sub-clause (ii-a), which was added by the Amendment Act of 1995 is also indicative of similar exclusion from shamilat deh land. The exclusion has been made somewhat wider. If that is so, it can be held that in the 1961 Act, to which assent of the President was obtained, there existed a provision to exclude land from the purview of the shamilat deh land which was allotted to a displaced person. By adding subclause (ii-a), exclusion added by sub-clause (ii) has been made somewhat illustrative. The added provisions do not fundamentally alter any provision of the 1961 Act. As such, it cannot be said that for the same, assent of the President was needed. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohammed Abdul Khader v. Govt Of A.P. and others, (AIR 1985 Andhra Pradesh 217), was dealing with a similar situation. After analyzing the provisions of Articles 168,246 and Entry 5 in List II of the Constitution of India, it was held that the State Legislature was competent to enact law and it was not necessary to get asset of the President because the same had already been given to the Principal Act. It was observed as under :- "A conjoint reading of Arts. 168 and 246 together with item 5 in List II gives no scope for doubt that the Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh is competent to make law in respect of matters enumerated in item 5 of State List which includes the constitution and powers of the Municipal Corporations. Thus it is within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to enact Act No. 13 of 1983. When the Bill was passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature and the same was presented to the Governor he accorded his assent to the Bill and thereby Act No. 13 of 1983 became law. Thus it is within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to enact Act No. 13 of 1983. When the Bill was passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature and the same was presented to the Governor he accorded his assent to the Bill and thereby Act No. 13 of 1983 became law. No provision in the Constitution is brought to our notice to countenance the argument that once the Principal Act received the assent of the President, every Bill seeking amendment of the parent Act should be reserved by the Governor for consideration and assent of the President." The principle of law laid down by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court thus negates the judgment cited to the contrary by the counsel for the opposite party and we are in respectful agreement with the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 30. To the same effect is the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Ahmed Aga etc. v. The State of Mysore and another etc., AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1443. There also amendment in the Principal Act was challenged on the ground that like the earlier Act, the latter does not contain assent of the President. The Honble Supreme Court held that when the "Principal Act had sanction of the President and enables the orders to be passed which had the force of law enabling restrictions to be imposed by rules covered by the purposes of the Act. The amendment only varied the form of restrictiveness without appreciably adding to its content. The amendments did not go beyond a regulation which was fully authorized by the language of the provisions of the Principal Act. Even any additional licensing involved did not go beyond the purview of the provisions of the principal Act and the rules framed thereunder. The mere change in form, from statutory rules to statutory provisions, could hardly constitute even additional regulation. It is only an additional restriction from the special point of view of Article 304(b) which requires Presidential Sanction." 31. In the present case also, as has been discussed earlier, the provision to exclude land allotted on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons from shamilat deh land exists in the Principal Act. Only scope of that provision has been enlarged by adding sub-clause (ii-a) of the Amendment Act of 1995. 32. In the present case also, as has been discussed earlier, the provision to exclude land allotted on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons from shamilat deh land exists in the Principal Act. Only scope of that provision has been enlarged by adding sub-clause (ii-a) of the Amendment Act of 1995. 32. Otherwise also, we feel that once the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) has held that the 1961 Act shall prevail over the provisions of 1950 Act, in so far as shamilat deh land is concerned, thereafter, there is no question of putting the Amendment Act of 1995 for consideration of the President, as envisaged in Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we reject argument (a) raised by counsel for the petitioner. 33. Mr. Sharma primarily has laid stress upon his argument that the State Legislature was not competent to nullify the effect of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra) and to give retrospective effect to Act No. 8 of 1995, which is under challenge. By making reference to earlier litigation between the parties, he argued that a valuable right has accrued to the petitioner. The petitioner filed CWP No. 3560 of 1976 in this Court, laying challenge to allotment of land, out of the shamilat deh land to respondent No. 7. That writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.8.1985. The said order has become final. As such, by the Amendment Act 1995, accrued valuable right cannot be taken away from the petitioner, that too, by giving retrospective effect to the said provision w.e.f. 9.7.1985. The prayer is to quash the Amendment Act of 1995. 34. Mr. Sidhu and other Advocates who have put in appearance for the respondents vehemently argued that the State Legislature has the power to pass validation Act to take away the fundamental basis upon which any judgment or decree may have been passed. He further argued that the State Legislature is competent to give retrospective or prospective effect to any statute/provision. 35. After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court feels that arguments (b) and (c) raised by Mr. Sharma are liable to be rejected. 36. He further argued that the State Legislature is competent to give retrospective or prospective effect to any statute/provision. 35. After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court feels that arguments (b) and (c) raised by Mr. Sharma are liable to be rejected. 36. As per established law, the Legislature has the power to pass an enactment giving it retrospective operation" with a view to remove the defect which the Court had found in the previous law. It is only to be seen that any provision made by the Legislature is consistent with the provision of Part III of the Constitution of India. (Refer to AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2254). A similar controversy came up before the Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others v. The Karnal Co-op. Farmers Society Limited, etc. etc., AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1. In that case also, exactly similar proposition was before the Honble Supreme Court. Many right holders had got decrees passed regarding shamilat deh land in their favour. The State of Haryana, with a view to negate those judgments and decrees, incorporated an amendment in the provisions of the 1961 Act. The matter went before the Honble Supreme Court and to resolve the controversy, it was held as under :- 26. Haryana State Legislature had the competence to legislate on the subject of common lands in villages, that is, land or immovable property in shamilat dehof the village was not under challenge. Haryana State Legislature could have, in exercise of its ancillary amending power, legislated on the subject of shamilat deh, retrospectively was also not under challenge. Haryana State Legislature had the competence to legislate on the subject of common lands in villages, that is, land or immovable property in shamilat dehof the village was not under challenge. Haryana State Legislature could have, in exercise of its ancillary amending power, legislated on the subject of shamilat deh, retrospectively was also not under challenge. What was under challenge before the High Court was the Haryana State Legislatures power to abrogate the civil courts decrees and orders granted in favour of certain persons after the coming into force of the principal Act from 4th May, 1961, to the effect that several lands and immovable properties in villages formerly regarded as shamilat deh, were excluded from shamilat dehunder the principal Act and that they being in possession or enjoyment of them were their absolute owners, by making a mere declaration under the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981 that such civil courts decrees or orders could be disregarded or disobeyed as nullities by the Assistant Collector of First Grade while deciding claims under section 7 and new section 13 A of the principal Act that those lands or immovable property were shamilat deh of the village. 27. Under our Constitution no Legislature has the power to abrogate civil courts decrees or orders or judicial adjudications by merely declaring under a law made by it that such decrees or orders or adjudications are no longer valid or binding on the parties, for such power of declaration Would be a judicial function which cannot be encroached upon by a Legislature and the only way by which a competent Legislature can make the judicial adjudications, decrees or orders ineffective is by fundamentally altering the law on which they are based, is well-settled. (Emphasis supplied) 28. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [1970] 1 SCR 388, a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the constitutionality of the Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963, which had validated the imposition of tax declared to be illegal by Courts, and held thus : "Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind, for that is (it) tantamount(s) to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not possess or exercise. A court s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. 31. Thus, it becomes clear that a Legislature while has the legislative power to render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions, by removing or altering or neutralising the legal basis in the unamended law on which such decisions were founded, even retrospectively, it does not have the power to render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions by making a law which simply declares the earlier judicial decisions as invalid or not binding for such power if exercised would not be a legislative power but a judicial power which cannot be encroached upon by a Legislature under our Constitution." (Emphasis supplied) 37. In the afore-said case, retrospective operation of the amendment did not find favour with the Honble Supreme Court on the ground that it has simply nullified the judgment and decree without altering fundamentals, on the basis of which those judgments and decrees were passed. 38. On the contrary, in the present case, by amendment, the very fundamental basis to exclude land from the definition of shamilat deh land has been altered, based on which, some orders may have been passed in favour of the petitioner Gram Panchayat. The very definition of the shamilat deh has been altered. Otherwise also, the Gram Panchayat being a statutory body and a creature of the statute and having interest in the land only under the statute, is not competent to lay challenge to the amendment Act as has been done in the present case. 39. To the same effect is the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in The Govt. of A.P. and another v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2037. In that case, it was held as under :- "8. We see no substance in the respondents contention that by redefining the term house with retrospective effect and by validating the levies imposed under the unamended Act as if, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of any court, that Act as amended was in force on the. date when the tax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon a judicial, function. date when the tax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon a judicial, function. The power of the Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively, the one no less than the other. Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitations, the power of the Legislature to enact laws is plenary. 9. The State legislature, it is significant, has not overruled or set aside the judgment Of the High Court. It has amended the definition of house by the substitution of anew section 2(15) for the old section and it has provided that the new definition shall have retrospective effect, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority. In other words, it has removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court so that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. 10. In Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. (2), the Legislature amended the law retrospectively and thereby removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court of Allahabad. It was held by this Court that this was within the permissible limits a nd validation of the old Act by amending it retrospectively d id not constitute an encroachment on the functions of the judiciary. (emphasis supplied) 40. The Honble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar controversy in M/s. Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd.s case (supra), regarding competency of the legislature to pass Act retrospectively/prospectively, observed as under :- "14. The next question to be considered is whether the State while purporting to amend the Act has encroached upon the judicial power and set aside the binding judgment of this Court. We do not think that Mr. Nariman was justified in contending so. The principles have been well established in a string of decisions of this Court, and we may briefly summarise as follows: The legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law. There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law. There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. That of course, is subject to the legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitation. The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well known pattern of all validating acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be considered as encroachment on judicial power. The legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision. Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer 1972 R.C.R.(Rent) 508 : (1973) 1 SCR 515: (AIR 1972 SC 2205), Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. 1975 Suppl. SCR 394 : (AIR 1975 SC 2037), I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCR 237 : (AIR 1976 SC 2250) and Misri Lal Jain v. State of Orissa (1977) 3 SCR 714: (AIR 1977 SC 1686)." 41. So far as the last argument (d) of Mr. Sharma that there exists repugnancy between Section 8 of the 1950 Act and the provisions of Amendment Act of 1995 is concerned, no relief can be given to the petitioner on that score also. In Gram Panchayat of village Jamalpurs case (supra), this question was specifically dealt with by the Honble Supreme Court. Provisions of Section 8 of 1950 Act and the provisions of 1961 Act were considered and ultimately, it was opined as under :- "13. This situation creates a conundrum. The Central Act of 1950 prevails over the Punjab Act of 1953 by virtue of Article 254(1) of the Constitution read with Entry No. 41 of the Concurrent List; and, Article 254(2) cannot afford assistance to reverse that position since the Presidents assent, which was obtained for a specific purpose, can not be utilised for according priority to the Punjab Act. Though the law made by the Parliament prevails over the law made by the State Legislature, the interest of the evacuees in the Shamlat-deh lands cannot be dealt with effectively by the Custodian under the Central Act, because of the peculiar incidents and characteristics of such lands. Though the law made by the Parliament prevails over the law made by the State Legislature, the interest of the evacuees in the Shamlat-deh lands cannot be dealt with effectively by the Custodian under the Central Act, because of the peculiar incidents and characteristics of such lands. The unfortunate result is that the vesting in the Custodian of the evacuee interest in the Shamlat-deh lands is, more or less, an empty formality. It does not help the Custodian to implement the provisions of the Central law but, it excludes the benign operation of the State law. 14. The line of reasoning of our learned Brother, Chinnappa Reddy, J. affords a satisfactory solution to this constitutional impasse, which we adopt without reservation of any kind. The pith and substance of the Punjab Act of 1953 is Land which falls under Entry No. 18 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. That Entry reads thus : "Entry No. 18 - Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." Our learned Brother has extracted a passage from a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1965] 1 S.C.R. 1982, which took the view that since, the Punjab Act of 1953 is a measure of agrarian reform it would receive the protection of Article 31-A. It may be recalled that the Act had received the assent of the President as required by the first proviso to that Article. The power of the State Legislature to pass law on matters enumerated in the State List is exclusive by reason of the provision contained in Article 246(3). In a nutshell, the position is that the Parliament has passed a law on a matter which falls under Entry No. 41 of the Concurrent List, while the State Legislature has passed a law which falls under Entry No. 18 of the State List. The law passed by the State Legislature being a measure of agrarian reform, is conducive to the welfare of the community and there is no reason why that law should not have effect in its full amplitude. The law passed by the State Legislature being a measure of agrarian reform, is conducive to the welfare of the community and there is no reason why that law should not have effect in its full amplitude. By this process, the village panchayats will be able to meet the needs of the village community and secure its welfare. Accordingly, the Punjab Act of 1953 would prevail in the State of Punjab over the Central Act of 1950, even in so far as Shamlat-deh lands are concerned." 42. Once, it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court that the State Legislature was competent to pass the Principal Act and the shamilat deh land would fall within the purview of 1961 Act, and it will not be subject matter of Section 8 of the 1950 Act, this Court to Rs. 19,70,250/-. The increased amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition to the date of payment. The parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.